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Abstract	  	   Piety	  Projects:	  Islamic	  Schools	  for	  Indonesia’s	  Urban	  Middle	  Class	  Karen	  Bryner	  	  This	  dissertation	  examines	  two	  piety	  projects	  competing	  for	  control	  over	  popular	  conceptualizations	  of	  piety	  and	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  good	  Muslim,	  as	  presented	  by	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  Islamic	  Primary	  School	  and	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  Integrated	  Islamic	  Primary	  School	  in	  Jogjakarta,	  Indonesia.	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  promotes	  an	  Indonesian	  Islam,	  pluralistic	  and	  inclusive	  of	  multi-­‐tradition	  approaches	  to	  Islam	  that	  is	  flexible	  in	  regards	  to	  acceptable	  forms	  of	  worship.	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  promotes	  a	  transnational	  Islam,	  inspired	  by	  the	  Egyptian	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  and	  linked	  to	  the	  Indonesian	  Islamic	  political	  party,	  Prosperous	  Justice	  Party	  (Partai	  Keadilan	  Sejatera,	  PKS).	  The	  school’s	  purificationist	  approach	  pushes	  for	  the	  removal	  of	  local	  customs	  and	  traditions	  from	  mainstream	  Islam	  and	  promotes	  exacting	  observance	  of	  standardized	  practices.	  These	  two	  schools’	  disparate	  approaches	  to	  Islam	  are	  emblematic	  of	  the	  larger	  polarizing	  trends	  in	  approaching	  Islam	  in	  Indonesia	  today.	  	  This	  dissertation	  has	  particular	  significance	  for	  understanding	  the	  intersection	  of	  Islamic	  movements,	  Islamic	  education,	  and	  the	  religious	  middle	  class.	  Based	  on	  15	  months	  of	  ethnographic	  research,	  this	  dissertation	  demonstrates	  how	  schooling	  can	  be	  a	  tool	  for	  shaping	  socio-­‐religious	  and	  political	  climates	  of	  a	  community	  and	  country.	  It	  adds	  to	  the	  growing	  literature	  on	  the	  educational	  spaces	  developing	  alongside	  Islamic	  piety	  movements	  throughout	  the	  Muslim	  world.	  Additionally,	  this	  dissertation	  provides	  a	  rare	  example	  of	  the	  influence	  on	  Egyptian	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  ideologies	  on	  education,	  rather	  
	  
than	  politics.	  It	  also	  illustrates	  how	  the	  schools’	  disparate	  approaches	  to	  Islam	  shape	  distinct	  religious	  subjectivities	  within	  their	  students.	  The	  documentation	  of	  the	  innovation	  of	  the	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  school	  model	  and	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology	  employed	  by	  both	  schools	  adds	  to	  the	  rich	  history	  of	  Indonesia’s	  Islamic	  schooling	  traditions.	  Finally,	  this	  dissertation	  demonstrates	  how	  middle	  class	  parents’	  classed	  aspirations	  and	  anxieties	  regarding	  education,	  wealth,	  morality,	  and	  corruption	  coalesce	  to	  create	  ready	  consumers	  for	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  Islamic	  school:	  one	  that	  provides	  a	  longer	  school	  day,	  strong	  academics,	  and	  a	  robust	  religious	  curriculum	  focused	  on	  Islamic	  morals	  and	  values.
	  i	  
	  
Table	  of	  Contents	  
Acknowledgements	  ................................................................................................................	  iv	  
Glossary	  and	  Abbreviations	  ...............................................................................................	  vii	  
Chapter	  1.	  Introduction	  .........................................................................................................	  1	  A	  Cacophony	  of	  Islamic	  Activity	  in	  Indonesia	  ...........................................................................	  3	  Islam,	  the	  State,	  and	  Religious	  Education	  ...................................................................................	  9	  Religion	  and	  the	  state	  .....................................................................................................................	  9	  Islamic	  education	  and	  the	  state	  ...............................................................................................	  11	  Extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  Schools	  .................................................................................................	  15	  Conceptual	  Framework:	  Piety	  Projects	  ....................................................................................	  22	  Research	  Setting	  and	  Methodology	  ............................................................................................	  29	  Organization	  of	  Dissertation	  .........................................................................................................	  31	  
Chapter	  2.	  The	  Politics	  of	  Religion:	  Indonesian	  Versus	  Transnational	  Islam	  ..	  36	  Points	  of	  Difference	  Between	  NU,	  Muhammadiyah,	  and	  PKS	  .........................................	  38	  Politics	  and	  secularism	  ...............................................................................................................	  39	  Qur’anic	  interpretation	  and	  bid’ah	  ........................................................................................	  42	  Are	  you	  Indonesian	  enough?	  ....................................................................................................	  45	  Friction	  Points	  between	  NU,	  Muhammadiyah,	  and	  PKS	  ....................................................	  48	  A	  Glimpse	  into	  Jogja’s	  Educational	  Battlefield	  .......................................................................	  54	  Muhammadiyah	  .............................................................................................................................	  55	  Nahdlatul	  Ulama	  ............................................................................................................................	  56	  Non-­‐JSIT	  integrated	  Islamic	  schools	  .....................................................................................	  60	  Hidayatullah	  ....................................................................................................................................	  63	  Conclusion	  .............................................................................................................................................	  64	  
Chapter	  	  3.	  A	  Flexible	  Islam,	  the	  Glue	  of	  the	  Nation:	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  Islamic	  
Primary	  School	  ......................................................................................................................	  66	  The	  Al	  Azhar	  Franchise	  ....................................................................................................................	  68	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  ............................................................................................................................................	  72	  The	  Universal	  in	  Flexible	  Islam	  ....................................................................................................	  78	  Qur’an-­‐	  and	  Hadith-­‐based	  beliefs	  ...........................................................................................	  78	  Inclusivity	  .........................................................................................................................................	  82	  Pluralism	  ...........................................................................................................................................	  84	  Flexible	  Islam	  and	  the	  Middle	  Class:	  An	  Easy	  Fit	  .................................................................	  88	  Conclusion	  .............................................................................................................................................	  91	  
	  
	  ii	  
Chapter	  4.	  Exacting	  Islam,	  Benefiting	  Humanity	  as	  a	  Whole:	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  
Integrated	  Islamic	  Primary	  School	  .................................................................................	  98	  JSIT’s	  Roots	  in	  the	  Egyptian	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  and	  Politics	  ..................................	  101	  Network	  of	  Integrated	  Islamic	  Schools	  (JSIT)	  ....................................................................	  105	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  Integrated	  Islamic	  Primary	  School	  ....................................................	  111	  The	  Universal	  in	  Exacting	  Islam	  ...............................................................................................	  116	  Qur’an-­‐	  and	  Hadith-­‐based	  beliefs	  ........................................................................................	  118	  Standardized	  practices	  ............................................................................................................	  120	  Exacting	  adherence	  ...................................................................................................................	  122	  The	  Paradox	  of	  Universal	  and	  Exacting	  Islam	  ....................................................................	  128	  Conclusion	  ..........................................................................................................................................	  137	  
Chapter	  5.	  Students’	  Trajectories	  in	  Religious	  Subjectivities	  ..............................	  140	  Methods	  ...............................................................................................................................................	  142	  Secondary	  school	  preference	  ................................................................................................	  144	  Professional	  goals	  ......................................................................................................................	  149	  Conceptualization	  of	  a	  good	  Muslim	  ..................................................................................	  152	  Moral	  subjectivity	  ......................................................................................................................	  156	  Conclusion	  ..........................................................................................................................................	  167	  
Chapter	  6.	  Intelligence,	  Piety,	  and	  Citizenship	  .........................................................	  175	  Moral	  Character	  as	  Piety	  ..............................................................................................................	  179	  The	  Ideology	  of	  Integrated	  Islam	  .............................................................................................	  183	  Desegregation	  of	  secular	  and	  religious	  knowledge	  in	  the	  classroom	  .................	  188	  Qur’an-­‐based	  epistemology	  ...................................................................................................	  189	  Consciousness	  of	  God	  ...............................................................................................................	  192	  Visions	  of	  a	  National	  Piety	  Project	  ...........................................................................................	  194	  Conclusion	  ..........................................................................................................................................	  205	  
Chapter	  7.	  Middle	  Class	  Morality:	  Parents	  and	  School	  Selection	  ........................	  209	  Middle	  Class	  Anxiety	  with	  Wealth	  and	  Morality	  ................................................................	  211	  The	  Profile	  of	  Middle-­‐class	  Parents	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  and	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT….217	  Reasons	  or	  School	  Selection	  .......................................................................................................	  221	  Academic	  quality	  ........................................................................................................................	  222	  A	  solid	  moral	  foundation	  ........................................................................................................	  223	  Teaching	  methods	  and	  teachers	  ..........................................................................................	  228	  Extended-­‐day	  schools	  as	  “one-­‐stop	  shopping”	  ..............................................................	  230	  Parental	  Learning,	  Re-­‐teaching,	  and	  Risks	  ...........................................................................	  235	  Conclusion	  ..........................................................................................................................................	  243	  
Chapter	  8.	  Conclusion	  .......................................................................................................	  248	  
Bibliography	  .........................................................................................................................	  255	  
	  iii	  
	  
Table	  of	  Figures	  Figure	  1.	  Map	  of	  Islamic	  Educational	  Institutions	  in	  Indonesia,	  Primary	  and	  Secondary	  School	  ..........................................................................................................................	  35	  Figure	  2.	  Luqman	  SIT	  6th-­‐Graders’	  Junior	  High	  School	  Preference,	  by	  Type	  ............	  145	  Figure	  3.	  Luqman	  SIT	  4th-­‐Graders’	  Junior	  High	  School	  Preference,	  by	  Type	  ............	  147	  Figure	  4.	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  4th-­‐Graders’	  Junior	  High	  School	  Preference,	  by	  Type	  .............	  147	  Figure	  5.	  Distribution	  of	  Student	  Responses	  Regarding	  of	  Categories	  of	  Conceptualizations	  of	  a	  Good	  Muslim,	  by	  School	  .........................................................	  153	  Figure	  6.	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  Student	  Response	  Distribution	  of	  Categories	  of	  Conceptualizations	  of	  a	  Good	  Muslim	  ...............................................................................	  154	  Figure	  7.	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  Student	  Response	  Distribution	  of	  Categories	  of	  Conceptualizations	  of	  a	  Good	  Muslim	  ...............................................................................	  154	  Figure	  8.	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  Student	  Response	  Distribution	  as	  Outward	  Performance	  and	  Inner	  Character	  ...........................................................................................................................	  155	  Figure	  9.	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  Student	  Response	  Distribution	  as	  Outward	  Performance	  and	  Inner	  Character	  ......................................................................................	  155	  Figure	  10.	  	  Percentage	  of	  Students	  who	  Disagreed	  With	  a	  Woman	  Leaving	  Her	  House	  Unveiled,	  by	  Gender	  and	  School	  ..........................................................................................	  157	  Figure	  11.	  Percentage	  of	  Students	  who	  Disagreed	  With	  a	  Woman	  Leaving	  Her	  House	  Unveiled,	  by	  Gender	  Within	  School	  ....................................................................................	  157	  	  
Table	  of	  Tables	  Table	  1.	  Selected	  Islamic	  Institutions	  in	  Indonesia……………………………………………..37	  Table	  2.	  Extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  School	  Groups…………………………………………………….37	  Table	  3.	  Private	  Primary	  Schools	  in	  the	  Jogja	  Region,	  2008-­‐09……………………………54	  Table	  4.	  Student	  and	  Parent	  Totals	  and	  Number	  of	  Questionnaires	  Collected	  ……218	  	   	  
	  iv	  
Acknowledgements	  
 This	  research	  was	  made	  possible	  through	  a	  Fulbright-­‐Hays	  Doctoral	  Dissertation	  Award,	  for	  which	  I	  am	  very	  thankful.	  I	  am	  also	  extremely	  grateful	  for	  the	  funding	  of	  my	  research	  from	  the	  Sasakawa	  Young	  Leaders	  Fellowship	  Fund	  through	  the	  Weatherhead	  East	  Asian	  Institute	  at	  Columbia’s	  School	  of	  International	  and	  Public	  Affairs.	  Three	  Sasakawa	  Young	  Leaders	  Fellowship	  Fund	  Summer	  Fellowships	  enabled	  me	  to	  develop	  my	  language	  skills	  and	  begin	  to	  explore	  my	  interests	  in	  Islamic	  schooling	  in	  Indonesia.	  Two	  Sasakawa	  Young	  Leaders	  Fellowship	  Fund	  Academic	  Year	  Awards	  supported	  me	  while	  in	  New	  York	  as	  I	  analyzed	  my	  data	  and	  began	  writing.	  	  This	  dissertation	  is	  the	  product	  of	  generous	  cooperation	  and	  active	  support	  from	  a	  multitude	  of	  individuals.	  First,	  heartfelt	  gratitude	  goes	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  individuals	  in	  Indonesia.	  I	  am	  grateful	  for	  the	  willingness	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  educational	  communities	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  and	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  to	  open	  their	  schools	  and	  themselves	  to	  me.	  I	  am	  thankful	  for	  their	  patience	  and	  graciousness	  with	  my	  constant	  questions.	  Ery	  Masruri	  was	  extremely	  generous	  with	  his	  time.	  In	  addition,	  I	  am	  grateful	  for	  the	  many	  Indonesians	  outside	  of	  these	  two	  school	  communities	  who	  so	  willingly	  gave	  of	  their	  time	  to	  talk	  with	  me	  and	  share	  their	  contacts.	  I	  am	  particularly	  grateful	  to:	  Lathiful	  Khuluq	  who	  took	  unsolicited	  interest	  in	  my	  research	  and	  happily	  facilitated	  many	  interviews;	  Mark	  Woodward	  for	  frequently	  meeting	  with	  me	  to	  talk	  through	  ideas	  and	  offer	  insights	  into	  the	  Indonesian	  context;	  and	  Hairus	  Salim	  for	  his	  advice	  and	  assistance	  with	  the	  development	  of	  survey	  materials.	  I	  worked	  with	  wonderful	  research	  assistants,	  
	  v	  
Amanah	  Nurish	  and	  Junidah	  Nur,	  whose	  engagement	  with	  and	  insights	  regarding	  the	  research	  strengthened	  the	  data	  collected	  and	  made	  the	  research	  process	  more	  enjoyable.	  I	  am	  also	  grateful	  for	  each	  member,	  and	  in	  particular	  Erna	  and	  Vita,	  in	  Jogja’s	  small	  Mormon	  congregation;	  they	  welcomed	  and	  loved	  me,	  providing	  me	  an	  immediate	  sense	  of	  community	  when	  I	  was	  far	  away	  from	  home.	  I	  am	  also	  thankful	  to	  Jon	  Herstein	  and	  Briton	  Bieze	  and	  their	  two	  boys	  for	  opening	  their	  happy	  home	  to	  me	  whenever	  I	  was	  in	  Jakarta.	  Their	  company	  was	  refreshing.	  At	  Teachers	  College,	  there	  are	  several	  people	  for	  whom	  I	  am	  grateful.	  Professor	  Lambros	  Comitas	  has	  been	  a	  constant	  support	  of	  my	  development	  as	  an	  anthropologist	  and	  researcher,	  from	  my	  first	  week	  at	  Teachers	  College,	  through	  my	  several	  trips	  to	  Indonesia,	  and	  during	  the	  data	  analysis	  and	  writing	  process	  that	  has	  led	  to	  the	  completion	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  I	  am	  thankful	  for	  his	  encouragement,	  guidance,	  and	  friendship.	  My	  advisor,	  Professor	  Lesley	  Bartlett,	  provided	  continuous	  encouragement	  and	  cheer	  that	  kept	  me	  motivated.	  Her	  valuable	  insights	  and	  comprehensive	  feedback	  on	  countless	  drafts	  pushed	  me	  and	  this	  dissertation	  forward.	  Through	  extensive	  and	  invaluable	  conversations,	  Professor	  Kathy	  Pratt	  Ewing	  provided	  crucial	  guidance	  that	  shaped	  the	  analysis	  and	  deepened	  the	  discussions	  within	  my	  dissertation.	  Without	  her	  engagement	  with	  my	  work,	  this	  would	  have	  been	  a	  much	  less	  interesting	  document.	  I	  am	  extremely	  grateful	  for	  my	  fellow	  collegues	  who	  provided	  the	  moral	  support	  and	  camaraderie	  necessary	  to	  navigate	  the	  often	  tedious	  and	  isolating	  work	  of	  producing	  a	  dissertation.	  I	  am	  particularly	  thankful	  for	  Ariel	  Zycherman	  as	  well	  as	  Laura	  Paler,	  Georgina	  Cullman,	  Katie	  Keenan,	  Laura	  Scheiber,	  Dina	  Lopez,	  Sarah	  Smith,	  and	  Todd	  Nicewonger.	  I	  am	  
	  vi	  
indebted	  to	  Frances	  Sinanu	  and	  Dorita	  Setiawan	  for	  their	  friendship	  and	  endless	  willingness	  to	  clarify	  Indonesian	  texts	  and	  verify	  translations.	  Their	  friendship	  shortens	  the	  distance	  here	  in	  New	  York	  between	  Indonesia	  and	  me.	  	  I	  have	  a	  wonderful	  support	  group	  of	  (non-­‐Columbia)	  friends	  and	  family	  for	  which	  I	  am	  tremendously	  grateful.	  I	  am	  very	  thankful	  to	  Sarah	  Hogan	  for	  her	  friendship	  that	  spans	  intellectual	  and	  spiritual	  grounds	  and	  accommodates	  geographical	  distance	  so	  seamlessly.	  She	  was	  key	  in	  the	  genesis	  and	  development	  of	  my	  academic	  self.	  I	  am	  grateful	  for	  Matthew	  Wall	  and	  his	  belief	  in	  me	  that	  awakened	  confidence	  in	  myself.	  I	  am	  thankful	  for	  Shane	  Heath	  who	  always	  sees	  more	  than	  I	  do.	  I	  am	  also	  extremely	  thankful	  for	  Jessica	  Bruno,	  Karen	  Collier,	  Ned	  Gardner,	  and	  Brent	  Williams	  for	  their	  friendship	  and	  support	  these	  past	  8	  years	  in	  New	  York.	  Time	  with	  them	  helped	  me	  to	  step	  away	  from	  this	  all-­‐consuming	  project,	  put	  things	  in	  perspective,	  enjoy	  life,	  and	  rejuvenate	  my	  soul.	  I	  am	  also	  very	  grateful	  to	  Anna	  Moyer,	  Genet	  Kebede,	  Amy	  Stratford	  Barker,	  and	  Tom	  Driggs	  for	  their	  support,	  love,	  and	  encouragement.	  	  I	  have	  been	  generously	  blessed	  with	  and	  am	  eternally	  grateful	  for	  wonderful	  parents,	  Pat	  and	  Conrad	  Bryner,	  and	  siblings,	  Lee,	  Loren,	  Joan,	  Kent,	  and	  Ann	  and	  their	  families.	  Their	  consistent	  support	  and	  love	  acts	  as	  a	  safety	  net	  that	  always	  gives	  me	  the	  courage	  to	  venture	  out	  into	  the	  unknown.	  Finally,	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  my	  Heavenly	  Father	  who	  set	  me	  on	  this	  journey,	  supported	  me	  throughout,	  and	  taught	  (if	  not	  forced)	  me	  to	  believe	  in	  my	  capabilities	  and	  potential.	  	   	  
	  vii	  
	  
Glossary	  and	  Abbreviations	  	  
Aurat	   Private	  parts	  of	  the	  body	  that	  are	  inappropriate	  for	  the	  opposite	  sex	  to	  see	  unless	  that	  person	  is	  a	  spouse	  or	  blood	  relative	  
Bid’ah	   Innovation	  or	  practices	  added	  to	  Islam	  not	  found	  in	  the	  Qur’an	  
Dakwah	   Islamic	  propagation	  
Fatwah	   Formal	  legal	  opinion	  Hadith	   The	  sayings	  of	  the	  Prophet	  Muhammad	  
Ibadah	   Rituals	  and	  acts	  of	  worship	  JSIT	   Network	  of	  Integrated	  Islamic	  Schools	  Madrasa	   Islamic	  school	  with	  secular	  curriculum	  Muhammadiyah	   Modernist	  Islamic	  organization	  NU	   Nahdlatul	  Ulama,	  traditionalist	  Islamic	  organization	  Pesantren	   Generally	  a	  Islamic	  boarding	  school	  associated	  with	  NU	  PKS	   Prosperous	  Justice	  Party	  
Qur'an	   Holy	  text	  of	  Islam	  Shari’ah	   Islamic	  law	  








	  Although	  more	  than	  50,000	  tickets	  had	  already	  been	  sold,	  Lady	  Gaga’s	  2012	  Jakarta	  concert	  was	  cancelled	  by	  the	  national	  police,	  due	  to	  protests	  by	  various	  Islamic	  groups	  and	  threats	  from	  the	  fundamentalist	  Islamic	  Defenders	  Front	  (FPI)	  to	  cause	  “chaos”	  if	  the	  concert	  went	  on	  (Agence	  France-­‐Presse	  2012).1	  FPI	  aimed	  to	  prevent	  Lady	  Gaga,	  through	  the	  mobilization	  of	  30,000	  supporters,	  from	  “setting	  foot	  on	  our	  land.”	  The	  FPI	  chairman	  explained,	  “She	  had	  better	  not	  dare	  spread	  her	  Satanic	  faith	  in	  this	  country…Her	  style	  is	  vulgar,	  her	  sexual	  and	  indecent	  clothes	  will	  destroy	  our	  children’s	  sense	  of	  morality.	  She’s	  very	  dangerous”	  (Marhaenjati	  2012).	  The	  Minister	  of	  Religious	  Affairs	  welcomed	  the	  cancellation,	  believing	  it	  would	  “benefit	  the	  country.	  [As]	  Indonesians	  need	  entertainment	  and	  art	  which	  have	  moral	  values”	  (BBC	  News	  2012).	  	  In	  contrast,	  a	  politician	  of	  the	  Democratic	  Party	  of	  Struggle	  (PDI-­‐P)	  criticized	  the	  cancellation,	  believing	  that	  the	  concert	  would	  not	  have	  corrupted	  the	  country’s	  sense	  of	  morality.	  The	  politician	  said,	  “Whether	  someone	  goes	  to	  hell	  or	  heaven	  doesn’t	  depend	  on	  whether	  they	  watch	  concerts	  or	  not.	  It	  depends	  on	  their	  deeds	  and	  their	  hearts”	  (Al	  Arabiya	  2012).	  A	  Christian	  organization,	  the	  Indonesian	  Council	  of	  Churches	  (PGI),	  voiced	  support	  for	  the	  concert	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  Indonesia’s	  constitution	  supports	  freedom	  of	  expression	  (Marhaenjati	  2012).	  Commenting	  on	  larger	  issues	  at	  hand,	  an	  Indonesian	  lawmaker	  criticized,	  “The	  government	  shouldn’t	  discriminate	  when	  upholding	  the	  law.	  If	  they	  dare	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  Islamic	  Defenders	  Front	  raised	  $8,000	  in	  order	  to	  purchase	  157	  Lady	  Gaga	  tickets,	  a	  large	  enough	  block	  to	  create	  a	  credible	  threat	  to	  security.	  See	  “When	  religious	  intolerance	  rules,”	  Beth	  McAdams,	  The	  Straits	  
Times/Asia	  News	  Network,	  July	  10,	  2012.	  	  
	  	  
2	  
cancel	  shows	  that	  push	  a	  liberal-­‐capitalistic	  ideology	  like	  Lady	  Gaga,	  then	  they	  should	  also	  take	  firm	  action	  against	  demonstrations	  pushing	  ideologies	  from	  the	  Middle	  East,”	  which	  also	  often	  run	  counter	  to	  Indonesian	  culture	  (Al	  Arabiyah	  2012).	  Concerns	  with	  national	  and	  personal	  morality,	  freedom	  of	  expression	  (and	  very	  likely	  religious	  belief),	  and	  the	  preservation	  of	  Indonesian	  culture	  that	  emerged	  around	  Lady	  Gaga’s	  concert	  highlight	  major	  tensions	  in	  present	  day	  Indonesia	  regarding	  tolerance	  of	  others’	  beliefs	  and	  behavior.	  	  	  Indonesia’s	  reputation	  for	  longstanding	  religious	  pluralism	  throughout	  the	  archipelago	  has	  been	  challenged	  in	  recent	  years	  by	  acts	  of	  religious	  intolerance.	  News	  headlines	  not	  only	  report	  Muslim	  attacks	  on	  Christian	  churches	  and	  their	  members,	  but	  also	  on	  members	  of	  Ahmadiyah	  and	  Shiite	  communities	  for	  practicing	  supposedly	  heretical	  traditions	  of	  Islam.	  The	  Wahid	  Institute,	  a	  liberal	  research	  organization	  in	  Indonesia,	  reported	  a	  16-­‐18%	  increase	  in	  cases	  of	  religious	  intolerance,	  including	  violence,	  arson	  and	  discrimination,	  between	  2010	  and	  2011	  (Schonhardt	  2012;	  McBeth	  2012).	  This	  recent	  increase	  reflects,	  and	  is	  possibly	  an	  outgrowth	  of,	  Indonesia’s	  engagement	  with	  the	  worldwide	  revival	  of	  Islam	  ignited	  by	  the	  Iranian	  Revolution	  in	  1979.	  A	  multiplicity	  of	  revivalist	  efforts	  to	  Islamize	  Indonesia	  and	  Indonesians	  target	  political	  and	  socio-­‐cultural	  reforms.	  Some	  groups	  focus	  on	  the	  country’s	  political	  and	  governmental	  structures	  through	  political	  activism	  and	  new	  legislation.	  Others	  are	  concerned	  with	  creating	  more	  pious	  Muslims,	  focusing	  on	  shaping	  individuals’	  religious	  and	  moral	  subjectivities.	  These	  piety	  movements,	  as	  Mahmood	  (2004)	  has	  termed	  them,	  depend	  heavily	  on	  education.	  Aside	  from	  mosques,	  schools	  are	  a	  natural	  space	  of	  engagement.	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As	  levels	  of	  religious	  intolerance	  rise	  in	  Indonesia,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  look	  at	  Islamic	  schools	  that	  have	  developed	  within	  this	  revivalist	  period	  and	  ask	  how	  they	  shape	  their	  students’	  worldviews	  and	  subjectivities	  through	  intellectual	  and	  religious	  education.	  Drawing	  primarily	  upon	  anthropological	  literatures	  of	  religion,	  education,	  class,	  and	  Indonesia,	  this	  dissertation	  examines	  educational	  efforts	  by	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  Islamic	  Primary	  School	  and	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  Integrated	  Islamic	  Primary	  School	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Jogjakarta.	  While	  the	  schools	  share	  similarities	  in	  clientele	  profiles,	  levels	  of	  quality	  in	  academic	  and	  religious	  instruction,	  integrated	  approach	  to	  ‘secular’	  and	  religious	  knowledge,	  and	  emphasis	  on	  piety,	  the	  schools	  hold	  disparate	  and	  distinguishing	  conceptualizations	  of	  piety.	  	   Based	  on	  15	  months	  of	  ethnographic	  research,	  I	  argue	  that	  these	  schools	  not	  only	  promote	  educational	  and	  classed	  projects,	  they	  more	  specifically	  promote	  piety	  projects	  that	  are	  at	  odds	  with	  one	  another.	  Each	  school’s	  approach	  to	  piety	  shapes	  particular	  religious	  and	  moral	  subjectivities	  among	  their	  students.	  As	  such,	  the	  schools’	  opposing	  conceptualizations	  of	  piety,	  each	  championing	  flexible	  Indonesian	  pluralistic	  or	  exacting	  transnational	  purificationist	  approaches	  to	  Islam,	  are	  contributing	  to	  the	  battle	  for	  the	  preservation	  of	  or	  reformation	  of	  mainstream	  conceptualizations	  of	  piety	  and	  what	  a	  good	  Muslim	  looks	  like	  in	  Indonesia.	  This	  research	  demonstrates	  how	  schooling	  can	  be	  a	  tool	  for	  shaping	  political	  and	  socio-­‐religious	  climates	  of	  a	  community	  and	  country.	  	  
A	  Cacophony	  of	  Islamic	  Activity	  in	  Indonesia	  Indonesian	  Muslims,	  over	  85%	  of	  the	  country’s	  population,	  are	  predominantly	  Sunni.	  The	  process	  of	  the	  Islamization	  of	  Indonesia,	  as	  described	  by	  Geertz	  (1960),	  involved	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appropriating	  the	  local,	  deeply-­‐rooted	  Indic	  theories	  and	  Hindu-­‐Buddhist	  Javanese	  culture	  into	  Islamic	  practices.	  This	  initial	  and	  influential	  understanding	  of	  Indonesia’s	  Islamic	  practices	  led	  later	  researchers	  to	  mistakenly	  view	  the	  country’s	  Islam	  as	  an	  “Islamic	  superstructure	  erected	  atop	  a	  layer	  of	  Hindu	  belief	  that	  rests	  on	  a	  foundation	  of	  animistic	  folk	  religion”	  (Thomas	  1988:898).2	  Consequently,	  as	  Hefner	  (2000:xix)	  points	  out,	  referencing	  Marshall	  Hodgson’s	  (1974)	  assessment,	  this	  narrow	  and	  “modernist”	  understanding	  of	  Islam	  led	  to	  identifying	  “many	  practices	  and	  beliefs	  of	  Indonesian	  Muslims	  as	  ‘Hindu-­‐Buddhist’	  rather	  than	  as	  subaltern	  streams	  in	  Southeast	  Asian	  Islam”	  as	  the	  practitioners	  considered	  themselves	  to	  be.	  	  Cultural	  pluralism	  is	  a	  striking	  feature	  of	  Indonesian	  Islam	  today.	  It	  is	  far	  from	  uniform	  in	  practice.	  As	  a	  single	  group	  did	  not	  orchestrate	  the	  spread	  of	  Islam	  and	  religious	  scholars	  (ulama)	  did	  not	  monopolize	  control	  over	  the	  religion’s	  implementation,	  regional	  practices	  have	  varied,	  and	  continue	  to	  vary.	  Participants	  in	  Indonesia’s	  mainstream	  Islamic	  traditions	  recognize	  that	  there	  are	  different	  interpretations	  and	  variance	  in	  the	  balance	  of	  “divine	  command	  and	  local	  culture	  (adat)”	  (Hefner	  2000:14).	  	  In	  a	  simplified	  view	  of	  Indonesia’s	  current	  religious	  landscape,	  two	  main	  variants	  of	  Sunni	  Islam	  dominate	  mainstream	  Islamic	  practices.	  Scholars	  often	  refer	  to	  these	  two	  groups	  as	  traditionalist	  and	  modernist,	  or	  more	  recently	  in	  less	  progress-­‐laden	  terms,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Prior	  to	  the	  arrival	  of	  Islam,	  people	  of	  the	  now	  Indonesian	  archipelago	  were	  Hindu,	  Buddhist,	  and	  animist.	  Hindu-­‐Buddhist	  states,	  which	  flourished	  for	  centuries,	  left	  significant	  literary	  and	  artistic	  legacies	  that	  continued	  to	  thrive	  after	  the	  growth	  of	  Islam.	  It	  appears	  significant	  conversion	  to	  Islam	  began	  in	  the	  13th	  century	  and	  continued	  with	  greater	  intensity	  during	  the	  14th	  and	  15th	  centuries.	  Some	  scholars	  attribute	  the	  spread	  of	  Islam	  to	  its	  egalitarian	  ethos,	  which	  countered	  the	  Hindu	  caste	  system.	  Others	  consider	  it	  to	  have	  been	  a	  matter	  of	  establishing	  strategic	  alliances	  with	  Muslim	  traders	  working	  in	  the	  region.	  While	  there	  were	  wars	  between	  kingdoms,	  it	  seems	  they	  were	  more	  for	  dynastic,	  strategic,	  or	  economic,	  rather	  than	  religious,	  motivations.	  Upon	  the	  arrival	  of	  Western	  colonizers,	  a	  large	  number	  of	  local	  kings	  accepted	  Islam	  as	  a	  political	  strategy	  to	  counter	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  Christian	  nations	  (Ricklefs	  2001).	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classicalist	  and	  reformist	  (Lukens-­‐Bull	  2005).	  The	  classicalist	  and	  reformist	  streams’	  major	  organizational	  vehicles	  are	  Nahdlatul	  Ulama	  (NU)	  and	  Muhammadiyah,	  respectively.3	  NU’s	  elements	  of	  Sufism	  (mystical	  Islam)	  contrast	  with	  Muhammadiyah’s	  more	  “modern”	  or	  rational	  approach	  to	  religion,	  which	  included	  purging	  the	  mystical	  aspects	  from	  Islamic	  practices.	  	  These	  two	  streams	  claim	  just	  over	  50%	  of	  Indonesians’	  loyalty4	  (van	  Bruinessen	  2008:219),	  with	  Muhammadiyah’s	  urban	  following	  constituting	  over	  30	  million	  supporters	  and	  sympathizers	  (Woodward	  2011).	  NU’s	  predominately	  rural	  following	  is	  over	  50	  million	  strong	  (Al	  Qurtuby	  2013).	  	  The	  worldwide	  revival	  of	  Islam	  has	  not	  only	  inspired	  greater	  participation	  in	  the	  Muhammadiyah	  and	  NU	  organizations,	  it	  has	  also	  generated	  a	  greater	  diversity	  of	  Islamic	  practices,	  much	  of	  which	  is	  influenced	  by	  transnational	  Islamic	  movements	  and	  groups	  based	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  Consequently,	  Islamist5	  groups	  have	  gained	  popularity	  (Collins	  2003).6	  Many	  Indonesian	  Muslims	  are	  concerned	  that	  this	  transnational	  influence	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  Muhammadiyah	  organization	  is	  more	  formal	  with	  its	  membership	  status.	  For	  example,	  it	  provides	  member	  ID	  cards.	  NU	  membership	  is	  not	  as	  formalized	  and	  is	  usually	  something	  one	  is	  born	  into.	  In	  recent	  years,	  the	  membership	  of	  these	  organizations	  has	  become	  less	  clear,	  or	  less	  important	  (see	  chapter	  2).	  	  4	  In	  a	  recent	  national	  survey,	  42%	  of	  respondents	  indicated	  the	  NU	  represented	  more	  or	  less	  their	  Islamic	  leanings,	  while	  12%	  made	  the	  same	  claim	  about	  Muhammadiyah.	  The	  way	  the	  questions	  were	  framed	  suggests	  that	  respondents	  who	  identified	  as	  NU	  did	  not	  identify	  so	  much	  with	  the	  organization	  as	  much	  as	  with	  the	  religious	  attitudes	  associated	  with	  the	  organization,	  such	  as	  openness	  to	  local	  traditions,	  flexibility,	  and	  tolerance,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  more	  principled	  and	  puritan	  attitudes	  associated	  with	  Muhammadiyah	  (van	  Bruinessen	  2008:219).	  	  5	  “Islamist”	  denotes	  a	  view	  of	  Islam	  as	  an	  ideology	  that	  provides	  clear	  guidelines	  for	  social	  reform,	  human	  interaction,	  and	  political	  organization.	  	  6	  Collins	  (2003)	  argues	  that	  the	  Islamization	  efforts	  beginning	  after	  Suharto	  stepped	  down	  in	  1998	  were	  not,	  and	  continue	  to	  not	  be,	  uniform,	  differing	  in	  dakwah	  (religious	  propagation)	  and	  the	  role	  of	  Islam	  in	  government.	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  description	  of	  the	  streams	  of	  dakwah	  and	  the	  organizations	  behind	  each,	  see	  Collins	  2003.	  However,	  Collins	  focuses	  on	  the	  dakwah	  streams	  that	  have	  a	  political	  purpose.	  Some	  organizations,	  such	  as	  Muhammadiyah,	  which	  has	  been	  around	  for	  more	  than	  100	  years,	  are	  also	  involved	  in	  
dakwah,	  but	  do	  not	  seek	  an	  Islamic	  government	  (Jones	  1980:318).	  Some	  groups	  view	  democracy	  as	  un-­‐Islamic,	  while	  others	  see	  no	  contradiction	  between	  Islam	  and	  democracy	  (Collins	  2003).	  While	  the	  neo-­‐Salafi	  group	  rejects	  democracy	  and	  advocates	  for	  Shari’ah	  law,	  it	  does	  not	  believe	  in	  opposing	  a	  legitimate	  
	  	  
6	  
challenging	  the	  “Indonesian”	  ways	  of	  religious	  and	  political	  life	  (Fealy	  2008).	  Some	  argue	  that	  the	  religious	  scene	  has	  changed	  so	  much	  in	  the	  last	  30	  years	  that	  Muhammadiyah,	  the	  key	  player	  in	  the	  progressive	  Islamic	  reformist	  movement	  of	  the	  early	  20th	  century,	  now	  seems	  more	  moderate	  and	  relatively	  aligned	  with	  NU	  due	  to	  new	  Islamist	  groups	  widening	  the	  spectrum	  of	  Islamic	  practices	  (Masaaki	  et	  al.	  2010).	  	  	  Engagement	  with	  the	  worldwide	  revival	  has	  generated	  a	  surge	  in	  mosque	  construction,	  attendance	  at	  Friday	  worship	  services,	  the	  availability	  and	  purchasing	  of	  Islamic	  literature	  and	  music,	  veiling	  among	  women,	  the	  opening	  of	  Islamic	  banking	  branches,	  pilgrimages	  to	  Mecca,	  alms	  collection	  (zakat),	  religious	  education,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  Arabic,	  rather	  than	  a	  local	  language,	  for	  common	  daily	  interactions	  such	  as	  greetings	  (Bubalo	  &	  Fealy	  2005;	  Masaaki	  et	  al.	  2010).	  This	  increase	  in	  Islamic	  activities	  and	  the	  projection	  of	  Islamic	  piety,	  though,	  has	  not	  directly	  translated	  to	  full	  support	  for	  wholesale	  Islamization	  of	  the	  political	  and	  judicial	  system	  as	  some	  groups	  had	  hoped	  and	  others	  had	  feared.	  According	  to	  a	  survey7	  conducted	  in	  2007	  by	  the	  Indonesian	  Survey	  Institute,	  Indonesians	  only	  selectively	  support	  the	  implementation	  of	  Shari’ah	  law	  (Masaaki	  et	  al.	  2010:4).	  For	  example,	  they	  may	  not	  be	  in	  favor	  of	  punishments	  such	  as	  cutting	  off	  the	  hand	  of	  a	  thief,	  but	  they	  may	  support	  the	  requirement	  for	  all	  Muslim	  women	  to	  veil.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  government.	  (Although	  it	  advocates	  for	  a	  peaceful	  existence	  within	  their	  given	  context,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  many	  of	  the	  violent	  acts,	  such	  as	  the	  terrorist	  bombings	  in	  Bali	  in	  2002	  and	  2005,	  were	  committed	  by	  Salafi	  members	  [Collins	  2003].)	  Hizbut	  Tahrir	  is	  another	  group	  that	  rejects	  democracy,	  as	  well	  as	  desiring	  to	  once	  again	  set	  up	  a	  caliphate,	  the	  original	  form	  of	  Islamic	  government	  and	  a	  representation	  of	  a	  unified	  
ummah,	  the	  collective	  body	  of	  all	  Muslims	  throughout	  the	  world.	  Of	  all	  the	  new	  dakwah	  groups,	  the	  Tarbiyah	  Movement	  (Gerakan	  Tarbiyah)—also	  known	  as	  the	  Society	  of	  Tarbiyah	  (Jemaah	  Tarbiyah)—heavily	  influenced	  by	  the	  Egyptian	  Muslim	  Brotherhood,	  has	  gained	  the	  largest	  prominence	  in	  mainstream	  Indonesia.	  It	  claims	  no	  incompatibility	  between	  democracy	  and	  Islam.	  Its	  current	  public	  face	  is	  the	  political	  Prosperous	  Justice	  Party	  (PKS).	  Several	  of	  these	  groups,	  such	  as	  PKS	  and	  Hidayatullah,	  have	  established	  new	  private	  Islamic	  schools	  as	  part	  of	  their	  efforts.	  	  7	  The	  survey	  was	  called	  “The	  Trend	  of	  Support	  Toward	  the	  Islamic	  Values	  vs.	  Toward	  the	  Secular	  Values	  and	  Influence	  of	  Political	  Islam.”	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Islamist	  parties	  have	  adapted	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  widespread	  political	  support	  by	  softening	  their	  platforms,	  and	  becoming	  more	  pragmatic	  through	  focusing	  on	  the	  local,	  rather	  than	  exclusively	  on	  national-­‐level	  policies.	  This	  has	  resulted	  in	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  passing	  of	  perda	  Shari’ah	  (paratuan	  daerah	  Shari’ah)	  or	  Shari’ah-­‐based	  bylaws	  at	  the	  provincial	  and	  district	  levels	  (Masaaki	  2010:4).	  Indonesia’s	  highly	  decentralized	  government	  facilitates	  such	  legislative	  activity.	  The	  provincial	  and	  local	  governments	  of	  Aceh,	  a	  strictly	  observant	  Muslim	  area	  of	  the	  island	  of	  Sumatra,	  have	  passed	  laws	  enforcing	  a	  curfew	  on	  woman	  after	  dark,	  requiring	  woman	  to	  veil,	  or	  imposing	  a	  tax	  for	  zakat,	  the	  Islamic	  practice	  of	  alms-­‐giving	  (Buehler	  2008).	  In	  less	  overtly	  political	  tactics,	  many	  radical	  groups	  have	  gained	  traction	  in	  influencing	  public	  opinion	  by	  strategically	  selecting	  events,	  such	  as	  the	  Lady	  Gaga	  concert,	  in	  which	  they	  “blur	  the	  lines	  between	  jihadism	  and	  anti-­‐vice	  and	  anti-­‐apostasy	  activities”	  (McBeth	  2012).	  	  The	  complex	  and	  often	  confusing	  cacophony	  of	  Islamizing	  efforts	  currently	  taking	  place	  is,	  Ricklefs	  (2008)	  tentatively	  suggests,	  leading	  to	  a	  polarization	  of	  society	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  religious	  identity.	  Yet	  Ricklefs	  (2008)	  also	  describes	  the	  state	  of	  contemporary	  Islam	  in	  Java	  as	  “one	  of	  much	  complexity,	  confused	  and	  confusing”	  (133)	  and	  therefore	  too	  complex	  to	  be	  reduced	  to	  two	  groupings	  of	  moderate−liberal	  and	  radical−extremist.	  These	  two	  sides	  and	  their	  multiple	  permutations	  fall	  into	  “ideal	  types.”	  On	  one	  side,	  there	  is	  the	  approach	  to	  Islam	  that	  is	  “liberal	  in	  their	  interpretations	  [of	  religious	  texts],	  supportive	  of	  gender	  equality,	  supportive	  of	  multiculturalism	  and	  welcoming	  of	  other	  faiths,	  valuing	  local	  culture,	  accepting	  of	  mysticism,	  politically	  disinterested	  and	  peaceful	  in	  approach”	  (133).	  The	  other	  group’s	  approach	  to	  Islam	  is	  “puritan,	  inflexible,	  anti-­‐feminist,	  intolerant	  of	  other	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cultures	  and	  faiths,	  rejecting	  local	  culture,	  opposed	  to	  mysticism,	  hoping	  to	  impose	  its	  version	  of	  Islam	  from	  the	  top	  down	  and	  assertive	  or	  even	  willing	  to	  use	  violence”	  (133).	  	  This	  polarization	  extends	  to	  the	  types	  of	  Islamic	  schooling	  available	  for	  middle-­‐class	  Indonesian	  children.	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  the	  Network	  of	  Integrated	  Islamic	  Schools	  (Jaringan	  




Islam,	  the	  State,	  and	  Religious	  Education	  Writing	  specifically	  about	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  Indonesian	  context,	  Ropi	  (2006:242)	  argues,	  “Islamic	  education	  reform	  movements	  cannot	  be	  separated	  from	  the	  political	  context	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  Muslim	  population.”	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  statement	  is	  relevant	  to	  pre-­‐Independence	  times	  as	  well.	  The	  political	  agendas	  are	  clearly	  seen	  in	  both	  formal	  governmental	  education	  reform	  as	  well	  as	  informal	  reforms	  initiated	  through	  independent	  educational	  organizations	  establishing	  private	  schools	  such	  as	  pesantren,	  madrasas,	  and	  modern	  Islamic	  schools.	  This	  section	  briefly	  reviews	  the	  historic	  relationship	  between	  religion,	  the	  state,	  and	  the	  development	  of	  Islamic	  schools	  in	  general,	  setting	  the	  stage	  for	  a	  detailed	  explanation	  of	  the	  recent	  emergence	  of	  extended-­‐day	  schools.	  
	  
Religion	  and	  the	  state	  The	  role	  of	  religion	  in	  public	  life	  has	  been	  a	  continuous	  point	  of	  debate	  since	  the	  conception	  of	  Indonesia	  as	  an	  independent	  country.	  As	  Indonesians	  prepared	  for	  independence	  from	  Dutch	  colonial	  rule	  in	  1945,	  many	  activists	  wanted	  to	  require	  Indonesia’s	  Muslims	  to	  follow	  Shari’ah	  law.8	  In	  the	  end	  this	  was	  excluded	  from	  the	  final	  version	  of	  Pancasila,	  the	  nation’s	  founding	  philosophy.	  The	  first	  of	  Pancasila’s	  five	  principles	  declares,	  however,	  Belief	  in	  One	  and	  Only	  One	  God.9	  This	  tenet	  of	  Pancasila	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  While	  Shari’ah	  is	  not	  implemented	  at	  the	  national	  level,	  some	  district	  governments	  have	  recently	  begun	  implementing	  Shari’ah	  for	  Muslims	  within	  their	  jurisdiction.	  Indonesia’s	  highly	  decentralized	  government	  allows	  for	  great	  governance	  flexibility	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  	  9	  As	  Indonesia	  is	  comprised	  of	  myriad	  ethnic	  groups	  and	  religious	  backgrounds,	  the	  founding	  principles	  state	  “Belief	  in	  one	  God”,	  but	  the	  name	  of	  that	  God	  is	  withheld	  so	  as	  to	  accommodate	  Muslims,	  Christians	  (as	  in	  Protestant	  groups),	  Catholics,	  and	  other	  monotheistic	  religions.	  This	  was	  an	  effort	  to	  claim	  to	  be	  a	  religious,	  monotheistic	  country.	  However,	  this	  in	  turn	  meant	  the	  country	  would	  not	  officially	  recognize	  the	  animistic	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the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Religious	  Affairs	  (MoRA)	  demonstrated	  and	  guaranteed	  the	  prominence	  of	  religion,	  and	  particularly	  Islam,	  in	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  nation	  (Fealy	  2004;	  Hefner	  2000;	  Rifai	  2006).	  	  Once	  Pancasila	  was	  ratified,	  a	  president	  was	  democratically	  elected.	  President	  Sukarno	  stayed	  in	  office	  for	  22	  years,	  until	  1967,	  when	  he	  was	  replaced	  by	  a	  coup.	  The	  Indonesian	  parliament	  appointed	  Suharto,	  an	  army	  general,	  as	  president	  of	  the	  country.	  During	  his	  32-­‐year	  authoritarian	  and	  brutal	  New	  Order	  regime	  (1965-­‐1998),	  Suharto	  established	  impressive	  economic	  development	  and	  political	  order.	  Suharto	  sought	  to	  promote	  the	  secular	  ideals	  of	  Pancasila	  and	  national	  unity	  in	  part	  by	  managing	  Islam	  (Sidel	  2006).	  President	  Suharto’s	  preoccupation	  with	  power	  at	  all	  costs	  prevented	  a	  consistent	  position	  on	  religious	  matters.	  Initially,	  he	  marginalized	  Islam10	  and	  pushed	  for	  a	  secular	  society.	  However,	  by	  the	  late	  1980s,	  he	  courted	  moderate	  Muslims	  and	  promoted	  a	  more	  Islamic	  image	  of	  himself	  (van	  Bruinessen	  2002:132)	  as	  the	  general	  public	  was	  showing	  renewed,	  widespread	  interest	  in	  Islam.	  In	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  Suharto	  switched	  gears	  yet	  again	  as	  he	  sought	  favor	  with	  the	  ultra-­‐conservative	  Islamists.	  Ultimately,	  general	  disapproval	  of	  the	  widespread	  corruption	  and	  nepotism	  that	  riddled	  his	  government	  and	  the	  economic	  blow	  of	  the	  Asian	  financial	  crisis	  weakened	  Suharto’s	  regime	  (Hefner	  2000:59,	  72,	  82,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  religions,	  which	  had	  pre-­‐Islamic	  presence	  throughout	  the	  archipelago,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  minority	  religions,	  and	  in	  more	  contemporary	  debates,	  atheists.	  Initially	  there	  were	  five	  officially	  recognized	  religions:	  Islam,	  Catholicism,	  Christianity,	  Buddhism,	  and	  Hinduism.	  Buddhism	  and	  Hinduism	  were	  creatively	  reinterpreted	  as	  monotheistic	  religions	  in	  order	  to	  be	  officially	  recognized	  (Ricklefs	  1981:213).	  A	  sixth	  religion,	  Confucianism,	  has	  since	  been	  formally	  recognized.	  The	  other	  fours	  pillars	  of	  Pancasila	  are	  more	  nationalistic	  rather	  than	  religious,	  namely:	  Just	  and	  civilized	  humanity;	  Unity	  of	  Indonesia;	  Democracy	  guided	  by	  the	  inner	  wisdom	  in	  the	  unanimity	  arising	  out	  of	  deliberations	  among	  representatives;	  and,	  Social	  justice	  for	  all	  Indonesians.	  
	  10	  In	  the	  1973,	  Suharto	  forced	  Islamic	  political	  parties	  into	  a	  single	  collation,	  the	  United	  Development	  Party	  (Partai	  Persatuan	  Pembangunan,	  PPP).	  Eventually	  the	  party	  eventually	  came	  to	  publicly	  oppose	  Suharto.	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xviii).	  Due	  to	  widespread	  protests	  and	  calls	  for	  resignation,	  Suharto	  stepped	  down	  in	  1998.	  A	  new	  president	  was	  democratically	  elected	  in	  1999.	  The	  advent	  of	  democracy	  opened	  the	  door	  for	  a	  greater	  religious	  presence	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  and	  greater	  assertiveness	  of	  religious	  groups	  in	  shaping	  political	  and	  social	  issues	  (Schonhardt	  2012;	  McBeth	  2012).	  	  To	  many	  Indonesians	  during	  the	  New	  Order,	  Islam	  became	  a	  tool	  for	  adapting	  to	  their	  rapidly	  modernizing	  society.	  For	  the	  working	  class,	  Islam	  provided	  new	  ways	  to	  create	  community	  in	  urban	  settings;	  Islam	  also	  provided	  a	  channel	  for	  protest.	  To	  the	  middle	  class,	  Islam	  provided	  a	  unifying	  set	  of	  values	  to	  stand	  in	  for	  ethnic	  traditions	  that	  were	  becoming	  irrelevant	  in	  the	  face	  of	  development	  (Collins	  2002:158,	  Jones	  1980:317).	  As	  the	  middle	  class	  began	  embracing	  more	  Islamic	  lifestyles,	  anxieties	  arose	  regarding	  morality,	  wealth,	  and	  corruption	  (Jones	  2012).	  In	  addition	  to	  a	  general	  increased	  interest	  in	  Islam,	  these	  middle-­‐class	  anxieties	  have	  contributed	  to	  a	  rapid	  growth	  of	  a	  new	  market	  for	  private	  religious	  schools.	  	  	  
Islamic	  education	  and	  the	  state	  Prior	  to	  the	  20th	  century,	  pesantren,	  or	  Islamic	  boarding	  schools,	  were	  the	  only	  formal	  indigenous	  educational	  institutions	  in	  Java	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  what	  is	  now	  considered	  Indonesia	  (Lukens-­‐Bull	  2005).	  The	  establishment	  of	  multiple	  pesantren	  throughout	  the	  region	  is	  said	  to	  have	  been	  in	  effort	  to	  counter	  colonial	  schooling	  (Whalley	  1993).	  Pesantren	  are	  generally	  associated	  with	  the	  traditionalist	  NU	  organizations.	  After	  the	  1975	  Joint	  Declaration	  requiring	  madrasas	  to	  increase	  general	  education	  topics	  to	  be	  70%	  of	  their	  curriculum,	  most	  pesantren,	  although	  not	  required	  by	  the	  law,	  also	  increased	  the	  amount	  of	  secular	  subjects	  they	  offered	  either	  by	  incorporating	  secular	  subjects	  into	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their	  curriculum	  or	  by	  attaching	  a	  madrasa	  to	  their	  pesantren	  for	  students	  to	  attend	  in	  the	  mornings	  and	  then	  return	  to	  the	  pesantren	  to	  continue	  religious	  training	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  day	  (Azra	  &	  Afrianty	  2005).	  Pesantren	  leaders	  continue	  to	  struggle	  to	  find	  the	  best	  balance	  between	  general	  subjects	  and	  religious	  ones	  in	  their	  schools.	  They	  acknowledge	  the	  need	  to	  increase	  subject	  matters	  that	  will	  develop	  employable	  skills	  in	  their	  graduates.	  They	  are	  being	  creative	  in	  how	  to	  “modernize”	  while	  maintaining	  their	  Islamic	  character	  (Lukens-­‐Bull	  2005).	  	  Madrasas,	  first	  established	  in	  Indonesia	  in	  the	  early	  20th	  century,	  were	  originally	  Islamic	  schools	  with	  some	  general	  education	  courses.	  These	  schools	  were	  originally	  modeled	  after	  the	  Dutch	  government	  and	  Christian	  missionary	  schools,	  where	  general	  education	  classes	  were	  included	  with	  religious	  classes.	  The	  modern	  classroom	  with	  chalkboards	  and	  desks	  replaced	  pesantren’s	  study	  circles	  huddled	  on	  the	  floor	  gathered	  around	  the	  teacher.	  While	  they	  were	  initially	  open	  to	  only	  boys,	  girls	  currently	  constitute	  slightly	  over	  50%	  of	  enrolled	  madrasa	  students	  (Azra	  et	  al.	  2007).11	  Suharto	  viewed	  Indonesia’s	  dual	  education	  system—the	  general	  stream	  run	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  National	  Education	  (MoNE)	  and	  the	  religious	  stream	  under	  the	  aegis	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Religious	  Affairs	  (MoRA)—a	  challenge	  to	  creating	  a	  “distinctive	  national	  identity,	  national	  unity	  and	  patriotism”	  (Porter	  2002:53).	  Through	  a	  series	  of	  reforms	  beginning	  in	  the	  1970s	  to	  the	  present,	  school	  curriculum	  for	  madrasas	  (Islamic	  schools	  under	  the	  aegis	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Several	  factor	  contribute	  to	  the	  slightly	  higher	  female	  enrollment	  rate	  for	  madrasas.	  Observant	  Muslims	  find	  the	  religious	  school	  setting	  more	  appropriate	  for	  adolescent	  girls.	  Additionally,	  boys	  are	  expected	  to	  become	  the	  breadwinners	  of	  a	  family	  and	  are	  therefore	  sent	  to	  the	  general	  schools,	  which	  tend	  to	  provide	  better	  education.	  If	  family	  budgets	  were	  tight,	  money	  would	  be	  invested	  in	  the	  boys’	  education	  at	  state	  schools	  while	  girls	  would	  be	  sent	  to	  the	  less	  expensive	  option,	  the	  madrasa	  (Azra	  et	  al.	  2007).	  It	  will	  be	  interesting	  to	  see	  if	  girls	  enrollment	  changes	  due	  to	  the	  new	  legislation	  that	  declared	  state	  schools	  to	  be	  free	  beginning	  in	  2010.	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Religious	  Affairs)	  was	  aligned	  with	  general	  school	  curricula	  under	  MoNE.	  In	  March	  1975,	  the	  Ministers	  of	  National	  Education,	  Religious	  Affairs,	  and	  Home	  Affairs	  issued	  a	  Joint	  Decree	  stipulating	  that	  the	  madrasas’	  curriculum	  should	  consist	  of	  70%	  of	  teaching	  periods	  dedicated	  to	  secular	  subjects,	  leaving	  30%	  of	  teaching	  time	  for	  religious	  subject	  matter.	  The	  decree	  also	  stipulated	  the	  value	  of	  a	  diploma	  from	  a	  madrasa	  to	  be	  equivalent	  to	  that	  of	  non-­‐religious	  schools.	  In	  effect,	  this	  decree	  standardized	  madrasa	  education	  (Rifai	  2006).	  The	  changes	  allowed	  for	  transferability	  of	  students	  from	  religious	  to	  general	  schools	  and	  vice	  versa.	  These	  changes	  also	  prepared	  graduates	  from	  madrasas	  to	  successfully	  compete	  for	  seating	  in	  higher	  levels	  of	  education	  (Thomas	  1988).	  Subsequent	  policies	  tightened	  the	  standardization	  process,	  incorporating	  madrasas	  more	  deeply	  into	  the	  national	  education	  system.	  Although	  madrasas	  played	  a	  role	  in	  extending	  educational	  opportunities	  to	  poor	  students12	  largely	  in	  rural	  areas,	  they	  typically	  provided	  poorer	  quality	  education	  than	  general	  schools.	  Despite	  efforts	  to	  incorporate	  them	  into	  the	  national	  education	  system,	  they	  are	  considered	  second-­‐class	  educational	  institutions.13	  14	  	   In	  the	  1920s,	  around	  the	  same	  time	  as	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  madrasa,	  Muhammadiyah	  established	  the	  first	  “modern	  Islamic	  schools,”	  infusing	  Islam	  into	  the	  Dutch	  schooling	  system	  (Azra	  &	  Afrianty	  2005:10).	  Muhammadiyah	  leaders	  feared	  that	  modernization	  and	  a	  concomitant	  rational	  mindset	  would	  alienate	  Muslim	  intellectuals	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Prior	  to	  the	  government’s	  2010	  declaration	  that	  all	  state	  schools	  are	  to	  be	  tuition-­‐free,	  state	  general	  schools	  were	  more	  expensive	  than	  madrasas,	  making	  madrasas	  a	  more	  affordable	  schooling	  option.	  	  13	  This	  is	  highlighted	  by	  the	  performance	  of	  junior	  and	  senior	  secondary	  pass	  rates	  on	  national	  examinations.	  Madrasa	  students’	  failure	  rates	  are	  two-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	  times	  those	  of	  general	  school	  students	  (Azra	  et	  al.	  2008:180-­‐82).	  Madrasas	  generally	  serve	  rural	  and	  disadvantaged	  populations.	  Over	  half	  of	  madrasa	  students	  are	  children	  of	  farmers	  or	  laborers;	  this	  is	  about	  50%	  higher	  than	  in	  general	  schools	  (Azra	  et	  al.	  2007:182).	  	  14	  Another	  significant	  factor	  to	  lower	  quality	  schooling	  at	  madrasas	  is	  funding.	  State	  subsidies	  per	  student	  at	  the	  primary	  level	  for	  state	  and	  private	  madrasas	  average	  only	  about	  75%	  and	  38%	  respectively	  of	  the	  average	  subsidy	  provided	  for	  students	  at	  state	  general	  schools	  (Azra	  et	  al.	  2007).	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from	  Indonesia’s	  common	  Islamic	  practices	  that	  were	  steeped	  in	  mystical	  Sufi	  traditions	  and	  practices.	  Consequently,	  the	  leaders	  introduced	  what	  they	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  more	  rational	  approach	  to	  religion.	  A	  remodeled,	  modern	  Islam	  aimed	  to	  counter	  secular	  and	  Christian	  trends.	  Their	  rationalism	  and	  opposition	  to	  superstition	  successfully	  attracted	  Indonesian	  intellectuals	  to	  the	  organization	  (Rifai	  2006).	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  pesantren	  and	  madrasa	  of	  the	  day,	  Muhammadiyah	  schools	  devoted	  relatively	  little	  time	  to	  religious	  subjects.	  Arabic	  was	  not	  taught.	  Even	  though	  the	  reformists	  talked	  about	  returning	  to	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith,	  they	  read	  them	  regularly	  in	  Indonesian	  translations	  written	  almost	  exclusively	  by	  contemporary	  reformist	  writers	  (van	  Bruinessen	  2008:223).	  Muhammadiyah’s	  Islamic	  schools,	  at	  the	  primary	  level	  in	  particular,	  generally	  provided	  better	  quality	  education	  than	  madrasas	  and	  have	  significantly	  contributed	  to	  the	  transformation	  of	  Islamic	  schooling	  in	  the	  20th	  century	  (Azra	  &	  Afrianty	  2005).	  	  	  	  In	  a	  general	  sense	  of	  the	  word,	  pesantren	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  schools	  could	  be	  considered	  madrasas	  since	  they	  are	  Islamic	  schooling	  institutions;	  however,	  they	  are	  not	  categorized	  as	  such	  in	  Indonesian	  society.	  Curricular	  content	  and	  ministry	  affiliation	  distinguish	  educational	  institutions	  in	  Indonesia.	  Madrasas	  and	  pesantren	  are	  under	  the	  aegis	  of	  MoRA;	  Muhammadiyah	  schools	  are	  under	  the	  aegis	  of	  MoNE.	  While	  pesantren	  are	  also	  directed	  under	  MoRA,	  their	  general	  lack	  of	  a	  full	  general	  education	  curriculum	  categorizes	  them	  differently	  than	  madrasas.	  Painting	  in	  broad	  brushstrokes,	  pesantren	  generally	  educate	  students	  to	  become	  classicalist	  of	  NU	  ulama	  (religious	  leaders);	  madrasas	  educate	  students	  to	  become	  intellectual	  ulama;	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  schools	  educate	  students	  to	  become	  educated	  Muslims	  (Azra	  &	  Afrianty	  2005:6).	  The	  renewed	  interest	  in	  Islam	  throughout	  Indonesia	  has	  generated	  a	  reform	  of	  these	  institutions	  as	  well	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as	  an	  expansion	  of	  religious	  schooling	  options	  beyond	  traditional	  NU	  pesantren,	  madrasas,	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  schools,	  to	  other	  institutions	  such	  as	  Salafi	  pesantren15	  and	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schools.	  	  	  
Extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  Schools	  The	  new	  educational	  phenomenon	  of	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schools,	  as	  I	  term	  it,	  has	  gained	  significant	  momentum	  in	  the	  last	  15	  years	  or	  so,	  growing	  from	  a	  handful	  to	  over	  1,000	  primary	  and	  secondary	  schools.	  The	  extended-­‐day	  schools	  are	  an	  innovation	  in	  Indonesia’s	  long	  history	  of	  Islamic	  educational	  institutions.	  They	  developed	  out	  of	  a	  specific	  set	  of	  needs,	  in	  response	  to	  a	  specific	  set	  of	  circumstances.	  This	  educational	  trend	  is	  part	  of	  larger	  efforts	  to	  develop	  a	  religious	  ethos	  to	  replace	  the	  secular	  mindsets	  and	  abstract	  approaches	  to	  Islam.	  However,	  for	  these	  schools,	  academics	  are	  still	  of	  equal	  importance.	  Similar	  trends	  are	  seen	  in	  Islamic	  schooling	  throughout	  the	  world.	  There	  is	  both	  a	  push	  to	  focus	  on	  religious	  education	  to	  teach	  morals	  when	  the	  secular	  state	  has	  failed	  (Adely	  &	  Starrett	  2011)	  as	  well	  as	  to	  merge	  religious	  knowledge	  with	  “marketable”	  instruction	  (Liomeier	  2005:405).	  For	  example,	  in	  Egypt,	  Herrera	  argues	  that	  demand	  for	  private	  Islamic	  schools	  has	  increased	  as	  the	  public	  seeks	  Islamic	  instruction	  perceived	  to	  be	  missing	  in	  secular	  state	  schools.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  some	  of	  the	  new	  Islamic	  schools	  cater	  to	  elite	  families	  who	  want	  an	  Islamic	  environment	  for	  their	  children	  but	  will	  also	  pay	  a	  premium	  for	  English	  language	  and	  computer	  skills	  (Herrera	  2000,	  2006).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Salafi	  is	  a	  newer	  transnational	  approach	  to	  Islam,	  taking	  a	  scripturalist	  approach	  to	  understanding	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  following	  a	  stricter	  approach	  to	  following	  the	  teachings	  of	  Islam.	  Salafi	  pesantren	  could	  be	  considered	  the	  concurrent	  educational	  development	  in	  pesantren	  schooling	  as	  JSIT	  schools	  are	  to	  the	  “older”	  modern	  Islamic	  schools.	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International	  trends	  in	  expanding	  private	  Islamic	  schooling	  markets	  are	  facilitated	  by	  the	  democratization	  of	  Islam,	  or	  a	  broadening	  of	  legitimacy	  in	  who	  can	  produce	  and	  transmit	  religious	  knowledge	  (Eikelman	  1985,	  1992).	  This	  democratization	  has	  created	  new	  hierarchies	  of	  knowledge,	  perceptions	  of	  expertise,	  and	  credentials	  (Eikelman	  1985,	  1992;	  Messick	  1993,	  Fischer	  and	  Abedi	  1990,	  Mottahedeh	  2008).	  Consequently,	  more	  individuals	  and	  groups	  are	  establishing	  Islamic	  schools	  with	  little	  or	  no	  formal	  religious	  training	  or	  sponsorship	  from	  formal	  religious	  organizations,	  thus	  creating	  diverse	  content	  and	  ideas	  of	  what	  makes	  a	  school	  Islamic.	  This	  introduces	  new	  forms	  of	  understanding	  into	  public	  and	  sometimes	  politicized	  arenas	  (Herrera	  2000,	  2006;	  Hefner	  &	  Zaman	  2006;	  Hefner	  2009a;	  Janson	  2005).	  While	  differing	  in	  aspirations	  regarding	  the	  legal	  implementation	  of	  Shari’ah	  law	  and	  strictness	  in	  Islamic	  practice,	  the	  various	  school	  groups	  involved	  in	  Indonesia’s	  trend	  of	  extended-­‐day	  schools	  are	  united	  in	  the	  ambition	  of	  producing	  a	  well-­‐educated	  generation	  of	  pious,	  observant	  Muslims.	  As	  the	  term	  suggests,	  these	  schools	  extend	  the	  length	  of	  the	  school	  day,	  meeting	  two	  to	  four	  hours	  longer	  than	  most	  general	  and	  private	  Islamic	  schools,	  which	  release	  students	  at	  noon	  or	  1	  p.m.	  This	  feature	  is	  highly	  attractive	  for	  practical	  reasons,	  as	  it	  correlates	  more	  conveniently	  with	  the	  work	  schedules	  of	  middle-­‐class	  parents.	  	  This	  trend	  is	  made	  up	  of	  several	  groups,	  most	  significantly	  of	  the	  Network	  of	  Integrated	  Islamic	  Schools	  (Jaringan	  Sekolah	  Islam	  Terpadu,	  hereafter	  known	  as	  JSIT),	  the	  Network	  of	  Hidayatullah	  Integral	  Schools,	  and	  Al	  Azhar	  Islamic	  Schools,	  in	  addition	  to	  smaller	  groups	  and	  independent	  schools.	  While	  still	  small	  in	  number,	  particularly	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  longer-­‐standing	  Islamic	  education	  institutions,	  they	  are	  growing	  rapidly	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and	  are	  teaching	  an	  influential	  group	  of	  students,	  predominately	  from	  the	  middle	  and	  upper-­‐middle	  classes,	  who	  are	  likely	  to	  become	  social	  activists,	  politicians,	  academics,	  businesspeople,	  and	  the	  like.	  The	  graphic	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  chapter	  (Figure	  1)	  maps	  out	  pre-­‐tertiary	  Islamic	  schooling	  in	  present-­‐day	  Indonesia,	  highlighting	  extended-­‐day	  schools.	  As	  a	  survey	  of	  all	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  school	  groups	  does	  not	  exist	  and	  such	  an	  undertaking	  was	  not	  part	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  my	  research,	  the	  following	  analysis	  is	  based	  upon	  research	  on	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT,	  two	  of	  the	  first	  extended-­‐day	  school	  groups.	  As	  the	  popularity	  of	  the	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schools	  has	  grown,	  many	  spinoffs	  have	  sprouted	  up,	  and	  it	  is	  unclear	  how	  much	  the	  form	  and	  ideology	  of	  the	  new	  schools	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  schools	  of	  this	  study.16	  	   Al	  Azhar,	  headquartered	  in	  the	  affluent	  area	  of	  Kebayoran	  Baru	  in	  southern	  Jakarta,	  is	  a	  prominent,	  largely	  apolitical	  educational	  group	  that	  caters	  to	  middle-­‐	  and	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  families.	  While	  all	  education	  is	  political,	  this	  group	  does	  not	  have	  formal	  or	  informal	  ideological	  ties	  or	  sponsorship	  with	  a	  religious	  organizations	  (such	  as	  Muhammadiyah	  or	  NU)	  or	  political	  parties	  (such	  as	  PKS).	  Al	  Azhar	  is	  one	  of	  the,	  if	  not	  the	  most,	  well-­‐respected	  names	  in	  quality	  Islamic	  schooling.	  The	  group’s	  highly	  centralized	  franchise17	  management	  model	  works	  to	  ensure	  the	  high	  quality	  of	  the	  schooling.	  In	  2010	  it	  had	  35	  preschools,	  35	  primary	  schools,	  30	  secondary	  schools,	  and	  a	  university,	  mainly	  on	  the	  island	  of	  Java	  (personal	  communication	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  headquarters	  office,	  May	  2010).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  While	  ideological	  and	  structural	  similarities	  were	  found	  at	  two	  other	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schools	  I	  visited	  in	  Jogja,	  one	  an	  independent	  school	  and	  the	  other	  a	  member	  of	  a	  small	  school	  group,	  claims	  to	  representativeness	  cannot	  be	  made	  regarding	  all	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schools.	  	  17	  The	  term	  “franchise”	  emerged	  from	  the	  data	  when	  during	  interviews,	  leadership	  referred	  to	  their	  schools	  as	  franchises,	  complete	  with	  Memorandums	  of	  Understanding	  between	  headquarters	  and	  the	  local	  sponsoring	  foundations	  that	  run	  the	  schools.	  	  They	  also	  discuss	  these	  schools	  using	  terms	  business	  terms	  such	  as	  “brand	  name”	  and	  “marketing.”	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Al	  Azhar	  promotes	  a	  flexible	  Islam	  that	  accommodates	  various	  Islamic	  practices.	  In	  chapter	  3,	  I	  provide	  details	  on	  this	  school	  group	  based	  on	  my	  research	  at	  the	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  primary	  school	  campus	  on	  Jogja.	  The	  Network	  of	  Integrated	  Islamic	  Schools	  (Jaringan	  Sekolah	  Islam	  Terpadu	  JSIT),18	  the	  largest	  group	  of	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schools,	  is	  headquartered	  in	  Depok,	  abutting	  Jakarta	  on	  the	  south.	  According	  to	  Hefner,	  they	  are	  part	  of	  a	  “multi-­‐stranded	  educational	  movement	  that,	  to	  the	  surprise	  of	  many,	  became	  one	  of	  the	  fasted	  growing	  trends	  in	  Islamic	  education	  in	  post-­‐Suharto	  era”	  (Hefner	  2009:73).19	  In	  2009,	  the	  Network	  had	  571	  preschools,	  424	  primary,	  and	  130	  secondary	  member	  schools	  throughout	  the	  archipelago	  (JSIT	  2009).	  	  The	  majority	  of	  members	  of	  the	  partnering	  foundations	  that	  run	  the	  schools	  are	  members	  of	  the	  Islamist	  Prosperous	  Justice	  Party	  (Partai	  Keadilan	  Sejahtera,	  hereafter	  PKS).	  Due	  to	  laws	  that	  forbid	  political	  parties	  from	  sponsoring	  social	  institutions,	  such	  as	  schools	  or	  health	  clinics,	  there	  are	  no	  formal	  or	  fiscal	  ties	  between	  JSIT	  and	  PKS.	  However,	  they	  are	  ideologically	  unified	  and	  the	  Network	  is	  a	  strategic	  piece	  of	  the	  PKS’	  larger	  vision	  to	  Islamize	  the	  country	  politically	  and	  culturally.	  While	  the	  link	  is	  not	  formally	  promoted,	  it	  is	  no	  secret	  and	  the	  schools	  are	  often	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  general	  public	  as	  “PKS	  schools.”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  An	  important	  clarification	  on	  the	  use	  of	  JSIT	  and	  the	  more	  general	  term	  of	  integrated	  Islamic	  schools	  needs	  to	  be	  made.	  Most	  literature	  refers	  to	  JSIT	  schools	  as	  simply	  integrated	  Islamic	  schools	  (SIT),	  which	  they	  certainly	  are,	  seeing	  as	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  network,	  all	  of	  their	  schools	  have	  this	  in	  their	  title,	  and	  they	  claim	  to	  have	  coined	  the	  phrase.	  However,	  the	  few	  authors	  writing	  about	  integrated	  Islamic	  schools	  generally	  do	  not	  differentiate	  between	  JSIT	  schools	  and	  the	  multiple	  independent	  schools	  or	  education	  groups	  who	  also	  use	  the	  phrase.	  This	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  non-­‐JSIT	  integrated	  Islamic	  schools	  being	  associated	  with	  the	  politics	  of	  PKS.	  Many	  integrated	  Islamic	  schools	  do	  not	  want	  to	  identify	  with	  the	  political	  party	  and	  its	  platforms,	  although	  they	  do	  identify	  with	  their	  approaches	  to	  teaching	  Islam	  in	  schools	  and	  implementing	  Islam	  in	  form	  and	  practice.	  	  	  19	  Hefner’s	  reference	  included	  JSIT	  and	  Network	  of	  Hidayatullah	  Integral	  Schools.	  However,	  JSIT	  is	  the	  larger	  network	  of	  the	  two.	  See	  chapter	  2	  for	  more	  details.	  	  
	  	  
19	  
While	  not	  achieving	  the	  same	  reputation	  as	  Al	  Azhar,	  JSIT	  schools	  are	  well-­‐respected	  among	  the	  middle	  class	  and	  are	  known	  to	  rival	  top	  state	  general	  schools	  in	  their	  communities.	  In	  chapter	  4,	  I	  provide	  details	  on	  this	  school	  group	  based	  on	  my	  research	  at	  the	  member	  school	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  campus	  in	  Jogja.	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT,	  along	  with	  other	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  school	  groups,	  are	  redefining	  formal	  Islamic	  schooling	  in	  urban	  Indonesia.	  Like	  the	  Muhammadiyah	  schools,	  they	  are	  run	  under	  MoNE	  to	  highlight	  their	  academic	  emphasis.	  There	  are	  six	  main	  facets	  that	  distinguish	  these	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schools	  from	  Indonesia’s	  more	  common	  Islamic	  schooling	  models	  (i.e.	  pesantren,	  madrasa,	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  schools):	  1)	  relatively	  expensive	  tuition	  and	  fees;	  2)	  a	  Qur’an-­‐based	  epistemology	  that	  guides	  the	  integration	  of	  Islamic	  knowledge	  and	  general	  knowledge	  in	  all	  subjects;	  3)	  an	  expanded	  religion	  curriculum	  on	  top	  of	  the	  full	  national	  curriculum;	  4)	  focus	  of	  religious	  curriculum	  on	  Islamic	  values	  and	  ethics	  rather	  than	  the	  more	  traditional	  subjects,	  such	  as	  fiqh	  (jurisprudence)	  or	  tafsir	  (commentary	  on	  the	  Qur’an);	  5)	  an	  extended	  school	  day,	  releasing	  students	  one	  to	  three	  hours	  later	  than	  state	  general	  schools	  and	  other	  private	  Islamic	  day	  schools;	  and	  6)	  no	  association	  with	  formal	  Islamic	  organizations	  (i.e.	  Muhammadiyah	  or	  NU).	   Extended-­‐day	  schools	  have	  reimagined	  or	  re-­‐imaged	  Islamic	  schooling	  to	  be	  rigorous	  in	  both	  academics	  and	  religion,	  and	  have	  integrated	  the	  two	  fields	  within	  the	  classroom	  by	  teaching	  the	  national	  education	  curriculum	  within	  an	  Islamic	  framework.	  Qur’anic	  knowledge	  and	  discussions	  of	  God’s	  hand	  in	  history	  and	  science	  are	  not	  only	  integrated	  into	  all	  subject	  matter,	  but	  take	  precedence	  over	  human	  knowledge	  if	  the	  two	  are	  in	  conflict.	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  intent	  of	  this	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology	  and	  Qur’an-­‐based	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epistemology	  goes	  beyond	  educating	  students	  to	  know	  their	  facts	  according	  to	  science	  and	  the	  Qur’an;	  its	  aim	  is	  to	  engender	  piety	  among	  students	  by	  instilling	  intellectual	  respect	  for	  God	  and	  indebtedness	  to	  God’s	  benevolence.	  Therefore,	  these	  schools,	  much	  like	  the	  piety	  movements	  across	  the	  Muslim	  world,	  aim	  to	  not	  only	  teach	  about	  Islam,	  but	  to	  motivate	  students	  to	  incorporate	  Islam	  into	  all	  aspects	  of	  their	  lives,	  to	  live	  with	  Islamic	  values,	  to	  develop	  Islamic	  character,	  and	  to	  be	  pious.	  	  Both	  school	  groups	  consider	  that	  their	  independence	  from	  religious	  organizations20	  allows	  them	  to	  promote	  a	  universal,	  rather	  than	  an	  organization-­‐specific,	  Islam.21	  However,	  the	  schools	  conceptualize	  a	  universal	  Islam	  quite	  differently.	  Al	  Azhar	  views	  a	  universal	  Islam	  as	  inclusive.	  This	  concept	  of	  universal	  means	  “all	  encompassing”	  (Collier	  and	  Ong	  2005:9-­‐10).	  Universal	  Islam	  to	  them	  welcomes	  all	  forms	  for	  worship.22	  Al	  Azhar,	  therefore,	  promotes	  a	  pluralistic	  Islam	  that	  allows	  for	  flexibility	  in	  how	  one	  demonstrates	  piety.	  This	  widens	  the	  boundaries	  of	  who	  is	  considered	  a	  pious	  Muslim.	  More	  in	  line	  with	  transnational	  trends,	  JSIT	  considers	  a	  universal	  Islam	  to	  be	  a	  normative,	  standardized,	  and	  “deculturalized”	  form	  of	  practice	  that	  is	  therefore	  applicable	  to	  all.	  This	  conceptualization	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  As	  noted	  previously,	  JSIT	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  Islamic	  Prosperous	  Justice	  Party	  (PKS).	  However,	  this	  is	  a	  political	  party	  and	  therefore	  not	  considered	  a	  religious	  organization	  in	  the	  same	  sense	  as	  the	  non-­‐political	  community	  organizations	  or	  ormas	  (organisasi	  masyarakat)	  such	  as	  NU,	  Muhammadiyah,	  and	  other	  religious	  organizations.	  The	  blurring	  of	  boundaries	  between	  PKS	  as	  a	  political	  party	  and	  a	  religious	  organization	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  chapter	  2.	  	  	  21	  In	  Islam,	  a	  religious	  organization	  is	  the	  closest	  parallel	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  denomination	  within	  Christianity.	  Consequently,	  the	  closest	  equivalent	  to	  a	  Christian	  denomination	  in	  Indonesia’s	  landscape	  of	  Islamic	  practices	  are	  religious	  organizations,	  such	  as	  NU	  or	  Muhammadiyah,	  to	  name	  the	  two	  largest.	  These	  religious	  organizations	  promote	  specific	  and	  distinct	  interpretations	  of	  holy	  texts	  and	  forms	  of	  rituals	  and	  acts	  of	  worship,	  resulting	  in	  group-­‐specific	  practices,	  cultures	  and	  customs.	  	  22	  It	  is	  recognized	  that	  Al	  Azhar	  does	  have	  a	  bounded	  definition	  of	  Islam,	  and	  is	  therefore	  exclusive	  to	  a	  certain	  extent.	  For	  example,	  the	  Ahmadiyah	  group,	  a	  group	  that	  claims	  to	  be	  Muslim	  but	  also	  claims	  to	  follow	  a	  current	  prophet	  and	  therefore	  does	  not	  accept	  the	  Prophet	  Muhammad	  as	  the	  last	  and	  final	  prophet,	  is	  not	  considered	  to	  be	  Muslim	  by	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  Indonesian	  Muslims.	  Al	  Azhar	  teachers	  on	  a	  survey	  I	  administered	  but	  is	  not	  discussed	  in	  this	  dissertation,	  did	  not	  agree	  with	  permitting	  this	  group	  to	  operate	  in	  the	  country.	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considers	  the	  “universal,”	  as	  Collier	  and	  Ong	  (2005)	  discuss	  it,	  to	  be	  a	  “phenomena	  whose	  significance	  and	  validity	  are	  not	  dependent	  on	  the	  ‘props’	  of	  a	  ‘culture’	  or	  a	  ‘society’.	  	  They	  are	  rather…‘based	  on	  impersonal	  principles,	  which	  can	  be	  set	  out	  and	  developed	  without	  regard	  to	  context’”	  (Collier	  and	  Ong	  2005,	  quoting	  Giddens,	  “Living	  a	  Post-­‐Traditional	  society,”	  pp.	  58-­‐59).23	  In	  JSIT’s	  perspective,	  Muslims	  are	  beholden	  to	  a	  normative	  standard	  regardless	  of	  time	  and	  space.	  Motivated	  by	  this	  perspective,	  the	  JSIT	  promotes	  a	  more	  exacting	  approach	  to	  Islam	  that	  more	  narrowly	  defines	  piety.	  These	  varying	  conceptualizations	  are	  crucial	  in	  shaping	  the	  unique	  models	  of	  Islam,	  and	  therefore	  piety,	  taught	  to	  students	  at	  each	  school.	  The	  school	  groups’	  motivations	  for	  promoting	  their	  particular	  versions	  of	  universal	  Islam	  are	  as	  different	  as	  their	  conceptualizations.	  I	  argue	  that	  Al	  Azhar	  is	  motivated	  by	  quality	  of	  relationships	  between	  groups,	  maintaining	  mutual	  respect,	  and	  preserving	  harmony	  in	  society.	  This	  necessitates	  a	  flexible	  approach	  to	  practices	  and	  imposes	  only	  basic,	  common	  standards	  among	  all	  practicing	  Muslims.	  While	  welcoming,	  this	  approach	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  being	  criticized	  for	  compromising	  important	  standards,	  being	  too	  unstructured	  in	  specifics,	  and	  therefore	  being	  a	  watered-­‐down	  version	  of	  Islam.	  I	  also	  argue	  that	  JSIT	  is	  motivated	  by	  principle.	  Disciplined	  obedience	  to	  a	  high	  standard	  is	  prized.	  This	  exacting	  approach	  risks	  being	  perceived	  as	  exclusive	  and	  alienating	  individuals	  who	  do	  not	  conform.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  In	  this	  perspective,	  a	  universal	  Islam	  is	  much	  like	  the	  1948	  UN	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  “a	  common	  standard	  of	  achievement	  for	  all	  peoples	  and	  all	  nations.”	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Conceptual	  Framework:	  Piety	  Projects	  This	  dissertation	  draws	  primarily	  upon	  anthropology’s	  literatures	  of	  religion,	  class,	  education,	  and	  Indonesia.	  This	  research	  has	  particular	  significance	  for	  understanding	  the	  intersection	  of	  Islamic	  movements,	  Islamic	  education,	  and	  the	  religious	  middle	  class.	  The	  two	  schools’	  opposing	  versions	  of	  piety	  have	  significant	  ramifications	  for	  middle-­‐class	  subjectivities,	  religious	  tolerance,	  and	  national	  politics.	  Initially,	  reform	  associated	  with	  the	  worldwide	  revival	  of	  Islam	  was	  spoken	  of	  largely	  in	  terms	  of	  politics;	  but	  in	  recent	  years,	  focus	  on	  social	  and	  cultural	  reforms	  has	  greatly	  increased.	  While	  political	  reform	  focuses	  on	  the	  legal	  structures,	  social	  and	  cultural	  reform	  focuses	  on	  individuals.	  The	  development	  of	  individual	  piety,	  or	  the	  (re)formation	  of	  one’s	  religious	  dispositions,	  has	  become	  a	  key	  means	  to	  social	  and	  cultural	  reform	  within	  local	  Islamic	  revival	  efforts	  (Brenner	  1996;	  Deeb	  2006;	  Hirschkind	  2009;	  Mahmood	  2004;	  Rinaldo	  2007;	  Rudnyckyj	  2006).	  This	  dissertation	  offers	  a	  unique	  examination	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  on	  educational	  reform	  efforts	  in	  Indonesia.	  The	  significant	  emphasis	  al-­‐Banna	  put	  on	  education	  is	  often	  overshadowed	  in	  the	  press	  and	  scholarly	  research	  by	  the	  political	  nature	  of	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  groups.	  The	  importance	  of	  education	  and	  its	  power	  to	  effect	  change,	  however,	  was	  not	  lost	  on	  the	  Tarbiyah	  Movement-­‐cum-­‐PKS	  (Hasan	  2009;	  Machmudi	  2006).	  In	  accordance	  with	  Indonesian	  law,	  PKS	  does	  not	  directly	  sponsor	  or	  finance	  JSIT;	  however,	  PKS	  cadre	  members	  established	  and	  manage	  JSIT	  headquarters	  and	  most	  JSIT	  member	  schools.	  JSIT	  schools	  teach	  Islamic	  principles	  and	  promote	  religious	  subjectivities	  of	  the	  Tarbiyah	  Movement,	  or	  transnational-­‐style	  Islam.	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Mahmood	  (2004)	  argues	  the	  reform	  efforts	  of	  Egypt’s	  piety	  movement,	  as	  she	  terms	  it,	  were	  not	  aimed	  at	  challenging	  political	  secularism,	  but	  rather	  social	  and	  cultural	  secularism.	  In	  other	  words,	  activists	  did	  not	  work	  to	  influence	  issues	  of	  the	  state,	  such	  as	  arguing	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  Shari’ah	  as	  governing	  law.	  Rather,	  they	  opposed	  a	  secularism	  that	  formulated	  religion	  as	  a	  sphere	  of	  life	  (economic,	  legal,	  familial,	  etc.)	  rather	  than	  a	  way	  of	  life.	  Activists	  aimed	  to	  “imbue	  each	  of	  the	  various	  spheres	  of	  contemporary	  life	  with	  a	  regulative	  sensibility	  that	  takes	  its	  cue	  from	  Islamic	  theological	  corpus	  rather	  than	  from	  modern	  secular	  ethics”	  (Mahmood	  2004:47).	  Religion	  was	  to	  be	  a	  way	  in	  which	  to	  regulate	  one’s	  life	  and	  gauge	  one’s	  character	  regardless	  of	  the	  public	  or	  private	  contexts	  in	  which	  one	  participated	  throughout	  the	  day—employment,	  education,	  domestic	  life,	  or	  social	  activities.	  	  Mahmood	  (2004),	  building	  upon	  Foucault’s	  notions	  of	  ethics	  to	  be	  “local	  and	  particular”	  rather	  than	  universal,	  demonstrated	  that	  while	  activists	  of	  Egypt’s	  piety	  movement	  had	  similar	  goals,	  their	  forms	  of	  piety	  were	  not	  uniform	  (28).	  For	  Foucault,	  morals	  are	  a	  “set	  of	  norms,	  rules,	  values	  and	  injunctions,”	  while	  ethics	  refers	  to	  the	  “practices,	  techniques,	  and	  discourses”	  through	  which	  “highly	  specific	  ethical-­‐moral	  subjects	  come	  to	  be	  formed”	  (Mahmood	  2004:28).	  In	  this	  process	  of	  subject	  formation,	  an	  individual’s	  ethical	  subjectivity	  is	  an	  “affect	  of	  a	  modality	  of	  power	  operationalized	  through	  a	  set	  of	  moral	  codes	  that	  summon	  a	  subject	  to	  constitute	  herself	  in	  accord	  with	  its	  precepts”	  (Mahmood	  2004:28).	  Various	  “prescriptive	  agencies,	  such	  as	  family…educational	  institutions	  or	  churches”	  promote	  their	  own	  similar	  or	  disparate	  morals	  and	  ethics	  (Foucault	  1985:25).	  Mahmood	  (2004)	  argued,	  within	  one	  cultural	  and	  historical	  space,	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there	  are	  various	  configurations	  of	  personal	  piety;	  each	  variation	  is	  a	  product	  of	  “specific	  discursive	  formation	  rather	  than	  of	  the	  culture	  at	  large”	  (120).	  	  A	  key	  mechanism	  for	  the	  development	  of	  piety	  within	  piety	  movements	  is	  education:	  formal	  and	  informal,	  state-­‐sponsored	  and	  private.	  The	  expansion	  of	  Islamic	  education	  activities	  since	  the	  encounter	  of	  the	  Muslim	  world	  with	  colonial	  powers	  has	  been	  facilitated	  through	  the	  objectification	  of	  Islam,	  or	  the	  conceptualizing	  of	  religion	  into	  a	  system	  of	  specific	  beliefs	  and	  practices	  that	  can	  be	  intellectually	  examined,	  comprehended,	  reformed	  and	  purified,	  and	  transmitted	  through	  schooling	  (Eickelman	  1992).	  This	  objectification	  of	  Islam	  has	  contributed	  to	  a	  “democratization”	  of	  religious	  knowledge,	  redefining	  what	  can	  be	  considered	  legitimate	  religious	  knowledge	  and	  who	  can	  be	  considered	  a	  religious	  specialist	  (Deeb	  2006;	  Eickelman	  1992;	  Messick	  1993),	  and	  how	  it	  can	  be	  transmitted	  (Hirschkind	  2006;	  Eickelman	  &	  Anderson	  2003).	  This	  greater	  access	  to	  the	  now	  portable	  knowledge	  of	  Islam	  allows	  for	  more	  individuals	  to	  establish	  new	  institutions	  of	  learning	  as	  legitimate	  locations	  for	  religious	  instruction.	  In	  Indonesia,	  this	  is	  seen	  in	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  private	  religious	  schooling	  market	  through	  growing	  numbers	  of	  schools	  sponsored	  by	  individuals	  and	  groups	  who	  are	  not	  connected	  to	  formal	  religious	  groups	  and	  are	  led	  by	  individuals	  without	  traditional	  training	  in	  Islam.	  	  To	  look	  at	  educational	  efforts	  within	  Indonesia’s	  Islamic	  schooling	  market,	  I	  draw	  upon	  Bartlett’s	  (2003)	  concept	  of	  educational	  projects.	  Bartlett	  introduces	  the	  concept	  of	  educational	  projects	  to	  compare	  two	  programs	  competing	  to	  define	  and	  influence	  popular	  concepts	  of	  adult	  literacy	  in	  Brazil.	  She	  argues	  that	  educational	  projects	  include	  “theory,	  pedagogy,	  philosophy,	  training,	  and	  institutions	  plus	  a	  variety	  of	  social	  actors	  and	  social	  practices;”	  they	  also	  “simultaneously	  work	  at	  the	  cultural/discursive	  and	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political/structural	  levels”	  (Bartlett	  2003:187).	  Educational	  projects	  “shape	  how	  we	  think	  about	  things	  as	  intimate	  as	  knowledge,	  intelligence,	  and	  personhood,	  even	  while	  they	  structure	  our	  material	  world”	  (Bartlett	  2003:187).	  	  The	  school	  groups	  of	  this	  study	  are	  not	  only	  educational	  and	  class	  projects	  (see	  chapter	  7	  on	  middle-­‐class	  parents),	  but	  more	  specifically	  piety	  projects.	  Extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schools	  are	  conceived	  within	  the	  formal	  structure	  of	  the	  national	  education	  system.	  Unlike	  the	  religiously-­‐themed	  informal	  educational	  component	  (generally	  study	  circles)	  of	  piety	  movements	  throughout	  the	  world	  that	  focus	  on	  religious	  themes,	  these	  schools	  address	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  education,	  integrating	  religion	  and	  academic	  subjects	  into	  one	  epistemological	  framework.	  The	  schools	  must	  be	  academically	  competitive	  to	  succeed	  in	  the	  middle-­‐class	  milieu	  in	  which	  they	  operate.	  They	  distinguish	  themselves	  from	  other	  high-­‐performing	  general	  and	  religious	  schools	  through	  the	  non-­‐cognitive	  or	  non-­‐academic	  curriculum	  they	  offer,	  namely	  religion	  and,	  more	  specifically,	  piety.	  Religion	  is	  not	  only	  a	  subject	  matter	  to	  be	  cognitively	  mastered,	  but	  also	  to	  be	  embodied	  by	  the	  students,	  displayed	  through	  their	  moral	  character,	  and	  identified	  by	  their	  piety.	  There	  are	  two	  components	  to	  piety:	  1)	  the	  proper	  performance	  of	  religious	  duties	  and	  acts	  of	  worship;	  and,	  more	  fundamentally	  important,	  2)	  Islamic	  character,	  or	  daily	  conduct	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  principles	  of	  devotion	  and	  moral	  and	  virtuous	  behavior	  (Mahmood	  2004).	  	  The	  specific	  forms	  of	  schooling	  shape	  distinct	  forms	  of	  religious	  subjectivities	  within	  their	  students.	  McLeod	  (2000),	  employing	  Bourdieu’s	  notions	  of	  “habitus”	  and	  “field,”	  argues	  that	  schools	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  “paradigmatic	  social	  fields…in	  which	  practices,	  discourses	  and	  ethos	  of	  particular	  kinds	  of	  schooling	  shape	  the	  dispositions	  and	  ways	  of	  being	  of	  young	  people”	  (503).	  In	  the	  same	  vein	  as	  the	  piety	  movement	  of	  Egypt,	  the	  piety	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projects	  of	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schools	  aim	  to	  instill	  Islamic	  “regulative	  sensibilities”	  in	  students	  through	  a	  new	  way	  of	  Islamic	  schooling	  that	  integrates	  Islam	  into	  all	  subject	  matters.	  In	  addition	  to	  introducing	  Islamic	  practices	  within	  government	  school	  structures,	  such	  as	  group	  prayer	  or	  Islamic	  dress	  codes,	  as	  documented	  in	  places	  like	  Morocco	  (Boyle	  2006)	  and	  Egypt	  (Herrera	  2003),	  the	  schools	  of	  this	  study	  have	  also	  reframed	  national	  curriculum	  within	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology	  (see	  chapter	  6)	  in	  order	  to	  not	  only	  teach	  Islamic	  practices,	  but	  to	  also	  imbed	  comprehensive	  affinities	  to	  Islam	  and	  God	  at	  a	  deeper	  level	  within	  students.	  While	  using	  the	  same	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology	  approach	  to	  knowledge,	  the	  schools’	  disparate	  approaches	  to	  Islam	  shape	  different	  religious	  subjectivities	  within	  students.	  These	  piety	  projects	  compete	  for	  “hegemonic	  control	  over	  popular	  conceptualizations”	  (Bartlett	  2003:187)	  of	  piety	  and	  being	  a	  good	  Muslim.	  They	  influence	  ideas	  about	  religion’s	  place	  in	  public	  and	  private	  spheres,	  male−female	  interactions,	  religious	  tolerance,	  and	  national	  politics.	  The	  schools	  teach	  their	  students	  how	  to	  accommodate,	  assimilate,	  and	  reject	  various	  outside	  influences,	  such	  as	  Western	  knowledge	  and	  transnational	  Islam.	  They	  teach	  students	  what	  a	  “good	  Muslim”	  and	  moral	  character	  look	  like.	  However,	  the	  school	  groups’	  motivations	  for	  promoting	  their	  particular	  versions	  of	  Islam	  and	  their	  conceptualizations	  of	  piety	  vary	  in	  significant	  ways.	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  the	  two	  school	  groups	  are	  emblematic	  of	  the	  currently	  polarizing	  approaches	  to	  Islam	  in	  Indonesia	  identified	  by	  Ricklefs	  (2008).	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  study,	  I	  focus	  on	  a	  subset	  of	  Ricklefs’	  (2008:123)	  differentiating	  parameters	  of	  these	  two	  groups	  to	  highlight	  the	  factors	  that	  contribute	  to	  the	  differences	  in	  schools’	  competing	  forms	  of	  piety.	  These	  parameters	  are:	  “attitudes	  towards	  interpretation	  of	  theology	  (liberal,	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flexible	  and	  contextual,	  or	  puritan,	  inflexible	  and	  scriptural),	  attitudes	  towards	  woman	  (favoring	  gender	  equality,	  or	  supporting	  separate	  roles	  and	  only	  prescribed	  interactions);	  attitude	  towards	  other	  religions,	  especially	  Christianity	  (welcoming,	  cooperative	  and	  tolerant,	  or	  opposed),	  attitudes	  towards	  mysticism	  (approving	  and	  embracing,	  or	  rejecting);	  [and]	  attitude	  towards	  indigenous	  culture	  (tolerant	  and	  open,	  or	  intolerant	  and	  opposed).”	  There	  are	  two	  parameters	  where	  the	  schools	  do	  not	  differ:	  “basic	  theology	  (Modernist	  or	  Orthodox,	  that	  is,	  rejecting	  or	  accepting	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  four	  Orthodox	  [Sunni]	  schools	  of	  law);	  and	  modus	  operandi	  (irenic,	  or	  assertive	  or	  indeed	  prepared	  to	  use	  violence)”	  (Ricklefs	  2008:123).	  However,	  while	  both	  are	  modernist	  in	  theology,	  rejecting	  the	  four	  Orthodox	  schools	  of	  law,	  their	  variations	  in	  interpretations	  of	  this	  Modernist	  theology	  generate	  differences	  in	  attitudes	  towards	  women,	  indigenous	  cultures,	  mysticism,	  and	  other	  religions.	  	  One	  final	  parameter	  is	  important	  to	  note:	  “political	  posture	  (detached	  from	  politics,	  or	  involved—the	  latter	  case	  whether	  publicly	  or	  clandestinely)”	  (Ricklefs	  2008:123).	  The	  schools’	  relationships	  to	  formal	  politics	  do	  not	  directly	  influence	  forms	  of	  piety;	  however,	  they	  do	  highlight	  great	  differences	  in	  the	  schools’	  larger	  formal	  ideological	  goals	  for	  formal	  national	  development,	  as	  JSIT	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  political	  party	  PKS.	  However,	  as	  Mahmood	  (2004)	  points	  out,	  while	  piety	  movements	  generally	  do	  not	  directly	  engage	  with	  politics,	  their	  transformative	  powers	  are	  immense,	  and	  the	  ethical	  influence	  on	  individuals	  can	  greatly	  influence	  politics.	  Both	  school	  groups	  are	  extremely	  aware	  of	  the	  political	  influence	  individual	  citizens	  can	  have	  in	  the	  political	  arena,	  and	  both	  see	  piety	  as	  a	  crucial	  form	  of	  citizenship	  (see	  chapter	  6).	  However,	  PKS-­‐linked	  JSIT	  has	  a	  more	  focused	  and	  formalized	  political	  agenda	  in	  the	  education	  of	  students.	  
	  	  
28	  
These	  piety	  projects	  are	  set	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Islamic	  middle	  class.	  The	  relatively	  high	  tuition	  and	  fees	  of	  these	  schools	  make	  them	  unaffordable	  for	  lower	  classes,	  the	  traditionally	  typical	  Islamic	  schooling	  population.	  Many	  scholars	  argue	  that	  the	  rise	  of	  Islamic	  piety	  in	  Indonesia	  has	  been	  a	  fundamentally	  middle-­‐class	  phenomenon	  (Brenner	  1996,	  Hefner	  2000,	  Smith-­‐Hefner	  2007,	  as	  cited	  by	  Jones	  2012:159).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  middle	  classes—more	  than	  other	  classes	  in	  Indonesia—are	  embracing	  a	  more	  Islamic	  lifestyle.	  The	  new	  prominence	  of	  Islam	  in	  the	  Indonesian	  public	  sphere	  since	  the	  late	  1980s	  has	  assumed	  a	  “moral	  tone	  for	  the	  middle	  class	  position	  between	  the	  working	  classes	  and	  the	  wealthy”	  (Jones	  2012:159).	  The	  anxieties	  around	  this	  relatively	  new	  phenomenon	  of	  middle-­‐classness	  in	  Indonesia	  stem	  from,	  among	  other	  things,	  the	  incompatibility	  between	  wealth	  and	  morality,	  and	  in	  particular	  consumption	  and	  corruption	  (Jones	  2012).	  Indonesia	  is	  well	  known	  for	  its	  high	  levels	  of	  corruption.24	  This	  corruption	  is	  seen	  both	  internally	  and	  internationally	  as	  a	  key	  impediment	  to	  the	  country’s	  economic	  development.	  Jones	  (2012)	  argues	  that	  the	  rise	  in	  public	  forms	  of	  Islamic	  piety	  is	  a	  partial	  solution	  to	  public	  anxieties	  about	  corruption.	  I	  argue,	  more	  specifically,	  that	  the	  rise	  in	  Islamic	  schooling	  among	  the	  middle	  classes	  is	  due	  to	  parental	  expectations	  that	  it	  will	  safeguard	  children	  against	  moral	  corruption.	  No	  less	  important,	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  schools’	  academic	  programs	  also	  provided	  the	  educational	  foundation	  for	  future	  education	  and	  training	  students	  need	  to	  be	  successful	  professionals,	  thus	  maintaining	  middle-­‐class	  status.	  The	  aspirations,	  dilemmas,	  and	  anxieties	  of	  the	  newly	  religious	  middle	  classes,	  particularly	  in	  relation	  to	  tensions	  between	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Indonesia	  is	  constantly	  at	  the	  top	  of	  lists	  of	  corrupt	  countries	  in	  the	  world.	  Jones	  (2012)	  provides	  a	  thorough	  analysis	  of	  the	  forms	  of	  monetary	  corruption	  that	  can	  take	  place,	  particularly	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  feminized	  work	  in	  the	  home.	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morality,	  consumption,	  and	  corruption,	  create	  ready	  consumers	  for	  the	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  school	  market.	  	  	  
Research	  Setting	  and	  Methodology	  The	  bulk	  of	  my	  research	  took	  place	  in	  Yogyakarta	  (hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  Jogja),	  Central	  Java.	  The	  city	  and	  the	  surrounding	  areas	  are	  home	  to	  3.5	  million	  people.	  Jogja,	  the	  cultural	  capital	  of	  Indonesia	  and	  a	  university	  town	  with	  six	  major	  universities,	  is	  also	  the	  headquarters	  of	  Muhammadiyah,	  the	  country’s	  second	  largest	  Islamic	  organization.	  In	  2009,	  Muhammadiyah	  schools	  accounted	  for	  86%	  of	  all	  primary	  Islamic	  schools	  in	  the	  Yogyakarta	  province	  (author’s	  calculation	  from	  MoNE	  2009	  data).	  As	  such,	  Jogja	  provided	  an	  interesting	  setting	  to	  look	  at	  the	  development	  of	  newcomers	  to	  the	  Muhammadiyah-­‐dominated	  modern	  Islamic	  schooling	  market.	  I	  made	  several	  trips	  to	  Jakarta	  for	  interviews	  with	  leadership	  at	  headquarters	  of	  both	  school	  groups.	  The	  two	  school	  groups	  of	  focus	  for	  this	  study	  are	  arguably	  the	  two	  most	  influential	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  school	  groups	  in	  the	  country:	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  the	  JSIT,	  the	  Network	  of	  Integrated	  Islamic	  Schools	  (JSIT).	  Azhar	  is	  one	  of	  the,	  if	  not	  the	  most,	  well-­‐respected	  names	  in	  modern	  Islamic	  schooling	  in	  Indonesia.	  Al	  Azhar	  has	  65	  primary	  and	  secondary	  schools	  throughout	  the	  country,	  the	  majority	  of	  which	  are	  in	  the	  Jakarta	  area.	  It	  is	  also	  the	  largest	  foundation	  not	  associated	  with	  an	  Islamic	  organization	  (such	  as	  Muhammadiyah)	  managing	  Islamic	  schools	  promoting	  the	  Indonesian	  approach	  to	  Islam.	  JSIT	  has	  a	  significantly	  greater	  presence	  throughout	  the	  archipelago,	  with	  over	  550	  primary	  and	  secondary	  member	  schools.	  It	  is	  the	  largest	  organized	  network	  of	  modern	  Islamic	  schools	  promoting	  a	  transnational	  approach	  to	  Islam	  in	  the	  country.	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As	  my	  objective	  for	  this	  research	  project	  was	  to	  understand	  the	  new	  trend	  in	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schools	  in	  urban	  areas,	  I	  located	  myself	  in	  Jogja,	  a	  burgeoning	  urban	  center	  where	  there	  is	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schools.	  In	  Jogja,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  my	  research,	  there	  was	  only	  one	  operating	  Al	  Azhar	  campus,	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  in	  the	  Sleman	  district.	  That	  same	  year	  there	  were	  16	  JSIT	  primary	  schools	  in	  operation.	  I	  selected	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  Integrated	  Islamic	  Primary	  School	  (Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT)	  as	  my	  JSIT	  research	  site	  for	  its	  historical	  role	  in	  the	  city,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  reputation	  throughout	  the	  network.	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  is	  the	  longest-­‐running	  JSIT	  school	  in	  the	  Jogja	  area,	  as	  well	  as	  one	  of	  the	  first	  in	  the	  country.	  Additionally,	  as	  the	  school	  was	  touted	  as	  an	  exemplary	  JSIT	  school	  by	  national	  and	  regional-­‐level	  leadership,	  I	  selected	  it	  for	  its	  representation	  of	  JSIT	  ideals	  in	  school	  performance.	  I	  also	  chose	  this	  school	  for	  the	  rich	  institutional	  history	  available	  through	  two	  original	  founders	  still	  on	  the	  school	  board.	  	   The	  bulk	  of	  my	  data	  comes	  from	  interviews	  and	  some	  observations.	  I	  conducted	  over	  120	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  with	  an	  array	  of	  stakeholders	  involved	  with	  the	  two	  school	  groups,	  namely	  leadership	  at	  the	  two	  organizations’	  headquarters	  in	  Jakarta	  (n=13),	  founders	  and	  board	  members	  (n=18),	  school	  administration	  (n=15),	  teachers	  (n=27),	  and	  parents	  (n=14)	  from	  the	  two	  schools	  in	  Jogja.	  I	  also	  conducted	  18	  structured	  group	  interviews	  with	  students	  in	  grades	  four	  and	  six	  from	  both	  schools.	  I	  conducted	  observations	  in	  classrooms	  as	  well	  as	  common	  areas	  for	  teachers,	  and	  attended	  school	  events.	  Outside	  of	  the	  two	  school	  groups,	  I	  conducted	  37	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  with	  Ministry	  of	  National	  Education	  and	  Ministry	  of	  Religious	  Affairs	  officers	  (n=4),	  religious	  activists,	  and	  leaders	  and	  scholars	  from	  the	  larger	  Islamic	  community	  (n=29)	  and	  other	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extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schools	  (n=4)	  to	  understand	  their	  perceptions	  of	  these	  two	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  school	  groups.	  	  Interviews	  were	  recorded,	  transcribed,	  and	  then	  analyzed	  using	  Atlas.ti	  software.	  I	  created	  a	  content-­‐driven	  coding	  system	  structured	  around	  general	  themes	  that	  immerged	  during	  the	  data	  collection	  process.	  Upon	  coding	  transcripts,	  new	  themes	  and	  sub-­‐themes	  emerged	  and	  were	  added	  to	  the	  codebook.	  After	  coding	  a	  subset	  of	  transcripts,	  I	  revised	  the	  coding	  system	  and	  began	  recoding	  again	  from	  the	  beginning,	  making	  small	  adjustments	  as	  I	  worked	  through	  the	  entire	  data	  set.	  After	  coding	  was	  completed,	  I	  culled	  quotes	  based	  on	  themes	  to	  explore	  relationships	  between	  and	  within	  the	  school	  groups	  and	  the	  larger	  public.	  To	  supplement	  parent	  interview	  data,	  I	  conducted	  a	  survey	  of	  parents	  from	  both	  schools	  through	  self-­‐administered	  questionnaires.	  The	  questionnaires	  were	  distributed	  through	  the	  classroom	  teachers,	  via	  students,	  to	  all	  parents.	  Complete	  questionnaires	  were	  then	  returned	  to	  the	  teachers	  through	  the	  students	  and	  collected	  at	  the	  main	  office.	  A	  total	  of	  229	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  and	  708	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  parent	  surveys	  were	  collected,	  achieving	  83%	  and	  88%	  return	  rates	  respectively.	  The	  data	  was	  analyzed	  using	  Stata	  statistical	  software.	  	  
Organization	  of	  Dissertation	  	   In	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  context	  for	  the	  arguments	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  chapter	  2	  maps	  out	  two	  points	  of	  difference	  between	  the	  Indonesian	  and	  transnational	  camps’	  approaches	  to	  politics	  and	  Qur’anic	  interpretations	  regarding	  innovation	  in	  Islamic	  practices.	  The	  mainstream	  Islamic	  organizations	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  represent	  Indonesian	  Islam.	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The	  PKS	  Islamic	  political	  party,	  inspired	  by	  the	  Egyptian	  Muslim	  Brotherhood,	  represents	  transnational	  Islam.	  The	  two	  sides	  disagree	  on	  the	  role	  of	  Islamic	  law	  in	  national	  politics	  and	  the	  role	  of	  pre-­‐Islamic	  Indonesian	  culture	  in	  Islamic	  practices.	  As	  a	  challenger	  to	  the	  status	  quo,	  PKS	  has	  an	  uphill	  battle	  as	  it	  exerts	  influence	  to	  reconfigure	  what	  the	  public	  views	  as	  mainstream.	  	   The	  flexible	  Islam	  promoted	  by	  the	  Al	  Azhar	  school	  group	  is	  emblematic	  of	  Indonesian	  Islam.	  Chapter	  2	  describes	  Al	  Azhar	  in	  general	  and	  the	  Jogja	  campus	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  specifically	  to	  illustrate	  the	  attitudes	  and	  practices	  that	  contribute	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  flexible	  Islam	  they	  promote.	  Drawing	  on	  interviews	  with	  leadership	  and	  teachers	  at	  the	  national	  and	  local	  levels,	  I	  show	  that	  Al	  Azhar’s	  flexible	  Islam	  is	  comprised	  of	  three	  interrelated	  components:	  Qur’an-­‐	  and	  Hadith-­‐based	  beliefs,	  inclusivity,	  and	  pluralism.	  This	  set	  of	  parameters	  facilitates	  an	  easy	  compatibility	  with	  mainstream	  Indonesian	  culture.	  While	  Islamic	  values,	  such	  as	  honesty,	  respect	  for	  elders,	  hard	  work,	  and	  service	  to	  others,	  are	  standardized,	  various	  forms	  of	  Islamic	  practices	  are	  honored	  as	  legitimate	  forms	  of	  worship.	  As	  such,	  piety	  can	  be	  expressed	  in	  multiple	  ways,	  the	  focus	  being	  on	  the	  participation	  in	  Islamic	  practices,	  making	  form	  secondary	  to	  observance.	  	  	   The	  exacting	  Islam	  championed	  by	  the	  JSIT	  school	  group	  is	  characteristic	  of	  transnational	  Islam.	  Chapter	  Four	  reviews	  JSIT	  in	  general	  and	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  in	  Jogja	  specifically	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  approaches	  and	  practices	  that	  combine	  to	  create	  the	  exacting	  Islam	  they	  promote.	  The	  Egyptian	  Muslim	  Brotherhood-­‐inspired	  Tarbiyah	  Movement	  is	  institutionally	  represented	  by	  the	  Islamic	  political	  party	  PKS	  and	  ideologically	  drives	  JSIT.	  Based	  on	  interviews	  with	  leadership	  and	  teachers	  at	  the	  national	  and	  local	  levels,	  I	  illustrate	  the	  three	  interrelated	  components	  of	  JSIT’s	  exacting	  Islam	  to	  be:	  Qur’an-­‐	  
	  	  
33	  
and	  Hadith-­‐based	  beliefs,	  standardized	  practices,	  and	  exacting	  adherence.	  While	  the	  general	  public	  highly	  values	  the	  Islamic	  morals	  and	  values	  promoted	  at	  the	  school,	  observers	  frequently	  criticize	  the	  standardized,	  mono-­‐traditional	  approach	  to	  Islamic	  practices	  as	  exclusive	  and	  rigid.	  This	  school	  promotes	  a	  specific,	  explicitly	  defined	  form	  of	  piety,	  requiring	  disciplined	  adherence	  regardless	  of	  time	  of	  space.	  	  	  	   Specific	  forms	  of	  schooling	  promote	  specific	  forms	  of	  religious	  subjectivities.	  Based	  on	  group	  interviews	  with	  students,	  chapter	  5	  investigates	  the	  correlation	  between	  the	  type	  of	  Islam	  taught	  at	  each	  school	  and	  the	  respective	  schools’	  students’	  religious	  subjectivities.	  Students’	  religious	  inclinations	  from	  both	  schools	  were	  fairly	  similar	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  prominence	  of	  religion	  in	  future	  educational	  and	  professional	  aspirations.	  However,	  differences	  between	  students’	  conceptualizations	  of	  a	  “good	  Muslim”	  and	  moral	  subjectivities	  generally	  mirrored	  the	  schools’	  unique	  approaches	  to	  Islam.	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  students’	  diversified	  conceptualization	  of	  a	  good	  Muslim	  offered	  greater	  moral	  flexibility	  in	  accepting	  and	  interpreting	  deviant	  moral	  behavior.	  The	  majority	  of	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  students’	  focused	  conceptualizations	  of	  a	  good	  Muslim	  aligned	  with	  a	  less	  flexible	  moral	  subjectivity	  that	  left	  little	  room	  for	  situational	  considerations	  for	  deviant	  moral	  conduct.	  	  	   Both	  school	  groups	  view	  piety	  as	  a	  crucial	  form	  of	  national	  citizenship.	  Although	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT	  conceptualizations	  of	  piety	  differ,	  they	  both	  agree	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  piety	  for	  both	  the	  individual	  and	  the	  nation.	  Based	  on	  interviews	  with	  leadership	  and	  teachers	  from	  the	  national	  and	  local	  levels,	  chapter	  6	  lays	  out	  the	  schools’	  employment	  of	  what	  I	  term	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology	  to	  instill	  piety	  in	  students	  while	  teaching	  the	  national	  curriculum.	  The	  components	  of	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology	  are	  intended	  to	  create	  an	  intellectual	  respect	  for	  and	  emotional	  indebtedness	  to	  God,	  which	  in	  turn	  is	  meant	  to	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Figure 1. Map of Islamic Educational Institutions in Indonesia, Primary and Secondary School 
	  
Data Sources: 
Pesantren and Madrasa: EMIS of Directorate General of Islamic Education, 2008. 
www.kemenag.go.id/index.php?a=artikel&id2=data2008 retrieved January 20, 2011. Data for 2008. 
Muhammadiyah: Personal communication with Secretary of Central Board Muhammadiyah, Oct. 31, 
2011. 
Network of Integrated Islamic Schools: JSIT website, JSIT Membership, retrieved October 20, 2010. Data 
for 2010. 
Al-Azhar: Personal communication with Al-Azhar, October 25, 2010. Data is for the year 2010. 
Hidayatullah: Hefner, Robert (2009). Islamic Schools, Social Movements, and Democracy in Indonesia. 
In Making Modern Muslims: The politics of Islamic education in Southeast Asia. Robert Hefner (ed.) Pp. 
55-105. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. Data for the year 2007. 
*This number is for boarding facilities only; while the majority of pesantren are boarding facilities, some 
are not. Also, this number it is not specific to primary and secondary facilities. College students also 
attend and board at pesantren in order to continue their religious education while attending university. It 
is unclear and thus must be assumed that this number also includes facilities for tertiary level students. 
**This number includes pre-primary schools. 
***This is an estimation, as there is not way to calculate a more exact number.  
Note: While madrasas and pesantren are Islamic schools, they differ from the “Islamic school” category 
as they fall under the aegis of the Ministry of Religious Affairs rather than the Ministry of National 
Education. While it is debated to have been earlier, many scholars agree that the first pesantren were 
established in the 16th century while the first madrasas were established in the early 20th century. 
Under the aegis of the Ministry of National Education, schools have greater freedom with curriculum. 
The Al-Azhar and Network of Integrated Islamic Schools are considered elite since their school fees are 
generally expensive and thus exclusive. The Muhammadiyah (MUH) schools were first established in 
1920s; while the first al-Azhar school was established in the 1960s, al-Azhar’s expansion of campuses 
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Battles	  over	  politics,	  over	  Muslim	  identities,	  and	  over	  what	  a	  Muslim	  modernity	  should	  
look	  like	  are	  to	  be	  fought	  on	  the	  field	  of	  education.	  Whatever	  one	  wants	  Muslim	  society	  to	  
become,	  it	  seems,	  the	  principle	  instrument	  of	  coercion,	  influence,	  and	  change	  is	  to	  be	  the	  
schools;	  education	  has	  become	  the	  leading	  edge	  in	  various	  efforts	  to	  transform	  Islam	  and	  the	  
Muslim	  world.	   Berkey	  2007:41	  	   Islamic	  schools,	  more	  than	  ever,	  are	  in	  the	  market	  to	  fuel	  or	  stymie	  particular	  transformations	  of	  religion,	  society,	  and	  politics	  in	  Indonesia.	  These	  battles	  within	  schooling	  reflect	  the	  larger	  differences	  between	  religious	  groups	  and	  religious	  political	  parties.	  The	  following	  chapter	  examines	  the	  intergroup	  politics	  between	  Indonesia’s	  two	  largest	  mainstream	  religious	  institutions,	  namely	  Muhammadiyah	  (a	  modernist	  Islamic	  group	  in	  urban	  areas	  that	  sponsors	  Muhammadiyah	  schools)	  and	  NU	  (a	  mystic,	  traditionalist	  Islamic	  group	  mainly	  in	  rural	  areas	  whose	  followers	  run	  pesantren),	  and	  the	  transnationally	  influenced	  Prosperous	  Justice	  Party	  (PKS,	  an	  Islamic	  political	  party	  whose	  cadre	  members	  run	  JSIT;	  see	  chapter	  4	  for	  more	  details	  on	  JSIT).	  (See	  Table	  1.)	  	  As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  surge	  in	  the	  observance	  of	  Islam	  in	  Indonesia	  has	  not	  been	  monopolized	  by	  one	  form	  of	  piety.	  While	  there	  are	  permutations	  and	  variations,	  the	  multiple	  voices	  loosely	  fall	  into	  one	  of	  two	  types	  of	  Islam:	  Indonesian	  and	  transnational,	  or	  what	  some	  informants	  refer	  to	  as	  “not	  Indonesian.”	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT	  represent	  educational	  institutions	  that	  promote	  these	  two	  types	  of	  approaches.	  (See	  Table	  2.)	  In	  order	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  motivation	  behind	  each	  school’s	  piety	  project,	  this	  chapter	  reviews	  the	  dynamics	  between	  religious	  entities	  that	  find	  themselves	  in	  competing	  camps	  in	  the	  battle	  over	  retaining	  or	  gaining	  relevance	  in	  mainstream	  Indonesian	  society.  
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Table 1. Selected Islamic Institutions in Indonesia 
 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia’s largest religious organization, 
was established in 1926 and is known for its Sufism (mystical Islam) 
and accommodation of local traditions within Islamic practices.  
 
Model of Islamic reform: Accommodationst/Traditionalist 
 
Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s second largest religious organization, 
was established in 1912 to modernize Islam in Indonesia by purifying 
local traditions from Islamic practice. However, it is allows more 
flexibility within social and political spheres than revivalist groups.  
 
Model of Islamic reform: Purificationist/Modernist 
 
The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), Indonesia’s largest Islamic 
political party, is the institutional manifestation of the Tarbiyah 
Movement, an underground Islamic dakwah (religious propagation) 
movement established during the 1980s and influenced by the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The party was originally established 
in1998 as the Prosperous Party (PK) but reconstituted itself as PKS in 
2002. The party aims for a comprehensive Islamic reform of 
Indonesian society, touching on personal religious practices as well 
as the country’s political, social and cultural spheres.  
 
Model of Islamic reform: Purificationist/Revivalist 
See Machmudi (2008: 53-61) for discussions on models of Islamic reform in Indonesia. 
Table 2. Extended-day Islamic School Groups 
 
The Al Azhar Islamic Pesantren Foundation (Al Azhar), established 
in1952, expanded its informal religious instructions programs 
(namely Qur’anic study circles at the foundation’s mosque) in 1962 
by building formal Islamic schools. The schools were meant to 
address the general public malaise toward Islam.  
 
Approach to Islam: Flexible 
 
The Network for Integrated Islamic Schools (JSIT) was established in 
2003 to formally coordinate and facilitate the operations of loosely 
associated integrated Islamic schools. The first integrated Islamic 
schools were established in 1994 out of individual initiatives of 
Tarbiyah Movement activists-cum-PKS cadre. JSIT is a social 
organization used for PKS’s effort to culturally Islamize the country. 
 
Approach to Islam: Exacting 
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The	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  outline	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  Indonesian	  versus	  transnational	  debates	  regarding	  the	  attributes	  of	  piety	  and	  religious	  life.	  Using	  the	  country’s	  two	  mainstream	  religious	  organizations—NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah—to	  represent	  the	  Indonesian	  camp	  and	  PKS	  to	  represent	  the	  transnational	  camp,	  I	  first	  explain	  two	  major	  ideological	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  groups:	  the	  role	  of	  Islam	  in	  politics	  and	  the	  approach	  to	  Qur’anic	  interpretation.	  The	  transnational	  approach	  has	  been	  criticized	  for	  disrupting	  the	  “Indonesian	  way(s)”	  of	  conducting	  politics	  and	  being	  Muslim.	  In	  turn,	  the	  Indonesian	  approach	  has	  been	  criticized	  for	  contaminating	  true	  Islam	  through	  the	  accommodation	  of	  local	  cultural	  practices.	  I	  briefly	  review	  some	  factors	  contributing	  to	  the	  tensions	  between	  these	  two	  camps.	  Although	  two	  religious	  school	  groups	  are	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  end	  the	  chapter	  with	  a	  review	  of	  other	  Islamic	  schools	  and	  groups	  in	  Jogja	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  variety	  of	  schools	  promoting	  variations	  of	  Indonesian	  and	  transnational	  Islam	  and	  contributing	  to	  battles	  over	  relevance	  in	  mainstream	  Indonesia.	  	  	  
Points	  of	  Difference	  Between	  NU,	  Muhammadiyah,	  and	  PKS	  	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  are	  the	  two	  dominant	  religious	  organizations	  on	  Java	  with	  significant	  influence	  over	  mainstream	  schools	  of	  thought	  regarding	  how	  to	  conduct	  a	  pious	  life	  in	  Indonesia.	  Their	  influence	  on	  believers	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  different	  denominations	  in	  Christianity.	  NU	  practices	  are	  infused	  with	  Javanese	  and	  mystical	  Sufi	  traditions.	  Muhammadiyah	  and,	  more	  intensely,	  the	  PKS,	  are	  considered	  purificationist	  in	  approach,	  as	  they	  advocate	  the	  removal	  of	  local	  customs	  and	  traditions	  from	  their	  practices	  of	  Islam.	  As	  part	  of	  an	  early	  20th−century	  transnational	  reformist	  movement,	  Muhammadiyah	  was	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established	  in	  1912	  in	  reaction	  to	  the	  syncretic,	  mystic	  approach	  to	  Islam—which	  was	  later	  institutionalized	  by	  the	  establishment	  of	  Nahdlatul	  Ulama,	  or	  NU,	  in	  1926.	  The	  arrival	  of	  new	  transnational	  approaches	  to	  religious	  observance	  in	  the	  1980s	  generated	  strong	  competition	  for	  Muhammadiyah	  and	  NU	  membership.	  PKS	  is	  one	  of	  the	  more	  visible	  and	  high	  profile	  groups	  within	  this	  new	  wave	  of	  Islamization.	  	  Although	  Muhammadiyah’s	  roots	  are	  from	  an	  earlier	  transnational	  movement	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  the	  organization	  has	  localized	  its	  practices,	  and	  has	  become	  one	  of	  Indonesia’s	  mainstream	  approaches	  to	  Islam.	  Additionally,	  Muhammadiyah’s	  purification	  efforts	  focused	  on	  religious	  practices,	  rather	  than	  the	  social	  and	  political	  spheres	  that	  PKS’s	  transnational	  vision	  also	  aims	  to	  reform	  (Machmudi	  2008:53-­‐61).	  Some	  argue	  that	  the	  religious	  scene	  has	  changed	  so	  much	  in	  the	  last	  30	  years	  that	  Muhammadiyah,	  the	  key	  player	  in	  the	  progressive	  Islamic	  reformist	  movement	  of	  the	  early	  20th	  century,	  now	  seems	  more	  moderate	  and	  compatible	  with	  NU	  relative	  to	  new	  transnational	  Islamist	  groups,	  which	  have	  widened	  the	  spectrum	  of	  Islamic	  practices	  (Masaaki	  et	  al.	  2010).	  According	  to	  a	  national-­‐level	  Muhammadiyah	  education	  officer	  in	  Jakarta,	  ideological	  differences	  between	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  and	  PKS	  are	  two-­‐pronged:	  “The	  way	  they	  approach	  politics	  and	  the	  way	  they	  understand	  the	  Qur’an”	  (Interview	  with	  Muhammadiyah	  officer,	  March	  24,	  2010).	  These	  two	  differences	  are	  explained	  below.	  	  
Politics	  and	  secularism	  Since	  Indonesia’s	  independence,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  county’s	  government—Islamic	  or	  secular—has	  been	  debated.	  During	  the	  construction	  of	  Pancasila,	  the	  country’s	  founding	  philosophy,	  one	  draft	  included	  the	  requirement	  that	  all	  Muslims	  be	  required	  to	  adhere	  to	  
	  	  
40	  
Shari’ah.	  In	  the	  end,	  however,	  this	  clause	  was	  withdrawn.	  The	  first	  of	  five	  founding	  principles	  is	  “Belief	  in	  one	  God,”	  ultimately	  leaving	  the	  government	  religious	  but	  without	  a	  specific	  religion.	  Debates	  regarding	  religion’s	  formal	  role	  in	  government	  continue	  today,	  with	  reformers	  hoping	  that	  Shari’ah	  will	  play	  a	  role	  in	  national	  governance.	  	  Muhammadiyah	  and	  NU	  individuals	  have	  played	  significant	  roles	  throughout	  Indonesia’s	  nearly	  70-­‐year	  national	  history.	  The	  National	  Awakening	  Party	  (Partai	  
Kebangkitan	  Bangsa,	  or	  PKB)	  and	  The	  National	  Mandate	  Party	  (Partai	  Amanat	  Nasional,	  or	  PAN)	  are	  associated	  with	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  respectively.	  Although	  members	  of	  these	  religious	  groups	  head	  the	  parties,	  the	  parties	  do	  not	  promote	  Islamist	  platforms.	  	  PKS	  is	  a	  relatively	  new	  political	  party,	  established	  immediately	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  Suharto	  in	  1998,	  originally	  as	  the	  Justice	  Party	  (Partai	  Keadilan,	  PK)	  and	  then	  reformulated	  as	  the	  PKS	  (Partai	  Keadilan	  Sejahtera)	  in	  2002.	  PKS	  is	  an	  Islamic	  political	  party	  and	  initially	  campaigned	  for	  the	  application	  of	  Shari’ah	  within	  government	  structures.	  However,	  PKS	  has	  since	  reined	  in	  its	  Islamic	  aspirations	  in	  order	  to	  garner	  wider	  political	  support.	  Using	  campaigns	  for	  social	  justice	  and	  public	  welfare,	  the	  party	  aims	  to	  educate	  the	  population	  on	  
Shari’ah,	  and	  thus	  bring	  about	  the	  application	  of	  Shari’ah	  through	  grassroots-­‐level	  calls	  for	  change	  (Machmudi	  2008:217-­‐218).	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  “Indonesian”	  form	  of	  politics	  is	  a	  Pancasila	  government,	  one	  that	  promotes	  religion,	  but	  doesn’t	  require	  Shari’ah	  law,	  or	  any	  religion’s	  law,	  to	  be	  imposed	  upon	  its	  citizens.	  As	  a	  Muhammadiyah	  officer,	  explained:	  Muhammadiyah	  does	  not	  have	  an	  agenda	  to	  set	  up	  a	  new	  Islamic	  state.	  Muhammadiyah	  wants	  to	  strengthen	  a	  Pancasila	  state,	  but	  of	  course	  implementing	  Islam	  not	  as	  a	  formal	  political	  ideology	  but	  the	  substance	  of	  Islamic	  morality.	  (Interview	  with	  Muhammadiyah	  officer,	  March	  24,	  2010)	  	  NU,	  like	  Muhammadiyah,	  supports	  a	  Pancasila	  state.	  While	  they	  do	  not	  want	  Islam	  or	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Shari’ah	  law	  to	  determine	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  land,	  they	  are	  keen	  to	  have	  individuals	  employ	  
Shari’ah	  as	  a	  code	  for	  personal	  conduct,	  believing	  that	  as	  individuals	  live	  by	  Islamic	  morals,	  they	  build	  a	  moral	  society	  and	  government.	  My	  informant	  continued,	  pointing	  out	  that	  in	  the	  beginning,	  PK	  (before	  it	  became	  PKS)	  	  definitely	  said	  that	  they	  wanted	  to	  be	  a	  party	  that	  set	  up	  an	  Islamic	  state	  or	  Shari’ah	  state.	  Later	  on,	  after	  so	  many	  critiques	  on	  that,	  they	  said,	  [they	  wanted	  a]	  Medina	  state25…If	  they	  follow	  the	  Medina	  state,	  it	  is	  like	  a	  Pancasila	  state	  actually,	  but	  the	  word	  Medina	  also	  brings	  a	  connotation,	  “Oh,	  that	  is	  something	  related	  to	  Islam,”	  rather	  than	  saying	  “Pancasila”	  (Interview	  with	  Muhammadiyah	  officer,	  March	  24,	  2010).	  	  	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  PKS	  changed	  its	  original	  goals	  in	  response	  to	  public	  criticism.	  However,	  the	  call	  for	  a	  Medina	  state,	  although	  similar	  to	  a	  Pancasila	  state,	  emphasizes	  a	  hope	  for	  the	  state	  to	  reflect	  an	  explicitly	  Islamic	  character.	  	  	  Currently	  within	  PKS,	  there	  is	  internal	  conflict	  between	  the	  purist	  and	  pragmatic,	  or	  what	  Woodward	  et	  al.	  (2011	  and	  2012)	  refer	  to	  as	  the	  “Justice”	  and	  “Prosperity,”	  factions	  of	  the	  party.	  The	  Prosperity	  faction,	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  expand	  the	  party’s	  voter	  appeal	  beyond	  its	  Islamist	  base,	  advocates	  for	  a	  softening	  of	  Islamist	  ideology,	  while	  the	  Justice	  faction	  insists	  on	  maintaining	  their	  strict,	  core	  Wahabi26	  Islamic	  values.	  This	  shift	  mirrors	  findings	  of	  Elman	  and	  Warner	  (2008),	  who	  argue	  that,	  globally,	  religious	  political	  parties	  are	  shifting	  to	  more	  moderate	  platforms	  in	  order	  to	  stay	  politically	  relevant.	  In	  Indonesia,	  there	  are	  some	  who	  consider	  the	  shift	  within	  PKS	  to	  be	  sincere,	  and	  there	  are	  others	  who	  are	  skeptical	  (Wahid	  2009;	  Woodward	  2012).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Medina,	  Muhammad’s	  hometown,	  was	  the	  seat	  of	  the	  first	  Islamic	  State.	  	  26	  Wahabism	  is	  a	  purificationist	  movement	  of	  strict	  observance	  that	  originated	  in	  and	  is	  the	  dominant	  form	  of	  Islam	  in	  Saudi	  Arabia.	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Tensions	  between	  the	  groups	  could	  also	  be	  due	  in	  part	  to	  jealousy	  over	  PKS’	  political	  success.	  In	  less	  than	  14	  years,	  PKS	  has	  become	  the	  largest	  and	  most	  influential	  Islamic	  party	  in	  Indonesia	  and	  the	  fourth-­‐largest	  political	  party	  overall,	  the	  other	  three	  being	  secular	  (Woodward	  et	  al.	  2012).	  In	  the	  2009	  presidential	  election,	  the	  party	  joined	  the	  incumbent,	  and	  now	  re-­‐elected,	  president’s	  coalition.	  The	  party’s	  reputation	  for	  running	  a	  clean	  campaign	  and	  working	  on	  social	  issues	  through	  Islamic	  values	  has	  increased	  the	  popularity	  of	  the	  party,	  even	  if	  those	  supporting	  it	  are	  not	  as	  observant	  of	  Islam	  as	  the	  party	  cadre.	  Two	  Christian	  friends	  of	  mine	  once	  commented	  that	  if	  they	  were	  Muslim,	  they	  would	  vote	  for	  PKS	  because	  of	  their	  clean	  reputation.	  This	  was	  unexpected	  praise,	  as	  it	  came	  on	  the	  heels	  of	  their	  expressions	  of	  concern	  over	  their	  perception	  of	  PKS’	  exclusive	  attitudes	  toward	  non-­‐Muslims.	  While	  a	  moderated	  Islamic	  political	  platform	  may	  increase	  PKS’	  popularity	  among	  voters,	  the	  party’s	  strong	  Islamic	  values	  have	  been	  a	  main	  attraction	  for	  parents	  to	  JSIT	  schools	  from	  the	  beginning.	  One	  mother	  who	  was	  not	  a	  PKS	  member	  commented	  that	  while	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  was	  a	  “PKS	  school,”	  she	  liked	  the	  Islamic	  education	  her	  children	  received	  there.	  She	  later,	  in	  a	  formal	  interview,	  said	  that	  after	  a	  prayerful	  search	  for	  a	  school	  “that	  was	  right	  for	  me,	  right	  for	  this	  world	  and	  the	  next,”	  Allah	  guided	  her	  to	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT.	  Consequently,	  she	  has	  enrolled	  her	  three	  daughters	  there	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  mother,	  April	  30,	  2010).	  	  	  
Qur’anic	  interpretation	  and	  bid’ah	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  have	  differences	  in	  how	  they	  approach	  Islam,	  with	  Muhammadiyah’s	  being	  more	  similar	  to	  PKS	  in	  some	  ways.	  However,	  according	  once	  again	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to	  a	  national-­‐level	  Muhammadiyah	  education	  officer	  in	  Jakarta,	  “Muhammadiyah	  understands	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith	  in	  very,	  very	  rational	  ways	  and	  sometime	  we	  are	  liberal	  while	  they	  [PKS]	  want	  to	  understand	  the	  text	  in	  a	  more	  scripturalist	  way”	  (Interview	  with	  Muhammadiyah	  officer,	  March	  24,	  2010).	  While	  it	  is	  unclear	  what	  he	  is	  referring	  to	  specifically	  as	  “very	  rational”	  or	  “liberal,”	  he	  presents	  Muhammadiyah	  as	  being	  more	  contextual,	  rather	  than	  textual	  or	  scripturalist,	  in	  interpreting	  the	  Qur’an.	  A	  contextual	  approach	  allows	  for	  contextualizing	  or	  adapting	  Qur’anic	  teachings	  to	  contemporary	  times,	  while	  a	  textual	  or	  scripturalist	  approach	  focuses	  on	  the	  teachings	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith	  and	  promotes	  principles	  and	  practices	  that	  disregard	  the	  context	  (social,	  historical,	  cultural)	  in	  which	  the	  religion	  is	  implemented	  (Woodward	  et	  al.	  2012).	  Consequently,	  this	  textual,	  rather	  than	  contextual,	  understanding	  of	  principles	  expects	  the	  purer	  form	  of	  practice	  to	  be	  free	  from	  the	  accommodation	  of	  local	  traditions.	  Both	  Muhammadiyah	  and	  PKS	  are	  similar	  in	  that	  they	  strive	  to	  purify	  Islamic	  ritual	  and	  understanding	  from	  the	  more	  mystic	  Javanese	  practices	  of	  NU.	  PKS,	  however,	  is	  considered	  to	  have	  taken	  purification	  efforts	  further	  than	  Muhammadiyah,	  applying	  them	  to	  social	  and	  political	  spheres	  as	  well.	  	  	   Regardless,	  NU	  feels	  under	  attack	  from	  both	  Muhammadiyah	  and	  PKS.	  Two	  professors	  with	  NU	  backgrounds	  at	  the	  State	  Islamic	  University	  in	  Jogja	  (UIN-­‐Jogja)	  boiled	  down	  the	  distinctions	  between	  the	  three	  groups	  to	  difference	  in	  Qur’anic	  interpretation	  of	  the	  permissibility	  of	  bid’ah.	  Bid’ah	  is	  an	  innovation,	  or	  a	  practice	  that	  was	  not	  mentioned	  in	  the	  Qur’an	  but	  is	  incorporated	  into	  the	  rituals	  and	  practices	  of	  Islam.	  Muhammadiyah	  and	  PKS,	  as	  two	  interviewees	  explained,	  consider	  the	  presence	  of	  bid’ah	  in	  NU’s	  rituals	  and	  practices	  to	  be	  heretical:	  Informant	  1:	  Both	  Muhammadiyah	  and	  PKS	  consider	  NU	  as	  a	  supporter	  of	  TBC…TBC	  stands	  for	  tahayul,	  bid’ah,	  and	  churafat.	  Actually	  TBC	  is	  a	  term	  in	  the	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medical	  field	  that	  stands	  for	  tuberculosis.	  But	  they	  changed	  it	  to	  TBC	  to	  stand	  for:	  T	  tahayul—tahayul	  means	  superstition;	  B	  is	  for	  bid’ah	  or	  religious	  innovation—bid’ah	  means	  practicing	  something	  that	  is	  not	  literally	  mentioned	  in	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith;	  and	  C	  is	  for	  churafat	  that	  has	  very	  close	  meaning	  with	  superstition…They	  regard	  NU	  as	  practicing	  TBC,	  and	  therefore	  their	  Islam	  is	  not	  pure	  and	  therefore	  they	  will	  go	  to	  hell.	  	  	  Informant	  2:	  There	  is	  a	  prophet’s	  saying,	  “kullu	  bid’atin	  dlolalatin.”	  Kullu	  for	  NU	  means	  “some.”	  But	  for	  Muhammadiyah	  kullu	  means	  “all.”	  So	  Muhammadiyah	  translates	  the	  prophet’s	  saying	  as	  “all	  bid’ah	  is	  going	  astray.”	  And	  going	  astray	  is	  going	  to	  hell…NU	  people	  translate	  the	  prophet’s	  saying	  “kullu	  bid’atin	  dlolalatin”	  as	  “some	  bid’ah	  is	  going	  astray.”	  (Interview	  with	  UIN-­‐Jogja	  professors,	  October	  14,	  2009)	  	  	  According	  to	  these	  men,	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  one	  word	  in	  the	  Qur’an	  as	  “all”	  or	  “some”	  creates	  significant	  difference	  among	  groups	  in	  attitudes	  towards	  practices,	  and	  the	  permissibility	  of	  incorporating	  local	  culture	  into	  practices.	  The	  first	  informant	  went	  on	  to	  give	  an	  example	  of	  an	  NU	  bid’ah:	  	  The	  Qur’an,	  for	  example,	  does	  not	  encourage	  us	  to	  pray	  together	  in	  a	  group	  after	  somebody	  dies.	  NU	  says	  if	  we	  have	  to	  pray,	  we	  do	  it	  in	  a	  group…Instead	  of	  praying	  individually,	  we	  do	  it	  in	  a	  group.	  We	  can	  see	  the	  advantages	  of	  being	  together.	  But	  according	  [to]	  them,	  PKS	  and	  Muhammadiyah,	  it	  is	  bid’ah	  because	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  the	  prophets	  do	  not	  mention	  that	  [group	  prayer	  after	  a	  person’s	  death].	  According	  to	  their	  understanding,	  we	  NU	  people	  created	  a	  new	  religion.	  As	  a	  result,	  Muhammadiyah	  and	  in	  particular	  PKS	  always	  not	  only	  criticize	  us,	  but	  also	  attack	  us.	  So	  this	  is	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  three	  groups…Muhammadiyah	  tends	  to	  be	  less	  [critical].	  PKS	  fights	  the	  hardest	  in	  attacking	  NU…in	  the	  terms	  of	  religious	  practice.	  (Interview	  with	  UIN-­‐Jogja	  professors,	  October	  14,	  2009)	  	  	  	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  how	  NU	  members	  could	  feel	  animosity	  towards	  Muhammadiyah	  and	  PKS	  for	  being	  judged	  as	  going	  to	  hell	  for	  what	  they	  consider	  to	  be	  sincere	  and	  conscientious	  practice	  of	  Islam.	  Bid’ah,	  or	  innovation,	  being	  likened	  to	  tuberculosis	  is	  a	  strongly	  critical	  perspective	  that	  views	  NU	  practices	  as	  a	  corrupting	  disease	  weakening	  the	  living	  vitality	  of	  Islam.	  Following	  this	  stream	  of	  logic,	  then,	  to	  restore	  the	  health	  of	  Islam,	  it	  must	  be	  cleansed	  from	  its	  infection	  of	  local	  culture.	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   As	  a	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  founder,	  referring	  to	  mainstream	  Islam	  in	  general,	  and	  not	  solely	  NU	  practices,	  explained,	  We	  know	  that	  Islam	  in	  Indonesia	  is	  contaminated	  by	  the	  culture	  or	  local	  customs	  (adat)	  that	  exist	  in	  Indonesia.	  So	  it	  seems	  some	  of	  Islam	  has	  become	  ambiguous	  or	  Islamic	  identity	  has	  become	  unclear	  among	  Muslims	  because	  the	  Islam	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Islam	  of	  local	  culture	  (budaya	  lokal)	  have	  been	  intermixed…Maybe	  we	  want	  to	  say	  we	  want	  to	  standardize	  (menstandarisasikan)	  a	  common	  and	  modern	  Islam,	  that’s	  not	  too	  contaminated	  (yang	  kontaminsasinya	  tidak	  terlalu	  banyak)…if	  there	  are	  adjustments,	  they	  should	  be	  the	  peripheral	  (cabang-­‐cabang),	  not	  the	  core	  (utama)	  of	  it.	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  founder,	  April	  19,	  2010)	  	  	  The	  “infection”	  and	  “contamination”	  of	  local	  practices,	  in	  other	  words,	  compromise	  the	  purity	  of	  true	  Islam.	  	  
Are	  you	  Indonesian	  enough?	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  are	  united	  in	  their	  objection	  to	  PKS’	  overall	  aim	  to	  reform	  current	  mainstream	  Indonesian	  practices.	  While	  there	  is	  no	  singular	  “Indonesian	  way,”	  there	  is	  a	  multi-­‐voiced	  Indonesian	  mainstream	  that	  is	  being	  challenged.	  Although	  the	  majority	  of	  Muslims	  in	  Indonesia	  are	  Sunni,	  they	  express	  their	  religion	  through	  three	  major	  inclinations:	  traditionalist,	  modernist,	  and	  revivalist	  (Machmudi	  2008).	  As	  Sikand	  (2008)	  warns,	  while	  such	  categories	  are	  useful	  for	  heuristic	  purposes,	  it	  is	  important	  not	  to	  exaggerate	  their	  differences.	  A	  modernist	  may	  have	  traditionalist	  leanings	  on	  particular	  aspects,	  or	  a	  revivalist	  may	  on	  something	  else.	  The	  difference	  in	  interpretation	  of	  a	  single	  Hadith	  has	  led	  to	  distinct	  differences	  in	  religious	  practices.	  	  As	  noted,	  both	  Muhammadiyah	  and	  PKS	  oppose	  NU	  innovations,	  which	  include	  praying	  over	  dead	  bodies,	  visiting	  gravesites	  to	  honor	  the	  dead,	  and	  inserting	  qunut	  as	  part	  of	  sholat;	  yet	  Muhammadiyah	  is	  less	  intense	  in	  its	  criticisms.	  Even	  though	  Muhammadiyah	  aimed	  to	  rationalize	  and	  modernize	  Islam	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  by	  doing	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away	  with	  NU’s	  mystic	  practices,	  Bahtiar	  Effendy,	  a	  political	  science	  analyst	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  activist	  known	  from	  his	  frequent	  op-­‐ed	  pieces	  in	  The	  Jakarta	  Post	  to	  be	  an	  opponent	  of	  the	  PKS,	  saw	  a	  difference	  between	  Muhammadiyah	  and	  PKS.	  	  Muhammadiyah	  has	  been	  able	  to	  adjust	  [their]	  standards	  within	  the	  Indonesian	  cultural	  tradition,	  and	  that’s	  what	  actually	  also	  happened	  with	  Nahdlatul	  Ulama	  [NU].	  Even	  though	  they	  have	  different	  religious	  points	  of	  view,	  they	  try	  to	  contextualize	  it	  within	  their	  own	  traditional	  ways	  of	  thinking	  and	  ways	  of	  understanding	  religion.	  (Interview	  with	  Bahtiar	  Effendy,	  December	  10,	  2010)	  	  While	  there	  are	  differences	  in	  religious	  practices	  and	  ideas	  of	  appropriate	  forms	  of	  worship,	  both	  groups	  have	  localized	  their	  practices	  to	  their	  Indonesian	  communities.	  However,	  he	  indicated	  that	  this	  is	  somehow	  different	  from	  PKS:	  PKS	  is	  puritan	  in	  nature	  but	  many	  perceive	  PKS	  as	  theologically	  representing	  a	  non-­‐Indonesian	  Islam	  rather	  than	  Indonesian	  Islam,	  and	  more	  specifically	  Saudi	  Arabian	  Islam	  with	  the	  idea	  of,	  well,	  not	  as	  strong	  as	  Wahabism	  developing	  in	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  but	  that	  kind	  of	  perception	  exists.	  Of	  course	  if	  you	  try	  to	  talk	  to	  PKS	  people,	  then	  they	  will	  deny	  it	  wholeheartedly:	  “No,	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  build	  and	  develop	  the	  so-­‐called	  Indonesian	  Islam.”	  (Interview	  with	  Bahtiar	  Effendy,	  December	  10,	  2010)	  	  While	  all	  groups	  practice	  Islam,	  mainstream	  groups	  feel	  an	  “Indonesian-­‐ness”	  in	  PKS	  practices	  is	  missing.	  These	  mainstream	  organizations	  criticize	  what	  they	  perceive	  to	  be	  a	  Wahabi	  influence	  on	  PKS’	  strict	  observance	  of	  Islam.	  Although	  there	  has	  been	  a	  history	  of	  tension	  between	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah,	  they	  both	  oppose	  PKS’	  “non-­‐Indonesian”	  Islam.	  	  The	  tensions	  between	  the	  three	  organizations	  rose	  to	  the	  point	  that	  Hidayat	  Nur	  Wahid,	  the	  then-­‐Chairman	  of	  PKS,	  invited	  Hasyim	  Muzadi	  and	  Din	  Syamsyuddin,	  the	  chairmen	  of	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  respectively,	  to	  a	  meeting	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  seek	  mediation	  from	  the	  leader	  of	  Gontor,	  a	  prestigious	  pesantren	  all	  three	  men	  had	  attended	  as	  youth.	  Apparently,	  Hidayat	  Nur	  Wahid	  felt	  that	  PKS	  was	  unjustly	  being	  singled	  out	  as,	  among	  other	  things,	  an	  organization	  that	  was	  co-­‐opting	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  assets	  for	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party	  expansion	  purposes.	  (This	  will	  be	  detailed	  in	  the	  following	  section	  of	  this	  chapter.)	  Bahtiar	  recounted	  the	  meeting	  to	  me	  as	  told	  to	  him	  by	  Hasyim	  Muzadi	  of	  NU.	  	  So	  Pak	  Hasyim	  told	  me,	  “The	  first	  thing	  I	  asked	  Hidayat	  Nur	  Wahid	  is,	  ‘Do	  you	  represent	  Indonesian	  Islam?’”	  He	  was	  not	  complaining	  about	  the	  mosques	  and	  the	  assets	  or	  infrastructure	  of	  NU.	  The	  first	  question	  Pak	  Hasyim	  asked	  Hidayat	  was	  whether	  Hidayat	  represented	  Indonesian	  Islam.	  And	  according	  to	  Pak	  Hasyim,	  Hidayat	  couldn’t	  answer	  it,	  or	  he	  did	  not	  answer	  it.	  He	  said,	  “Myself	  and	  Pak	  Din	  represent	  Indonesian	  Islam.	  Does	  PKS	  represent	  Indonesian	  Islam?”	  This	  was	  a	  very	  straightforward	  question.	  This	  is	  the	  suspicion	  that	  both	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  have	  of	  PKS.	  (Interview	  with	  Bahtiar	  Effendy,	  December	  10,	  2010)	  	  In	  fairness,	  Bahtiar	  suggested	  that	  the	  opposition	  to	  PKS	  was	  not	  just	  the	  principle	  of	  unwelcomed	  reformation	  of	  religious	  practices,	  but	  also	  a	  sense	  of	  being	  threatened	  by	  PKS’s	  success	  as	  a	  political	  organization.	  PKS	  has	  become	  the	  largest	  Islamic	  party	  in	  the	  country.	  He	  suggested,	  	  Of	  course	  there	  is	  always	  the	  possibility	  that	  these	  two	  organizations,	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah,	  are	  jealous	  of	  PKS.	  They	  were	  able	  to	  sort	  of	  maneuver	  themselves	  into	  a	  positive	  social	  mobility.	  And	  this	  kind	  of	  question	  was	  used	  to	  justify	  that	  they	  [NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah]	  are	  legitimately	  able	  to	  be	  in	  conflict	  with	  the	  PKS.	  That	  is	  always	  a	  possibility	  because	  you	  know	  in	  2004	  PKS	  was	  really	  the	  rising	  political	  party.	  (Interview	  with	  Bahtiar	  Effendy,	  December	  10,	  2009)	  	  PKS’	  Islamic	  practices	  greatly	  concern	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  activists.	  PKS	  has	  localized	  the	  inspiration	  they	  took	  from	  the	  Wahabi-­‐influenced	  Egyptian	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  for	  its	  religious	  and	  political	  practices	  (Machmudi	  2008).	  This	  process,	  however,	  resulted	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  models	  of	  political	  and	  religious	  practices	  that	  challenge	  the	  “Indonesian”	  ways	  of	  doing	  things.	  Islamist	  hopes	  for	  government	  replace	  those	  of	  a	  Pancasila	  State.	  Their	  purificationist,	  de-­‐culturalized—possibly	  even	  Saudi	  Arabian,	  but	  definitely	  less	  “Indonesian”—Islam	  challenges	  the	  authenticity	  of	  Islamic	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practices	  that	  have	  been	  developing	  since	  the	  13th	  century	  in	  what	  is	  now	  Indonesia.27	  Historically,	  Muhammadiyah	  and	  NU’s	  educational	  institutions	  have	  been	  key	  in	  institutionalizing	  their	  organizations’	  practices.	  Consequently,	  Muhammadiyah	  and	  NU	  activists	  view	  PKS-­‐linked	  schools	  as	  a	  threat,	  believing	  that	  they	  are	  undermining	  common	  Islamic	  practices	  of	  mainstream	  Indonesians.	  	  
Friction	  Points	  between	  NU,	  Muhammadiyah,	  and	  PKS	  Since	  in	  Indonesia	  political	  parties	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  sponsor	  social	  institutions	  or	  vice	  versa,	  NU28	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  are	  religious	  social	  institutions	  rather	  than	  political	  parties.	  As	  religious	  social	  organizations,	  the	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  own	  mosques,	  schools,	  hospitals	  or	  other	  social	  institutions	  as	  part	  of	  their	  dakwah	  (religious	  propagation)	  efforts.	  Although	  the	  connections	  are	  not	  legally	  formalized,	  the	  National	  Awakening	  Party	  (Partai	  Kebangkitan	  Bangsa,	  or	  PKB)	  and	  the	  National	  Mandate	  Party	  (Partai	  Amanat	  Nasional,	  or	  PAN)	  are	  parties	  associated	  with	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  respectively.	  Members	  from	  the	  organizations	  traditionally	  hold	  key	  leadership	  positions	  in	  the	  parties.	  Although	  these	  parties	  represent	  the	  ideology	  of	  these	  religious	  organizations,	  neither	  party’s	  platform	  is	  Islamist.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  As	  Anderson	  (1990:68)	  says,	  “the	  penetration	  of	  Islam	  [into	  Indonesia]	  was	  more	  assimilative	  than	  revolutionary…Islam	  came	  to	  Java	  on	  the	  heels	  not	  of	  conquest	  but	  of	  trade.”	  It	  necessarily	  accommodated	  many	  of	  the	  customs	  and	  traditions	  of	  centuries-­‐old	  religions	  of	  the	  area,	  losing	  much	  of	  its	  doctrinal	  strength	  and	  “pristine”	  content.	  	  28	  The	  NU	  made	  this	  change	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  withdrawing	  from	  being	  a	  political	  party	  and	  becoming	  a	  religious	  organization.	  Muhammadiyah	  has	  never	  been	  formally	  involved	  in	  politics.	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  In	  contrast,	  PKS	  is	  an	  Islamic	  political	  party	  with	  cadre	  members	  who	  sponsor	  and	  manage	  social	  institutions.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  JSIT	  schools,	  Fahmi	  Alaydrus,29	  PKS’	  Education	  Department	  Chairman,	  explained	  the	  relationship	  between	  JSIT	  schools	  and	  PKS:	  	  Political	  parties	  in	  Indonesia	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  own	  schools.	  So	  in	  a	  formal	  legal	  sense,	  it	  [PKS]	  doesn’t.	  But	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  people	  who	  are	  in	  [JSIT]	  integrated	  Islamic	  schools	  are	  affiliated	  with	  or	  become	  PKS	  cadres.	  No	  problem.	  So	  people	  that	  have	  the	  perception	  that	  the	  schools	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  and	  Nurul	  Fikri	  are	  part	  of	  PKS	  aren’t	  wrong;	  it’s	  correct,	  but	  the	  school	  is	  not	  owned	  by	  PKS.	  (Interview	  with	  Fahmi	  Alaydrus,	  May	  1,	  2010)	  	  JSIT	  schools	  are	  not	  owned	  by	  PKS;	  however,	  they	  are	  ideologically	  driven	  by	  them	  and	  are	  therefore	  strategic	  in	  promoting	  the	  group’s	  ideologies,	  just	  as	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  promote	  their	  ideologies	  through	  their	  schools.	  	  Although	  PKS	  is	  a	  political	  party,	  it	  acts	  much	  like	  a	  religious	  organization,	  to	  the	  concern	  of	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah.	  PKS	  is	  the	  only	  Islamic	  party	  to	  issue	  fatwas,30	  such	  as	  the	  prohibition	  of	  shaking	  hands	  between	  genders	  (Rinaldo	  2007).	  In	  2007,	  PKS	  declared	  the	  official	  date	  of	  the	  advent	  of	  Idul	  Fitri	  (the	  end	  of	  Ramadan)—an	  act	  generally	  left	  to	  Islamic	  leaders	  rather	  than	  politicians.31	  Additionally,	  party	  members	  are	  expected	  to	  adhere	  to	  specific	  Islamic	  practices	  and	  standards,	  such	  as	  maintaining	  appropriate	  male−female	  interactions	  (Machmudi	  2008).	  In	  many	  conversations,	  professional	  and	  casual	  alike,	  during	  my	  time	  in	  Indonesia,	  people	  talked	  about	  NU,	  Muhammadiyah,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  In	  addition	  to	  being	  PKS’	  Education	  Department	  Chairman,	  Fahmi	  Alaydrus	  also	  serves	  as	  Chairman	  of	  Yayasan	  Nurul	  Fikri,	  the	  foundation	  sponsoring	  the	  original	  JSIT	  schools.	  	  30	  A	  fatwa	  is	  “formal	  advice	  from	  an	  authority	  on	  a	  point	  of	  Islamic	  law	  or	  dogma”	  as	  defined	  by	  M.B.	  Hooker	  in	  Indonesian	  Islam:	  Social	  Change	  Through	  Contemporary	  Fatawa.	  Honolulu	  Press:	  University	  of	  Hawai’i	  Press	  (2003,	  viii;	  cf	  p.	  1).	  	  	  31	  The	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  leadership	  reacted	  to	  this	  declaration,	  saying	  the	  party	  had	  acted	  outside	  of	  its	  jurisdiction.	  In	  subsequent	  years,	  the	  PKS	  has	  refrained	  from	  announcing	  this	  date.	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PKS	  as	  if	  they	  were	  equivalent	  categories,	  each	  with	  their	  own	  distinct	  way	  of	  practicing	  Islam.	  	  Given	  that	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  memberships	  cover	  nearly	  50%	  of	  all	  Muslims	  in	  Indonesia,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  many	  members	  of	  PKS	  leadership	  are	  actually	  from	  Muhammadiyah	  and	  NU	  backgrounds	  (Machmudi	  2008).	  JSIT	  leaders	  are	  always	  quick	  to	  point	  out	  their	  schools’	  families	  and	  leaders	  have	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  backgrounds.	  Background	  and	  involvement	  in	  the	  organizations,	  however,	  are	  two	  different	  things.	  Background	  is	  generally	  dependent	  on	  where	  an	  individual	  is	  from	  (rural	  areas	  are	  dominated	  by	  the	  NU	  and	  urban	  areas	  by	  Muhammadiyah),	  and	  involvement	  is	  a	  deliberate	  choice.	  Given	  some	  overlap	  between	  Muhammadiyah	  and	  PKS	  in	  reformist	  ideas	  about	  Islam	  and	  urban	  location,	  several	  Muhammadiyah	  members	  became	  involved	  with	  PKS.	  Initially,	  participation	  of	  Muhammadiyah	  members	  in	  PKS	  was	  not	  a	  concern	  to	  Muhammadiyah	  leadership.	  	  	  As	  the	  nascent	  political	  party	  began	  defining	  itself,	  creating	  its	  own	  culture	  and	  Islamic	  identity	  and	  growing	  its	  numbers,	  Muhammadiyah	  and	  NU	  began	  to	  view	  PKS	  as	  predatory	  to	  their	  own	  infrastructures	  and	  memberships.	  This	  concern	  was	  the	  seed	  of	  the	  contentions	  that	  led	  to	  the	  abovementioned	  mediation.	  According	  to	  a	  Muhammadiyah	  leader,	  during	  this	  initial	  growth,	  the	  PKS	  looked	  to	  gain	  support	  by	  co-­‐opting	  public	  spaces	  as	  well	  as	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  mosques	  and	  schools.	  For	  example,	  PKS	  “provided	  services	  in	  the	  mosques	  available	  in	  [Jakarta’s]	  shopping	  malls.	  Because	  shopping	  centers	  sometimes	  have	  their	  own	  small	  mosques	  called	  musholla,	  a	  small	  place	  to	  worship,	  and	  also	  parking	  spaces	  that	  are	  transformed	  into	  mosques	  on	  Friday”	  (Interview	  Bahtiar	  Effendy,	  December	  10,	  2009).	  These	  areas	  were	  built	  by	  commercial	  entities	  to	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accommodate	  the	  needs	  of	  their	  observant	  costumers.	  It	  was	  a	  good	  business	  strategy	  to	  keep	  costumers	  in	  the	  malls	  rather	  than	  forcing	  them	  to	  leave	  the	  building	  to	  find	  a	  place	  to	  perform	  sholat	  at	  the	  appropriate	  times	  of	  the	  day.	  These	  areas	  of	  worship,	  however,	  were	  not	  intended	  for	  affiliation	  with	  any	  religious	  organization.	  PKS	  was	  savvy	  enough	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  these	  unsupervised	  areas	  of	  worship	  by	  having	  members	  become	  prayer	  leaders,	  leading	  prayers	  and	  offering	  Friday	  sermons.	  	  More	  disconcerting,	  however,	  were	  what	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  saw	  as	  predatory	  practices	  on	  their	  own	  mosques32	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  schools.	  A	  female	  Muhammadiyah	  activist,	  and	  former	  JSIT	  parent,	  explained	  the	  process	  PKS	  used	  to	  co-­‐opt	  Muhammadiyah	  schools.	  This	  was	  also	  a	  common	  process	  for	  mosques.	  	  	  Initially	  it	  was	  usually	  like	  this:	  before	  PKS	  came,	  a	  school	  belonged	  to	  Muhammadiyah.	  But	  then	  people	  splintered	  from	  Muhammadiyah,	  one	  joined	  PKS	  and	  the	  one	  remained	  Muhammadiyah.	  And	  maybe	  there	  was	  a	  kindergarten	  around	  the	  houses	  where	  the	  Muhammadiyah	  people	  joined	  PKS;	  [so]	  they	  converted	  [reoriented	  the	  ideology	  of]	  the	  school	  [to	  PKS/JSIT].	  Or,	  the	  school	  did	  not	  have	  a	  notary	  even	  though	  the	  school	  belonged	  to	  Aisyiyah	  [Muhammadiyah’s	  female	  organization]	  but	  it	  was	  not	  legalized	  by	  a	  notary.	  So	  they,	  the	  PKS	  people,	  they	  went	  to	  a	  notary	  and	  tried	  to	  legalize	  it	  under	  a	  different	  name.	  (Interview	  with	  former	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  parent	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  activist,	  February	  9,	  2010)	  	  Shifting	  loyalties	  within	  a	  community	  are	  not	  unheard	  of.	  It	  is	  common	  for	  a	  mosque	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  belonging	  to	  the	  community	  in	  which	  it	  is	  located,	  and	  therefore	  Muhammadiyah-­‐turned-­‐PKS	  communities	  may	  have	  felt	  some	  claim	  on	  their	  community	  mosques.	  However,	  Muhammadiyah	  considered	  the	  buildings	  as	  belonging	  to	  the	  organization,	  regardless	  of	  the	  community	  affiliations.	  There	  are	  no	  reliable	  numbers,	  but	  this	  female	  activist	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  The	  NU	  tells	  stories	  of	  Muhammadiyah	  having	  done	  similar	  things	  with	  their	  mosques	  as	  well.	  But	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  that	  they	  were	  not	  as	  predatory	  as	  the	  joke	  goes	  that	  they	  Muhammadiyah	  only	  stole	  the	  gong	  out	  of	  the	  mosque,	  not	  the	  entire	  mosque.	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commented	  that	  “many”	  preschools	  and	  schools	  were	  converted	  from	  Muhammadiyah	  to	  JSIT	  schools.33	  Muhammadiyah	  membership	  provided	  opportunities	  for	  Muhammadiyah-­‐turned-­‐PKS	  members	  in	  leadership	  positions	  of	  mosques	  and	  schools	  to	  realign	  the	  institutions’	  ideological	  orientation	  with	  that	  of	  PKS.	  A	  high-­‐level	  Muhammadiyah	  official	  recounted	  to	  me	  a	  popular	  story.	  On	  a	  visit	  to	  a	  Muhammadiyah	  school,	  the	  Muhammadiyah	  Chairman,	  Din	  Syamsyuddin,	  asked	  the	  students	  what	  the	  organization’s	  mission	  was.	  To	  his	  displeasure,	  student	  responses	  did	  not	  reflect	  Muhammadiyah’s	  mission,	  but	  rather	  that	  of	  PKS.	  A	  few	  informants	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  accuse	  PKS	  of	  specifically	  assigning	  cadre	  members	  to	  take	  teaching	  posts	  at	  Muhammadiyah	  schools,	  and	  then	  teach	  according	  to	  PKS	  ideology.	  	  In	  2006,	  Muhammadiyah	  issued	  Central	  Board	  Muhammadiyah	  Decree	  Number	  149/KEP/I.0/B2006,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  prevent	  any	  more	  such	  instances,	  and	  to	  protest	  rigid	  forms	  or	  puritanism	  (Ricklefs	  2008).	  The	  decree	  pointedly	  states:	  All	  Muhammadiyah	  members	  and	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  organization’s	  management,	  must	  be	  free	  from	  the	  influence,	  mission,	  infiltration	  and	  agenda	  of	  political	  parties…Every	  Muhammadiyah	  member	  needs	  to	  be	  aware,	  understand	  and	  adopt	  a	  critical	  attitude	  towards	  all	  political	  parties	  in	  this	  nation,	  including	  those	  which	  claim	  to	  be	  engaged	  in	  religious	  proselytization,	  or	  develop	  proselytization	  auxiliaries/activities,	  such	  as	  the	  Prosperous	  Justice	  Party	  (PKS),	  recognizing	  that	  they	  are	  in	  fact	  political	  parties.	  Every	  political	  party	  is	  focused	  on	  the	  acquisition	  of	  political	  power.	  For	  that	  reason,	  in	  dealing	  with	  any	  political	  party,	  we	  must	  always	  remain	  committed	  to	  the	  true	  Path	  of	  Muhammadiyah	  and	  must	  free	  ourselves,	  and	  never	  engage	  ourselves	  with	  the	  mission,	  interests,	  activities	  or	  goals	  of	  the	  above	  mentioned	  political	  parties	  (Muhammadiyah	  2006,	  Points	  2	  and	  3).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Although	  it	  is	  presumed	  that	  many	  of	  the	  transfers	  took	  place	  before	  JSIT	  was	  established,	  the	  term	  JSIT	  is	  used	  to	  indicate	  that	  the	  schools	  were	  transferred	  into	  the	  PKS-­‐linked	  school	  network,	  which	  in	  2001	  was	  formalized	  as	  JSIT.	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The	  statement,	  according	  to	  a	  national-­‐level	  Muhammadiyah	  education	  leader,	  was	  intended	  to	  emphasize	  “the	  importance	  of	  being	  Muhammadiyah	  and	  not	  having	  a	  double	  membership	  with	  PKS,	  because	  this	  organization	  [PKS]	  was	  not	  mainly	  a	  political	  party	  but	  also	  a	  religious	  movement	  that	  had	  a	  certain	  ideology	  [different	  than	  Muhammadiyah]”	  (Interview	  with	  Muhammadiyah	  officer,	  March	  24,	  2010).	  PKS	  seems	  to	  have	  employed	  more	  machinations	  to	  co-­‐opt	  NU	  mosques,	  possibly	  due	  to	  fewer	  NU	  members	  being	  involved	  with	  PKS.	  For	  example,	  an	  NU	  mosque	  would	  be	  in	  need	  of	  repairs	  or	  financial	  help	  for	  upkeep.	  PKS	  cadres	  would	  offer	  financial	  contributions	  to	  fix	  up	  the	  mosque.	  An	  MOU,	  declaring	  control	  of	  the	  mosque	  be	  transferred	  to	  the	  benefactors,	  would	  be	  signed	  by	  unsuspecting	  NU	  people	  inexperienced	  in	  the	  legality	  involved	  with	  an	  MOU.	  Although	  pesantren34	  were	  never	  mentioned	  as	  being	  targeted	  by	  PKS,	  after-­‐school	  community	  study	  groups	  for	  children	  in	  NU	  mosques	  were.	  In	  these	  situations,	  PKS	  members	  would	  teach	  the	  after-­‐school	  community	  classes	  from	  a	  PKS	  ideology.	  Additionally,	  Friday	  services,	  during	  which	  men	  of	  the	  community	  gathered	  for	  group	  prayer	  and	  sermon,	  would	  be	  conducted	  by	  PKS	  members,	  thus	  spreading	  PKS	  ideology	  to	  the	  larger	  NU	  community	  (Interview	  with	  UIN-­‐Jogja	  professors,	  October	  14,	  2009).	  	  While	  losing	  infrastructure	  and	  membership	  was	  a	  concern,	  the	  teachings	  that	  take	  place	  in	  schools	  and	  mosques	  pose	  the	  greatest	  threat	  to	  the	  preservation	  of	  Indonesian	  Islam.	  The	  following	  section	  demonstrates	  the	  various	  efforts	  of	  educators	  in	  Jogja	  to	  retain	  or	  gain	  relevance	  in	  mainstream	  Islamic	  practices	  through	  the	  establishment	  of	  Islamic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Although	  there	  are	  no	  stories	  of	  NU	  schools	  being	  infiltrated,	  new	  JSIT	  schools	  are	  attracting	  middle-­‐class	  NU	  parents	  since	  NU	  does	  not	  generally	  provide	  academically	  rigorous	  schools,	  like	  many	  Muhammadiyah	  schools,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section.	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schools.	  This	  section	  focuses	  on	  Islamic	  groups	  outside	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT,	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  diversity	  in	  and	  provide	  a	  snapshot	  of	  Jogja’s	  educational	  landscape	  in	  which	  they	  are	  functioning.	  	  	  
A	  Glimpse	  into	  Jogja’s	  Educational	  Battlefield	  	  Schools	  representing	  permutations	  of	  the	  Indonesian	  and	  transnational	  camps	  populate	  the	  educational	  landscape	  of	  Jogja.	  In	  the	  2008−2009	  school	  year,	  Muhammadiyah	  schools	  accounted	  for	  86%	  of	  all	  private	  Islamic	  schools	  in	  the	  Special	  Region	  of	  Yogyakarta	  (see	  Table	  3).	  In	  some	  ways,	  JSIT	  schools	  have	  become	  a	  strong	  catalyst	  for	  diversification	  of	  the	  small	  but	  growing	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schooling	  market.	  Many	  educators	  who	  more	  closely	  align	  with	  the	  transnational	  Islamic	  movement	  seek	  to	  emulate	  JSIT	  schools’	  quality	  academics	  and	  significant	  religious	  training.	  However,	  their	  disinterest	  in	  political	  activities	  or	  specific	  teaching approaches	  expected	  of	  JSIT	  school	  personnel	  motivates	  them	  to	  create	  their	  own	  institutions.	  Consequently,	  several	  different	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  school	  groups	  of	  the	  transnational	  ilk	  have	  emerged,	  tailored	  to	  their	  organization-­‐specific	  goals.	  	  Other	  school	  groups,	  in	  particular	  those	  sponsored	  by	  NU	  activists	  who	  feel	  threatened	  by	  JSIT	  ideology,	  are	  creating	  Indonesian	  Islam-­‐friendly	  schooling	  options	  for	  middle	  class	  families.	  These	  schools	  appear	  to	  be	  in	  direct	  response	  to	  the	  competition	  JSIT	  and	  other	  transnational	  Islam	  groups	  are	  creating	  for	  the	  newly	  middle-­‐class	  Muslims.	  As	  will	  be	  demonstrated,	  parents	  often	  seek	  religious	  schooling	  for	  their	  children	  but	  
Table 3. Private Primary Schools in 
the Jogja Region, 2008-09 
Islamic 266 69% 
MUH 230 86% 
Integrated Islam (SIT) 23 9% 
Other 13 5% 
Christian 105 27% 
Protestant 28 27% 
Catholic 77 73% 
Non-Religious 12 3% 
Total 383  
Source: Ministry of National Ed., 2009 
Note: Not all Integrated Islam schools (SIT) 
are members of the Network for Integrated 




demonstrate	  little	  discernment	  towards	  the	  type	  of	  Islam	  and	  religious	  subjectivities	  that	  schools	  promote.	  It	  seems	  these	  newer	  schools	  from	  both	  camps	  are	  more	  a	  response	  to	  JSIT	  than	  to	  Al	  Azhar	  schools.	  A	  possible	  explanation	  is	  that	  Al	  Azhar	  is	  more	  expensive	  and	  more	  elitist,	  leaving	  several	  organizations	  looking	  to	  a	  JSIT	  model	  that	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  more	  accessible	  to	  a	  greater	  portion	  of	  the	  middle	  class.	  The	  review	  of	  various	  providers	  of	  Islamic	  schools	  in	  Jogja	  demonstrates	  this	  diversification.	  	  
Muhammadiyah	  Historically,	  Muhammadiyah	  started	  what	  most	  people	  consider	  to	  be	  the	  first	  modern	  Islamic	  schools	  in	  Indonesia,	  promoting	  strong	  academics	  in	  addition	  to	  religious	  instruction.	  Consequently,	  the	  new	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schools	  could	  easily	  be	  considered	  serious	  competition	  for	  them.	  The	  number	  of	  JSIT	  schools	  is	  growing	  and	  the	  potential	  for	  large-­‐scale	  competition	  may	  be	  a	  concern	  to	  Muhammadiyah.	  However,	  there	  are	  currently	  over	  240	  Muhammadiyah	  schools	  in	  the	  Jogja	  region35	  and	  only	  19	  JSIT	  schools,36	  thus	  limiting	  the	  actual	  scale	  of	  competition.	  Muhammadiyah	  is	  also	  working	  to	  improve	  the	  quality	  of	  their	  extensive	  network	  of	  14,000	  day	  schools37	  throughout	  the	  country	  rather	  than	  creating	  new	  institutions.	  	  Islamic	  schools	  linked	  to	  Muhammadiyah’s	  religious	  ideology,	  aside	  from	  possibly	  Al	  Azhar	  31,	  are	  curiously	  absent	  from	  Jogja’s	  new	  educational	  market	  of	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schools.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  organization’s	  sponsorship	  of	  schools	  does	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Calculated	  by	  author	  from	  data	  received	  from	  Ministry	  of	  National	  Education	  office	  in	  Jogja.	  	  	  36	  JSIT	  Website,	  accessed	  June	  20,	  2011.	  	  37	  This	  number	  includes	  kindergarten,	  primary,	  and	  secondary	  schools.	  Number	  obtained	  from	  personal	  communication	  with	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Central	  Board	  Muhammadiyah,	  November	  2,	  2011.	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encourage	  individual	  members	  to	  create	  their	  own	  schools.	  In	  the	  northern	  area	  of	  Jogja,	  however,	  there	  is	  one	  small	  school	  group,	  Budi	  Mulia	  Dua,	  sponsored	  by	  Amien	  Rais,	  a	  former	  chairman	  of	  Muhammadiyah.	  Although	  community	  members	  assume	  the	  religious	  aspects	  of	  the	  school	  are	  guided	  by	  Muhammadiyah	  ideology,	  Budi	  Mulia	  Dua	  is	  not	  an	  Islamic	  school,	  but	  rather	  an	  elite	  private	  general	  school.	  Aside	  from	  this	  school,	  it	  seems	  individual	  Muhammadiyah	  members	  are	  not	  establishing	  private	  schools	  of	  their	  own.	  	  
Nahdlatul	  Ulama	  	  While	  Muhammadiyah	  is	  known	  for	  its	  day	  schools	  that	  focus	  on	  the	  national	  curriculum	  plus	  additional	  religion	  classes,	  NU	  is	  known	  for	  its	  boarding	  schools	  whose	  specialty	  is	  religion,	  rather	  than	  academic	  training,	  although	  the	  national	  curriculum	  is	  often	  taught.	  There	  is	  a	  trend	  to	  improve	  the	  NU	  pesantren’s	  academic	  training	  and	  include	  modern	  technologies	  such	  as	  computers,	  but	  it	  is	  still	  a	  work	  in	  progress.	  This	  academic	  weakness	  provides	  JSIT	  with	  an	  untapped	  market	  for	  such	  schools	  in	  NU	  communities.	  Two	  members	  of	  an	  NU	  think	  tank	  and	  publication	  house	  in	  Jogja	  voiced	  concern	  over	  the	  influence	  of	  PKS-­‐linked	  schools	  in	  East	  Java,	  an	  NU	  stronghold.	  	  I	  have	  heard	  many	  complaints	  from	  the	  surrounding	  schools	  in	  East	  Java.	  Many	  [PKS-­‐linked]	  integrated	  Islamic	  schools	  have	  already	  started	  to	  appear,	  even	  in	  the	  villages.	  People	  feel	  uneasy	  because	  the	  ideology	  is	  different;	  it’s	  disrupting	  the	  ideology	  that’s	  already	  been	  established	  there...That	  is	  troubling.	  (Interview	  with	  NU	  activists,	  October	  21,	  2009)	  	  Community	  members,	  both	  NU	  and	  otherwise,	  are	  attracted	  to	  PKS-­‐linked	  schools	  due	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  schooling,	  the	  modern	  facilities	  and	  technology,	  and	  the	  longer	  school	  day;	  as	  such,	  JSIT	  school	  enrollment	  is	  increasing.	  The	  “different	  ideological	  issues”	  between	  “the	  NU	  (aswaja)	  ideology	  and	  Wahabi	  ideology”	  are	  said	  to	  be	  causing	  unrest.	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Certainly	  NU	  leadership	  is	  concerned.	  It	  is	  not	  clear,	  though,	  how	  much	  unrest	  is	  being	  created	  among	  the	  parents	  and	  the	  general	  NU	  community.	  	  The	  informant	  believed	  many	  of	  the	  parents	  to	  be	  unaware	  of	  the	  JSIT	  schools’	  affiliation	  with	  PKS.	  Like	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  and	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  parents,	  they	  may	  simply	  be	  less	  concerned	  about	  organizational	  affiliation	  than	  they	  are	  with	  quality	  schooling	  options	  and	  a	  general	  education	  in	  Islamic	  values	  (see	  chapter	  7).	  This	  same	  man	  speculated	  that	  unless	  a	  local	  kyai,38	  or	  NU	  religious	  leader,	  made	  a	  formal	  statement	  against	  the	  JSIT	  schools,	  the	  schools	  would	  continue	  to	  grow	  in	  popularity	  and	  number.	  Considering	  the	  respect	  community	  members	  have	  for	  their	  kyai,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  a	  formal	  statement	  by	  the	  kyai	  could	  influence	  the	  general	  population	  to	  reconsider	  their	  choices	  and	  view	  the	  schools	  as	  a	  threat	  in	  the	  same	  way	  active	  NU	  members	  would.	  	  When	  asked	  how	  dangerous	  he	  considered	  JSIT	  ideology	  to	  be	  for	  NU	  people,	  this	  same	  man	  responded:	  Very	  dangerous.	  Ideologically	  dangerous.	  The	  Islam	  that	  we	  have	  built	  will	  be	  destroyed	  (hancur).	  Islam	  that	  collaborates	  with	  this	  culture	  will	  be	  destroyed	  (hancur)	  because	  their	  platform	  is	  Arab	  Islam,	  exclusive	  Islam.	  Honestly,	  as	  an	  NU	  person,	  I	  am	  a	  bit	  anxious	  with	  Muhammadiyah,	  let	  alone	  PKS.	  Initially,	  my	  son	  was	  in	  a	  Muhammadiyah	  elementary	  school	  [in	  Jogja].	  When	  I	  was	  looking	  for	  primary	  schools,	  an	  NU	  school	  did	  not	  exist.	  In	  the	  end,	  I	  put	  him	  in	  a	  state	  madrasa.	  I	  pulled	  him	  out	  of	  the	  Muhammadiyah	  school	  because	  I	  think	  that	  even	  the	  ideology	  of	  Muhammadiyah	  is	  different	  than	  my	  ideology.	  Later	  on	  my	  son	  would	  be	  different.	  Later	  he	  would	  not	  qunut	  (a	  short	  prayer	  at	  the	  end	  of	  morning	  sholat)	  during	  morning	  sholat.	  This	  is	  within	  the	  context	  of	  Muhammadiyah	  on	  NU	  ideology.	  Especially	  when	  it’s	  more	  extreme	  than	  that,	  to	  me	  it’s	  very	  dangerous.	  (Interview	  with	  NU	  activists,	  Jogja,	  October	  21,	  2009)	  	  The	  greatest	  concern	  for	  this	  man	  would	  be	  that:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  In	  the	  NU	  tradition,	  local	  religious	  leadership	  is	  highly	  respected	  and	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  guide	  for	  the	  community.	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later	  the	  [PKS]	  ideology	  will	  have	  become	  deeply	  embedded	  in	  the	  kids	  and	  the	  children	  will	  have	  a	  negative	  view	  of	  NU	  traditions.	  That’s	  the	  real	  concern.	  The	  person	  who	  was	  originally	  NU,	  then	  goes	  there	  [a	  JSIT	  school]	  and	  when	  the	  ideology	  is	  firmly	  embedded,	  that	  person	  will	  actually	  be	  hostile	  towards	  the	  NU	  community	  from	  which	  they	  originated.	  (Interview	  with	  NU	  activists,	  Jogja,	  October	  21,	  2009)	  	  This	  exchange	  suggests	  concern	  both	  for	  religious	  practices	  changing	  and	  for	  the	  social	  fabric	  of	  the	  NU	  community	  being	  disrupted.	  NU	  communities	  are	  generally	  in	  more	  rural	  areas	  where	  the	  community	  activities	  and	  relationships	  are	  intertwined	  with	  the	  social	  lives	  of	  community	  members;	  for	  example,	  the	  NU	  bid’ah,	  or	  innovation,	  to	  pray	  together	  as	  a	  community	  over	  a	  dead	  body.	  Consequently,	  the	  JSIT	  ideology	  has	  great	  potential	  to	  disrupt	  the	  social	  fabric	  of	  NU	  communities	  if	  neighbors	  become	  critical	  of	  such	  practices	  and	  refuse	  to	  participate,	  or	  worse,	  “become	  hostile	  towards	  the	  community	  from	  which	  they	  originated.”	  For	  Muhammadiyah	  in	  the	  urban	  areas,	  where	  life	  tends	  to	  be	  more	  segregated	  between	  work,	  home,	  and	  mosque,	  disruptions	  in	  Muhammadiyah	  ideology	  may	  not	  be	  felt	  in	  such	  extensive	  social	  ways	  as	  an	  NU	  community	  might	  experience.	  	  To	  thwart	  the	  encroachment	  of	  JSIT	  schools	  on	  NU	  communities,	  NU	  activists	  are	  establishing	  their	  own	  version	  of	  the	  JSIT	  integrated	  Islamic	  schools.39	  My	  informants	  speculated	  that	  if	  NU	  people	  did	  not	  create	  NU	  schools	  to	  rival	  the	  JSIT	  schools	  for	  their	  middle-­‐class	  members,	  the	  latter’s	  presence	  would	  only	  grow	  stronger.	  In	  Jogja,	  an	  NU	  kyai	  who	  also	  serves	  as	  Dean	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Islamic	  Law	  at	  Jogja’s	  State	  Islamic	  University	  (UIN-­‐Jogja)	  established	  the	  city’s	  first	  NU	  integrated	  Islamic	  school	  in	  2010.	  Acknowledging	  that	  the	  education	  obtained	  at	  standard	  NU-­‐associated	  schools	  was	  no	  competition	  for	  JSIT	  schools,	  he	  strategically	  planned	  to	  include	  “integrated	  Islamic	  school”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  There	  is	  no	  estimation	  of	  how	  many	  have	  been	  established.	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as	  well	  as	  “NU”	  in	  the	  school’s	  name.	  Some	  of	  his	  NU	  friends	  objected	  to	  the	  use	  of	  “integrated	  Islam,”	  but	  he	  had	  two	  reasons	  for	  its	  inclusion.	  	  First,	  because	  when	  we	  say	  this	  is	  an	  SIT	  [integrated	  Islamic	  school],	  everybody	  will	  take	  it	  for	  granted	  that	  it’s	  a	  good	  school…The	  second	  is	  the	  more	  important	  reason.	  Because	  they	  [PKS]	  have	  stolen	  our	  mosques,	  I	  want	  to	  steal	  their	  name…I	  use	  the	  term	  integrated	  Islamic	  school,	  but	  let’s	  say	  in	  my	  words,	  I	  NU-­‐ize	  integrated	  Islamic	  schools…It’s	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  interpretation.	  I	  don’t	  want	  that	  when	  you	  say	  the	  term	  “integrated	  Islamic	  school,”	  you	  come	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  this	  belongs	  to	  PKS.	  No.	  I	  want	  to	  say	  that	  there	  is	  another	  interpretation	  that	  is	  very	  NU.	  (Interview	  with	  UIN-­‐Jogja	  professors,	  October	  14,	  2009)	  	  	  His	  school	  opened	  for	  the	  2010−2011	  year,	  with	  “integrated	  Islamic	  school”	  as	  part	  of	  its	  title,	  but	  sans	  “NU.”	  Yet	  the	  school	  name	  connotes	  the	  NU	  tradition,	  which	  would	  be	  readily	  recognizable	  to	  NU	  members.	  Perhaps	  the	  exclusion	  of	  NU	  from	  the	  title	  was	  strategic.	  An	  affiliation-­‐free	  school	  could	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  draw	  in	  non-­‐NU	  families.	  The	  school’s	  curriculum	  included	  English	  and	  Arabic	  and	  the	  school	  day	  extended	  until	  4	  p.m.,	  just	  like	  JSIT	  schools.	  Yet	  it	  is	  unclear	  if	  this	  NU	  integrated	  school	  included	  the	  JSIT	  (and	  Al	  Azhar)	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology	  and	  approach	  to	  secular	  and	  religious	  curricula	  in	  the	  classrooms	  (as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  6).	  Regardless,	  it	  is	  notable	  that	  JSIT	  schools	  are	  established	  to	  transform	  Indonesian	  Islam	  while	  the	  NU	  integrated	  Islamic	  schools,	  just	  like	  the	  Al	  Azhar	  schools,	  are	  working	  in	  the	  name	  of	  preservation.	  	  While	  it	  is	  not	  conclusive	  (as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  3),	  some	  NU	  community	  members	  in	  Jogja	  speculated	  about	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  and	  its	  connection	  to	  NU.	  A	  well-­‐known	  NU	  leader	  heads	  the	  school.	  Several	  of	  the	  founders	  are	  from	  NU.	  Some	  NU	  community	  members	  find	  it	  curious	  that	  NU	  people	  would	  establish	  an	  Al	  Azhar	  school	  since	  the	  Al	  Azhar	  foundation	  was	  born	  out	  of	  a	  Muhammadiyah	  mosque.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  local	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  activists	  on	  a	  city	  council	  established	  the	  first	  Al	  Azhar	  campus	  in	  Jogja	  as	  one	  way	  to	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diversify	  the	  Islamic	  school	  market,	  or	  possibly	  even	  more	  strategically	  to	  provide	  a	  non-­‐PKS-­‐linked	  Islamic	  schooling	  option	  for	  the	  city’s	  elite.	  	   It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  during	  interviews	  with	  religious	  leaders	  and	  other	  community	  members	  about	  extended-­‐day	  schools,	  concerns	  regarding	  Al	  Azhar	  schools	  did	  not	  surface.	  All	  concerns	  went	  immediately	  to	  JSIT	  schools.	  This	  could	  be	  explained	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  ways.	  First,	  Al	  Azhar	  is	  likely	  not	  seen	  as	  a	  threat	  but	  rather	  an	  ally	  to	  Indonesian	  Islam.	  Secondly,	  Al	  Azhar	  has	  not	  expanded	  like	  JSIT	  schools	  have.	  Although	  Al	  Azhar	  established	  its	  first	  school	  nearly	  30	  years	  before	  the	  first	  SIT,	  in	  the	  2010-­‐11	  school	  year,	  Al	  Azhar	  had	  35	  preschools	  and	  65	  primary	  and	  secondary	  schools	  throughout	  the	  country	  while	  JSIT	  had	  571	  preschools	  and	  554	  primary	  and	  secondary	  member	  schools.	  Thus,	  Al	  Azhar’s	  presence	  is	  likely	  not	  viewed	  as	  competition	  for	  the	  general	  student	  population	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  JSIT	  schools.	  	  	  
Non-­‐JSIT	  integrated	  Islamic	  schools	  As	  mentioned	  in	  chapter	  5,	  while	  JSIT	  schools	  appear	  to	  be	  the	  first	  to	  use	  the	  term	  “integrated	  Islamic	  school,”	  they	  have	  not	  held	  exclusive	  rights	  to	  it.	  Due	  to	  the	  popularity	  of	  JSIT	  schools,	  many	  schools	  also	  use	  the	  term	  “integrated	  Islamic	  schools”	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  reputation,	  regardless	  of	  their	  commitment	  to	  JSIT’s	  educational,	  and	  political,	  goals.	  There	  is	  no	  observable	  way	  to	  identify	  JSIT	  affiliation;	  it	  is	  often	  only	  discernible	  upon	  inquiring	  at	  schools	  in	  regards	  to	  their	  membership.	  The	  two	  following	  integrated	  Islamic	  schools	  have	  JSIT	  roots,	  but	  are	  currently	  independent	  of	  the	  network.	  	  The	  Institute	  of	  Integrated	  Islamic	  Education	  for	  the	  Development	  of	  Pious	  Children	  (Lembaga	  Pendidikan	  Islam	  Terpadu	  Bina	  Anak	  Sholeh,	  LPIT	  BIAS),	  more	  commonly	  know	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as	  BIAS,	  was	  established	  in	  Jogja	  and	  now	  runs	  several	  schools	  in	  other	  cities.	  The	  founder	  is	  the	  wife	  of	  one	  of	  the	  original	  founders	  of	  the	  preschool,	  whose	  children	  became	  the	  first	  students	  of	  the	  primary	  school	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT.	  Due	  to	  inconsistency	  in	  educational	  visions	  for	  the	  preschool,	  she	  and	  her	  husband	  eventually	  parted	  ways	  with	  the	  group	  to	  start	  their	  own	  integrated	  Islamic	  preschool	  and	  then	  primary	  school.	  There	  are	  conflicting	  reports	  from	  both	  groups	  as	  to	  who	  actually	  coined	  the	  phrase	  “integrated	  Islamic	  schools.”	  Regardless,	  BIAS	  leadership	  left	  to	  start	  a	  new	  school	  with	  greater	  focus	  on	  student	  character	  through	  moral	  development.	  Additionally,	  they	  did	  not	  want	  to	  be	  connected	  “with	  politics,”	  but	  rather	  just	  “pure	  Islam”	  (Interview	  with	  BIAS	  representative,	  Interview	  May	  6,	  2010).	  This	  group	  has	  also	  developed	  a	  school	  in	  the	  Jogja	  area	  specifically	  for	  students	  with	  learning	  disabilities.	  	  Jabal	  Nur	  SIT	  is	  a	  small	  independent	  primary	  school	  located	  in	  a	  more	  rural	  area	  outside	  of	  Jogja.	  This	  non-­‐JSIT	  school	  tends	  toward	  the	  transnational	  dress	  codes	  and	  more	  regulated	  male−female	  interactions;	  however,	  they	  make	  it	  clear	  they	  are	  not	  interested	  in	  politics	  or	  an	  exclusive	  approach	  to	  Islam.	  Funders,	  leadership,	  and	  some	  teachers	  of	  this	  school	  were	  initially	  part	  of	  Nurul	  Islam	  SIT	  during	  its	  first	  two	  years	  of	  operation.40	  In	  2001,	  some	  of	  the	  school’s	  foundation	  members	  and	  several	  of	  the	  teachers	  split	  off	  to	  form	  Jabal	  Nur	  SIT.	  One	  of	  the	  school’s	  administrators	  explained	  the	  purpose	  of	  their	  school	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  discussion	  about	  the	  split	  from	  the	  JSIT	  school.	  We	  seek	  to	  restore	  Islamic	  learning	  as	  a	  whole	  (menyeluruh)	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  we	  give	  children	  the	  understanding	  that	  in	  Islam	  there	  is	  a	  variety	  of	  groups	  (aliran)	  that	  maybe	  have	  somewhat	  different	  understandings.	  Our	  children	  are	  given	  such	  insights,	  but	  the	  important	  thing	  is	  that	  our	  kids	  know	  not	  to	  degrade	  other	  groups	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Although	  JSIT	  was	  not	  yet	  established,	  this	  school	  was	  associated	  with	  PKS	  cadre	  and	  became	  a	  member	  school	  when	  JSIT	  was	  formed	  in	  2003.	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(menjelek-­‐jelekkan	  kelompok).	  [We	  let	  them	  know]	  there	  are	  some	  differences	  between	  the	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah,	  and	  they	  should	  not	  let	  that	  cause	  strife.	  We	  all	  respect	  each	  other.	  As	  for	  the	  background	  of	  our	  teachers,	  we	  are	  also	  from	  various	  [Islamic	  groups].	  There	  is	  NU,	  Muhammadiyah,	  and	  there	  is	  also	  Tarbiyah	  [Movement	  members].	  But,	  thank	  God,	  here	  we	  can	  eliminate	  differences.	  There’s	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  agreement	  that	  each	  person	  doesn’t	  carry	  a	  specific	  religious	  label	  [into	  the	  school].	  (Interview	  with	  Jabal	  Nur	  SIT	  leadership,	  April	  21,	  2010)	  	  The	  educators	  who	  split	  off	  did	  so	  in	  order	  to	  be	  a	  part	  of	  a	  school	  that	  was	  more	  inclusive	  and	  respectful	  of	  various	  religious	  practices	  and	  political	  affiliation.	  Two	  of	  the	  teachers	  I	  talked	  with	  in	  independent	  conversation	  said	  they	  left	  due	  to	  disagreement	  with	  the	  original	  school’s	  policies,	  which	  required	  teachers	  to	  be	  involved	  “in	  politics”—a	  lightly	  masked	  way	  for	  them	  to	  say	  that	  they	  did	  not	  want	  to	  be	  involved	  with	  PK,	  which	  is	  now	  PKS.	  However,	  in	  a	  separate	  conversation,	  local	  JSIT	  leadership	  attributed	  the	  secession	  to	  disagreements	  over	  the	  management	  of	  funds.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  as	  the	  partners	  implemented	  and	  refined	  their	  visions	  for	  the	  school,	  differences	  emerged,	  eventually	  leading	  to	  a	  separation.	  While	  JSIT,	  BIAS,	  and	  Jabal	  Nur	  SIT	  leadership’s	  visions	  of	  Islamic	  education	  overlap	  in	  many	  ways,	  specific	  differences	  interfere	  with	  full	  collaboration.	  Each	  group	  offers	  the	  larger	  Jogja	  community	  a	  variation	  of	  a	  transnational	  approach	  to	  Islamic	  schooling.	  	  	  While	  both	  of	  these	  schools	  attribute	  their	  separation	  from	  JSIT	  affiliation	  in	  part	  to	  differences	  in	  politics,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Hefner	  (2009)	  reported	  that	  some	  educators	  from	  JSIT	  schools	  across	  Java	  did	  not	  feel	  their	  schools	  were	  politically	  oriented	  or	  maintained	  political	  agendas.	  Additionally,	  during	  my	  time	  at	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim,	  I	  saw	  very	  little	  overt	  connection	  to	  the	  party.	  This	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  Four.	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Hidayatullah	  The	  Network	  of	  Integral	  Hidayatullah	  Schools	  (Jaringan	  Sekolah	  Integral	  
Hidayatullah)	  supports	  member	  schools	  across	  the	  country,	  including	  one	  in	  Jogja.	  In	  2007,	  they	  were	  operating	  133	  schools	  (Hefner	  2009:78).	  Hidayatullah	  is	  a	  populist	  group	  that	  caters	  to	  the	  poor	  and	  lower	  middle	  class.	  Originally	  an	  educational	  foundation,	  Hidayatullah	  transformed	  itself	  in	  2000	  into	  a	  political	  movement	  supporting	  an	  Islamic	  state.	  In	  addition	  to	  schools,	  it	  runs	  several	  other	  types	  of	  social	  institutions	  and	  programs,	  such	  as	  businesses	  and	  husbandry	  and	  forestry	  projects.	  The	  group	  views	  education	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  transforming	  society;	  they	  would	  like	  to	  see	  Islamic	  law	  integrated	  into	  all	  aspects	  of	  individuals’	  lives.	  Their	  schools	  also	  offer	  extended-­‐day	  school	  hours	  and	  integrate	  Islam	  into	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  curriculum.	  They	  oppose	  the	  “Western”	  values	  of	  secularism,	  pluralism	  (the	  idea	  of	  all	  religions	  being	  equal),	  and	  liberalism	  (Hefner	  2009:81).	  	  Unfortunately,	  I	  was	  not	  able	  to	  visit	  a	  Hidayatullah	  school.	  Although	  my	  contact	  to	  the	  Hidayatullah	  school,	  a	  faculty	  member	  at	  the	  State	  Islamic	  University	  in	  Jogja	  who	  had	  a	  son	  enrolled	  at	  the	  school,	  strategically	  requested	  an	  interview	  for	  me—as	  opposed	  to	  directly	  contacting	  the	  school	  myself—I	  was	  not	  granted	  the	  opportunity.	  As	  this	  was	  the	  only	  interview	  denied	  me	  in	  all	  of	  my	  time	  in	  Indonesia,	  I	  could	  not	  help	  but	  wonder	  if	  their	  excuse	  of	  being	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  renovations	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  my	  remaining	  time	  (four	  months)	  in	  the	  country	  was	  a	  thinly	  veiled	  excuse	  for	  disinterest	  in	  speaking	  with	  an	  American	  researcher.	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Conclusion	  Although	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  have	  their	  differences	  regarding	  appropriate	  Islamic	  practices	  and	  how	  to	  be	  a	  good	  Muslim,	  the	  differences	  do	  not	  seem	  as	  stark	  as	  they	  once	  did	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  new	  ideas	  introduced	  by	  transnational	  approaches,	  as	  exemplified	  by	  PKS,	  which	  have	  begun	  to	  take	  root	  in	  Indonesia.	  PKS,	  inspired	  by	  the	  Egyptian	  Muslim	  Brotherhood,	  aims	  to	  purify	  Islamic	  practices	  by	  ridding	  them	  of	  local	  traditions,	  and	  to	  establish	  a	  greater	  presence	  of	  Shari’ah	  in	  government.	  Their	  ideas	  of	  a	  pious	  life	  and	  Islamic	  society	  include	  an	  Islamic	  government.	  This	  opposes	  the	  mainstream	  Indonesian	  tradition	  of	  “Islamic-­‐but-­‐pluralistic	  nationalism”	  (Hefner	  2009:73)	  that	  supports	  a	  religious	  country	  but	  with	  no	  specific	  religion	  or	  religious	  laws	  governing	  the	  citizens.	  These	  newer,	  transnational	  approaches	  challenge	  the	  “Indonesian”	  ways	  of	  political	  and	  religious	  life	  in	  mainstream	  Indonesia.	  Islamic	  schools	  are	  playing	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  promulgating	  variations	  on	  these	  two	  different	  approaches.	  As	  a	  challenger	  to	  the	  status	  quo,	  PKS	  has	  an	  uphill	  battle	  as	  it	  exerts	  its	  efforts	  to	  reconfigure	  what	  the	  public	  views	  as	  “mainstream.”	  	  In	  this	  dissertation,	  Indonesian	  and	  transnational	  approaches	  to	  Islam	  are	  represented	  respectively	  by	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT	  school	  groups.	  Each	  school	  group	  highly	  values	  Islamic	  piety,	  but	  each	  one	  promotes	  its	  own	  form	  of	  piety.	  In	  essence,	  the	  piety	  projects	  of	  these	  groups	  are	  contributing	  to	  either	  preserving	  or	  reforming	  Indonesian	  society	  and	  Indonesian	  ways	  of	  being	  Muslim	  in	  urban	  Indonesia.	  Al	  Azhar’s	  flexible	  Islam	  (see	  chapter	  3)	  contributes	  to	  preservation	  of	  Indonesian	  pluralism,	  while	  JSIT’s	  exacting	  Islam	  (see	  chapter	  4)	  is	  promoting	  a	  transnational	  purificationist	  Islam	  that	  cleanses	  local	  traditions	  from	  Islamic	  practices.	  The	  next	  two	  chapters	  are	  dedicated	  to	  a	  detailed	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A	  Flexible	  Islam,	  the	  Glue	  of	  the	  Nation:	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  Islamic	  Primary	  School	  	  	  
What	  we	  want	  is	  an	  Islam	  that’s	  accepted	  everywhere,	  that’s	  not	  exclusive,	  extreme	  right,	  or	  
extreme	  left.	  	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  foundation	  secretary,	  March	  14,	  2010	  	  	  
Muhammadiyah	  and	  NU	  are	  groups	  (masuk	  golongan).	  Our	  [Al	  Azhar	  31]	  guidelines…are	  the	  
Qur’an	  and	  the	  sunnah	  (teachings	  of	  Prophet).	  Maybe	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  are	  
also…guided	  by	  the	  two	  of	  these	  things,	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  the	  sunnah,	  but	  maybe	  there	  are	  still	  
things	  or	  beliefs	  they	  include	  that	  perhaps	  not	  everyone	  can	  agree	  with.	  Islam	  brings	  peace	  
and	  blessings…Islam	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  divide.	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  headmaster,	  February	  18,	  2010	  	   Extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schooling	  for	  the	  middle	  class	  in	  Indonesia	  is	  marked	  by	  two	  competing	  piety	  projects.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  discuss	  one	  of	  those:	  specifically,	  the	  one	  codified	  within	  the	  Al	  Azhar	  network.	  The	  schools	  affiliated	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  pride	  themselves	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  they	  promote	  an	  inclusive	  Islam.	  The	  universality	  of	  Islam	  in	  Al	  Azhar’s	  institutional	  approach	  is	  found	  in	  its	  inclusiveness.	  Acceptance	  of	  individuals	  as	  Muslims,	  without	  focus	  on	  a	  particular	  membership	  in	  Islamic	  organizations	  or	  distinguishing	  forms	  of	  practice	  as	  right	  or	  wrong,	  is	  meant	  to	  create	  unity	  among	  Islamic	  groups	  and	  Muslims.	  Al	  Azhar	  leaders	  view	  the	  tendencies	  to	  focus	  on	  differences	  between	  various	  groups	  and	  to	  consider	  one	  as	  infinitely	  better	  than	  another	  as	  divisive.	  The	  secretary	  of	  the	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  Foundation	  said:	  	  I’m	  so	  tired	  of	  hearing	  Muhammadiyah	  mock	  NU	  and	  NU	  ridicule	  Muhammadiyah.	  That’s	  not	  helpful;	  those	  who	  benefit	  are	  the	  anti-­‐Muslims.	  If	  we	  continue	  like	  this…the	  brotherhood	  of	  Islam,	  the	  unity	  of	  Islam	  will	  be	  destroyed.	  We	  must	  figure	  out	  how	  to	  unite	  everyone…When	  one’s	  asked,	  one	  should	  be	  able	  to	  answer,	  “I’m	  Muslim,”	  not	  “Muhammadiyah,”	  not	  “NU,”	  but,	  “I’m	  Muslim.”	  Then	  when	  people	  are	  hit	  by	  disasters,	  they	  aren’t	  asked	  if	  they’re	  Muhammadiyah	  and	  if	  they	  are	  they’re	  told	  Muhammadiyah	  people	  aren’t	  going	  to	  be	  helped.	  That’s	  dangerous.	  That’s	  what	  happened	  in	  Afghanistan,	  Pakistan.	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  foundation	  secretary,	  April	  14,	  2010)	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  This	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  officer,	  an	  active	  NU	  member,	  is	  not	  expecting	  Islamic	  organizations	  to	  disband;	  however,	  he	  wants	  the	  feelings	  of	  differences	  to	  be	  replaced	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  their	  universal	  membership	  in	  the	  brotherhood	  of	  Muslims,	  the	  ummah,	  or	  the	  worldwide	  community	  of	  Muslims,	  which	  is	  not	  determined	  by	  specific	  religious	  ideologies	  or	  national	  boundaries.	  He	  sees	  societal	  danger	  in	  exclusionist	  approaches.	  	  Al	  Azhar	  attempts	  to	  build	  a	  unified	  Indonesia	  by	  offering	  a	  version	  of	  Islam	  that	  accommodates	  a	  variety	  of	  opinions	  on	  how	  to	  be	  Muslim.	  Through	  a	  moderate,	  open	  approach	  to	  Islam,	  differences	  in	  practices	  are	  nearly	  irrelevant	  in	  light	  of	  a	  unified	  commitment	  to	  the	  Islam	  as	  found	  in	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith	  before	  interpretation-­‐	  mediated	  practice.	  	  This	  type	  of	  focus	  on	  a	  common	  religious	  identity,	  Muslim	  rather	  than	  Muhammadiyah	  or	  NU,	  is	  expected	  to	  provide	  a	  shared	  culture	  and	  mutual	  respect	  for	  each	  other’s	  interpretations	  of	  holy	  texts	  and	  execution	  of	  ritual	  and	  practice.	  To	  instill	  this	  culture	  of	  acceptance,	  I	  argue,	  Al	  Azhar	  conceptualizes	  a	  universal	  Islam	  as	  one	  that	  is	  adaptable,	  and	  thus	  accommodating.	  This	  flexible	  Islam	  is	  comprised	  of	  three	  interrelated	  components:	  Qur’an-­‐	  and	  Hadith-­‐based	  beliefs,	  inclusivity,	  and	  pluralism.	  I	  begin	  this	  chapter	  with	  a	  brief	  historical	  overview	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  Islamic	  Pesantren	  Foundation	  (Yayasan	  Pesantren	  Islam	  Al	  Azhar,	  or	  YPI	  Al	  Azhar,	  henceforth	  known	  as	  Al	  Azhar)	  and	  compare	  its	  franchise	  business	  model	  to	  a	  neo-­‐liberal,	  post-­‐Fordist	  model.	  I	  also	  review	  the	  history	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  Islamic	  Primary	  School	  (hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  Al	  Azhar	  31),	  the	  Al	  Azhar	  campus	  at	  which	  I	  conducted	  my	  research	  to	  create	  a	  context	  for	  outlining	  the	  three	  interrelated	  components	  of	  Al	  Azhar’s41	  conceptualization	  of	  a	  universal	  Islam:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Throughout	  this	  chapter,	  and	  the	  entire	  dissertation,	  I	  often	  refer	  to	  Al	  Azhar,	  the	  foundation	  headquartered	  in	  Jakarta,	  and	  Al	  Azhar	  31,	  the	  school	  in	  Jogja,	  interchangeably.	  Although	  the	  majority	  of	  the	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Qur’an-­‐	  and	  Hadith-­‐based	  beliefs,	  inclusivity,	  and	  pluralism.	  I	  argue	  that	  these	  three	  components	  combine	  to	  form	  a	  flexible	  Islam,	  which	  is	  intended	  to	  promote	  peaceful	  co-­‐existence	  in	  the	  religiously	  diverse	  society.	  Finally,	  I	  argue	  that	  Al	  Azhar’s	  flexible	  Islam,	  aimed	  at	  unifying	  all	  Muslims	  and	  creating	  social	  stability,	  parallels	  the	  nationalist	  pluralist	  rhetoric	  of	  Sukarno	  and	  Suharto	  that	  worked	  to	  unify	  the	  diverse	  ethnic	  populations	  within	  Indonesia.	  	  	  
The	  Al	  Azhar	  Franchise	  At	  the	  center	  of	  the	  Al	  Azhar	  Islamic	  Pesantren	  Foundation’s	  massive	  headquarters	  complex	  in	  Kebayoran	  Baru,	  an	  affluent	  area	  of	  southern	  Jakarta,	  is	  a	  large	  mosque	  built	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1950s.	  The	  foundation’s	  roots	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  this	  mosque,	  originally	  Agung	  Kebayoran	  Mosque,	  which	  was	  established	  by	  a	  Muhammadiyah	  activist42	  and	  supported	  by	  the	  Minster	  of	  Social	  Affairs	  and	  the	  mayor	  of	  Jakarta	  (YPI	  Al	  Azhar	  2012).	  In	  Islamic	  tradition,	  the	  mosque	  hosted	  Qur’anic	  study	  circles	  for	  adults	  in	  the	  morning	  and	  for	  children	  in	  the	  afternoon.	  During	  a	  visit	  in	  1960,	  the	  Sheikh	  from	  Cairo’s	  world-­‐renowned	  Al	  Azhar43	  University	  renamed	  the	  mosque	  Al	  Azhar.	  In	  response	  to	  troubling	  socio-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  data	  was	  collected	  at	  the	  school,	  the	  centralized	  nature	  of	  the	  foundation	  and	  management	  of	  schools	  generates	  great	  consistency	  in	  ideology	  and	  practices	  between	  the	  two,	  and	  therefore	  allows	  for	  this	  interchangeability.	  Additionally,	  the	  headmaster	  has	  been	  headmaster	  at	  two	  other	  Al	  Azhar	  campuses	  and	  was	  assigned	  by	  headquarters	  to	  open	  Al	  Azhar	  31.	  Any	  site-­‐specific	  characteristics	  will	  be	  specifically	  mentioned	  as	  such.	  	  42	  A	  national-­‐level	  Muhammadiyah	  education	  official	  in	  Jakarta	  explained	  the	  relationship	  between	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  as	  follows:	  “Al	  Azhar	  is	  actually	  quite	  close	  to	  Muhammadiyah.	  The	  foundation	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  is	  under	  the	  family	  of	  Professor	  Hamka	  and	  Professor	  Hamka	  was	  the	  former	  leader	  of	  Muhammadiyah.	  His	  father,	  H.	  Rosul,	  was	  the	  person	  who	  brought	  Muhammadiyah	  to	  Sumatra.	  So	  Al	  Azhar	  is	  a	  ‘brand’	  of	  Muhammadiyah,	  but	  it’s	  family-­‐owned.	  But	  the	  system	  is	  very	  close	  to	  Muhammadiyah	  because	  the	  owner	  was	  a	  Muhammadiyah	  activist”	  (Interview	  with	  Muhammadiyah	  officer,	  March	  24,	  2010).	  	  43	  Al	  Azhar	  University	  of	  Cairo	  is	  the	  premier	  university	  for	  Islamic	  learning	  in	  the	  Muslim	  world.	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religious	  conditions	  of	  the	  day,44	  and	  to	  live	  up	  to	  its	  venerable	  namesake,	  the	  foundation	  began	  expanding	  its	  educational	  activities	  to	  formal	  Islamic	  schooling.	  	  Nurcholish	  Madjid,	  a	  prominent	  Indonesian	  Muslim	  intellectual	  who	  advocated	  for	  tolerance,	  pluralism,	  and	  democracy,	  was	  involved	  in	  the	  efforts	  to	  establish	  the	  schools.45	  He	  often	  taught	  that	  according	  to	  the	  Qur’an,	  God	  created	  all	  things	  in	  pairs	  consisting	  of	  two	  contradictory	  parts;	  therefore,	  it	  was	  only	  right	  that	  Muhammadiyah	  and	  NU	  both	  existed	  in	  Indonesian	  society,	  as	  two	  wings	  of	  one	  eagle.	  He	  believed	  it	  to	  be	  God’s	  will	  that	  both	  existed.	  Consequently,	  rather	  than	  emphasizing	  differences,	  he	  advocated	  for	  the	  two	  organizations	  to	  collaborate	  in	  actualizing	  the	  ideals	  of	  Islam	  (Saleh	  2001:91).	  This	  concept	  of	  collaboration	  and	  mutual	  respect	  has	  persisted	  through	  the	  subsequent	  decades	  and	  continues	  to	  influence	  multiple	  Islamic	  groups.	  The	  educational	  mission	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  is	  to	  “Become	  a	  leading,	  modern	  dakwah	  (religious	  propagation)	  and	  Islamic	  education	  institution	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  enlightening	  and	  educating	  people	  of	  the	  nation	  to	  form	  an	  Indonesian	  community	  of	  faith,	  knowledge,	  good	  works,	  devotion	  to	  the	  glory	  of	  Muslims	  (wal	  Izzul	  Muslims)”	  (YPI	  Al	  Azhar	  2012).	  The	  phrase	  of	  “wal	  Izzul	  Muslims,”	  or	  “the	  glory	  of	  Muslims,”	  harkens	  back	  to	  the	  intellectual	  Golden	  Age	  of	  Islam.	  This	  emphasizes	  its	  intellectual	  focus,	  and	  also	  highlights	  a	  lack	  of	  focus	  on	  political	  issues.	  The	  foundation	  hopes	  Al	  Azhar	  students	  will	  become	  “pious	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  The	  first	  school	  was	  built	  in	  the	  early	  1960s	  to	  counter	  the	  permeation	  of	  Communism	  in	  all	  sectors	  of	  government,	  which	  occurred	  largely	  during	  Sukarno’s	  reign,	  and	  the	  oppressive	  nature	  of	  Suharto’s	  rule.	  Sensing	  the	  Muslim	  population	  to	  be	  “like	  young	  chicks	  who’d	  lost	  their	  mother	  hen”	  (Busyairi	  2002:90),	  manifested	  by	  empty	  mosques	  and	  prayer	  rooms	  and	  idle	  dakwah	  efforts,	  Al	  Azhar	  leadership	  set	  out	  to	  not	  only	  revive	  the	  mosque,	  but	  to	  go	  beyond	  afternoon	  study	  groups	  and	  established	  Islamic	  schools.	  This	  new	  vision	  included	  eventual	  establishment	  of	  a	  university	  “to	  equal	  Al	  Azhar	  University	  in	  Cairo,”	  the	  mosque’s	  namesake	  (Busyairi	  2002:91).	  	  45	  Abdullah	  Hakim	  directed	  the	  efforts	  with	  the	  assistance	  of	  Nurcholish	  Madjid,	  Mahfudh	  Makmun,	  A.	  Wachid	  Zaini,	  and	  others.	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upstanding	  Muslim	  intellectuals,	  physically	  and	  mentally	  healthy,	  intelligent,	  capable	  and	  skilled,	  who	  believe	  in	  themselves,	  have	  strong	  personalities	  (kepribadian	  yang	  kuat),	  are	  champions	  for	  good	  (berwatak	  pejuang)	  and	  also	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  improve	  themselves	  and	  their	  families,	  and	  be	  responsible	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  people	  and	  the	  nation”	  (YPI	  Al	  Azhar	  2012).	  Al	  Azhar	  is	  run	  like	  a	  franchise,	  with	  campus	  branches	  throughout	  the	  archipelago.	  This	  business	  model	  suggests	  that	  foundation	  leaders	  show	  great	  concern	  in	  monitoring	  the	  quality	  of	  their	  institutions.	  A	  conversation	  with	  senior	  officers	  at	  Al	  Azhar’s	  Jakarta	  headquarters	  demonstrated	  the	  level	  of	  attention	  and	  pride	  given	  to	  preserving	  the	  high	  reputation	  of	  the	  schools.	  	  Officer	  1:	  Al	  Azhar	  is	  the	  most	  powerful	  brand	  name	  for	  Islamic	  education	  in	  Indonesia.	  	  Officer	  2:	  You	  know,	  there	  are	  a	  lot	  of	  schools	  or	  foundations,	  so	  be	  careful.	  If	  you	  see	  Al	  Azhar	  1,	  Al	  Azhar	  2	  or	  Al	  Azhar	  3,	  it	  belongs	  to	  us.	  But	  once	  you	  get	  to	  Kemang	  [an	  affluent	  area	  of	  Jakarta],	  there	  is	  Al	  Azhar	  Kemang.	  That’s	  different;	  that	  Al	  Azhar	  belongs	  to	  a	  personal	  foundation…	  So	  now	  Al	  Azhar	  University	  has	  patent	  rights	  to	  the	  name	  [Al	  Azhar]	  because	  of	  that	  kind	  of	  practice,	  because	  a	  lot	  of	  people	  would	  like	  to	  steal	  the	  name	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  for	  their	  own	  use.	  	  Officer	  1:	  Not	  because	  they	  do	  not	  agree	  with	  the	  curriculum	  or	  content,	  but	  they…seek	  personal	  gain,	  for	  personal	  financial	  benefit.	  	  Karen:	  	  	  	  	  Like	  for	  profit?	  	  Officer	  1:	  Yes.	  	  	  Officer	  2:	  Yes,	  because	  indeed	  Al	  Azhar	  is	  a	  very	  powerful	  brand.	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  headquarters	  officers,	  April	  12,	  2009)	  	  	  While	  Al	  Azhar	  is	  a	  non-­‐profit	  organization,	  it	  is	  very	  protective	  of	  its	  brand	  name	  and	  reputation.	  In	  order	  to	  protect	  the	  reputation	  and	  guarantee	  a	  particular	  product,	  Al	  Azhar	  is	  highly	  centralized.	  As	  the	  headmaster	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  put	  it,	  “We	  here	  are	  a	  franchise,	  like	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McDonalds.	  So	  we	  coordinate	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  Jakarta”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  headmaster,	  March	  17,	  2009).46	  Numbering	  the	  campuses,	  rather	  than	  personalizing	  the	  names	  to	  the	  location,	  reinforces	  the	  image	  of	  a	  franchise.	  In	  effort	  to	  protect	  their	  brand	  name,	  the	  foundation	  has	  copyrighted	  the	  use	  of	  the	  “Al	  Azhar.”	  This	  means	  that	  any	  other	  organization,	  educational	  or	  otherwise,	  must	  petition	  Al	  Azhar	  headquarters,	  and	  upon	  approval,	  follow	  particular	  rules	  in	  order	  to	  use	  the	  name.	  Considering	  that	  the	  name	  Al	  Azhar	  symbolizes	  the	  epitome	  of	  religious	  education	  throughout	  the	  Muslim	  world,	  it	  is	  surprising	  that	  a	  single	  organization	  could	  gain	  legal	  control	  over	  the	  use	  of	  the	  name	  in	  a	  predominantly	  Muslim	  country.	  It	  also	  suggests	  some	  kind	  of	  favor	  with	  the	  government	  to	  have	  been	  able	  to	  obtain	  the	  legal	  possession	  of	  the	  name.	  	  Initial	  efforts	  to	  establish	  schools	  focused	  on	  Jakarta,	  but	  they	  then	  expanded	  across	  the	  archipelago.	  Starting	  with	  a	  preschool	  in	  1964,	  Al	  Azhar	  had	  expanded	  to	  35	  preschools	  and	  kindergartens,	  65	  primary	  and	  secondary	  schools,	  and	  a	  university	  by	  2010.	  Nearly	  80%	  of	  Al	  Azhar’s	  primary	  and	  secondary	  school	  growth	  occurred	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  2000s	  in	  concert	  with	  the	  swelling	  of	  popular	  interest	  in	  Islam	  and	  Islamic	  activism.	  	   Al	  Azhar’s	  franchise	  management	  approach	  mirrors	  a	  neo-­‐liberal	  business	  model	  with	  post-­‐Fordist	  adaptability	  to	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  a	  specific	  niche	  of	  clientele.	  Al	  Azhar	  has	  been	  selective	  in	  its	  expansion,	  careful	  to	  guard	  reputation	  as	  a	  network	  of	  high	  quality	  schools.	  It	  is	  not	  apologetic	  for	  being	  one	  of	  the	  most	  expensive	  private	  Islamic	  schools	  in	  the	  country.	  The	  schools	  are	  built	  around	  a	  balance	  of	  teaching	  a	  flexible	  Islam	  that	  accommodates	  religious	  understanding	  of	  parents	  who	  are	  relatively	  new	  in	  exploring	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  A	  memorandum	  of	  understanding	  is	  signed	  between	  headquarters	  and	  the	  sponsoring	  foundation	  of	  a	  new	  school.	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their	  own	  personal	  religious	  journeys.	  Their	  clientele	  are	  generally	  upper-­‐middle	  class	  parents	  who	  are	  religious-­‐minded,	  but	  living	  their	  religion	  in	  less	  regimented	  and	  overtly	  Islamic	  ways.	  	  	  
Al	  Azhar	  31	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  sits	  along	  North	  Ring	  Road,	  the	  busy	  double-­‐lane	  thoroughfare	  that	  wraps	  around	  the	  city	  of	  Jogjakarta.	  Pulling	  into	  the	  campus,	  one	  immediately	  sees	  the	  MTQ	  National	  Monument	  XVI,	  which	  looks	  less	  like	  a	  monument	  and	  more	  like	  a	  small,	  high-­‐ceilinged,	  enclosed	  gazebo.	  (The	  importance	  of	  this	  building	  will	  be	  explained	  below.)	  The	  monument	  is	  connected	  by	  a	  covered	  walkway	  to	  a	  larger	  rectangular	  two-­‐story	  building,	  which	  houses	  the	  school’s	  administrative	  offices	  on	  the	  ground	  level	  and	  a	  small	  library	  and	  computer	  room	  on	  the	  second	  level.	  Upon	  rounding	  these	  buildings,	  the	  grounds	  open	  up	  to	  the	  fenced-­‐in,	  colorful	  preschool	  complex	  and	  then,	  behind	  that,	  the	  larger	  elementary	  school	  complex.	  The	  open	  fields	  to	  one	  side	  and	  the	  small	  Code	  River	  tucked	  in	  a	  ravine	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  campus	  offer	  a	  refreshing	  change	  from	  the	  crowded	  residential	  complexes	  and	  busy	  city	  streets	  on	  the	  inner	  side	  of	  Ring	  Road.	  The	  ample	  greenery	  throughout	  the	  campus	  provides	  a	  welcome	  calming	  atmosphere.	  	   Al Azhar 31 teachers on the first day of school	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The	  elementary	  school’s	  cement-­‐tiled	  courtyard	  doubles	  as	  the	  workout	  area	  during	  gym	  class	  and	  meeting	  grounds	  for	  morning	  assemblies	  and	  school	  events.	  To	  one	  side	  is	  a	  small	  grassy	  area	  with	  a	  compact	  jungle	  gym	  complete	  with	  swings,	  monkey	  bars,	  and	  slides.	  The	  clean,	  spacious,	  air-­‐conditioned	  classrooms	  are	  full	  of	  natural	  light.	  They	  are	  furnished	  with	  area	  rugs	  and	  colorful	  tables,	  with	  chairs	  for	  the	  younger	  grades	  and	  individual	  desks	  and	  chairs	  for	  the	  upper	  grades.	  While	  the	  medium	  of	  instruction	  is	  Indonesian,	  classroom	  walls	  are	  decorated	  with	  student	  work	  and	  attractive	  teaching	  materials	  in	  Indonesian,	  Arabic,	  and	  English.	  	  The	  school	  grounds	  were	  once	  government	  property,	  owned	  by	  the	  Sultan.47	  In	  1991,	  Jogjakarta	  hosted	  the	  Department	  of	  Religion’s	  national	  bi-­‐annual	  Musabaqah	  
Tilawatil	  Qur’an	  (MTQ),	  a	  multi-­‐day	  event	  involving	  competitions	  related	  to	  the	  Qur’an.	  To	  memorialize	  the	  city’s	  honor	  of	  hosting	  the	  competition,	  the	  small	  single-­‐room	  National	  Monument	  XVI	  was	  constructed	  on	  an	  otherwise	  empty	  lot	  next	  to	  the	  busy	  ring	  road.	  In	  1999,	  after	  several	  years	  of	  ineffective	  use	  of	  the	  building,	  the	  Mataram	  Development	  of	  Islam	  Center	  Foundation48	  	  (Yayasan	  Pusat	  Pengembangan	  Islam	  Mataram	  -­‐	  YPPIM)	  was	  established	  with	  the	  “aim	  to	  develop	  the	  greatness	  of	  Islam	  by	  providing	  various	  amenities	  in	  the	  MTQ	  National	  Monument	  XVI	  complex”	  (YPPIM	  2007:21).	  	  In	  2003,	  after	  another	  period	  of	  inefficient	  use	  of	  the	  space,	  Hafidz,	  a	  foundation	  board	  member,	  proposed	  the	  area	  become	  a	  “living”	  and	  “dynamic”	  monument	  through	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  private	  Islamic	  school	  on	  the	  monument	  grounds.	  In	  an	  unusual	  move,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Jogja	  is	  a	  special	  region	  with	  the	  attributes	  of	  a	  kingdom	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Indonesia.	  The	  Sultan	  is	  governor	  of	  the	  region	  by	  virtue	  of	  him	  being	  Sultan.	  	  48	  Mataram	  is	  the	  former	  name	  of	  Yogyakarta	  when	  it	  was	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Mataram,	  under	  the	  Sultan.	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the	  Sultan	  donated	  the	  land	  to	  the	  foundation,	  making	  it	  private	  real	  estate.	  Just	  as	  in	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  original	  Al	  Azhar	  mosque	  in	  Jakarta,	  government	  figures	  were	  involved	  in	  the	  conceptualization	  and	  support	  of	  the	  school	  in	  Jogja,	  signaling	  that	  a	  role	  of	  these	  schools	  is	  to	  be	  supportive	  of	  the	  local	  government.	  Keen	  to	  be	  successful	  in	  their	  endeavor	  and	  aware	  of	  the	  multiple	  private	  Islamic	  schools	  operating	  in	  Jogja,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  growing	  trend	  in	  elite49	  Islamic	  schools,	  the	  foundation	  strategically	  decided	  to	  establish	  a	  branch	  of	  Al	  Azhar.	  The	  secretary	  of	  the	  foundation	  explained:	  We	  initiated	  the	  establishment	  of	  an	  Al	  Azhar	  preschool	  and	  kindergarten	  in	  collaboration	  with	  the	  foundation	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  Islamic	  Education	  Center	  in	  Jakarta.	  It’s	  a	  franchise.	  Our	  use	  of	  the	  name	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  was	  not	  random;	  you	  must	  have	  permission.	  So	  by	  using	  the	  name	  Al	  Azhar,	  thank	  God,	  [in	  Jogja]	  if	  I	  can	  make	  a	  business	  analogy,	  [Al	  Azhar]	  it	  is	  a	  marketable	  brand	  (dagangannya	  laku).	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  foundation	  secretary,	  June	  17,	  2009)	  	  The	  well-­‐known	  reputation	  of	  the	  Al	  Azhar	  schools	  was	  expected	  to	  facilitate	  entrance	  into	  Jogja’s	  burgeoning	  market	  for	  quality	  private	  Islamic	  schools.	  Upon	  establishing	  a	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding50	  between	  Al	  Azhar	  headquarters	  in	  Jakarta	  and	  the	  local	  sponsoring	  foundation,	  the	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  Yogyakarta	  branch	  was	  established.	  	  	  It	  is	  not	  lost	  on	  local	  NU	  activists	  that	  Hafidz,	  a	  prominent	  NU	  activist	  and	  the	  mastermind	  of	  the	  plan,	  founded	  an	  non-­‐partisan	  Islamic	  school	  that	  delivered	  the	  full	  national	  curriculum,	  rather	  than	  an	  NU	  pesantren,	  which	  tends	  to	  focus	  more	  heavily	  on	  religious	  studies	  and	  promote	  the	  NU	  tradition.	  During	  interviews,	  a	  few	  NU	  activists	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  “Elite”	  is	  defined	  by	  high	  tuition	  fees	  not	  affordable	  by	  those	  earning	  the	  average	  wage	  in	  the	  city.	  See	  the	  end	  of	  the	  section	  for	  details.	  	  	  	  50	  There	   are	   three	   types	   of	  MOUs:	   one	   in	  which	   all	   teachers	   and	   the	  headmaster	   are	  provided	  by	  Al	  Azhar	  headquarters;	  another	  in	  which	  the	  headmaster	  is	  sent	  by	  headquarters	  to	  lead	  the	  school,	  but	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  staff	   are	   local;	   and	  another	   in	  which	  all	   staff	   and	  administrators	   are	   from	  headquarters.	   In	   this	   school,	   the	  headmaster	  was	  transferred	  from	  other	  Al	  Azhar	  school,	  but	  teachers	  were	  all	  local	  hires.	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wondered	  aloud,	  as	  if	  repeating	  a	  question	  they	  had	  considered	  among	  themselves	  before,	  “why	  would	  an	  NU	  man	  establish	  a	  ‘Muhammadiyah	  school’?”	  Al	  Azhar’s	  roots	  are	  in	  Muhammadiyah,	  as	  a	  Muhammadiyah	  activist	  started	  the	  original	  mosque,	  but	  the	  suggestion	  that	  Muhammadiyah	  ideology	  influences	  the	  current	  foundation	  is	  dismissed	  by	  the	  leadership	  and	  is	  not	  immediately	  observed	  in	  practice.	  	  A	  few	  NU	  informants	  playfully	  speculated	  that	  Hafidz	  was	  trying	  to	  insert	  some	  NU	  teachings	  into	  the	  school	  culture	  and	  thus	  inculcate	  NU	  leanings	  among	  students.	  While	  headquarters	  centrally	  regulates	  the	  religion	  curriculum	  through	  in-­‐house	  religion	  textbooks,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  some	  NU	  attitudes	  filter,	  intentionally	  or	  not,	  into	  the	  classroom	  through	  the	  main	  religion	  teacher.	  He	  is	  a	  humorous,	  charismatic	  man,	  the	  son	  of	  a	  kyai	  (NU	  religious	  leader)	  who	  aspires	  to	  becoming	  a	  kyai	  himself.	  Additionally,	  Hafidz	  had	  organized	  at	  least	  one	  NU-­‐specific	  activity	  for	  the	  faculty.	  During	  a	  special	  faculty	  meeting,	  those	  in	  attendance	  were	  led	  in	  prayer	  intended	  to	  clean	  the	  school	  of	  spirits.	  According	  to	  NU	  belief,	  spirits	  occupy	  empty	  uninhabited	  spaces,	  such	  as	  the	  rice	  fields	  that	  surround	  much	  of	  the	  school,	  making	  the	  school	  susceptible	  to	  visits	  from	  spirits.	  Indeed,	  earlier	  that	  school	  year	  a	  female	  student	  had	  seen	  a	  spirit	  in	  the	  bathroom.	  	  In	  an	  interview	  with	  the	  school’s	  foundation	  secretary,	  I	  repeated	  outside	  curiosities	  about	  an	  NU	  man	  starting	  a	  school	  generally	  associated	  with	  Muhammadiyah.	  I	  commented	  that	  some	  thought	  perhaps	  NU	  teachings	  were	  being	  inserted	  into	  the	  school,	  and	  then	  asked	  what	  he	  thought	  of	  these	  speculations.	  He,	  an	  NU	  activist	  himself,	  smiled,	  looking	  slightly	  amused,	  raised	  his	  eyebrows,	  and	  shrugged	  his	  shoulders	  to	  suggest	  it	  might	  be	  the	  case,	  before	  asking	  who	  had	  suggested	  such	  things	  to	  me.	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  Another	  perplexing	  question	  is	  why	  Hafidz	  chose	  to	  run	  an	  elite	  Islamic	  school	  rather	  than	  a	  school	  for	  economically	  disadvantaged	  students,	  another	  NU	  tradition.	  Perhaps	  the	  government	  was	  not	  interested	  in	  donating	  land	  to	  a	  specific	  group’s	  school.	  Or,	  perhaps	  Hafidz	  strategically	  wanted	  to	  diversify	  the	  large	  private	  Islamic	  schooling	  market	  dominated	  by	  Muhammadiyah	  schools	  and	  being	  quickly	  populated	  by	  JSIT	  schools	  linked	  to	  PKS—a	  party	  troubling	  to	  both	  Muhammadiyah	  and	  NU	  leaders.	  Regardless	  of	  motive,	  by	  establishing	  a	  branch	  of	  Al	  Azhar,	  the	  foundation	  provided	  middle-­‐class	  parents	  with	  a	  “moderate,”	  as	  Al	  Azhar	  leadership	  often	  described	  their	  institution,	  Islamic	  schooling	  option.	  The	  eclectic	  backgrounds	  of	  board	  members	  symbolize	  the	  inclusiveness	  of	  religious	  practices	  the	  school	  attempts	  to	  instill	  in	  its	  students.	  The	  sponsoring	  foundation	  board	  members	  come	  from	  various	  religious	  and	  professional	  backgrounds.	  For	  example,	  board	  members	  include	  a	  high-­‐level	  administration	  official	  at	  the	  Muhammadiyah	  University,	  Jogjakarta	  campus;	  a	  former	  Ministry	  of	  Religious	  Affairs	  district	  office	  head	  in	  charge	  of	  religious	  education;	  a	  well-­‐known	  kyai	  (NU	  leader	  and	  religious	  scholar);	  and	  a	  current	  regional	  legislator,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  former	  member	  of	  the	  Tarbiyah	  Movement	  who	  refused	  to	  become	  politically	  active	  when	  the	  Movement’s	  cadre	  members	  were	  required	  to	  become	  members	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Partai	  Keadilan	  (PK),	  which	  is	  now	  the	  PKS.	  Many	  of	  the	  board	  members	  are	  well	  established	  in	  their	  careers	  and	  have	  extensive	  professional	  experience	  related	  to	  either	  religion	  or	  education.	  	  The	  presence	  of	  the	  monument	  and	  donated	  land	  serves	  as	  a	  subtle	  message	  that	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  is	  connected	  to	  the	  Sultan	  and	  government	  of	  Jogja	  and	  the	  government’s	  patronage	  to	  Islam.	  It	  also	  speaks	  to	  the	  nationalist	  loyalty	  Al	  Azhar	  demonstrates	  towards	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the	  state.	  Al	  Azhar	  does	  not	  officially	  have	  a	  political	  agenda,	  but	  one	  Al	  Azhar	  leader	  in	  Jakarta	  explained	  that	  Al	  Azhar	  schools	  are	  expected	  to	  promote	  an	  Islam	  that	  will	  support	  a	  Pancasila	  state.	  	  Beginning	  in	  2005	  with	  preschool	  and	  kindergarten	  classes,	  the	  school	  grew	  with	  the	  advancement	  of	  the	  original	  cohort.	  As	  such,	  in	  the	  2009−2010	  school	  year,	  four	  grades	  were	  in	  operation	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  preschool	  and	  kindergarten.	  Grades	  three	  and	  four	  had	  two	  classes,	  while	  grades	  one	  and	  two	  had	  three	  classes,	  each	  averaging	  27	  students.	  The	  popularity	  of	  the	  school	  grew	  to	  the	  point	  that	  for	  the	  2010−2011	  school	  year,	  the	  grade-­‐one	  class	  enrollment	  reached	  maximum	  target	  enrollment	  numbers,	  creating	  four	  full	  classrooms	  of	  students	  per	  grade.	  For	  incoming	  students,	  schooling	  costs51	  included	  a	  one-­‐time	  facilities	  fee	  of	  US$685	  (Rp	  7,000,000),	  a	  yearly	  activities	  fee	  of	  US$206	  (Rp	  2,100,00),	  and	  monthly	  tuition	  of	  US$33	  (Rp	  335,000).	  This	  works	  out	  to	  cost	  US$1,254	  for	  initial	  enrollment	  and	  the	  first	  academic	  year,	  and	  US$569	  for	  the	  subsequent	  academic	  years,	  plus	  any	  fees	  for	  after-­‐school	  clubs	  or	  special	  activities.	  As	  the	  average	  monthly	  income	  in	  Jogja	  in	  2009	  was	  US$119	  (PBS	  Statistics	  Indonesia	  2011:	  31),	  this	  school	  is	  only	  viable	  for	  the	  middle	  and	  upper	  classes.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  The	  July	  1,	  2009	  exchange	  rate	  was	  used	  to	  calculate	  the	  U.S.	  dollar	  amounts.	  July	  is	  the	  month	  in	  which	  the	  2009−10	  school	  year	  began.	  Dollar	  amounts	  are	  rounded	  to	  the	  nearest	  whole	  amount.	  The	  activities	  fee	  is	  Rp.	  60,000	  per	  month,	  but	  is	  presented	  as	  an	  annual	  fee	  to	  be	  comparable	  to	  the	  Al	  Azhar	  school	  fee,	  which	  is	  charged	  one	  time	  each	  year.	  The	  school	  year	  is	  11	  months.	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The	  Universal	  in	  Flexible	  Islam	  Unlike	  the	  mainstream	  Islamic	  schools	  that	  have	  dominated	  the	  Islamic	  schooling	  market	  for	  the	  last	  100	  years,	  Al	  Azhar	  schools52	  are	  not	  affiliated	  with	  or	  owned	  by	  a	  specific	  religious	  organization	  such	  as	  Muhammadiyah	  or	  NU.53	  Their	  organization-­‐free	  status	  creates	  an	  open	  invitation	  to	  people	  of	  all	  political	  and	  religious	  backgrounds,	  preempting	  possible	  organizational	  loyalties	  from	  hindering	  enrollment.	  An	  the	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  secretary	  stated:	  Islam	  here	  is	  complete	  (kaffah),	  perfect	  (sempurna)	  Islam.	  So	  it	  means,	  we	  do	  not	  follow	  Muhammadiyah’s	  school	  of	  thought	  or	  any	  other	  school	  of	  thought.	  People	  here	  are	  taught	  that	  Islam	  is	  a	  universal	  view.	  Islam	  is	  universal,	  not	  fragmented	  into	  certain	  sects.	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  foundation	  secretary,	  June	  17,	  2009)	  	  Unhindered	  by	  organization-­‐specific	  traditions,	  interpretations,	  and	  histories,	  this	  founder	  believes	  the	  school	  is	  positioned	  to	  teach	  students	  a	  pure,	  kaffah	  (complete)	  Islam;	  a	  universal	  or	  non-­‐discriminatory	  Islam.	  The	  three	  interrelated	  components	  of	  Al	  Azhar’s	  conceptualization	  of	  a	  universal	  Islam	  are	  Qur’an-­‐	  and	  Hadith-­‐based	  beliefs,	  inclusivity,	  and	  pluralism;	  they	  combine	  to	  create	  a	  flexible	  Islam.	  	  
Qur’an-­‐	  and	  Hadith-­‐based	  beliefs	  	  	  A	  crucial	  aspect	  to	  Al	  Azhar’s	  universal	  Islam	  is	  the	  exclusion	  of	  the	  historical,	  group-­‐specific	  interpretations	  that	  build	  upon	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith.	  The	  Qur’an	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  The	  locus	  of	  this	  discussion	  is	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  Islamic	  Primary	  School	  in	  Jogja.	  However,	  conversations	  with	  administration	  at	  Al	  Azhar	  headquarters	  in	  Jakarta	  and	  leadership	  from	  the	  Al	  Azhar	  3	  Islamic	  High	  School	  located	  at	  the	  headquarters	  complex	  are	  also	  included.	  Due	  to	  the	  franchise	  business	  model	  employed	  by	  Al	  Azhar,	  consistency	  in	  attitudes	  and	  opinions	  across	  the	  network	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  institutions	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  greater	  than	  any	  variations	  that	  might	  occur	  within	  individual	  schools.	  	  	  53	  While	  both	  Al	  Azhar,	  and	  JSIT	  schools	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  are	  technically	  religious	  organizations	  as	  they	  run	  or	  oversee	  religious	  schools,	  they	  are	  not	  what	  Indonesians	  consider	  religious	  organizations	  (organisasi	  keagamaan)	  like	  Muhammadiyah	  or	  NU.	  These	  two	  organizations	  are	  comparable	  to	  what	  in	  Christianity	  would	  be	  considered	  a	  denomination	  as	  they	  have	  distinct	  beliefs	  and	  practices	  and	  separate	  religious	  leaders,	  yet	  hold	  the	  same	  core	  beliefs	  of	  most	  Muslims.	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considered	  to	  be	  God’s	  final	  revelation	  to	  humanity,	  the	  literal	  word	  of	  God	  as	  dictated	  to	  Muhammad	  by	  the	  angel	  Gabriel.	  Hadith	  are	  records	  of	  the	  Prophet	  Muhammad’s	  statements	  and	  acts	  as	  recorded	  by	  eyewitnesses.	  They	  are	  considered	  a	  source	  of	  religious	  law,	  second	  only	  to	  the	  Qur’an.	  Hadith	  are	  also	  considered	  the	  source	  for	  understanding	  
sunnah.	  Sunnah	  are	  social	  practices	  set	  for	  believers	  by	  the	  prophet	  and	  sometimes	  his	  close	  companions	  that	  are	  found	  in	  the	  Hadith	  (Woodward	  2011:6).	  Group-­‐specific	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  Hadith	  influence	  perceptions	  of	  the	  sunnah,	  generating	  differences	  in	  Islamic	  practices	  (van	  Bruinessen	  1996:3).	  Traditionally,	  memorizing	  the	  Qur’an	  was	  part	  of	  the	  oral	  tradition	  of	  Islamic	  societies	  for	  preserving	  knowledge.	  Although	  printing	  and	  information	  technology	  have	  dramatically	  facilitated	  storing	  and	  accessing	  knowledge,	  memorization	  holds	  a	  special	  place	  in	  Islam	  beyond	  its	  use	  for	  preservation.	  To	  memorize,	  and	  recite,	  the	  Qur’an	  is	  considered	  an	  act	  of	  purifying	  oneself.	  	  While	  it	  is	  acknowledged	  that	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  organizations	  use	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadiths	  as	  sources,	  they	  also	  add	  to	  them.	  As	  part	  of	  their	  curricula,	  students	  at	  NU-­‐affiliated	  schools	  study	  classical	  religious	  commentaries	  known	  as	  kitab	  kuning.	  The	  kitab	  
kuning	  are	  texts	  that	  contain	  interpretations	  on	  fiqh	  (law),	  morality,	  and	  other	  commentary	  on	  the	  Qur’an.	  	  Muhammadiyah	  provides	  organization-­‐specific	  content,	  such	  as	  its	  history.	  Al	  Azhar	  school	  educators	  find	  these	  interpretations,	  commentaries,	  and	  histories	  to	  be	  a	  distraction	  from	  the	  essence	  of	  Islam.	  All	  groups,	  however,	  accept	  and	  value	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith,	  making	  them	  universal	  in	  use	  and	  acceptance.	  By	  focusing	  solely	  on	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith,	  there	  is	  no	  loyalty	  to	  one	  group	  over	  the	  other.	  However,	  this	  then	  necessitates	  that	  the	  schools	  focus	  more	  on	  Islamic	  morals	  and	  basic	  practices	  rather	  than	  doctrine,	  making	  interpretations	  and	  exegesis	  less	  important.	  The	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  headmaster	  explained:	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Perhaps	  in	  some	  schools,	  like	  at	  Muhammadiyah	  schools,	  elements	  of	  Muhammadiyah	  are	  also	  discussed.	  At	  Al	  Azhar	  it’s	  not	  like	  that.	  We’re	  neutral.	  There	  are	  two	  things	  that	  guide	  our	  lives,	  namely	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith.	  Hadith	  are	  all	  the	  things	  done	  by	  the	  prophet	  Muhammad.	  We	  don’t	  have	  any	  other	  additions.	  But	  at	  Muhammadiyah	  schools,	  there’s	  additional	  Muhammadiyah-­‐related	  materials	  [keMuhammadiyahan]	  taught.	  We’re	  not	  like	  that.	  We	  do	  not	  bring	  in	  other	  streams	  and	  we	  have	  a	  neutral	  stance.	  We	  also	  don’t	  adhere	  to	  political	  parties	  or	  groups	  [like	  the	  PKS].	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  headmaster,	  February	  18,	  2010)	  	  Additionally,	  a	  grade	  four	  teacher	  explained:	  	  There	  are	  several	  streams	  (aliran-­‐aliran)	  in	  Islam.	  Essentially	  it	  is	  only	  one,	  that	  being	  Islam.	  But	  there	  are	  several	  teachings	  and	  those	  teaching	  are	  sunnah,	  things	  that	  can	  be	  done	  and	  things	  that	  can’t	  be	  done.	  These	  differences	  are	  in	  fact	  only	  about	  the	  teachings	  of	  the	  sunnah,	  but	  these	  differences	  are	  what	  ultimately	  lead	  to	  clashes	  between	  factions.	  At	  Al	  Azhar,	  we	  are	  open	  to	  all	  of	  them,	  so	  we’re	  not	  NU,	  Muhammadiyah,	  Salafi	  or	  any	  other,	  because	  the	  prophet	  Muhammad	  told	  us	  in	  the	  Hadith	  that	  Islam	  will	  be	  divided	  into	  various	  streams,	  but	  the	  point	  or	  the	  focus	  is	  only	  Islam.	  The	  bottom	  line	  is	  that	  Islam	  is	  correct	  as	  it	  is	  implemented	  by	  Muhammad,	  so	  we	  just	  follow	  that.	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  teacher,	  March	  18,	  2010)	  	  	  It	  is	  commonly	  accepted	  that	  the	  prophet	  spoke	  of	  Islam	  dividing	  into	  many	  different	  groups	  or	  streams,	  as	  this	  teacher	  said.	  Al	  Azhar	  understands	  that	  each	  stream	  is	  still	  a	  form	  of	  Islam	  and	  therefore	  must	  be	  respected	  at	  the	  school.	  By	  avoiding	  the	  interpretations	  and	  focusing	  only	  on	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith,	  Al	  Azhar	  considers	  itself	  to	  be	  promoting	  the	  core	  or	  essence	  of	  Islam,	  rather	  than	  various	  groups’	  specific	  canonical	  traditions	  and	  histories.	  	  The	  importance	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  as	  part	  of	  a	  child’s	  Islamic	  schooling	  is	  highlighted	  in	  several	  ways	  at	  school.	  Depending	  on	  the	  grade,	  students	  spend	  between	  12	  and	  15%	  of	  their	  study	  hours	  each	  week	  in	  religion-­‐related	  classes	  (religion	  of	  Islam,	  reciting	  and	  memorizing	  the	  Qur’an,	  and,	  starting	  in	  grade	  four,	  Arabic54).	  In	  addition	  to	  regular	  religion	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Since	  Arabic	  is	  the	  language	  in	  which	  the	  Qur’an	  is	  written,	  the	  purpose	  of	  studying	  Arabic	  is	  to	  become	  fluent	  in	  the	  language	  of	  the	  Qur’an.	  Arabic	  is	  generally	  considered	  part	  of	  the	  religious	  curriculum.	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class,	  students	  have	  a	  weekly	  70-­‐minute	  class	  on	  Qur’anic	  reading	  and	  35	  minutes	  a	  week	  of	  memorization	  of	  the	  Qur’an.	  Additionally,	  each	  student	  is	  pulled	  out	  of	  regular	  classes	  once	  a	  week	  for	  a	  10-­‐minute	  one-­‐on-­‐one	  session	  with	  a	  Qur’anic	  reading	  teacher.	  This	  offers	  individualized	  help	  on	  reading	  and	  pronunciation	  of	  the	  Qur’anic	  verses	  in	  Arabic.	  Overall,	  this	  means	  that	  over	  half	  of	  the	  religious	  curriculum	  is	  devoted	  to	  learning	  to	  recite	  and	  memorizing	  the	  Qur’an.	  Grades	  one	  and	  two	  spend	  9%,	  and	  grades	  three	  and	  four	  spend	  7%,	  of	  their	  weekly	  class	  time	  memorizing	  and	  learning	  to	  recite	  the	  Qur’an.	  Additionally,	  memorization	  of	  a	  chapter	  of	  the	  Qur’an55	  is	  a	  graduation	  requirement.	  Knowledge	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  is	  so	  important	  that	  it	  is	  part	  of	  requirements	  for	  hiring	  full-­‐time	  teachers,	  regardless	  of	  their	  specialized	  subject	  matter.	  The	  teachers	  at	  Al	  Azhar	  schools	  are	  expected	  to	  recite	  memorized	  parts	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  as	  part	  of	  the	  application	  process.	  At	  Jakarta	  headquarters,	  if	  a	  teacher	  memorizes	  the	  entire	  Qur’an,	  the	  school	  rewards	  the	  teacher	  with	  a	  hajj	  trip.	  While	  this	  is	  currently	  not	  offered	  at	  Al	  Azhar	  31,	  the	  administration	  hopes	  to	  reward	  their	  teachers	  in	  this	  way	  sometime	  in	  the	  future.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Given	  the	  difficulty	  of	  memorizing	  the	  Qur’an,	  the	  shortest	  chapter,	  which	  is	  the	  last	  chapter,	  is	  the	  chapter	  required	  for	  graduation.	  Memorization	  of	  the	  last	  chapter	  is	  common	  practice	  for	  Qur’anic	  students	  in	  Indonesia’s	  Islamic	  institutions.	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Inclusivity	  	  Being	  organization-­‐free	  allows	  the	  schools	  to	  be	  non-­‐partisan.	  As	  one	  high	  school	  administration	  official	  in	  Jakarta	  explained,	  Al	  Azhar	  schools	  are:	  Islamic	  schools,	  but	  in	  our	  own	  terms,	  we’re	  called	  Islamic	  private	  general	  schools	  (sekolah	  umum	  swasta	  Islam).	  We	  aren’t	  classified	  as	  an	  NU	  school;	  we’re	  also	  not	  classified	  as	  a	  Muhammadiyah	  school.	  We’re	  in	  between	  them.	  Our	  Islam,	  in	  Indonesian	  people’s	  terms,	  is	  moderate	  (moderat)	  Islam.	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  3	  administration,	  March	  21,	  2010)	  	  Al	  Azhar	  sees	  this	  organization-­‐free	  approach	  to	  Islam	  as	  “moderate,”	  a	  term	  that	  frequently	  surfaced	  in	  interviews.	  While	  terms	  such	  as	  “radical,”	  “moderate,”	  or	  “conservative”	  are	  hard	  to	  define	  and	  are	  often	  unhelpful	  in	  accurately	  describing	  a	  particular	  approach	  to	  Islam,56	  the	  repeated	  use	  of	  this	  term	  seemed	  to	  be	  a	  marketing	  phrase,	  as	  it	  connotes	  a	  safe	  and	  welcoming	  kind	  of	  Islam.	  In	  the	  above	  quote,	  this	  man	  defined	  “moderate”	  as	  covering	  the	  middle	  ground,	  having	  a	  sense	  of	  being	  non-­‐partisan.	  	  Al	  Azhar’s	  non-­‐partisan,	  moderate	  Islam	  aims	  to	  avoid	  contention	  that	  can	  arise	  over	  specifics	  in	  standardized	  Islamic	  practices.	  Even	  in	  the	  most	  basic	  rituals,	  Muhammadiyah	  and	  NU	  have	  different	  practices.	  For	  example,	  during	  Ramadan,	  NU	  will	  pray	  22	  times	  during	  the	  night	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  11.	  Ways	  of	  prayer	  also	  differ	  slightly.	  The	  NU	  pray	  facing	  west,	  reflecting	  pre-­‐modern	  geographic	  orientation,	  while	  Muhammadiyah	  face	  northwest,	  reflecting	  modern	  understanding	  of	  the	  location	  of	  Mecca	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  During	  my	  fieldwork,	  several	  times	  I	  attempted	  to	  understand	  how	  individuals	  understood	  terms	  such	  as	  “radical,”	  “conservative,”	  “liberal,”	  and	  “moderate”	  by	  conducting	  pile	  sorts	  with	  cards.	  These	  sorts	  were	  confusing	  for	  people,	  largely	  because	  they	  did	  not	  understand	  Islam	  in	  those	  terms.	  One	  man	  refused	  to	  do	  the	  task,	  as	  he	  thought	  the	  terms	  were	  Western	  labels	  that	  did	  not	  hold	  any	  meaning	  for	  him.	  During	  my	  fieldwork	  in	  separate	  conversations	  with	  Mark	  Woodward,	  a	  longtime	  Indonesianist	  and	  anthropologist,	  and	  Farish	  Noor,	  a	  prominent	  political	  scientist	  who	  focuses	  on	  South	  and	  Southeast	  Asia,	  both	  men	  commented	  the	  inaccuracy	  and	  impracticality	  of	  categorizing	  Islamic	  practices	  in	  Southeast	  Asia,	  and	  even	  more	  so	  in	  Indonesia,	  as	  one	  group’s	  practices	  could	  have	  shades	  of	  several	  terms	  depending	  on	  the	  aspects	  on	  which	  one	  focuses.	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(Woodward	  2011:220).	  In	  reference	  specifically	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  students	  are	  taught	  to	  pray	  at	  school,	  the	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  headmaster	  said:	  	  We	  are	  always	  neutral	  (netral).	  The	  important	  thing	  is	  not	  to	  go	  outside	  of	  the	  guidance	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith.	  If	  we	  make	  problems	  out	  of	  small	  things,	  disputes,	  arguments,	  and	  debates	  will	  arise	  and	  ultimately	  each	  person	  will	  go	  his	  own	  way.	  That’s	  not	  good.	  Instead	  we	  should	  be	  united.	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  headmaster,	  February	  18,	  2010)	  	  	  At	  her	  school,	  the	  teachers	  are	  given	  specific	  guidelines	  from	  Jakarta	  headquarters	  not	  to	  value	  one	  religious	  group	  over	  another	  in	  the	  classroom.	  By	  not	  favoring	  one	  group	  over	  another,	  but	  staying	  with	  the	  specific	  guidance	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith,	  they	  seek	  to	  avoid	  offending	  or	  favoring	  any	  single	  group.	  	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  foundation’s	  secretary	  explained,	  “What	  we	  want	  is	  an	  Islam	  that	  is	  accepted	  everywhere,	  not	  exclusive,	  not	  extreme	  right	  or	  extreme	  left”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  foundation	  secretary,	  June	  17,	  2009).	  Realistically,	  acceptance	  everywhere	  is	  not	  possible.	  By	  definition,	  extreme	  right	  or	  extreme	  left	  removes	  one	  from	  being	  central,	  lowering	  the	  probability	  of	  consensus	  or	  large-­‐scale	  acceptance.	  Conversely,	  a	  middle	  ground	  would	  not	  be	  acceptable	  to	  those	  in	  “exclusive	  extremes.”	  While	  “acceptance	  everywhere”	  may	  not	  be	  realistic,	  mainstream	  approval	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  realistic	  goal.	  	  	   Al	  Azhar	  does	  not	  envision	  opening	  Islam	  to	  only	  Muslims	  of	  any	  type,	  but	  to	  non-­‐Muslims	  as	  well.	  At	  Al	  Azhar	  3	  High	  School	  in	  Jakarta,	  an	  administrator	  commented	  on	  how	  the	  school	  tried	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  Islam	  is	  not	  in	  opposition	  to	  those	  outside	  of	  Islam.	  It	  is	  universally	  welcoming.	  In	  reference	  to	  a	  short	  study-­‐abroad	  trip	  for	  high	  school	  students	  to	  New	  Zealand,	  he	  said,	  We	  show	  that	  Islam	  is	  not	  closed	  to…the	  world	  outside	  of	  Islam,	  because	  Islam	  is	  for	  all,	  not	  just	  for	  the	  Islamic	  world.	  We	  are	  friends	  and	  friendly	  with	  everyone…	  We	  want	  to	  show	  that	  Islam	  is	  not	  extreme	  and	  not	  exclusive.	  Islam	  is	  universal.	  We	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want	  to	  build	  cooperation	  with	  everyone.	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  3	  administration,	  March	  21,	  2010).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  want	  to	  present	  a	  moderate	  (not	  extreme)	  and	  inclusive	  (not	  exclusive)	  Islam	  to	  the	  entire	  world.	  The	  middle	  ground	  they	  walk	  is	  a	  common	  ground	  where	  they	  hope	  all	  people	  should	  be	  able	  to	  peaceably	  co-­‐exist	  with	  Muslims	  and	  non-­‐Muslims	  alike.	  
Pluralism	  	  Pluralism	  involves	  having	  flexible	  standards	  and	  focusing	  on	  the	  essence	  of	  Islam,	  rather	  than	  the	  form	  of	  its	  implementation.	  The	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  headmaster	  recognizes	  that	  teachers	  at	  her	  school	  may	  have	  organizational	  affiliations	  that	  engender	  affinity	  for	  one	  style	  of	  practice	  over	  another.	  Outside	  of	  school	  grounds,	  teachers	  may	  do	  as	  they	  wish.	  However,	  at	  the	  school,	  the	  teachers	  are	  to	  check	  their	  affiliations	  at	  the	  door,	  and	  teach	  only	  according	  to	  the	  schools	  guidelines.	  The	  headmaster	  said,	  	  The	  important	  thing	  is	  we	  worship	  God.	  Our	  intention	  is	  to	  seek	  reward	  from	  Allah.	  So	  we	  all	  can	  return	  back	  again	  [to	  Allah].	  Later	  it	  is	  God	  who	  will	  judge	  our	  devotion	  and	  what	  we	  did.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  sholat	  subuh	  [required	  prayer	  before	  sunrise],	  there	  are	  people	  who	  recite	  Qunut	  prayers	  but	  some	  do	  not.	  In	  our	  opinion,	  prayer	  is	  good	  and	  it	  depends	  on	  individual	  beliefs	  [on	  how	  to	  perform	  them].	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  headmaster,	  February	  18,	  2010).	  	  In	  her	  opinion,	  flexibility	  in	  how	  to	  worship	  does	  not	  devalue	  that	  act	  of	  worship	  itself.	  She	  views	  preferences	  for	  how	  to	  pray	  as	  personal	  beliefs,	  which	  each	  individual	  is	  free	  to	  choose.	  	  At	  school	  children	  learn	  to	  pray;	  the	  school	  curriculum	  on	  how	  to	  pray	  is	  highly	  scripted	  for	  the	  teachers	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  teaching	  one	  organization’s	  practice	  over	  another.	  Students	  are	  taught	  it	  is	  their	  duty	  as	  a	  Muslim	  to	  perform	  sholat,	  the	  daily	  five	  required	  prayers.	  Students	  sholat	  together	  in	  the	  classrooms	  with	  their	  teachers	  each	  day.	  The	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expectation	  of	  performing	  sholat	  five	  times	  a	  day	  is	  reinforced	  through	  the	  students’	  completion	  of	  daily	  logs	  in	  which	  they	  report	  their	  performance	  of	  the	  previous	  day’s	  required	  prayers	  that	  take	  place	  outside	  of	  school	  hours.	  Students,	  however,	  are	  not	  asked	  to	  report	  on	  the	  style	  of	  sholat	  but	  simply	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  activity.	  In	  addition	  to	  required	  sholat,	  students	  also	  pray	  over	  their	  food	  at	  lunchtime,	  before	  lessons,	  and	  before	  going	  home.	  	  An	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  religion	  teacher	  believed	  that	  the	  forms	  of	  performance	  were	  customs	  or	  habits	  rather	  than	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  practice.	  As	  an	  example,	  he	  mentioned	  the	  dress	  and	  grooming	  standards	  of	  a	  more	  prescriptive	  approach	  to	  Islam	  taught	  at	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  (which	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  depth	  in	  the	  following	  chapter).	  This	  teacher	  worked	  for	  a	  year	  at	  an	  SIT	  run	  by	  one	  of	  the	  founders	  of	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  and	  therefore	  felt	  confident	  that	  his	  experience	  was	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim.57	  While	  teaching	  there,	  he	  was	  uncomfortable	  with	  the	  standards	  the	  school	  imposed	  on	  teachers,	  and	  eventually	  left	  the	  school	  to	  teach	  at	  Al	  Azhar	  31.	  He	  explained:	  The	  purity	  of	  Islam	  is	  one,	  not	  because	  of	  acts	  (perbuatan)	  but	  because	  of	  tawhid	  (unity),	  namely	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith.	  That’s	  the	  purity	  of	  Islam.	  Islam	  isn’t	  traditions	  or	  customs.	  So	  long	  as	  the	  traditions	  and	  customs	  don’t	  interfere	  with	  Islam,	  they’re	  fine.	  In	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT,	  the	  custom	  of	  a	  large	  hijab,	  or	  men	  wearing	  a	  beard	  and	  short	  pants—that’s	  custom.	  It’s	  not	  like	  that	  in	  the	  Qur’an.	  (Interview	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  religion	  teacher,	  February	  12,	  2010)	  	  The	  teacher	  did	  not	  believe	  that	  the	  SITs’	  implementation	  of	  dress	  standards	  was	  prescribed	  in	  the	  Qur’an,	  and	  therefore	  felt	  there	  could	  be	  flexibility	  in	  how	  one	  dresses	  appropriately.	  Since	  the	  Qur’an	  did	  not	  mandate	  specifics,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  SITs	  had	  come	  to	  establish	  their	  standards	  were,	  in	  his	  mind,	  a	  custom	  or	  tradition.	  He	  considered	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  The	  observations	  he	  makes	  as	  far	  as	  dress	  and	  attitudes	  are	  in	  line	  with	  those	  that	  I	  observed	  during	  my	  time	  at	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT.	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these	  traditions	  to	  be	  personal	  or	  group-­‐specific,	  rather	  than	  universally	  binding.	  	  As	  we	  continued	  this	  conversation,	  we	  talked	  more	  about	  the	  differences	  between	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  and	  Integrated	  Islamic	  Schools	  (SITs)	  in	  general.	  The	  topic	  again	  turned	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  pluralism	  or	  flexible	  standards.	  The	  term	  “moderate	  Islam”	  surfaced,	  and	  the	  religion	  teacher	  used	  the	  term	  in	  a	  similar	  manner	  as	  previously	  in	  this	  chapter,	  referring	  to	  a	  middle-­‐of-­‐the-­‐road,	  inclusive	  Islam.	  The	  following	  quote	  is	  lengthy,	  but	  it	  provides	  insight	  into	  debates	  among	  groups	  regarding	  the	  regulation	  of	  standards	  for	  behavior.	  It	  also	  highlights,	  through	  the	  interjection	  of	  a	  question	  from	  a	  teacher	  who	  had	  been	  listening,	  that	  teachers	  might	  be	  unclear	  at	  times	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  distinction	  between	  form	  of	  practice	  and	  essence.	  	  Karen:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  If	  there’s	  moderate	  Islam	  here	  [Al	  Azhar	  31],	  what	  kind	  of	  Islam	  is	  there	  at	  SITs?	  	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  religion	  teacher:	  It’s	  not	  moderate	  Islam.	  They	  justify	  their	  own	  group,	  “My	  group	  is	  right.”	  But	  we	  aren’t	  like	  that.	  They’re	  exclusive,	  “My	  group	  is	  right.”	  So	  if	  there	  are	  teachers	  who	  go	  there,	  they	  have	  to	  be	  like	  that.	  But	  here,	  we	  are	  not	  regulated	  on	  what	  to	  do.	  There	  are	  those	  that	  wear	  the	  peci	  [tight-­‐fitting	  brimless	  cap];	  there	  are	  those	  that	  don’t.	  Everyone’s	  different	  and	  free.	  That’s	  moderate	  (moderat).	  We	  don’t	  require	  a	  large	  
hijab.	  At	  SITs,	  the	  hijab	  has	  to	  be	  wide	  and	  cover	  the	  chest	  because	  in	  the	  Qur’an	  the	  hijab	  should	  cover	  the	  chest.	  And	  [women]	  can’t	  wear	  pants	  but	  must	  wear	  skirts.	  	  	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  teacher:	  How	  do	  you	  think	  it	  should	  be,	  Pak?	  	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  religion	  teacher:	  If	  it	  covers	  the	  aurat,58	  you’re	  fine.	  If	  the	  pants	  aren’t	  tight	  or	  anything,	  that’s	  also	  fine.	  The	  important	  thing	  is	  to	  cover	  the	  
aurat	  and	  not	  be	  too	  tight.	  At	  SITs,	  a	  teacher	  can’t	  dress	  like	  that.	  She’d	  definitely	  get	  thrown	  out.	  If	  you	  don’t	  want	  to	  follow	  their	  rules,	  you’d	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  The	  aurat	  is	  the	  private	  parts	  of	  the	  body	  not	  to	  be	  seen	  by	  those	  of	  the	  opposite	  sex	  who	  are	  not	  blood	  relatives	  or	  spouse.	  For	  men,	  this	  are	  is	  from	  the	  waist	  to	  the	  knees.	  The	  female	  aurat	  is	  contested	  among	  groups,	  but	  in	  general	  the	  aurat	  is	  the	  hair	  and	  the	  entire	  body	  excluding	  the	  face	  and	  the	  hands,	  and	  often	  the	  feet.	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told	  to	  leave.	  But	  here,	  you’re	  free.	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  religion	  teacher,	  February	  12,	  2010)	  	  Within	  this	  perspective	  that	  specific	  standards	  are	  not	  Islam,	  but	  rather	  traditions	  and	  customs,	  one	  understands	  how	  a	  less	  prescriptive	  way	  to	  veil	  for	  example,	  does	  not	  indicate	  a	  less	  pious	  sensibility.	  According	  to	  this	  religion	  teacher,	  the	  principle	  is	  to	  cover	  the	  aurat,	  and	  that	  can	  be	  accomplished	  in	  several	  equally	  acceptable	  ways.	  There	  is	  no	  need	  to	  create	  distinctions	  between	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  moral	  principle	  is	  implemented.	  	  	   However,	  while	  the	  school	  may	  teach	  that	  women	  should	  veil,	  woman	  who	  do	  not	  veil	  are	  not	  banned	  from	  attending	  the	  school.59	  As	  far	  as	  I	  could	  tell,	  the	  women	  who	  did	  not	  veil	  were	  not	  treated	  differently	  while	  on	  campus	  and	  did	  not	  look	  to	  be	  uncomfortable.	  The	  acceptance	  or	  tolerance	  of	  unveiled	  Muslim	  women	  was	  also	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  public	  display	  of	  students’	  family	  photos	  outside	  of	  the	  grade-­‐two	  classrooms	  along	  a	  main	  corridor.	  While	  most	  mothers	  and	  daughters	  in	  the	  photos	  were	  veiled,	  some	  were	  not.	  The	  equally	  prominent	  display	  of	  photos,	  regardless	  of	  veiling	  practice,	  spoke	  of	  acceptance	  of	  both	  practices.	  Finally,	  while	  administration	  did	  say	  it	  would	  be	  appreciated	  if	  I	  dressed	  in	  long	  sleeves	  and	  long	  pants	  or	  skirts,	  I	  was	  not	  requested	  to	  veil.	  A	  couple	  of	  times	  the	  headmaster	  did	  suggest	  I	  veil,	  but	  only	  because	  I	  “would	  look	  prettier”	  if	  I	  did.	  I	  didn’t	  feel	  this	  suggestion	  was	  a	  passive-­‐aggressive	  way	  to	  encourage	  me	  to	  veil	  while	  on	  campus	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  modesty.	  Her	  encouragement	  spoke	  more	  to	  how	  the	  veil	  has	  become	  a	  fashionable	  item.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  One	  mother	  commented,	  however,	  that	  woman	  must	  veil	  in	  order	  to	  attend	  the	  weekly,	  voluntary	  mothers’	  Qur’an	  study	  group	  on	  campus	  held	  during	  school	  hours	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  mother,	  April	  29,	  2010).	  The	  class	  is	  often	  lead	  by	  one	  of	  the	  religion	  teachers.	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   It	  is	  apparent	  that	  Qur’an-­‐	  and	  Hadith-­‐based	  beliefs,	  inclusivity,	  and	  pluralism	  are	  heavily	  interconnected.	  Throughout	  the	  entire	  discussion	  above,	  the	  recurring	  motivation	  for	  having	  a	  flexible	  Islam	  is	  the	  great	  desire	  to	  avoid	  contention,	  eliminate	  potential	  points	  of	  disagreement	  between	  groups,	  and	  to	  thus	  generate	  a	  society	  that	  is	  united	  and	  peaceful.	  Al	  Azhar	  is	  highly	  motivated	  by	  community	  and	  relationships	  within	  the	  community.	  A	  flexible	  Islam	  accommodates	  multiple	  traditions	  and	  practices,	  and	  conversely	  expects	  individuals	  to	  do	  the	  same	  towards	  those	  who	  participate	  in	  traditions	  different	  than	  their	  own.	  	  	  
Flexible	  Islam	  and	  the	  Middle	  Class:	  An	  Easy	  Fit	  	  	   While	  a	  flexible	  Islam	  welcomes	  a	  variety	  of	  Islamic	  practices,	  it	  also	  facilitates	  a	  compatible	  relationship	  between	  an	  active	  religious	  life	  and	  mainstream	  middle-­‐class	  Indonesian	  culture.	  The	  following	  vignette	  from	  Al	  Azhar	  31’s	  open	  house	  for	  potential	  new	  parents	  and	  students	  demonstrates	  this.	  	   	  Shaded	  under	  a	  large,	  open,	  outdoor	  tent,	  a	  camera-­‐happy	  crowd	  of	  parents	  surrounding	  a	  red	  carpeted	  catwalk	  watched	  sets	  of	  young	  girls	  as	  they	  took	  turns	  traversing	  the	  runway	  and	  striking	  poses	  to	  the	  beat	  of	  modern	  	   	  Al Azhar 31 Open House fashion show participants 
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Islamic	  music.	  The	  audience	  was	  treated	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  outfits,	  ranging	  from	  chic	  kid	  to	  glamour	  model	  to	  Javanese	  royalty	  fusion,	  all	  Muslim-­‐style.	  While	  the	  girls	  wore	  makeup	  and	  oversized,	  high-­‐heeled	  boots	  that	  accentuated	  their	  unnatural	  looking	  hip	  thrusts,	  struts,	  and	  arm	  positions,	  their	  hair	  was	  completely	  covered	  and	  their	  clothing	  exposed	  only	  their	  hands.	  Their	  hijabs	  were	  all	  shapes	  and	  sizes;	  some	  flowed	  over	  the	  shoulders,	  while	  others	  looked	  more	  like	  a	  head	  wrap	  accessorized	  with	  bands	  or	  flowers,	  leaving	  the	  neck	  exposed.	  The	  models	  looked	  like	  they’d	  just	  stepped	  out	  of	  advertisements	  for	  Katerina,	  one	  of	  the	  city’s	  trendy	  Islamic	  clothing	  stores.	  	  	  	  This	  fashion	  show	  was	  one	  of	  several	  performances	  at	  Al	  Azhar	  31’s	  2010	  Open	  House,	  an	  event	  to	  entice	  new	  parents	  to	  enroll	  their	  children	  for	  the	  coming	  school	  year.	  Other	  performances	  included	  numbers	  from	  the	  school	  drum	  band	  and	  the	  singing	  club,	  traditional	  Indonesian	  dances	  by	  groups	  of	  upper-­‐grade	  students,	  and	  Qur’anic	  recitations	  by	  individual	  students.	  SpongeBob	  SquarePants	  even	  made	  an	  appearance.	  Current	  and	  prospective	  school	  parents	  mingled	  as	  they	  watched	  performances,	  visited	  food	  stations,	  and	  perused	  vendor	  stalls	  hawking	  wares	  such	  as	  women’s	  tunics,	  religious	  story	  books,	  household	  items,	  and	  children’s	  games.	  A	  woman	  handed	  out	  free	  bags	  filled	  with	  individual-­‐sized	  bags	  of	  various	  chips	  and	  snacks.	  The	  scene	  looked	  like	  the	  busy	  street	  of	  Malioboro,	  Jogja’s	  popular	  downtown	  shopping	  district,	  with	  a	  mix	  of	  men	  and	  veiled	  and	  unveiled	  women	  browsing	  the	  goods.	  	  	  I	  was	  caught	  off	  guard	  by	  the	  fashion	  show,	  even	  though	  fashion	  shows	  and	  modeling	  contests	  are	  common	  in	  Indonesia.	  Malls	  and	  large	  department	  stores	  frequently	  sponsor	  modeling	  contests	  and	  fashion	  shows	  for	  babies	  and	  young	  children.	  One	  afternoon	  I	  stumbled	  upon	  a	  fashion	  show	  at	  a	  Kentucky	  Fried	  Chicken.	  The	  young	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participants	  all	  wore	  KFC	  T-­‐shirts	  that	  many	  mothers	  had	  creatively	  stylized	  by	  adding	  ribbon	  trim,	  cutting	  out	  the	  ribbed	  neck,	  or	  tying	  at	  a	  knot	  at	  the	  waist.	  The	  contestants	  mostly	  wore	  jean	  miniskirts	  and	  the	  same	  oversized	  high-­‐heeled	  boots.	  The	  scene	  perplexed	  me	  as	  I	  watched	  veiled,	  fully	  covered	  mothers	  prep	  their	  young	  daughters,	  applying	  makeup,	  fixing	  their	  hair	  (not	  one	  girl	  was	  veiled),	  and	  coaching	  them	  on	  their	  sexualized	  poses	  and	  struts.	  	  I	  knew	  high	  fashion	  and	  Islam	  were	  not	  closed	  worlds.	  Islamic	  fashion	  is	  a	  bustling	  industry	  in	  Indonesia,	  as	  many	  middle	  class	  women	  have	  come	  to	  express	  their	  modern	  and	  pious	  selves	  through	  contemporary	  Islamic	  clothing	  (Brenner	  1996,	  Jones	  2007).	  My	  puzzlement	  at	  KFC	  was	  at	  the	  inconsistency	  of	  mothers	  who	  veil—and	  thus	  would	  likely	  have	  a	  particular	  commitment	  to	  modesty	  and	  non-­‐sexualized	  public	  behavior—and	  also	  encourage	  their	  young	  daughters	  to	  engage	  in	  seemingly	  un-­‐Islamic	  behaviors	  that	  the	  veil	  typically	  discourages,	  both	  literally	  and	  symbolically.	  At	  Al	  Azhar	  31,	  the	  same	  sexualized	  poses	  seemed	  to	  be	  in	  even	  greater	  contradiction	  with	  the	  Islamic	  attire	  the	  students	  were	  modeling.	  Al	  Azhar	  31’s	  fashion	  show	  was	  also	  in	  sharp	  contrast	  to	  the	  simple	  and	  plain-­‐clothes	  approach	  to	  fashion	  and	  more	  rigid	  concepts	  of	  modesty	  that	  I	  observed	  at	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  campus,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  An	  Islamic	  fashion	  show	  strategically	  presented	  prospective	  parents	  with	  the	  message	  that	  the	  school	  was	  both	  Islamic	  and	  well	  centered	  in	  mainstream	  middle	  and	  upper-­‐middle	  class	  Indonesia.	  Although	  students	  did	  recite	  the	  Qur’an,	  most	  of	  the	  performances	  were	  not	  religious	  in	  nature.	  School	  drum	  bands	  are	  quite	  popular	  and	  a	  sign	  of	  school	  pride	  throughout	  the	  nation.	  The	  part-­‐time	  music	  teacher	  is	  a	  well-­‐respected	  local	  musician	  who	  teaches	  students	  popular	  songs	  that,	  while	  asserting	  general	  morals,	  are	  not	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necessarily	  Islamic.	  The	  traditional	  dances	  honored	  ethnic	  groups.	  The	  reputation	  of	  the	  school’s	  high	  academic	  standards	  is	  widely	  known	  in	  the	  community;	  therefore	  the	  school’s	  culture	  and	  facilities	  were	  under	  scrutiny	  that	  day	  by	  parents	  at	  the	  Open	  House.	  The	  range	  of	  events	  at	  the	  Open	  House	  demonstrated	  an	  easy	  mix	  of	  popular	  middle	  class	  culture	  and	  religious	  life.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  The	  three	  interrelated	  components,	  Qur’an-­‐	  and	  Hadith-­‐based	  beliefs,	  inclusivity,	  and	  pluralism,	  of	  Al	  Azhar’s	  conceptualization	  of	  a	  universal	  Islam	  combine	  to	  create	  a	  flexible	  Islam.	  Beliefs	  limited	  to	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith	  eliminate	  debates	  and	  difference	  on	  interpretations,	  allowing	  the	  school	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  basics	  to	  which	  all	  Muslims	  agree.	  Focusing	  on	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith	  as	  the	  common	  denominator,	  Islamic	  groups	  are	  expected	  to	  find	  common	  ground	  from	  which	  to	  live	  in	  peaceful	  coexistence.	  Inclusivity	  in	  the	  terms	  of	  mainstream	  Indonesian	  practices	  means	  they	  strive	  to	  hold	  the	  middle	  ground	  between	  the	  different	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  practices.	  They	  consider	  themselves	  to	  be	  neutral,	  not	  favoring	  one	  form	  of	  worship	  over	  another	  while	  staying	  within	  the	  guidance	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith.	  This	  inclusivity	  promotes	  a	  pluralism	  that	  involves	  having	  flexible	  standards	  and	  focusing	  on	  the	  essence	  of	  Islamic	  practices,	  rather	  than	  the	  form	  of	  its	  implementation.	  This	  flexible	  approach	  to	  Islam	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  the	  “glue	  of	  the	  nation”	  by	  maintaining	  and	  facilitating	  religious	  tolerance,	  and	  thus	  a	  peaceful	  society.	  	  While	  Al	  Azhar	  31’s	  flexible	  Islam	  aims	  to	  be	  religiously	  inclusive,	  the	  institution	  itself	  is	  economically	  exclusive	  given	  the	  high	  tuition	  (one	  of	  the	  most	  expensive	  in	  the	  city)	  and	  its	  selective	  franchise	  business	  model.	  Although	  a	  non-­‐profit	  institution,	  the	  school	  
	  	  
92	  
image	  and	  reputation	  are	  extremely	  important	  and	  carefully	  groomed.	  The	  neo-­‐liberal,	  post-­‐Fordian	  flexibility	  of	  the	  business	  side	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  has	  facilitated	  Al	  Azhar’s	  development	  of	  a	  very	  specific	  niche	  market	  within	  the	  burgeoning	  elite	  Islamic	  schooling	  market.	  Within	  Jogja,	  Al	  Azhar	  31’s	  popularity	  has	  increased	  and	  community	  confidence	  in	  the	  institution	  has	  grown	  to	  the	  point	  that	  by	  the	  fifth	  year	  of	  the	  elementary	  school’s	  operations,	  it	  reached	  maximum	  enrollment	  capacity	  for	  the	  incoming	  grade-­‐one	  class.	  Additionally,	  Al	  Azhar	  has	  not	  only	  expanded	  to	  establish	  a	  junior	  secondary	  school	  in	  2012,	  but	  in	  2011	  Al	  Azhar	  38,	  another	  preschool	  and	  elementary	  school,	  opened	  in	  Bantul,	  a	  town	  on	  the	  southern	  edge	  of	  Jogja.	  While	  this	  growth	  lags	  behind	  the	  JSITs	  in	  Jogja	  and	  the	  country	  in	  scale	  (there	  are	  over	  19	  JSIT	  primary	  schools	  in	  Jogja),	  Al	  Azhar	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  concerned;	  they	  are	  aware	  that	  their	  Al	  Azhar	  clientele	  within	  the	  middle	  class	  is	  a	  different	  subgroup	  than	  those	  interested	  in	  JSIT	  schools.	  	  This	  school	  is	  well	  aware	  of	  who	  its	  customers	  are:	  middle-­‐	  and	  upper-­‐class	  parents	  who	  are	  largely	  just	  beginning	  their	  own	  exploration	  and	  experience	  with	  religion	  on	  a	  personal,	  daily	  basis.	  A	  flexible,	  inclusive,	  middle-­‐way	  approach	  to	  Islam	  for	  these	  parents	  may	  seem	  the	  most	  attractive	  and	  safe.	  The	  headmaster	  explained:	  At	  Al	  Azhar,	  perhaps	  those	  that	  educate	  their	  children	  here	  are	  people	  whose	  Islamic	  understanding	  is	  of	  those	  who	  are	  just	  learning,	  so	  we	  have	  to	  adjust	  to	  it.	  And	  we	  must	  also	  remember	  that	  it	  is	  inside	  of	  us	  that	  we	  insert	  the	  values	  of	  Islam.	  We	  cannot	  be	  authoritarian,	  but	  should	  be	  loving,	  attentive,	  slowly	  and	  gradually.	  	  It’s	  all	  a	  necessary	  process.	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  headmaster,	  February	  18,	  2010)	  	  	  She	  believes	  the	  most	  effective	  way	  of	  teaching	  Islam—the	  values	  rather	  than	  the	  doctrines,	  interpretations	  and	  histories—is	  through	  attentiveness	  and	  patience.	  A	  pluralistic	  environment	  would	  certainly	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  safe	  environment	  for	  the	  exploration	  and	  development	  of	  religious	  sensibilities.	  This	  particular	  approach	  to	  Islam,	  as	  the	  headmaster	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alluded	  to,	  contrasts	  with	  more	  standardized	  and	  exacting	  approach	  found	  in	  JSIT	  schools,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  accommodating	  their	  clientele,	  JSIT	  schools	  aim	  to	  have	  parents	  and	  students	  “adjust”	  to	  their	  approach	  to	  religion.	  Al	  Azhar’s	  commitment	  in	  accommodating	  their	  clientele	  also	  speaks	  to	  the	  organization’s	  awareness	  of	  and	  sensitivity	  to	  their	  customers’	  needs,	  highlighting	  that	  it	  is	  not	  only	  an	  institution	  of	  learning,	  but	  also	  a	  business.	  Echoes	  of	  national	  concern	  with	  relatively	  new	  puritanical	  groups	  of	  Muslims	  challenging	  the	  longstanding	  pluralism	  and	  religious	  tolerance	  in	  Indonesia	  can	  be	  heard	  in	  local	  and	  national	  Al	  Azhar	  leadership’s	  promotion	  of	  a	  flexible	  Islam	  that	  accommodates	  multiple	  approaches	  to	  the	  religion.	  A	  flexible	  Islam	  is	  expected	  to	  unite	  the	  Muslim	  community,	  and	  therefore	  Indonesia,	  rather	  than	  create	  divisions	  and	  intolerance.	  The	  high	  school	  headmaster	  at	  Al	  Azhar	  3	  in	  Jakarta	  demonstrated	  his	  belief	  in	  the	  unifying	  effect	  of	  flexibility	  when	  he	  claimed,	  “Moderate	  Islam	  is	  Islam	  that	  returns	  to	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  sunnah.	  We	  have	  become	  the	  glue	  for	  our	  people	  and	  nation	  and	  it	  has	  become	  a	  unified	  people	  and	  nation”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  3	  administration,	  March	  21,	  2010).	  	  	  Al	  Azhar	  31’s	  pluralistic	  perspective	  that	  acts	  as	  “a	  glue”	  to	  unify	  the	  country	  is	  summed	  up	  by	  an	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  founder	  and	  board	  member,	  and	  former	  member	  of	  the	  Tarbiyah	  Movement	  who	  refused	  to	  become	  politically	  active	  when	  the	  Movement’s	  cadre	  members	  were	  required	  to	  become	  members	  of	  the	  Islamist	  Partai	  Keadilan	  (PK),	  which	  is	  now	  the	  PKS:	  	  I	  personally	  think	  Islam	  is	  good	  and	  everything	  [all	  forms	  of	  Islam]	  are	  fine.	  If	  you	  want	  to	  join	  a	  particular	  organization,	  go	  right	  ahead.	  As	  long	  as	  it	  doesn’t	  conflict	  with	  the	  sunnah,	  it	  doesn’t	  matter	  because	  it’s	  just	  an	  organization.	  Mr.	  Hafiz’s	  [chairman	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  31]	  own	  background	  is	  NU,	  but	  he	  doesn’t	  want	  to	  be	  defined	  (diklaim)	  as	  NU	  because	  he	  has	  many	  friends	  in	  Muhammadiyah	  and	  other	  organizations.	  I	  prefer	  to	  be	  neutral	  and	  not	  be	  pigeonholed	  by	  the	  label	  of	  an	  
	  	  
94	  
organization.	  We’re	  complementary,	  you	  know?	  If	  there	  are	  friends	  of	  NU,	  Muhammadiyah,	  Persis	  and	  so	  on,	  it’s	  great	  if	  you	  can	  complement	  one	  another.	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  board	  member,	  April	  29,	  2010)	  	  	  This	  founder	  believes	  multiple	  types	  of	  Islamic	  practices	  are	  not	  in	  opposition	  to	  each	  other	  but	  can	  actually	  complement	  each	  other,	  as	  long	  as	  they	  stay	  within	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith.	  Such	  a	  synergetic	  relationship	  is	  expected	  to	  benefit	  the	  country.	  Al	  Azhar’s	  encouragement	  of	  Islamic	  pluralism	  echoes	  the	  nationalist	  pluralism	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  New	  Order.	  “Unity	  in	  diversity”	  (Bhinneka	  Tunggall	  Ika)	  was	  a	  national	  motto	  employed	  by	  Indonesia’s	  first	  two	  presidents,	  Sukarno	  and	  Suharto,	  after	  gaining	  independence	  from	  the	  Dutch.	  Their	  efforts	  were	  meant	  to	  unite	  the	  country	  whose	  almost	  100	  million	  citizens	  spanned	  over	  approximately	  300	  ethnic	  groups	  and	  spoke	  over	  650	  local	  languages.	  Pluralism	  was	  promoted	  through	  Pancasila,	  the	  country’s	  founding	  doctrine	  of	  Indonesian	  nationalism.60	  During	  the	  New	  Order,	  pluralist	  nationalism	  was	  a	  key	  theme	  in	  engendering	  unity	  and	  peace.	  Rudnyckyj	  (2011)	  argues	  that	  Suharto’s	  carefully	  managed	  authoritarian	  nationalism	  is	  giving	  way	  to	  democratic	  exclusion	  as	  religious	  identity	  is	  being	  substituted	  for	  nationalist	  identity	  in	  what	  he	  calls	  a	  post-­‐Pancasila	  Indonesia.	  In	  a	  post-­‐Pancasila	  Indonesia,	  he	  sees	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  five	  officially	  recognized	  religions	  of	  Indonesia	  is	  shifting	  to	  Islam	  as	  a	  “common	  denominator	  of	  belonging”	  (191).	  Al	  Azhar’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  role	  of	  Islam	  in	  unifying	  not	  only	  the	  Muslim	  ummah,	  but	  also	  the	  country,	  is	  an	  example	  of	  Rudnyckyj’s	  observation.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Pancasila	  is	  the	  textual	  definition	  of	  Indonesia	  the	  nation-­‐state	  and	  the	  principles	  of	  belonging	  in	  the	  imagined	  community	  of	  Indonesians.	  The	  five	  principles	  are:	  Belief	  in	  one	  God,	  a	  just	  and	  civilized	  humanitarianism,	  the	  unity	  of	  Indonesia	  as	  a	  territorial	  unit,	  democracy	  guided	  by	  wisdom	  through	  representative	  deliberation,	  and	  social	  justice	  for	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  Indonesian	  people	  (Darmodiharjo,	  Dekker,	  Pringgodigodo	  et	  al.	  1970:31	  as	  cited	  by	  Rudnyckyj	  2010:190-­‐1).	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Al	  Azhar	  promotes	  an	  Islamic	  sensibility	  that	  honors	  multiple	  traditions	  and	  is	  not	  focused	  on	  form	  of	  execution,	  but	  the	  act	  of	  implementation.	  However,	  a	  flexible	  Islam	  still	  holds	  a	  codified,	  however	  loosely,	  set	  of	  beliefs	  and	  standards.	  This	  was	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  above	  discussion	  with	  the	  religion	  teacher	  who,	  when	  talking	  about	  veiling	  practices,	  stated	  that	  as	  long	  as	  the	  headscarf	  covers	  the	  aurat,	  it	  doesn’t	  matter	  what	  the	  size	  or	  style	  is	  as	  long	  as	  it	  covers	  the	  aurat.	  But	  what	  if	  the	  aurat	  is	  not	  covered?	  Is	  it	  possible	  to	  be	  a	  pious	  Muslim	  woman	  if	  you	  do	  not	  veil?	  The	  religion	  teacher	  implied	  that	  veiling,	  no	  matter	  how	  it	  is	  accomplished,	  is	  better	  than	  not	  veiling.	  If	  one	  interprets	  the	  Qur’an	  or	  Hadith	  to	  require	  women	  to	  veil,	  then	  even	  a	  flexible	  Islam	  based	  on	  that	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith	  will	  have	  some	  kind	  of	  standards,	  although	  ambiguous,	  on	  how	  to	  best	  live	  a	  pious	  life.	  	  	  This	  ambiguity	  creates	  challenges	  in	  promoting	  a	  flexible	  Islam,	  as	  differences	  of	  opinion,	  and	  confusion,	  can	  arise	  regarding	  the	  definition	  and	  shape	  of	  a	  pious	  life.	  This	  is	  illustrated	  by	  an	  interaction	  with	  a	  seasoned	  teacher	  from	  Al	  Azhar	  headquarters	  campus	  in	  Jakarta	  and	  from	  a	  teacher	  at	  Al	  Azhar	  31.	  In	  Jakarta,	  one	  afternoon	  during	  the	  course	  of	  our	  conversation	  as	  we	  drove	  back	  to	  the	  city	  from	  a	  social	  visit	  to	  retired	  Al	  Azhar	  teacher,	  I	  asked	  if	  it	  were	  permissible	  for	  a	  Muslim	  to	  say	  “assalamu	  alaikum”	  (a	  common	  Arabic	  greeting	  among	  Muslims	  that	  has	  gained	  popularity	  in	  mainstream	  Indonesia	  and	  has	  begun	  to	  replace	  greetings	  spoken	  in	  Indonesian)	  to	  a	  non-­‐Muslim.	  She	  immediately	  said,	  “Yes,	  of	  course	  it	  is.”	  When	  I	  relayed	  to	  her	  that	  her	  colleague,	  an	  officer	  in	  the	  headquarters	  office,	  did	  not	  agree	  with	  that	  practice,	  she	  responded,	  a	  little	  exasperated,	  “I	  wish	  they	  would	  make	  a	  handbook	  and	  let	  us	  know	  what’s	  appropriate	  and	  what’s	  not.”	  Perhaps	  she	  did	  not	  challenge	  his	  opinion	  given	  his	  position	  in	  the	  administrative	  offices	  and	  seeing	  him	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as	  more	  knowledgeable	  of	  the	  institution’s	  culture	  or	  unwritten	  rules.	  Although	  I	  did	  not	  ask	  her	  to	  confirm	  this,	  it	  seemed	  the	  wish	  for	  a	  handbook	  was	  due	  to	  other	  similar	  instances	  when	  her	  personal	  opinion,	  or	  others’,	  did	  not	  align	  with	  the	  practices	  of	  the	  institution	  and	  she	  felt	  in	  the	  wrong,	  or	  at	  least	  that	  she	  needed	  clarification	  or	  some	  type	  of	  standardized	  protocols.	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Open	  House	  as	  I	  helped	  teachers	  and	  staff	  return	  chairs	  to	  classrooms	  and	  potted	  plants	  to	  their	  regular	  spots	  around	  the	  school	  courtyard,	  I	  made	  a	  general	  comment	  about	  the	  fashion	  show	  to	  one	  of	  the	  young	  vice-­‐headmasters.	  She	  voiced	  discomfort	  with	  the	  event.	  She	  felt	  it	  was	  unfitting	  and	  inappropriate	  for	  the	  students’	  Islamic	  character.	  It	  was	  unclear	  exactly	  what	  she	  objected	  to:	  the	  worldliness	  of	  a	  fashion	  show	  itself,	  the	  presenting	  of	  young	  girls	  to	  the	  audience	  in	  a	  sexualized	  way	  even	  though	  they	  had	  not	  yet	  passed	  through	  puberty,	  or	  perhaps	  some	  other	  reason	  all	  together.	  Regardless,	  her	  discomfort	  with	  the	  school’s	  sponsorship	  of	  the	  fashion	  show	  demonstrated	  how	  differences	  in	  standards	  could	  cause	  disagreement	  and	  possibly	  tension	  between	  those	  of	  differing	  values.	  If	  there	  are	  only	  minimal	  institutionally	  standardized	  practices	  and	  protocols,	  certainly	  personal	  standards	  exist	  and	  may	  come	  in	  conflict	  with	  each	  other.	  This	  raises	  the	  issues	  of	  tolerance	  and	  acceptance,	  which	  must	  be	  managed	  on	  an	  individual	  basis	  when	  a	  standard	  has	  not	  been	  institutionally	  prescribed.	  These	  issues	  will	  be	  further	  explored	  in	  chapter	  6	  when	  I	  discuss	  students’	  religious	  sensibilities,	  and	  in	  particular	  students’	  moral	  subjectivity.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  flexible	  Islam	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  that	  aims	  to	  promote	  national	  unity	  through	  religious	  plurality,	  the	  following	  chapter	  examines	  the	  nature	  of	  JSIT’s	  exacting	  Islam	  intended	  to	  transform	  individuals	  and	  the	  country	  into	  a	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Chapter	  4	  	  
	  
Exacting	  Islam,	  Benefiting	  Humanity	  as	  a	  Whole:	  	  
Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  Integrated	  Islamic	  Primary	  School	  	  	  I	  asked	  Ery	  Masruri,61	  a	  founder	  of	  the	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  Integrated	  Islamic	  Primary	  School	  (Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  Sekolah	  Dasar	  Islam	  Terpadu,	  henceforth	  known	  as	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT)62	  and	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Mulia	  Foundation	  Consortium,63	  to	  describe	  the	  type	  of	  Islam	  taught	  at	  the	  school.	  Was	  it	  liberal,	  fundamentalist,	  moderate?	  His	  understandably	  lengthy	  response	  to	  a	  complex	  question	  included	  an	  explanation	  of	  how	  such	  terms	  inadequately	  encapsulate	  the	  entirety	  of	  his	  school’s	  approach	  to	  Islam.	  While,	  due	  to	  the	  intentional	  wording	  of	  my	  question,	  our	  conversation	  was	  framed	  by	  these	  problematic	  descriptors,	  the	  following	  excerpt	  provides	  first	  the	  motivation	  for	  and	  then	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  school’s	  “strict”	  approach	  to	  Islam:64	  	  We	  really	  wanted	  to	  give	  birth	  to,	  to	  practicing	  Islam	  that’s	  part	  of	  rahmatan	  lil	  
alamin	  [blessings	  for	  the	  universe],	  the	  Islam	  that	  created	  grace	  (rahmatan).	  Mercy	  (rahmat)	  is	  a	  positive	  value	  for	  the	  life	  of	  the	  world.	  We	  wanted	  to	  give	  birth	  to	  an	  institution	  to	  educate	  this	  generation	  that	  could	  become	  positive,	  giving	  birth	  to	  the	  virtues	  of	  Islam.	  The	  more	  a	  person	  adheres	  to	  Islam,	  the	  more	  he	  is	  of	  great	  worth	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Given	  the	  number	  of	  times	  in	  this	  dissertation	  that	  I	  refer	  to	  conversations	  with	  Ery	  Masruri,	  I	  mention	  his	  name.	  Aside	  from	  being	  a	  founder	  of	  the	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  Integrated	  Islamic	  Primary	  School	  and	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Mulia	  Foundation	  Consortium,	  he	  is	  also	  one	  of	  the	  founders	  of	  the	  integrated	  Islam	  concept	  within	  JSIT,	  a	  member	  of	  JSIT’s	  Research	  and	  Development	  Department,	  and	  founder	  of	  three	  additional	  JSIT	  schools	  in	  Jogja.	  	  	  62	  This	  school	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  throughout	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  dissertation.	  “SIT”	  is	  the	  abbreviation	  used	  in	  Indonesia	  for	  the	  Integrated	  Islamic	  School	  (Sekolah	  Islam	  Terpadu).	  JSIT	  is	  the	  abbreviation	  of	  the	  Network	  for	  Integrated	  Islamic	  Schools	  (Jaringan	  Sekolah	  Islam	  Terpadu).	  	  63	  The	  Mulia	  Foundation	  Consortium	  is	  a	  small	  consortium	  of	  daycare	  facilities,	  preschools,	  and	  primary	  and	  secondary	  JSIT	  schools	  that	  includes	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT.	  	  64	  I	  recognize	  that	  just	  as	  terms	  such	  as	  “fundamental”	  or	  “moderate”	  have	  become	  loaded	  terms	  and	  have	  multiple	  meanings,	  using	  any	  single	  word	  such	  as	  “flexible”	  or	  “exacting”	  to	  distinguish	  between	  comprehensive	  forms	  of	  practice	  is	  problematic.	  However,	  these	  terms	  are	  used,	  as	  they	  are	  heuristically	  relevant	  for	  the	  discussion.	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(bernilai	  tinggi),	  beneficial	  (bermanfaat),	  liked	  (disenangi)	  by	  everyone…The	  issues	  that	  are	  a	  part	  of	  our	  fundamental	  bond	  with	  God,	  they	  become	  non-­‐negotiable	  (harga	  mati).	  And	  maybe	  that’s	  what’s	  considered	  strict	  (ketat).	  Perhaps	  one	  could	  say	  Luqman	  al-­‐Hakim	  is	  fundamentalist65	  (fundamentalis)	  in	  terms	  of	  bonds	  with	  God,	  very	  fundamentalist…[For	  example,]	  the	  obligation	  provided	  by	  Islam	  that	  a	  woman	  (seorang	  wanita)	  should	  cover	  her	  aurat	  by	  wearing	  the	  hijab,	  that’s	  a	  non-­‐negotiable,	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  examinable	  benefits…	  Where	  are	  we	  going	  with	  this	  [fundamentalist	  approach]?	  It	  makes	  devout	  Muslims	  who	  are	  of	  great	  worth	  (bernilai	  tinggi),	  extremely	  obedient	  (ketaatan	  tinggi)	  to	  God,	  and	  are	  highly	  valuable	  (bernilai	  guna	  tinggi)	  to	  humanity	  as	  a	  whole.	  (Interview	  with	  Ery	  Masruri,	  October	  21,	  2009)	  	  The	  repeated	  imagery	  of	  “giving	  birth”	  to	  a	  very	  principled	  way	  of	  practicing	  Islam	  and	  an	  institution	  that	  educates	  students	  in	  this	  “strict”	  and	  selectively	  “fundamentalist”	  religion	  suggests	  the	  school’s	  founders	  believed	  this	  kind	  of	  Islam	  and	  Islamic	  school	  were	  not	  yet	  alive	  in	  Indonesia,	  or	  at	  least	  not	  thriving.	  In	  their	  minds,	  while	  Islam	  had	  been	  practiced	  for	  centuries	  in	  Indonesia,	  rahmatan	  lil	  alamin,	  an	  Islam	  that	  brings	  blessings	  to	  the	  entire	  world,	  was	  not	  widely	  practiced	  at	  the	  time.	  	  As	  he	  explained,	  this	  form	  of	  Islam	  expects	  individuals	  to	  bind	  themselves	  to	  God	  through	  the	  transformative	  process	  of	  performing	  specific	  sets	  of	  practices.	  Personal	  worth	  and	  one’s	  level	  of	  benefit	  to	  society	  are	  directly	  linked	  to	  one’s	  obedience	  to	  God.	  The	  greater	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  one	  is	  bound	  to	  God,	  or	  the	  greater	  the	  obedience	  to	  God,	  the	  greater	  the	  yield	  of	  blessings.	  The	  benefits	  of	  these	  blessings	  are	  twofold.	  The	  devout	  gain	  personal	  benefits	  (for	  example,	  a	  woman	  who	  veils	  appropriately	  will	  receive	  greater	  honor	  in	  society),	  and	  “humanity	  as	  a	  whole”	  benefits	  from	  these	  devout	  individuals.	  Personal	  obedience	  is	  considered	  to	  universally	  bless	  humanity.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Fundamentalism	  is	  a	  concept	  that	  has	  emerged	  within	  the	  context	  of	  this	  modern	  era.	  While	  Islamic	  fundamentalism	  generally	  rejects	  Western	  influence,	  it,	  along	  with	  fundamentalism	  found	  in	  Christianity	  and	  Judaism,	  incorporates	  the	  distinctive	  features	  of	  modernity	  such	  as	  ”technologies,	  science,	  communications,	  bureaucratizations,	  and	  rationalization”	  (Ewing	  2010:52).	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The	  birth	  of	  a	  moral	  institution,	  which	  brings	  to	  life	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  Muslim	  that	  in	  turn	  benefits	  society,	  recalls	  Maududi’s	  teachings	  that	  the	  family	  is	  the	  foundation	  of	  a	  moral	  society.	  Maududi,	  a	  great	  20th-­‐century	  Islamist	  thinker	  from	  Pakistan,	  worked	  to	  create	  a	  new	  ummah,	  a	  collective	  Muslim	  community,	  in	  South	  Asia	  by	  expunging	  colonial	  influences	  from	  the	  region.	  In	  his	  framing,	  the	  family,	  and	  in	  particular	  women,	  is	  an	  Islamic	  society’s	  base	  unit.	  Maududi’s	  social	  and	  political	  teachings	  have	  influenced	  Islamist	  groups	  and	  movements	  in	  Southeast	  Asia	  and	  across	  the	  globe,	  including	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  and	  the	  Iranian	  Revolution	  (Jenkins	  2008).	  	  Similarly,	  the	  JSIT	  schools	  are	  working,	  through	  what	  they	  believe	  to	  be	  the	  transformative	  powers	  of	  Islam	  on	  individuals	  and	  in	  turn	  on	  society,	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  pious	  Indonesia.	  These	  schools	  work	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  appropriate	  development	  of	  Muslims,	  and	  a	  Muslim	  nation,	  requires	  the	  implementation	  of	  specific	  religious	  practices	  and	  principles	  aligned	  with	  the	  original	  practices	  of	  Islam,	  thus	  making	  them	  universally	  applicable.	  The	  schools	  teach	  children	  to	  reject	  the	  Western,	  or	  neo-­‐colonial,	  influences	  of	  secularism	  and	  materialism,	  which	  are	  enemies	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  rahmatan	  lil	  alamin	  Islam,	  while	  harnessing	  useful	  scientific	  knowledge	  and	  technology	  from	  the	  West	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  modern	  society.	  Students	  are	  expected	  to	  become	  observant	  and	  pious	  Muslims,	  the	  prerequisite	  to	  creating	  a	  just	  and	  peaceful	  nation.	  Similar	  to	  Maududi’s	  envisioned	  features	  of	  family,	  with	  very	  specific	  gendered	  roles	  and	  forms	  of	  modesty	  (Maududi	  n.d),	  many	  JSIT	  practices	  promote	  specific,	  gendered	  ideas	  regarding	  male−female	  interactions,	  the	  proper	  roles	  men	  and	  women	  play	  in	  society,	  and	  female	  dress	  codes.	  Ery’s	  vision	  of	  growing	  a	  school	  system	  echoes	  Maududi’s	  vision	  of	  growing	  an	  Islamic	  nation.	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   In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  argue	  that	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT’s	  conceptualization	  of	  a	  universal	  Islam	  is	  comprised	  of	  three	  interrelated	  components,	  namely,	  Qur’an	  and	  hadith-­‐based	  beliefs,	  standardized	  practices,	  and	  exacting	  adherence,	  which	  combine	  to	  create	  an	  exacting	  Islam.	  I	  then	  explore	  the	  paradox	  of	  being	  “universal”	  while	  simultaneously	  requiring	  specific	  practices	  and	  rituals.	  This	  paradox	  will	  be	  discussed	  within	  the	  context	  of	  perceptions	  and	  practices	  of	  exclusivity.	  Before	  these	  discussions,	  I	  map	  out	  the	  history	  of	  the	  ideological	  and	  institutional	  roots	  of	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  larger	  political	  history	  and	  socio-­‐political	  agenda	  of	  the	  Tarbiyah	  Movement	  and	  PKS	  to	  set	  the	  context	  for	  my	  arguments.	  	  	  
JSIT’s	  Roots	  in	  the	  Egyptian	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  and	  Politics	  The	  Network	  of	  Integrated	  Islamic	  Schools	  (Jaringan	  Sekolah	  Islam	  Terpadu,	  henceforth	  JSIT)	  is	  one	  of	  the	  largest,	  if	  not	  the	  largest,	  association	  of	  Indonesian	  Islamic	  schools	  without	  a	  religious	  organization	  affiliation.	  As	  of	  2010,	  the	  network’s	  membership	  included	  570	  daycare,	  pre-­‐school	  and	  kindergarten	  facilities	  and	  550	  primary	  and	  secondary	  schools	  (JSIT	  2010).	  Unlike	  the	  Al	  Azhar	  schools	  that	  expanded	  under	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  governing	  board	  at	  headquarters,	  the	  initial	  growth	  of	  the	  now	  JSIT	  schools	  was	  organic	  and	  uncoordinated.	  Beginning	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  the	  first	  Integrated	  Islamic	  schools	  were	  established	  by	  independent	  dakwah	  activists	  from	  the	  Tarbiyah	  Movement	  in	  several	  different	  cities.	  The	  creation	  of	  the	  Tarbiyah	  Movement	  was	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  ideals	  from	  the	  Egyptian	  Muslim	  Brotherhood.	  Economic	  growth	  during	  the	  New	  Order	  allowed	  students	  to	  travel	  abroad	  for	  university	  training.	  Many	  of	  these	  students	  returned	  from	  international	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study	  with	  new	  ideals	  concerning	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  more	  pious	  and	  Islamic	  society.	  These	  activists	  localized	  the	  Islamic	  Brotherhood	  ideals	  to	  the	  Indonesian	  context,	  and	  eventually	  formed	  the	  Tarbiyah	  Movement	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  (Machmudi	  2008:134).	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  survival	  during	  Suharto’s	  secular	  New	  Order	  regime,	  it	  operated	  underground	  and	  was	  most	  successful	  on	  university	  campuses.	  The	  movement’s	  model	  of	  Islamization	  involves	  a	  system	  of	  Islam	  kaffah,	  or	  “comprehensive	  Islam.”	  It	  calls	  for	  Muslims	  to	  incorporate	  Islam	  into	  all	  aspects	  of	  their	  lives,	  to	  see	  Islam	  as	  the	  complete	  and	  only	  source	  for	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  all	  spiritual	  and	  worldly	  needs.	  From	  the	  Tarbiyah	  Movement	  activists’	  perspective,	  there	  is	  no	  single	  matter	  that	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  rules	  of	  Islam	  (Machmudi	  2008:66).	  The	  movement’s	  specific	  notions	  of	  how	  Islam	  is	  to	  be	  implemented	  require	  discipline	  and	  education	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  its	  many	  rules	  (Rinaldo	  2008).	  The	  disciplined	  individual	  is	  key	  to	  an	  alternative	  vision	  of	  national	  development	  that	  challenges	  secular,	  corrupt	  governments.	  A	  critical	  mass	  of	  such	  disciplined	  individuals	  influences	  political,	  economic,	  social,	  familial,	  and	  cultural	  aspects	  of	  society;	  they	  are	  then	  expected	  to	  create	  a	  new	  society	  based	  on	  Islamic	  principles.	  This	  vision	  of	  disciplined	  individuals	  is	  codified	  in	  school	  procedures	  and	  their	  expectation	  that	  students	  will	  become	  pious	  Muslims.	  	  The	  Tarbiyah	  Movement	  seeks	  to	  Islamize	  Indonesia	  through	  political	  and	  cultural	  avenues	  (Machmudi	  2008:51,66).	  When	  Suharto	  stepped	  down	  in	  1998,	  the	  movement	  became	  public	  and	  within	  months	  established	  the	  Prosperous	  Party	  (PK),	  which	  later	  became	  the	  Prosperous	  Justice	  Party	  (Partai	  Keadilan	  Sejahtera,	  henceforth	  PKS)	  in	  2002.	  Establishing	  a	  political	  party	  was	  key	  in	  these	  efforts	  to	  Islamize	  Indonesia’s	  national	  structures.	  While	  not	  immediately	  accepted	  by	  all	  Tarbiyah	  activists,	  an	  internal	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referendum	  in	  1998	  by	  the	  movement’s	  core	  cadre	  transformed	  the	  Tarbiyah	  Movement	  into	  a	  political	  institution.66	  As	  there	  was	  to	  be	  no	  distinction	  between	  the	  party	  and	  the	  movement,	  all	  religious	  training	  and	  activities	  were	  taken	  over	  by	  the	  party.	  The	  PKS	  continues	  to	  be	  the	  formal	  political	  arm	  of	  the	  Tarbiyah	  Movement	  (Machmudi	  2008:72).	  PKS	  has	  become	  well	  known,	  gaining	  more	  public	  support	  than	  any	  other	  Islamic	  political	  party	  in	  the	  country.	  	  The	  cultural	  strategy	  for	  Islamizing	  Indonesia	  targets	  the	  development	  of	  Islamic	  social	  institutions	  such	  as	  schools,	  health	  clinics,	  and	  financial	  institutions	  governed	  by	  
Shari’ah.	  67	  Al-­‐Banna,	  the	  founder	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  Muslim	  Brotherhood,	  was	  a	  schoolteacher	  and	  imam.	  He	  viewed	  education	  as	  not	  simply	  a	  way	  to	  teach	  knowledge,	  religious	  or	  secular,	  but	  as	  a	  way	  to	  bring	  about	  moral	  edification	  and	  the	  development	  of	  fully	  Islamic	  individuals.	  The	  belief	  is	  that,	  by	  working	  to	  implement	  Shari’ah	  in	  all	  aspects	  of	  one’s	  life,	  the	  sincere	  believer	  transforms	  the	  community	  around	  him.	  In	  time,	  a	  collective	  of	  believers	  transforms	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  Viewing	  education	  to	  have	  transformative	  powers	  for	  individuals	  and	  society,	  al-­‐Banna	  believed	  a	  new	  society	  required	  a	  new	  system	  of	  formal	  and	  informal	  education	  to	  nurture	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  Muslims	  committed	  to	  the	  cause.	  Once	  this	  was	  achieved,	  al-­‐Banna	  believed	  the	  Muslim	  nation	  (ummah)	  would	  be	  restored	  to	  its	  lost	  power	  and	  glory	  (Rosen	  2008).	  The	  significant	  emphasis	  al-­‐Banna	  put	  on	  education	  is	  often	  overshadowed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  Although	  some	  activists	  had	  been	  channeling	  their	  dakwah	  efforts	  through	  non-­‐political	  institutions,	  all	  movement	  members	  automatically	  became	  party	  members.	  Members	  who	  were	  not	  in	  agreement	  with	  the	  party	  as	  a	  manifestation	  of	  the	  movement,	  but	  rather	  the	  political	  wing	  of	  it,	  were	  excluded	  from	  the	  movement’s	  membership	  (Machmudi	  2006:73).	  	  67	  While	  non-­‐Muslims	  often	  associate	  Shari’ah,	  or	  Islamic	  law,	  with	  criminal	  laws	  and	  punishments,	  it	  encompasses	  laws	  regarding	  politics,	  economics,	  family	  life	  (marriage,	  divorce,	  adoption),	  human	  rights,	  sexuality,	  hygiene,	  and	  much	  more.	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in	  the	  press	  and	  scholarly	  research	  by	  the	  political	  nature	  of	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  groups.	  The	  importance	  of	  education	  and	  its	  power	  to	  effect	  change,	  however,	  is	  not	  lost	  on	  the	  Tarbiyah	  Movement	  (Machmudi	  2008).	  Tarbiyah	  is	  Arabic	  for	  education.68	  From	  its	  conception,	  the	  Tarbiyah	  Movement	  has	  been	  involved	  in	  various	  activities	  related	  to	  its	  namesake.	  This	  can	  be	  observed	  in	  PKS’	  various	  formal	  and	  informal	  educational	  efforts,	  the	  most	  publicly	  visible	  and	  widespread	  being	  JSIT	  and	  its	  member	  schools.69	  Through	  its	  investigation	  of	  the	  JSIT	  school	  group,	  this	  dissertation	  provides	  a	  significant	  contribution	  to	  the	  body	  of	  research	  on	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood’s	  transnational	  influence	  on	  Islamic	  schooling,	  of	  which	  there	  is	  currently	  a	  scarcity.	  PKS	  views	  the	  Islamization	  of	  the	  country	  as	  a	  gradual	  process	  that	  will	  culminate	  in	  a	  call	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  Shari’ah	  from	  the	  grassroots.	  There	  are,	  however,	  several	  groups	  in	  Indonesia	  who	  consider	  PKS	  to	  have	  a	  hidden	  agenda,	  believing	  that	  they	  will	  advance	  to	  political	  power	  through	  the	  democratic	  process	  but	  then	  unilaterally	  legislate	  
Shari’ah	  on	  all	  citizens	  (Wahid	  2009;	  Woodward	  et	  al.	  2011;	  Woodward	  et	  al.	  2012).	  While	  PKS	  has	  denied	  these	  allegations,	  it	  has	  also	  openly	  declared	  its	  commitment	  to	  the	  struggle	  of	  Islam,	  including	  applying	  Shari’ah.	  Yet,	  because	  it	  is	  a	  sensitive	  topic,	  the	  PKS	  has	  never	  clearly	  described	  what	  Shari’ah	  would	  look	  like	  in	  a	  democratic	  state.	  In	  addition	  to	  advocating	  for	  Shari’ah	  to	  be	  enforceable	  by	  law,	  the	  movement	  believes	  that	  Islamic	  laws	  must	  become	  part	  of	  the	  internal	  character	  and	  power	  of	  the	  individual	  cadre	  members.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  There	  are	  three	  Arabic	  words	  for	  “education.”	  Tarbiyah	  refers	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  “development	  of	  individual	  potential	  and	  to	  the	  process	  of	  nurturing	  and	  guiding	  a	  child	  to	  a	  state	  of	  completeness	  or	  maturity”	  (Halstead	  2004:522).	  	  69	  In	  addition	  to	  integrated	  Islamic	  schools	  other	  educational	  efforts	  include:	  1)	  Nurul	  Fikri	  college	  prep	  courses,	  which	  are	  used	  as	  recruitment	  purposes	  for	  Tarbiyah	  Movement	  campus	  groups;	  2)	  after-­‐school	  classes	  at	  mosques	  for	  children,	  and	  Friday	  sermons	  given	  during	  Friday	  prayer	  gatherings;	  and,	  3)	  workshops,	  seminars,	  and	  frequent	  small	  and	  large	  private	  study	  circles	  for	  PKS	  cadre	  members.	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Strong	  Islamic	  character	  is	  expected	  of	  all	  Muslims.	  This	  translates	  into	  highly	  popular	  anti-­‐corruption	  and	  clean-­‐government	  campaigning.	  The	  movement	  wishes	  to	  popularize	  
Shari’ah	  by	  stressing	  its	  role	  in	  achieving	  the	  goals	  of	  prosperity	  and	  justice	  for	  all	  Indonesians	  (Machmudi	  2008:191).	  	  The	  party,	  fifteen	  years	  after	  its	  establishment,	  is	  at	  a	  crossroads.	  While	  it	  has	  done	  better	  than	  other	  Islamist	  parties,	  disappointing	  election	  results	  in	  2009	  signaled	  the	  party’s	  need	  to	  change	  tactics	  to	  stay	  relevant	  and	  influential	  in	  politics.	  One	  group	  of	  cadre	  members	  is	  calling	  for	  the	  party	  to	  temper	  its	  original	  Islamist	  agenda	  in	  order	  to	  continue	  to	  be	  an	  active	  participant	  in	  the	  current	  political	  milieu.	  The	  other	  group	  favors	  remaining	  committed	  to	  the	  original	  platform	  (Woodward	  2011b).	  Regardless	  of	  this	  internal	  conflict,	  though,	  the	  social	  institutions	  run	  by	  cadre	  members	  are	  not	  likely	  to	  be	  significantly	  affected	  by	  this	  political	  problem.	  While	  the	  party	  may	  ultimately	  need	  to	  change	  its	  party	  line	  for	  political	  participation,	  the	  social	  institutions	  run	  by	  PKS	  cadre	  members	  are	  likely	  to	  remain	  unaffected	  by	  the	  party’s	  national	  levels	  of	  popularity,	  as	  there	  is	  sufficient	  local	  community	  support	  for	  the	  services	  that	  the	  institutions	  provide.	  This	  demonstrates	  how	  social	  institutions	  such	  as	  schools	  are	  able	  to	  promote	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  at	  the	  local	  level,	  affecting	  cultural	  and	  social	  aspects	  of	  society	  independently	  of	  formal	  political	  structures.	  	  	  
Network	  of	  Integrated	  Islamic	  Schools	  (JSIT)	  As	  the	  Tarbiyah	  Movement	  did	  not	  initially	  have	  a	  coordinating	  leadership	  body,	  the	  first	  integrated	  Islamic	  schools	  (Sekolah	  Islam	  Terpadu,	  or	  SIT)	  developed	  organically	  through	  the	  individual	  initiatives	  of	  activists.	  Education	  graduates	  of	  Indonesian	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universities	  who	  had	  joined	  the	  movement	  as	  students	  established	  many	  of	  the	  initial	  schools,	  beginning	  in	  1994	  (Chudleigh	  2011).	  As	  parents	  dissatisfied	  with	  the	  schooling	  options	  in	  their	  communities,	  the	  activists	  often	  established	  integrated	  schools	  for	  their	  own	  children.	  As	  one	  founder,	  who	  now	  works	  at	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Youth	  and	  Sports	  in	  Jakarta,	  said,	  “We	  set	  up	  our	  own,	  made	  our	  own	  school…[and]	  our	  children	  became	  the	  guinea	  pigs”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  founder,	  March	  22,	  2010).	  Proving	  themselves	  capable	  of	  providing	  a	  solid	  academic	  and	  religious	  education,	  the	  SITs	  gradually	  gained	  respect	  and	  popularity	  among	  their	  respective	  local	  communities;	  non-­‐Tarbiyah	  Movement	  members	  also	  began	  to	  enroll	  their	  children.	  Eventually	  regional	  associations	  of	  SITs	  were	  created	  as	  support	  networks.	  In	  2003,	  founders	  of	  initial	  schools,	  many	  of	  whom	  were	  involved	  in	  the	  establishment	  of	  PKS,	  formed	  the	  Network	  of	  Integrated	  Islamic	  Schools	  (Jaringan	  Sekolah	  Islam	  Terpadu,	  henceforth	  JSIT)	  to	  coordinate	  and	  facilitate	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  schools	  (Hasan	  2009:10).	  This	  brought	  all	  PKS-­‐linked	  SITs	  under	  one	  umbrella	  organization.	  Currently,	  all	  network	  member	  schools	  are	  expected	  to	  adhere	  to	  JSIT	  guidelines	  for	  integrating	  religious	  and	  secular	  knowledge	  and	  to	  follow	  the	  JSIT	  religion	  curriculum	  guidelines	  and	  competencies.	  There	  are,	  however,	  no	  standard	  textbooks	  for	  member	  schools	  to	  use.	  The	  schools	  are	  given	  latitude	  to	  be	  creative	  in	  how	  programs	  are	  run,	  but	  religious	  ideology	  is	  held	  constant.	  	  Given	  the	  rigid	  and	  tightly	  centralized	  organization	  of	  PKS,	  the	  JSIT’s	  looser	  management	  of	  schools	  is	  a	  surprising	  feature	  of	  the	  network.70	  Not	  all	  schools	  are	  politically	  oriented,	  nor	  are	  all	  school	  leaders	  connected	  to	  PKS	  (Hefner	  2009).	  However,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  While	  JSIT	  is	  a	  network	  and	  has	  less	  oversight	  of	  its	  members	  (anggota)	  than	  the	  Al	  Azhar	  franchise	  does	  with	  its	  branches	  (cabang),	  there	  is	  a	  consistent	  school	  ethos	  among	  members.	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PKS	  leadership	  told	  me	  that	  most	  school	  leadership	  was	  connected	  to	  the	  party	  cadre.	  Network	  members	  uninterested	  in	  PKS	  politics	  are	  likely	  attracted	  to	  the	  network	  for	  the	  curricular	  guidance	  and	  general	  positive	  reputation	  of	  the	  name.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  looser	  network	  allows	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  schools	  to	  be	  involved,	  thus	  strategically	  expanding	  the	  ethos	  and	  Islamic	  culture	  consistently	  promoted	  at	  JSIT	  schools.	  	  The	  general	  public	  often	  refers	  to	  JSIT	  schools	  as	  “PKS	  schools.”	  It	  is	  illegal,	  however,	  for	  political	  parties	  to	  own	  businesses	  or	  social	  institutions.	  Therefore	  there	  are	  no	  structural	  or	  financial	  ties	  between	  SITs	  and	  PKS.	  While	  individuals	  may	  be	  working	  on	  boards	  of	  both	  PKS	  and	  integrated	  Islamic	  schools,	  the	  institutions	  are	  formally	  distinct	  and	  independent	  of	  each	  other.	  Ideologically,	  however,	  they	  are	  intrinsically	  intertwined,	  as	  they	  are	  both	  institutions	  run	  by	  Tarbiyah	  Movement	  activists-­‐cum-­‐PKS	  cadre,	  and	  both	  share	  a	  united	  vision	  of	  the	  role	  of,	  and	  approach	  to,	  Islamic	  education	  required	  for	  the	  Islamization	  of	  Indonesia.	  The	  secretary	  of	  JSIT	  explained	  the	  formal	  relationship	  between	  the	  schools	  and	  the	  party:	  	  A	  party	  may	  not	  have	  schools,	  but	  members	  who	  are	  in	  the	  party	  may	  have	  a	  school.	  So	  we	  [PKS	  members]	  do	  dakwah	  (religious	  propagation)	  of	  Islam,	  not	  the	  party’s	  propaganda,	  but	  preach	  Islam…We	  make	  a	  social	  institution	  based	  on	  private	  individuals,	  not	  the	  party.	  We	  build	  clinics,	  schools,	  foundations.	  (Interview	  with	  JSIT	  secretary,	  December	  9,	  2009)	  	  
	  




PKS	  cadre	  members	  feel	  a	  personal	  responsibility	  to	  conduct	  dakwah	  among	  the	  community	  through	  various	  social	  institutions.	  These	  social	  institutions	  are	  built	  around	  religious	  cultural	  frames	  that	  parallel	  the	  Tarbiyah	  Movement	  and,	  consequently,	  the	  PKS,	  thus	  creating	  a	  web	  of	  social	  and	  political	  institutions	  guided	  by	  a	  unified	  vision	  of	  an	  Islamized	  Indonesia.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note,	  however,	  that	  while	  the	  school	  has	  clear	  links	  through	  JSIT	  to	  PKS,	  during	  interviews	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  personnel,	  they	  were	  vague	  or	  dismissive	  about	  their	  relationships	  with	  the	  party.	  In	  interviews,	  when	  I	  asked	  administrators	  and	  teachers	  about	  a	  school’s	  reputation	  as	  a	  “PKS	  school,”	  personnel	  claimed	  no	  affiliation.	  When	  pushed,	  a	  respondent	  would	  comment	  that	  perhaps	  the	  reputation	  came	  from	  having	  so	  many	  parents	  who	  were	  PKS	  members,	  leaving	  untouched	  any	  reference	  to	  the	  teachers,	  administrators,	  or	  JSIT.	  The	  most	  direct	  comment	  came	  from	  a	  Luqman	  al-­‐Hakim	  board	  member,	  also	  an	  active	  Muhammadiyah	  member,	  who	  explained,	  “We	  are	  actually	  not	  the	  PKS,	  although	  there	  may	  be	  similar	  tendencies	  in	  our	  methods	  of	  Islamic	  thinking”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  founder,	  May	  5,	  2009).	  Interestingly,	  parents	  and	  students	  freely	  volunteered	  information	  that	  the	  school	  or	  the	  teachers	  “were	  PKS.”	  	  In	  the	  first	  and	  only	  American	  publication	  on	  JSIT	  schools,	  Hefner	  (2009)	  reported	  that	  not	  all	  JSIT	  schools	  consider	  themselves	  to	  be	  politically	  motivated	  and	  are	  uncomfortable	  with	  explicitly	  mixing	  politics	  and	  education.	  On	  campus,	  I	  observed	  very	  little	  in	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  activities	  that	  linked	  the	  school	  to	  PKS	  or	  promoted	  activism	  with	  the	  party,	  but	  it	  appears	  there	  was	  a	  more	  direct	  connection	  between	  the	  party	  and	  the	  school	  years	  earlier.	  While	  looking	  through	  the	  school’s	  old	  photo	  albums,	  I	  found	  photos	  of	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some	  schoolteachers	  I	  recognized	  participating	  in	  a	  PKS	  rally	  off	  campus.	  Judging	  by	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  photos,	  the	  rally	  had	  taken	  place	  several	  years	  prior.	  I	  marked	  these	  photos	  to	  be	  scanned	  by	  the	  school	  librarian—I	  was	  not	  allowed	  to	  remove	  the	  albums	  from	  the	  campus,	  but	  I	  was	  offered	  use	  of	  the	  library’s	  scanner.	  The	  librarian	  and	  I	  worked	  through	  the	  photo	  albums,	  scanning	  marked	  photos.	  Upon	  encountering	  the	  PKS	  rally	  photos,	  the	  librarian	  paused	  and	  then	  without	  explanation	  excused	  herself	  for	  a	  moment,	  disappearing	  out	  of	  the	  library	  with	  the	  photo	  album.	  When	  she	  returned,	  the	  photos	  had	  been	  removed	  from	  the	  album,	  and	  she	  informed	  me	  that	  they	  were	  not	  available.	  At	  some	  point,	  it	  seems	  the	  school	  had	  been	  open	  about	  and	  proud	  of	  their	  PKS	  affiliation;	  indeed,	  why	  else	  would	  photos	  of	  teachers	  participating	  at	  a	  rally	  be	  placed	  in	  a	  school	  photo	  album?	  The	  album	  was	  old	  enough	  that	  it	  had	  likely	  not	  been	  looked	  at	  for	  quite	  a	  while.	  The	  librarian	  did	  not	  seem	  surprised	  to	  see	  the	  photos,	  but	  she	  sensed	  an	  inappropriateness	  with	  them	  that	  required	  consultation.	  It	  was	  clear	  that	  the	  current	  school	  administration	  did	  not	  want	  any	  linkage	  to	  the	  party.	  	  In	  the	  school	  personnel’s	  non-­‐school	  lives,	  connections	  did	  exist.	  The	  house	  of	  a	  teacher	  I	  visited,	  for	  example,	  had	  a	  few	  PKS	  logo	  stickers	  on	  the	  front	  windows.	  When	  asking	  two	  women	  on	  the	  street	  for	  help	  in	  locating	  Ery’s	  house	  for	  our	  first	  interview,	  I	  mentioned	  his	  name	  and	  showed	  them	  the	  directions	  he	  had	  dictated	  to	  me	  over	  the	  phone.	  Looking	  at	  the	  directions,	  one	  said	  to	  the	  other,	  “Oh,	  the	  PKS	  guy,”	  when	  they	  realized	  who	  I	  was	  looking	  for.	  They	  then	  proceeded	  to	  give	  me	  directions	  to	  his	  house,	  which	  also	  sported	  a	  faded	  PKS	  sticker	  on	  one	  of	  the	  windows.	  Additionally,	  one	  of	  the	  other	  school	  founders	  was	  serving	  as	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  PKS	  Regional	  Leadership	  Council	  (Dean	  Pen	  gurus	  
Wilayah)	  for	  Jogja	  at	  the	  time	  of	  my	  research.	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I	  was	  perplexed	  by	  the	  hesitancy,	  or	  near	  refusal,	  of	  the	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  personnel	  to	  acknowledge	  personal	  or	  institutional	  PKS	  affiliation	  particularly	  since	  at	  JSIT	  headquarters	  in	  Depok,	  leaders	  talked	  about	  it	  freely.	  I	  voiced	  my	  puzzlement	  to	  a	  JSIT	  headquarters	  official.	  He	  surmised:	  It’s	  related	  to	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  factors	  in	  Jogja.	  In	  Jogjakarta,	  Muhammadiyah	  is	  very	  strong	  and	  they	  are	  jealous	  of	  the	  integrated	  Islamic	  schools	  [JSIT	  schools]...The	  chairman	  of	  Muhammadiyah,	  Din	  Syamsyuddin,	  said	  so	  directly...He	  said	  because	  of	  integrated	  Islamic	  schools,	  Muhammadiyah	  schools	  are	  short	  of	  students.	  Their	  number	  of	  pupils	  has	  reduced	  because	  people	  prefer	  integrated	  Islamic	  schools.	  So	  in	  Jogjakarta	  maybe	  you	  have	  to	  be	  careful.	  It	  deals	  with	  the	  market.	  I	  think	  this	  is	  a	  marketing	  strategy	  because	  once	  branded	  PKS,	  people	  will	  stay	  away.	  They	  like	  the	  PKS,	  but	  maybe	  they	  do	  not	  want	  to	  see	  a	  school	  that	  only	  belongs	  to	  a	  party.	  Schools	  must	  belong	  to	  everyone.	  Maybe	  that’s	  why.	  (Interview	  with	  JSIT	  secretary,	  December	  9,	  2009).	  	  This	  comment	  confirms	  that,	  at	  least	  at	  JSIT	  headquarters,	  they	  consider	  the	  school	  to	  be	  linked	  to	  the	  party.	  It	  is	  possible,	  but	  unlikely	  given	  the	  close	  connection	  between	  headquarters	  and	  the	  schools,	  that	  headquarters	  was	  unaware	  of	  the	  school’s	  disinterest	  in	  or	  lack	  of	  connection	  to	  PKS.	  Downplaying	  affiliation	  seems	  to	  not	  only	  be	  a	  marketing	  strategy	  as	  suggested,	  but	  also	  one	  of	  reputation	  management	  in	  a	  town	  dominated	  by	  Muhammadiyah.	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  Muhammadiyah	  issued	  a	  decree	  in	  2007	  that,	  among	  other	  things,	  condemned	  Muhammadiyah	  member	  involvement	  with	  PKS.	  It	  also	  warned	  against	  supporting	  dakwah	  efforts	  (of	  which	  schools	  are	  easily	  included)	  by	  political	  parties,	  “such	  as	  Prosperous	  Justice	  Party	  (PKS)”	  (Muhammadiyah	  Central	  Board,	  Decree	  Number	  149/KEP/I.0/B2006:Points	  2	  and	  3).	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  previously	  open	  acknowledgement	  was	  reined	  in	  around	  the	  time	  tensions	  came	  to	  a	  head	  between	  Muhammadiyah	  and	  PKS.	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Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  Integrated	  Islamic	  Primary	  School	  
 Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  Integrated	  Islamic	  Primary	  School	  can	  be	  considered	  representative	  of	  the	  political	  and	  religious	  ideals	  of	  JSIT,	  as	  it	  has	  a	  long	  history	  of	  collaborating	  with	  the	  founders	  of	  the	  network	  in	  the	  early	  years	  before	  the	  network	  was	  established.	  Additionally,	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  is	  considered	  one	  of	  the	  network’s	  model	  schools.	  The	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  campus	  complex	  is	  an	  impressive	  compilation	  of	  two	  large	  three-­‐story	  buildings,	  a	  mosque,	  and	  a	  few	  other	  smaller	  buildings	  nestled	  in	  a	  calm	  residential	  neighborhood	  of	  spacious	  modern	  homes	  in	  southern	  Jogjakarta.	  Although	  the	  founders	  started	  out	  with	  great	  hopes,	  they	  did	  not	  envision	  the	  school	  growing	  to	  its	  current	  size	  when	  they	  acquired	  land	  and	  began	  construction	  of	  the	  current	  facilities.	  This	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  cramped	  classrooms	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  open	  space	  for	  student	  recreational	  activities.	  The	  school	  compound	  centers	  around	  an	  open	  rectangular,	  concrete-­‐tiled	  courtyard	  where	  morning	  ceremonies	  are	  held	  and	  children	  play	  during	  recess.	  The	  buildings	  around	  the	  perimeter	  of	  the	  courtyard	  consist	  of,	  starting	  at	  one	  end,	  a	  one-­‐story	  building	  containing	  the	  front	  office,	  a	  small	  counseling	  room,	  an	  office	  for	  a	  vice	  headmaster,	  and	  three	  classrooms,	  perpendicular	  to	  a	  long	  three-­‐story	  L-­‐shaped	  building,	  and	  then	  a	  two-­‐classroom	  long,	  three-­‐story	  building.	  Next	  to	  this	  is	  the	  two-­‐story	  mosque	  with	  a	  high-­‐pitched	  roof,	  bringing	  the	  buildings	  full	  circle,	  as	  it	  is	  adjacent	  to	  the	  front	  office.	  	  The	  entrance	  to	  the	  courtyard	  is	  accessed	  by	  passing	  between	  the	  mosque	  and	  the	  front	  office.	  The	  thick,	  white-­‐	  and	  dark-­‐green-­‐painted	  buildings	  house	  classrooms,	  teachers’	  rooms,	  a	  library	  and	  multimedia	  room,	  a	  computer	  lab	  with	  19	  computers,	  an	  indoor	  gym,	  and	  a	  covered,	  open-­‐air	  area	  directly	  below	  the	  gym	  on	  the	  ground	  floor.	  One	  of	  the	  large	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pillars	  supporting	  the	  structure	  doubles	  as	  a	  newly-­‐installed	  climbing	  wall.	  To	  one	  side	  of	  the	  courtyard	  is	  a	  washing	  station	  for	  students	  to	  prepare	  for	  sholat	  (daily	  required	  prayer);	  another	  washing	  station	  is	  located	  to	  one	  side	  of	  the	  mosque.	  As	  the	  mosque	  is	  not	  big	  enough	  to	  hold	  all	  800-­‐plus	  students	  and	  70	  teachers	  for	  group	  sholat,	  the	  upper-­‐grade	  boys	  and	  male	  teachers	  pray	  in	  the	  mosque.	  Female	  teachers	  oversee	  the	  upper-­‐grade	  girls,	  who	  pray	  in	  the	  gym,	  while	  the	  lower-­‐grade	  boys	  and	  girls	  pray	  in	  the	  covered	  open	  area	  on	  the	  ground	  level.	  Each	  group	  conducts	  their	  sholat	  independent	  of	  each	  other.	  While	  the	  buildings	  are	  not	  air-­‐conditioned,	  most	  rooms	  have	  a	  fan	  attached	  up	  high	  on	  one	  wall.	  The	  dim	  rooms	  are	  cramped	  with	  well-­‐worn,	  dark	  brown	  wooden	  tables	  for	  either	  one	  or	  two	  students,	  and	  individual	  wooden	  chairs.	  	  The	  lower-­‐grade	  classrooms	  each	  have	  an	  area	  rug	  for	  students	  to	  gather	  on	  in	  addition	  to	  desks	  similar	  to	  those	  in	  the	  upper-­‐grade	  classrooms.	  The	  limited	  wall	  space	  displays	  student	  work.	  Directly	  accessed	  from	  the	  street	  along	  the	  eastern	  perimeter	  of	  the	  property	  is	  another	  set	  of	  buildings.	  To	  one	  side	  of	  the	  compound	  entrance	  is	  a	  Shari’ah	  co-­‐op	  bank	  operated	  by	  the	  Consortium.	  Teachers’	  salaries	  are	  deposited	  to	  their	  compulsory	  accounts,	  and	  parents	  are	  able	  to	  make	  school	  fee	  payments	  at	  the	  bank,	  as	  well	  as	  at	  the	  school’s	  front	  office.	  To	  the	  south	  of	  the	  entrance	  is	  a	  store,	  owned	  by	  the	  foundation’s	  Consortium,	  that	  sells	  snacks	  and	  basic	  school	  supplies	  to	  the	  students.	  Next	  to	  this	  is	  a	  simple	  daycare	  for	  teachers’	  infants	  and	  toddlers,	  a	  small	  office	  for	  the	  consortium’s	  administrative	  needs,	  and	  a	  nurse’s	  office	  for	  students	  and	  teachers.	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School	  leadership	  consists	  of	  a	  headmaster	  and	  three	  vice-­‐headmasters	  elected	  from	  among	  the	  teaching	  staff,	  by	  the	  staff,	  for	  three-­‐year	  terms.71	  Once	  their	  terms	  are	  over,	  the	  administrators	  return	  to	  teaching	  positions	  within	  the	  school	  if	  they	  are	  not	  re-­‐elected	  for	  a	  second	  term.	  Men	  dominate	  leadership	  positions.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  this	  research,	  the	  school’s	  first	  female	  vice-­‐headmaster	  was	  serving	  her	  first	  term.	  While	  there	  are	  no	  official	  rules	  banning	  women	  from	  the	  position	  of	  headmaster,	  neither	  of	  the	  two	  female	  faculty	  members	  I	  asked,	  in	  different	  interviews,	  foresaw	  a	  woman	  becoming	  headmaster.	  The	  female	  vice-­‐headmaster	  clarified	  that,	  given	  that	  the	  amount	  of	  additional	  time	  the	  position	  required	  outside	  of	  regular	  school	  hours	  would	  infringe	  upon	  the	  woman’s	  time	  at	  home	  taking	  care	  of	  her	  children,	  women	  were	  not	  assigned	  to	  that	  role.	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  woman’s	  priority	  was	  to	  grow	  the	  nation	  through	  the	  home	  as	  a	  mother,	  rather	  than	  through	  a	  high-­‐level	  professional	  position	  at	  the	  school.	  	  The	  school	  is	  managed	  by	  the	  Mulia	  Foundation	  Consortium	  (Konsorsium	  Yayasan	  
Mulia),	  which	  oversees	  three	  daycare	  and	  preschool	  facilities,	  two	  of	  which	  also	  have	  kindergarten	  programs,	  the	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  elementary	  school,	  a	  junior	  high	  school,	  and	  a	  senior	  high	  school.	  Many	  of	  the Consortium’s	  board	  members	  are	  mid-­‐career	  individuals	  who	  were	  also	  part	  of	  the	  initial	  five	  activists	  that	  started	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT.	  One	  is	  a	  business	  owner,	  another	  a	  psychology	  professor	  at	  a	  small	  state	  university	  as	  well	  as	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Leadership	  assignment	  is	  semi-­‐democratic.	  Every	  three	  years,	  elections	  are	  held	  among	  the	  teachers	  and	  staff	  of	  the	  school	  for	  leadership	  positions.	  The	  Consortium	  provides	  a	  list	  of	  teachers	  from	  the	  school	  who	  meet	  specific	  requirements,	  such	  as	  being	  senior	  or	  a	  high-­‐performing	  teacher.	  Teachers	  vote	  for	  five	  people	  from	  the	  approved	  list	  to	  become	  headmaster	  candidates.	  The	  top	  five	  then	  make	  presentations	  about	  their	  visions	  for	  their	  tenure.	  After	  a	  second	  vote	  by	  the	  teachers,	  the	  Consortium	  then	  selects	  the	  headmaster	  from	  the	  top	  three	  candidates.	  Once	  the	  headmaster	  has	  been	  selected,	  the	  Consortium	  presents	  a	  set	  of	  lists	  of	  candidates	  for	  the	  three	  vice-­‐headmaster	  positions	  on	  which	  the	  school	  staff	  votes.	  The	  individuals	  who	  receive	  the	  most	  votes	  are	  then	  assigned	  one	  of	  three	  vice-­‐headmaster	  positions.	  	  
	  	  
114	  
active	  Muhammadiyah	  member,	  while	  another	  is	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  PKS	  Regional	  Leadership	  Council	  (Dewan	  Pengurus	  Wilayah)	  for	  the	  Jogja	  region.	  Due	  to	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  schooling	  options	  in	  the	  community,	  the	  founders	  took	  matters	  into	  their	  own	  hands.	  From	  very	  humble	  beginnings	  in	  1995	  with	  only	  eight	  students	  and	  seven	  teachers,	  enrollment	  14	  years	  later	  in	  2009	  had	  grown	  to	  809	  students	  with	  70	  teachers.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  outside	  community’s	  incremental	  interest	  and	  confidence	  in	  the	  school,	  beginning	  in	  the	  2003/04	  school	  year,	  enrollment	  applications	  outnumbered	  available	  space	  and	  some	  applicants	  were	  declined	  admittance.	  In	  2009,	  more	  than	  80	  students	  were	  turned	  away.	  The	  school	  is	  large,	  with	  six	  grades,	  and	  each	  grade	  comprised	  of	  four	  classes;	  previously,	  there	  had	  been	  40	  students	  in	  each	  class.	  However,	  a	  recent	  policy	  initiated	  for	  the	  2006−07	  school	  year	  reduced	  the	  maximum	  number	  of	  students	  to	  32	  per	  class.	  For	  the	  2009−10	  academic	  year’s	  incoming	  students,	  costs72	  included	  a	  monthly	  tuition	  fee	  of	  US$29	  (Rp	  300,000),	  a	  one-­‐time	  facilities	  fee	  of	  US$392	  (Rp	  4,000,000),	  and	  a	  yearly	  activities	  fee	  of	  US$65	  (Rp	  660,000).73	  	  This	  totals	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  The	  July	  1,	  2009	  exchange	  rate	  was	  used	  to	  calculate	  the	  U.S.	  dollar	  amounts.	  July	  is	  the	  month	  in	  which	  the	  2009−10	  school	  year	  began.	  Dollar	  amounts	  are	  rounded	  to	  the	  nearest	  whole	  amount.	  The	  activities	  fee	  is	  Rp	  60,000	  per	  month,	  but	  is	  presented	  as	  an	  annual	  fee	  so	  to	  be	  comparable	  to	  the	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  school	  fee,	  which	  is	  charged	  one	  time	  each	  year.	  The	  school	  year	  is	  11	  months.	  	  73	  In	  2009,	  the	  average	  monthly	  income	  in	  the	  Yogyakarta	  Region	  was	  US$118.85	  (Rp	  1,209,054)	  	  (PBS	  Statistics	  Indonesia	  2011:31).	  	  
	  




US$776	  for	  the	  first	  school	  year	  and	  US$384	  for	  the	  following	  school	  year.74	  While	  this	  annual	  tuition	  and	  fees	  is	  a	  third	  less	  expensive	  than	  Al	  Azhar	  31,	  it	  is	  still	  prohibitively	  expensive	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  population,	  given	  that	  the	  average	  monthly	  income	  in	  Jogja	  in	  2009	  was	  US$119	  (PBS	  Statistics	  Indonesia	  2011:31).	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  lacks	  the	  professional	  polish	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  31.	  The	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  complex	  is	  newer,	  with	  larger	  classrooms	  and	  more	  natural	  lighting	  as	  well	  as	  open	  outdoor	  space.	  Higher	  tuition	  and	  other	  fees	  certainly	  contribute	  to	  this	  difference	  in	  facilities.	  However,	  a	  marked	  difference	  can	  also	  be	  felt	  in	  the	  school	  leadership.	  At	  JSIT,	  the	  headmaster	  is	  a	  teacher,	  elected	  for	  a	  limited	  term.	  At	  Al	  Azhar,	  headmaster	  is	  a	  career	  position.	  Al	  Azhar	  31’s	  headmaster	  was	  a	  headmaster	  at	  two	  other	  campuses	  prior	  to	  starting	  her	  post	  in	  Jogjakarta	  when	  the	  school	  was	  founded.	  Her	  years	  of	  experience	  show	  in	  interactions	  with	  parents	  during	  meetings	  and	  events.	  	  However,	  as	  at	  Luqman,	  Al	  Azhar	  31’s	  two	  vice	  headmasters	  were	  selected	  from	  among	  the	  school’s	  teachers.	  These	  two	  women	  also	  carry	  a	  full	  load	  of	  teaching	  along	  with	  their	  administrative	  duties.	  The	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  headmaster	  lacks	  the	  public	  persona	  of	  a	  leader	  that	  comes	  with	  years	  of	  experience.	  Before	  becoming	  a	  religion	  teacher	  at	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  in	  2001,	  and	  then	  vice-­‐headmaster	  and	  finally	  headmaster	  in	  2004	  and	  2007,	  he	  worked	  office	  jobs	  at	  a	  research	  center	  and	  an	  Islamic	  community	  finance	  center	  (Baitul	  
Maal	  wa	  Tamil).	  At	  both	  schools,	  the	  headmasters	  were	  well	  respected	  by	  parents,	  staff,	  and	  teachers,	  and	  both	  administrations	  demonstrated	  high	  levels	  of	  dedication	  and	  attention	  towards	  their	  administrative	  responsibilities	  and	  students.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  As	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  is	  the	  oldest,	  largest,	  and	  most	  well-­‐known	  JSIT	  school	  in	  Jogja,	  its	  tuition	  is	  higher	  than	  any	  other	  JSIT	  school	  in	  the	  city.	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The	  Universal	  in	  Exacting	  Islam	  Like	  Al	  Azhar,	  JSIT	  schools	  are	  free	  from	  association	  with	  formal	  religious	  institutions,	  such	  as	  Muhammadiyah	  or	  NU,	  emboldening	  them	  to	  also	  claim	  that	  they	  teach	  a	  comprehensive,	  or	  universal,	  Islam.75	  JSIT	  leadership	  considers	  Islam	  to	  be	  larger	  than	  any	  religious	  organization.	  	  A	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  founder	  and	  board	  member	  explained:	  	  If	  we	  honestly	  look	  deeper	  into	  Islam,	  it’s	  not	  about	  the	  issues	  of	  groups	  (kelompok-­‐
kelompok)…	  Islam	  shouldn’t	  be	  trapped	  in	  something	  like	  that	  [debates	  about	  differences	  in	  rituals	  and	  practices]	  because	  [NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah]	  are	  merely	  organizations	  (organisasi)…It’s	  unfortunate	  if	  we	  let	  ourselves	  become	  stuck	  there	  [in	  debates].	  That’s	  what	  we	  teach	  the	  children.	  Islam	  is	  complete	  (utuh),	  so	  comprehensive	  (menyeluruh).	  	  (Interview	  with	  Ery	  Masruri,	  April	  8,	  2009)	  	  In	  classic	  Javanese	  reluctance	  and	  apology	  for	  any	  potentially	  critical	  comments,	  JSIT’s	  regional	  director	  for	  the	  Jogjakarta	  region	  continued	  along	  the	  same	  lines	  when	  he	  reasoned:	  Why	  can’t	  schools	  that	  use	  the	  label	  of	  Islam	  [NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  schools]…demonstrate	  how	  to	  become	  a	  Muslim?…	  Because	  perhaps	  religious	  matters	  at	  Muhammadiyah	  or	  even	  NU,	  forgive	  me	  if	  I	  am	  mistaken,	  are	  limited	  to	  the	  organizations’	  specific	  views	  (keMuhammadiyahan	  dan	  keNUan)….	  We	  don’t	  think	  it’s	  necessary	  to	  put	  forward	  an	  Islamic	  organization.	  We	  only	  put	  forward	  the	  values	  of	  Islam,	  the	  higher	  ones.	  (Interview	  with	  Jogja	  regional	  JSIT	  director,	  April	  1,	  2009)	  	  The	  JSIT	  schools,	  apparently,	  view	  differences	  in	  group	  practices	  as	  a	  source	  of	  contention,	  as	  does	  Al	  Azhar.	  	  Individuals	  not	  involved	  with	  JSIT	  schools	  independently	  suggested	  to	  me	  that	  the	  organization-­‐free/universal	  Islam	  approach	  was	  a	  marketing	  strategy	  more	  than	  anything	  else.	  Given	  that	  in	  urban	  areas	  the	  population	  is	  more	  fluid,	  with	  people	  from	  different	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  Although	  the	  JSIT	  is	  ideologically	  affiliated	  with	  the	  PKS	  and	  is	  run	  by	  PKS	  cadre	  members,	  the	  PKS	  is	  not	  a	  formal	  religious	  organization.	  However,	  their	  organization-­‐specific	  practices	  and	  philosophies	  regarding	  religious	  life	  make	  it	  similar	  to	  a	  religious	  organization	  rather	  than	  a	  political	  party.	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areas	  of	  the	  country	  moving	  in	  and	  out,	  a	  school	  can	  open	  up	  its	  consumer	  base	  by	  not	  claiming	  association	  with	  any	  particular	  religious	  group.	  These	  schools	  have	  become	  popular	  enough	  that,	  while	  it	  would	  be	  hard	  to	  prove,	  there	  may	  be	  truth	  to	  speculations	  that	  some	  non-­‐JSIT	  Islamic	  schools	  were	  only	  in	  it	  for	  the	  business.	  These	  schools	  were,	  as	  the	  accusations	  go,	  calling	  themselves	  integrated	  Islamic	  schools	  and	  charging	  expensive	  tuition	  fees,	  but	  were	  not	  really	  teaching	  the	  students	  how	  to	  be	  true	  Muslims.	  Money,	  not	  the	  Islamic	  character	  of	  the	  students,	  was	  the	  management’s	  priority.	  	  While	  being	  organization-­‐free	  may	  not	  have	  originally	  been	  a	  marketing	  strategy,	  it	  does	  have	  its	  advantages.	  One	  parent,	  a	  religion	  professor	  at	  the	  Islamic	  State	  University	  (UIN)	  in	  Jogja,	  admitted	  that	  he	  enrolled	  his	  son	  in	  an	  integrated	  Islamic	  school	  to	  prevent	  conflict	  with	  his	  rural,	  NU	  family	  members	  and	  friends:	  	  I	  prefer	  to	  send	  my	  son	  to	  an	  integrated	  Islamic	  school	  because	  I	  don’t	  have	  a	  choice.	  There	  is	  no	  NU	  school	  that	  has	  a	  good	  quality	  standard	  like	  I	  want…For	  me	  I	  prefer	  to	  send	  my	  children	  to	  an	  SIT	  rather	  than	  to	  Muhammadiyah	  because	  when	  I	  go	  to	  my	  village	  and	  my	  family	  there	  knew	  that	  my	  children	  were	  in	  a	  Muhammadiyah	  school,	  they	  would	  be	  very	  disappointed.	  But	  if	  I	  say	  that	  my	  children	  are	  in	  an	  integrated	  Islamic	  school,	  they	  don’t	  know	  what	  an	  integrated	  school	  is	  because	  they	  [the	  schools]	  are	  only	  in	  cities.	  (Interview	  with	  UIN	  professor,	  February	  2,	  2010)	  	  This	  parent’s	  enrollment	  choice	  was	  strategic	  in	  two	  ways.	  It	  provided	  his	  son	  a	  quality	  education	  (secular	  and	  religious)	  and	  avoided	  the	  disappointment	  of	  his	  NU	  family	  members.	  His	  stated	  reason	  for	  not	  sending	  his	  son	  to	  a	  Muhammadiyah	  school	  did	  not	  include	  a	  concern	  over	  his	  son	  learning	  Muhammadiyah	  rather	  than	  NU	  traditions.	  In	  fact,	  the	  man’s	  wife	  comes	  from	  a	  mixed	  background	  of	  both	  Muhammadiyah	  and	  NU	  traditions.	  Additionally,	  while	  he	  considers	  himself	  NU,	  he	  has	  quite	  pluralistic	  ideas	  about	  religion.	  He	  attributes	  these	  flexible	  attitudes	  towards	  Islam	  to	  having	  been	  exposed	  to	  multiple	  interpretations	  of	  the	  religion	  and	  forms	  of	  devotion	  through	  his	  academic	  studies	  as	  well	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as	  international	  travel	  to	  Canada,	  where	  he	  received	  a	  PhD	  in	  religious	  studies	  at	  McGill	  University.	  An	  NU	  friend	  aware	  of	  the	  PKS	  connection	  to	  JSIT	  schools	  warned	  this	  father	  that	  he	  was	  going	  to	  have	  to	  expunge	  his	  son	  of	  the	  “exclusive	  attitudes”	  taught	  at	  the	  SITs	  once	  his	  child	  graduated.	  The	  motivations	  for,	  and	  risks	  parents	  take	  in,	  enrolling	  their	  children	  in	  schools	  that	  don’t	  completely	  match	  their	  own	  religious	  perspectives	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  7.76	  Although	  his	  pluralistic	  attitudes	  regarding	  Islam	  are	  more	  in	  line	  with	  those	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  than	  JSIT	  schools,	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  was	  both	  too	  expensive	  and	  too	  far	  from	  this	  man’s	  home	  to	  be	  a	  viable	  schooling	  option.	  Unhindered	  by	  organization-­‐specific	  traditions,	  interpretations,	  and	  histories,	  JSIT	  views	  itself	  as	  positioned	  to	  teach	  students	  a	  purer	  form	  of	  Islam,	  the	  universally	  applicable	  Islam.	  The	  three	  interrelated	  components	  of	  JSIT’s	  conceptualization	  of	  a	  universal	  Islam	  are	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith-­‐based	  beliefs,	  standardized	  practices,	  and	  exacting	  adherence	  combine	  to	  create	  an	  exacting	  Islam.	  	  
Qur’an-­‐	  and	  Hadith-­‐based	  beliefs	  	   Parallel	  to	  Al	  Azhar,	  JSIT	  validates	  itself	  as	  a	  non-­‐partisan	  Islamic	  institution	  by	  confining	  their	  guiding	  religious	  texts	  to	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith,	  thus	  excluding	  historical	  and	  group	  specific	  texts	  and	  traditions.	  One	  of	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim’s	  three	  vice-­‐	  headmasters	  explained:	  So	  exactly	  why	  is	  there	  NU,	  Muhammadiyah?	  It’s	  actually	  just	  interpretation.	  It’s	  like	  this—the	  actual	  original	  source	  [of	  Islam]	  is	  one	  thing,	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  the	  Hadith.	  Then	  beneath	  that	  sometimes	  there	  are	  ways	  of	  understanding	  different	  concepts	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  For	  a	  thorough	  discussion	  on	  the	  competing	  religious,	  educational,	  and	  political	  agendas	  of	  parents	  and	  SITs,	  see	  the	  unpublished	  2011	  master’s	  thesis	  by	  Benita	  K.	  Chudleigh	  (2011).	  Educating	  for	  an	  Islamised	  Indonesia?	  Sekolah	  Islam	  Terpadu,	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  Studies,	  The	  Australian	  National	  University.	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and	  they	  are	  followed	  by	  many	  people.	  We	  do	  not	  want	  to	  distinguish	  between	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah.	  We	  just	  focus	  on	  Islam	  according	  to	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith.	  (Interview	  with	  a	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  vice-­‐headmaster,	  October	  5,	  2009)	  	  Rather	  than	  looking	  to	  an	  organization’s	  historical	  interpretations	  of	  particular	  issues	  or	  practices,	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  simplifies	  its	  focus	  to	  these	  most	  sacred	  texts	  of	  Islam.	  This	  prevents	  confusion	  and	  corruption	  of	  principles	  and	  rituals.	  	  	  That	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT’s	  weekly	  instruction	  time	  is	  devoted	  to	  the	  Qur’an	  demonstrates	  the	  school’s	  commitment	  to	  it.	  Depending	  on	  the	  grade,	  students	  spend	  between	  27−30%	  of	  their	  study	  hours	  each	  week	  on	  religious	  coursework	  (religion	  of	  Islam,	  reading	  and	  memorizing	  the	  Qur’an,	  and	  Arabic77).	  Two-­‐thirds	  of	  the	  religious	  curriculum	  centers	  on	  the	  Qur’an.	  Students	  spent	  four	  hours	  a	  week	  reading	  and	  memorizing	  the	  Qur’an.	  Grades	  one	  through	  three	  spent	  21%	  of	  their	  weekly	  class	  time	  memorizing	  and	  learning	  to	  recite	  the	  Qur’an;	  grades	  four	  and	  five	  spent	  17%,	  and	  grade	  six	  spent	  15%.	  For	  grades	  one	  through	  five,	  more	  time	  was	  spent	  each	  week	  on	  the	  Qur’an	  than	  on	  any	  other	  single	  subject.	  In	  grade	  six,	  mathematics	  becomes	  the	  only	  class	  that	  students	  study	  for	  an	  equal	  number	  of	  hours	  as	  the	  Qur’an.	  Graduation	  requirements	  at	  JSIT	  schools	  include	  the	  memorization	  of	  two	  chapters	  of	  the	  Qur’an,	  as	  opposed	  to	  one	  chapter	  at	  Al	  Azhar	  schools.78	  	  This	  significant	  amount	  of	  time	  spent	  on	  the	  Qur’an	  is	  the	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  contributing	  factors	  to	  the	  length	  of	  JSIT	  school	  day,	  next	  to	  time	  spent	  performing	  sholat.	  General	  state	  schools	  in	  Indonesia	  release	  students	  at	  noon.	  Muhammadiyah	  schools	  go	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  Since	  Arabic	  is	  the	  language	  in	  which	  the	  Qur’an	  is	  written,	  the	  purpose	  of	  studying	  Arabic	  is	  to	  become	  fluent	  in	  the	  language	  of	  the	  Qur’an.	  Arabic	  is	  generally	  considered	  part	  of	  the	  religious	  curriculum.	  	  78	  Both	  schools	  require	  the	  31st	  chapter	  of	  the	  Qur’an,	  and	  SITs	  require	  the	  30th	  chapter.	  The	  selection	  of	  these	  chapters	  is	  strategic	  and	  pragmatic—these	  are	  the	  shortest	  chapters	  in	  the	  Qur’an.	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until	  1	  p.m.,	  due	  to	  their	  religious	  curriculum.	  Al	  Azhar	  extends	  the	  school-­‐day	  hours	  until	  two	  in	  the	  afternoon.79	  SITs	  extend	  the	  school	  day	  until	  4:00	  in	  the	  afternoon,	  offering	  what	  they	  describe,	  in	  English,	  as	  “full-­‐day	  schools.”	  Classes	  end	  at	  3:30,	  and	  then	  students	  perform	  the	  afternoon	  sholat	  before	  starting	  after-­‐school	  clubs	  and	  activities	  or	  returning	  home.	  	  	   While	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT	  schools	  both	  highlight	  their	  use	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith	  as	  part	  of	  their	  universal	  Islam,	  their	  use	  of	  it	  is	  different.	  Al	  Azhar	  focuses	  on	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith,	  the	  common	  denominator	  among	  all	  traditions,	  so	  as	  not	  to	  promote	  one	  variation	  or	  form	  of	  practice	  over	  another	  at	  the	  schools,	  thus	  honoring	  other	  practices,	  or	  at	  least	  refraining	  from	  claiming	  one	  set	  of	  practice	  to	  be	  better	  than	  another.	  In	  contrast,	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  claims	  loyalty	  to	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith	  in	  order	  to	  both	  discredit	  practices	  they	  see	  as	  having	  added	  to	  these	  foundational	  sources	  and	  to	  champion	  one	  standardized	  form	  of	  practices	  they	  claim	  comes	  directly	  from	  these	  sources.	  	  	  
Standardized	  practices	  	   In	  line	  with	  the	  current	  transnational	  Islam	  trend,	  JSIT	  schools	  promote	  what	  Roy	  (2004)	  refers	  to	  as	  a	  “deculturalized”	  Islam.	  Transnational	  Islam	  is	  revivalist	  as	  well	  as	  purificationist,	  seeking	  to	  establish	  social	  and	  religious	  practices	  of	  the	  Prophet	  Muhammad	  and	  his	  close	  companions	  (Roy	  2004).	  Consequently,	  the	  focus	  on	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith	  is	  intended	  to	  replace	  localized	  Islam	  with	  the	  original	  form	  of	  Islamic	  practices.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  Throughout	  Indonesia’s	  primary	  schools,	  the	  younger	  grades	  end	  the	  school	  day	  earlier	  than	  the	  upper	  grades.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  simplicity	  during	  the	  discussion,	  the	  lower	  grades	  are	  not	  included.	  Consequently,	  these	  hours	  are	  for	  the	  upper	  grades.	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A	  founder	  and	  board	  member	  of	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  expounded	  upon	  the	  situation	  in	  Indonesia:	  We	  know	  that	  Islam	  in	  Indonesia	  is	  contaminated	  by	  the	  culture	  or	  local	  customs	  (adat)	  that	  exist	  in	  Indonesia.	  So	  it	  seems	  some	  of	  Islam	  has	  become	  ambiguous	  or	  Islamic	  identity	  has	  become	  unclear	  among	  Muslims	  because	  the	  Islam	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Islam	  of	  local	  culture	  (budaya	  lokal)	  have	  been	  intermixed…Maybe	  we	  want	  to	  say	  we	  want	  to	  standardize	  (menstandarisasikan)	  a	  common	  and	  modern	  Islam,	  that’s	  not	  too	  contaminated	  (yang	  kontaminsasinya	  tidak	  terlalu	  banyak)…if	  there	  are	  adjustments,	  they	  should	  be	  the	  peripheral	  (cabang-­‐cabang),	  not	  the	  core	  (utama)	  of	  it.	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  founder,	  April	  19,	  2010)	  	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  pluralism	  of	  Al	  Azhar,	  which	  allows	  for	  local	  influence	  on	  forms	  of	  practice,	  JSIT	  schools’	  universal	  Islam	  aims	  to	  be	  free	  of	  context	  or	  custom.	  It	  strives	  to	  be	  the	  original	  form	  of	  Islam	  shedding	  layers	  of	  interpretations	  and	  regional	  contextualization.	  While	  this	  founder	  acknowledged	  that	  “contamination”	  of	  religion	  with	  the	  local	  culture	  is	  unavoidable,	  he	  argued	  that	  these	  schools	  aim	  to	  teach	  a	  purer	  form	  of	  Islam.	  A	  standardized	  Islam	  is	  an	  Islam	  that	  is	  uniform	  in	  core	  practice	  regardless	  of	  time,	  place,	  or	  organization.	  A	  “modern”	  Islam	  therefore	  indicates	  some	  kind	  of	  adaptation	  to	  the	  current	  era	  and	  location.	  Rather	  than	  a	  standardized,	  deculturalized	  approach,	  Al	  Azhar	  promotes	  a	  multi-­‐tradition	  form	  of	  practice.	  In	  contrast,	  JSIT	  expects	  consistency	  in	  their	  specific	  forms	  of	  practice	  and	  standards	  regardless	  of	  context.	  	  	   Ironically,	  as	  JSIT	  leaders	  decry	  the	  negative	  aspects	  of	  religious	  organizations,	  JSIT	  is	  institutionalizing	  their	  own	  specific	  form	  of	  worship	  through	  their	  schools.	  Indonesians	  often	  view	  JSIT-­‐cum-­‐PKS’	  very	  specific	  approach	  to	  Islam	  as	  if	  it	  is	  a	  distinct	  religious	  approach.	  In	  many	  professional	  and	  casual	  conversations	  alike,	  people	  discussed	  NU,	  Muhammadiyah,	  and	  the	  PKS	  as	  if	  they	  were	  equivalent	  categories,	  each	  with	  their	  own	  distinct	  way	  of	  practicing	  Islam.	  It	  seems	  that	  a	  main	  difference	  in	  JSIT	  leadership’s	  minds	  is	  that	  they	  consider	  themselves	  to	  be	  implementing	  the	  higher,	  universal	  standards	  of	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Islam,	  rather	  than	  locally	  contextualized,	  and	  thus	  contaminated,	  forms	  of	  Islam	  found	  in	  Indonesia’s	  mainstream	  religious	  organizations.	  This	  paradox	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  a	  later	  section	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  	  	  
Exacting	  adherence	  The	  plurality	  of	  practices	  honored	  in	  the	  flexible	  Islam	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  is	  replaced	  in	  JSIT	  by	  the	  conviction	  that	  a	  specific	  approach	  to	  Islam	  leads	  to	  the	  most	  devout	  development	  of	  believers	  and	  Muslim	  society.	  Devotional	  practices	  are	  taught	  and	  expected	  to	  be	  performed	  in	  a	  very	  particular	  manner.	  Turning	  to	  additional	  excerpts	  of	  the	  conversation	  presented	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  chapter,	  Ery,	  the	  school	  founder	  and	  Consortium	  Chairman,	  described	  this	  exacting	  approach.	  He	  used	  the	  phrase	  “integrated	  Islam”	  to	  refer	  to	  JSIT’s	  approach	  to	  teaching	  Islam	  as	  well	  as	  their	  specific	  practice	  of	  religion:	  	  So	  issues	  that	  are	  part	  of	  our	  fundamental	  bond	  with	  God,	  they	  become	  non-­‐negotiable	  (harga	  mati).	  And	  maybe	  that’s	  what’s	  considered	  strict	  (ketat).	  Perhaps	  one	  could	  say	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  is	  fundamentalist	  (fundamentalis)	  in	  terms	  of	  bonds	  with	  God,	  very	  fundamentalist.	  For	  example,	  the	  issue	  of	  covering	  aurat,	  clothing.	  Later	  you	  can	  see	  it	  in	  our	  schools.	  For	  our	  students,	  because	  of	  the	  obligation	  provided	  by	  Islam	  that	  a	  woman	  (seorang	  wanita)	  should	  cover	  her	  aurat	  by	  wearing	  the	  hijab,	  that’s	  a	  non-­‐negotiable,	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  examinable	  benefits,	  social	  benefits,	  benefits	  of	  security	  (keamanan)	  for	  women,	  the	  glory	  of	  women,	  protection	  (penjagaannya),	  honor.	  The	  more	  women	  wear	  the	  hijab,	  the	  more	  they	  will	  be	  honored,	  free	  from	  the	  abuses	  of	  negative	  attitudes.	  It	  [veiling]	  is	  set	  in	  stone	  (harga	  mati).	  Maybe	  people	  will	  say	  integrated	  Islam	  is	  orthodox	  (ortodoks),	  integrated	  Islam	  is	  fundamental	  (fundamental).	  Because	  why?	  Because	  if	  there	  is	  a	  female	  student	  wearing	  clothing	  and	  then	  it	  reveals	  this	  (dibuka	  ininya)	  [pointing	  to	  his	  lower	  forearm],	  well,	  she’ll	  get	  reprimanded.	  The	  small	  hijab	  is	  not	  allowed	  (nggak	  boleh).	  The	  hijab	  should	  cover	  this	  [indicating	  the	  chest].	  (Interview	  with	  Ery	  Masruri,	  October	  21,	  2009)	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  According	  to	  Ery,	  not	  only	  is	  veiling	  required,	  but	  a	  very	  specific	  form	  of	  veiling,	  which	  includes	  a	  certain	  dress	  code	  for	  women	  and	  girls.	  He	  explicitly	  rejects	  the	  small	  hijab	  and	  long-­‐sleeved	  tops	  that	  could	  accidently	  expose	  the	  forearm.	  As	  he	  sees	  it,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  one	  binds	  oneself	  to	  God	  cannot	  be	  negotiated;	  they	  are	  set	  in	  stone.	  This	  straightforward	  approach	  is	  connected	  to	  highly	  specific	  methods	  of	  performance	  and	  implementation.	  Those	  who	  regulate	  their	  behavior	  within	  these	  parameters	  become	  the	  recipients	  of	  particular	  desirable	  benefits,	  such	  as	  personal	  safety,	  as	  well	  as	  social	  honor	  from	  the	  larger	  society.	  	  	   As	  Rinaldo	  (2008)	  purports,	  the	  PKS	  women’s	  style	  of	  the	  hijab	  (Muslim	  dress)	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  express	  individual	  identities,	  but	  rather	  a	  particular	  pious	  habitus,	  and	  is	  stylistically	  different	  than	  that	  worn	  by	  most	  Indonesian	  women.	  The	  female	  PKS	  dress	  code	  is	  a	  loose	  hijab	  that	  drapes	  over	  the	  shoulder	  and	  down	  the	  front	  and	  back	  with	  loose	  tunics,	  long	  skirts,	  and	  heavy	  socks;	  they	  adorn	  themselves	  with	  little	  jewelry	  and	  or	  makeup,	  as	  they	  believe	  Islam	  prohibits	  too	  much	  display.	  While	  there	  is	  a	  wide	  continuum	  of	  Islamic	  dress	  in	  Indonesia,	  the	  mainstream	  veiling	  practices	  and	  busana	  Muslim	  (mainstream	  Indonesian	  style	  of	  Islamic	  dress)	  include	  what	  Ery	  would	  consider	  a	  “small	  hijab”—a	  hijab	  that	  generally	  covers	  the	  hair,	  but	  does	  not	  always	  drape	  over	  the	  shoulders,	  nor	  does	  it	  fully	  extend	  below	  the	  chest.	  It	  is	  often	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tucked	  in	  to	  the	  collar	  of	  the	  woman’s	  blouse	  or	  tied	  and	  styled	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  show	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  neck.	  Most	  Muslim	  women	  wearing	  the	  “small	  hijab”	  also	  wear	  a	  mix	  of	  Western	  and	  Islamic	  clothing,	  including	  pants,	  rather	  than	  only	  skirts.	  The	  PKS	  woman’s	  distinct	  clothing	  practices	  mark	  the	  women	  as	  pious,	  but	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  piety	  than	  the	  “more	  interpretive	  versions	  of	  Islam,	  which	  allow	  for	  more	  flexibility	  in	  clothing	  practices”	  (Rinaldo	  2008:32).	  Rinaldo	  continues	  to	  note	  that	  these	  clothing	  practices	  represent	  an	  orientation	  toward	  something	  new	  and	  different	  in	  Indonesia;	  they	  hearken	  to	  the	  Middle	  East,	  but	  do	  not	  fully	  imitate	  it.	  	  School	  uniforms	  of	  female	  JSIT	  personnel	  fall	  in	  line	  with	  this	  PKS	  dress	  style.	  Among	  students,	  pants	  are	  not	  allowed	  except	  during	  gym	  class;	  however,	  the	  student	  hijab	  is	  not	  as	  long.	  Again,	  according	  to	  Rinaldo	  (2008),	  PKS	  dress	  codes	  for	  men	  are	  less	  distinguishable	  from	  other	  Indonesian	  men.	  However,	  at	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  and	  other	  SITs,	  unlike	  most	  Indonesian	  men,	  males	  often	  wear	  collarless	  shirts,	  pants	  hemmed	  above	  the	  ankle,	  a	  peci,	  or	  brimless,	  tight-­‐fitting	  cap,	  and	  sport	  facial	  hair.	  This	  style	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  more	  in	  line	  with	  how	  the	  Prophet	  Mohammed	  dressed.	  Ery	  did	  not	  consider	  all	  aspects	  of	  Islam	  taught	  at	  SITs	  to	  be	  so	  “strict”	  or	  “fundamental”	  as	  the	  dress	  code.	  Ery,	  in	  continuation	  of	  the	  opening	  conversation	  of	  this	  chapter,	  mentioned	  the	  school’s	  open	  interactions	  with	  Westerners	  and	  non-­‐Muslims	  as	  an	  example:	  In	  other	  aspects	  we	  aren’t	  [fundamental]—in	  terms	  of	  violence,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  non-­‐Muslims.	  We	  are	  determined	  that	  our	  community	  service—such	  as	  once	  a	  year	  if	  there	  are	  disaster	  victims,	  we	  don’t	  distinguish	  between	  Muslims,	  Christians.	  For	  example,	  Karen,	  as	  a	  non-­‐Muslim	  woman,	  we	  welcomed	  you.	  Our	  children,	  I	  think,	  were	  not	  negative...They	  didn’t	  reflect	  anti-­‐non-­‐Muslim	  attitudes.	  That’s	  not	  fundamental,	  anti-­‐Western,	  right?	  In	  fact,	  they’re	  very	  open.	  But	  the	  things	  that	  are	  very	  principled,	  such	  as	  prayer,	  the	  basic	  forms	  of	  human	  devotion	  to	  God,	  that’s	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when	  we	  are	  very	  strict.	  But	  in	  terms	  of	  relationships	  with	  human	  beings,	  we’re	  open.	  (Interview	  with	  Ery	  Masruri,	  October	  21,	  2009)	  	  Ery	  distinguishes	  acts	  of	  devotion	  and	  social	  interactions	  as	  two	  distinct	  aspects	  of	  one’s	  religious	  life	  that	  are	  regulated	  differently.	  Acts	  that	  demonstrate	  one’s	  level	  of	  devotion	  to	  God,	  such	  as	  the	  performance	  of	  prayer	  or	  style	  of	  dress,	  are	  not	  open	  to	  variation.	  One’s	  relationship	  with	  God	  requires	  strict	  observance	  to	  highly	  regulated	  activities	  they	  have	  determined	  to	  be	  Islamic,	  which	  often	  eliminate	  practices	  that	  other	  Muslims	  think	  of	  as	  Islamic,	  but	  that	  the	  JSIT	  perspective	  considers	  to	  be	  Indonesian.	  However,	  he	  believes	  interaction	  with	  others	  to	  not	  be	  so	  restricting.	  Individuals	  are	  free	  to	  interact	  with	  believers	  and	  non-­‐believers.	  This	  openness	  was	  fortuitous	  for	  me,	  as	  a	  non-­‐Muslim	  researcher.	  	  However,	  how	  one	  interacts	  with	  others,	  in	  particular	  with	  the	  opposite	  sex,	  regardless	  of	  religious	  affiliation,	  is	  highly	  regimented	  at	  the	  schools.	  While	  both	  genders	  work	  together	  within	  the	  same	  school,	  social	  interaction	  is	  regulated	  and	  physical	  contact	  between	  men	  and	  women	  is	  restricted	  to	  blood	  relatives.	  Men	  and	  woman	  are	  not	  to	  be	  alone	  in	  the	  same	  room	  together.	  This	  became	  quite	  evident	  to	  me,	  as	  school	  protocol	  on	  my	  second	  visit	  required	  a	  male	  office	  assistant	  to	  join	  my	  interview	  with	  one	  of	  the	  male	  vice-­‐headmasters,	  since	  the	  only	  available	  space	  was	  not	  in	  an	  open	  public	  space.	  While	  most	  teacher	  interviews	  took	  place	  in	  the	  small	  library	  where	  other	  staff	  members	  were	  perennially	  present,	  on	  one	  rainy	  afternoon	  several	  months	  into	  my	  research	  at	  the	  school,	  I	  interviewed	  a	  male	  teacher	  alone.	  We	  sat	  on	  the	  floor	  of	  a	  small	  second-­‐floor	  office	  with	  the	  door	  intentionally	  left	  wide	  open,	  as	  if	  inviting	  public	  view	  to	  be	  the	  third	  participant.	  For	  students,	  male−female	  interactions	  are	  taught	  through	  both	  curricular	  content	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discussed	  within	  the	  classrooms	  as	  well	  as	  through	  school	  policy.	  Male	  and	  female	  students	  are	  segregated	  into	  their	  own	  classrooms	  beginning	  at	  grade	  four,	  the	  grade	  during	  which	  some	  children	  enter	  puberty.	  However,	  when	  classes	  are	  small,	  such	  as	  Saturday	  morning	  study	  sessions	  or	  some	  classes	  at	  Abu	  Bakar	  Junior	  High,	  practicality	  calls	  for	  gender	  mixed	  classes.	  	  In	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  interactions	  of	  faculty	  and	  staff,	  men	  and	  women	  do	  not	  shake	  hands	  or	  make	  any	  kind	  of	  physical	  contact.	  Eye	  contact	  between	  men	  and	  women	  is	  often	  avoided	  or	  infrequent.	  As	  a	  woman	  conducting	  my	  research	  with	  male	  informants	  at	  the	  school,	  communication	  was	  often	  strained,	  as	  these	  men	  distanced	  themselves	  from	  me	  physically,	  made	  inconsistent	  eye	  contact,	  and	  were	  reluctant	  to	  socialize	  with	  me.	  If	  standing	  while	  talking,	  men	  would	  often	  stand	  to	  my	  side	  with	  a	  gap	  between	  us,	  rather	  than	  standing	  directly	  in	  front	  of	  me.	  Female	  teachers,	  though,	  were	  generally	  quite	  friendly	  with	  me.	  	  In	  many	  conversations	  I	  observed	  among	  the	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  staff,	  there	  was	  little	  eye	  contact	  between	  the	  two	  genders.	  While	  male	  and	  female	  teachers	  did	  show	  warmth	  towards	  each	  other,	  I	  never	  observed	  physical	  contact	  between	  the	  genders.	  During	  meetings,	  men	  and	  women	  grouped	  themselves	  and	  sat	  with	  a	  distance	  between	  the	  groups,	  even	  if	  it	  was	  a	  small	  gathering	  around	  a	  single	  table.	  Being	  consistent	  with	  this	  standard,	  the	  Minister	  of	  Information,	  Communications	  and	  Technology,	  a	  PKS	  member,	  has	  been	  quite	  vocal	  regarding	  appropriate	  male−female	  interactions—so	  much	  so	  that	  he	  was	  heavily	  mocked,	  via	  posts	  on	  social	  networking	  sites,	  when	  he	  was	  unintentionally	  filmed	  clasping	  Michelle	  Obama’s	  hand	  as	  she	  and	  President	  Obama	  were	  visiting	  dignitaries	  during	  their	  visit	  to	  Indonesia	  in	  2010	  (Jakarta	  Post	  2010).	  Although	  he	  tweeted	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that	  Mrs.	  Obama	  had	  thrust	  her	  hand	  in	  his	  and	  he	  had	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  shake	  her	  hand,	  a	  simple	  viewing	  of	  the	  short	  clip	  suggests	  otherwise.	  	  Modern	  technologies	  seem	  to	  be	  acceptable	  tools	  to	  mediate	  this	  physical	  restriction	  on	  male−female	  interactions.	  Dating,	  or	  men	  and	  women	  spending	  time	  together	  alone	  before	  marriage,	  is	  considered	  inappropriate.	  Generally,	  a	  couple	  is	  to	  have	  chaperoned	  visits,	  and	  if	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  connection,	  a	  wedding	  is	  arranged,	  often	  within	  a	  few	  months.	  One	  of	  the	  female	  office	  staff	  had	  told	  me	  about	  the	  matchmaking	  agency	  she	  had	  signed	  up	  with	  to	  facilitate	  this	  process	  of	  not	  only	  finding	  a	  possible	  match,	  but	  also	  providing	  chaperoning	  services.	  While	  physical	  interactions	  are	  restricted,	  texting	  each	  other,	  at	  least	  as	  a	  sixth-­‐grade	  male	  teacher	  explained	  it	  to	  me,	  was	  completely	  acceptable.	  Texting	  is	  the	  most	  common	  form	  of	  cell	  phone	  communication	  in	  Indonesia,	  as	  calling	  is	  extremely	  expensive.	  	  Social	  networking	  sites	  are	  also	  in	  use.	  In	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  interview	  during	  which	  an	  additional	  staff	  member	  was	  asked	  to	  join	  us	  in	  the	  secluded	  room,	  for	  example,	  the	  vice-­‐headmaster	  casually	  commented	  on	  looking	  at	  my	  Facebook	  profile.	  He	  inquired	  if	  the	  location	  of	  a	  particular	  hiking	  trip	  of	  which	  I	  had	  posted	  photos	  had	  been	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  In	  another	  instance,	  a	  male	  teacher	  who	  wished	  to	  give	  me	  a	  book	  of	  compiled	  talks,	  one	  of	  which	  discussed	  SIT’s	  teaching	  philosophies,	  offered	  to	  pass	  it	  along	  to	  me	  at	  a	  local	  mall,	  as	  he	  did	  not	  teach	  at	  the	  school	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  We	  arranged	  the	  meeting	  via	  text	  messages.	  To	  my	  surprise	  and	  initial	  confusion,	  after	  greeting	  me	  at	  the	  mall,	  he	  congratulated	  me	  on	  having	  won	  a	  BMW.	  Apparently,	  from	  what	  I	  understood,	  he	  had	  googled	  my	  name	  and	  a	  found	  an	  announcement	  about	  a	  Karen	  Bryner	  winning	  a	  car	  for	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having	  the	  highest	  sales	  at	  her	  company.80	  These	  men’s	  unabashed	  use	  of	  the	  Internet	  to	  gather	  personal	  information	  on	  me	  felt	  inconsistent	  with	  their	  rigid	  maintenance	  of	  physical	  distance	  and	  interaction	  as	  we	  talked.	  The	  use	  of	  technology,	  it	  seems,	  is	  an	  appropriate	  way	  to	  communicate	  with,	  and	  find	  information	  about,	  the	  opposite	  sex.	  	  In	  contrast,	  at	  the	  Al	  Azhar	  31,	  ways	  of	  wearing	  the	  veil	  and	  male−female	  interactions	  are	  not	  restricted.	  The	  children	  are	  not	  separated	  into	  classes,	  and	  mixed-­‐gender	  groups	  are	  a	  part	  of	  in-­‐class	  activities.	  While	  some	  male	  teachers	  did	  not	  opt	  to	  shake	  my	  hand,	  it	  was	  due	  to	  personal	  choice	  rather	  than	  school-­‐wide	  practice.	  One-­‐on-­‐one	  interviews	  with	  male	  teachers	  were	  not	  considered	  objectionable,	  and	  male	  and	  female	  teachers	  alike	  were	  social	  and	  friendly	  with	  me.	  During	  meetings,	  men	  and	  women	  often	  grouped	  themselves,	  but	  it	  seemed	  to	  be	  not	  out	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  propriety	  as	  much	  as	  simply	  common	  practice.	  	  
The	  Paradox	  of	  Universal	  and	  Exacting	  Islam	  The	  universal	  Islam	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  promotes	  is	  expected	  to	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  bless	  all	  of	  humanity	  and	  requires	  an	  exacting	  and	  disciplined	  practice.	  The	  public	  often	  perceives	  this	  exacting	  and	  mono-­‐traditional	  practice	  of	  Islam	  to	  be	  exclusive,81	  a	  label	  that	  JSIT	  leadership	  does	  not	  welcome.	  This	  exclusivity	  is	  often	  discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  attitudes	  of	  superiority	  towards	  other	  Islamic	  traditions	  and	  well	  as	  other	  religions.	  In	  our	  final	  interview,	  I	  asked	  Ery	  about	  the	  school’s	  reputation	  for	  being	  exclusive.	  He	  responded:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  After	  our	  conversation,	  I	  returned	  home	  and	  googled	  my	  name.	  	  I	  found	  a	  Karen	  Bryner	  in	  Missouri	  who	  had	  managed	  a	  BMW	  Championship	  Gold	  Tournament	  in	  2008.	  	  81	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  is	  also	  often	  labeled	  as	  exclusive,	  but	  in	  the	  economic	  rather	  than	  ideological	  sense,	  to	  which	  the	  leadership	  does	  not	  object.	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When	  an	  institution	  has	  strong	  character,	  certainly	  people	  on	  the	  outside	  will	  see	  the	  institution	  as	  exclusive.	  But	  when	  they	  enter	  it,	  they	  will	  see	  that	  it	  is	  not	  exclusive.	  I	  think	  Miss	  Karen	  could	  confirm	  this.	  Miss	  Karen,	  how	  did	  you	  find	  us?	  Would	  you	  assess	  us	  as	  exclusive?	  (Interview	  with	  Ery	  Masruri,	  May	  5,	  2010)	  	  After	  agreeing	  that	  people	  had	  been	  open	  with	  me,	  I	  hesitantly	  and	  with	  a	  bit	  of	  trepidation	  also	  replied	  that,	  in	  all	  honesty,	  at	  times	  I	  had	  felt	  alien,	  and	  while	  teachers	  and	  staff	  had	  perhaps	  not	  been	  suspicious	  of	  me	  (which	  I	  actually	  felt	  many	  had	  been,	  but	  in	  following	  Javanese	  custom	  did	  not	  say	  it	  directly),	  several	  had	  been	  hesitant	  to	  talk	  with	  me.	  He	  responded	  that	  it	  was	  only	  natural,	  given	  I	  was	  a	  foreigner	  and	  a	  researcher,	  that	  I	  should	  receive	  a	  lot	  of	  attention	  and	  that	  people	  be	  curious	  as	  to	  why	  I	  was	  there.	  But	  he	  then	  assured	  me	  that	  after	  the	  novelty	  of	  a	  foreigner	  had	  worn	  off,	  certainly	  their	  hesitations	  had	  subsided	  and	  interactions	  were	  not	  strained.	  	  I	  however,	  did	  not	  feel	  that	  way.	  To	  clarify,	  the	  many	  female	  teachers	  (most	  male	  teachers	  avoided	  informal	  conversation	  out	  propriety)	  were	  warm	  and	  welcoming	  towards	  me.	  I	  was	  invited	  by	  a	  few	  different	  teachers	  to	  participate	  in	  social	  activities.	  I	  spent	  an	  enjoyable	  Saturday	  afternoon	  with	  a	  married	  couple,	  both	  of	  whom	  taught	  at	  the	  school,	  and	  their	  children.	  My	  research	  assistant	  and	  I	  were	  invited	  several	  times	  to	  the	  home	  of	  a	  teacher	  who	  lived	  near	  the	  beach;	  unfortunately,	  timing	  prevented	  us	  from	  accepting	  the	  invitations.	  The	  male	  English	  teacher	  shared	  with	  me	  a	  magazine	  geared	  towards	  introducing	  children	  to	  English	  that	  he	  was	  in	  the	  last	  stages	  of	  finalizing	  before	  releasing	  the	  first	  edition.	  He	  invited	  me	  to	  be	  a	  guest	  in	  the	  correspondence	  section.	  Additionally,	  Ery	  and	  all	  but	  one	  foundation	  board	  member	  were	  unguarded	  and	  open	  with	  me,	  a	  couple	  accommodated	  several	  interviews,	  and	  always	  did	  what	  they	  could	  to	  facilitate	  my	  research.	  However,	  interactions	  with	  the	  school	  administration	  were	  often	  vaguely	  strained	  and	  many	  teachers	  kept	  their	  distance.	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Although	  the	  administration	  cooperated	  with	  me,	  there	  was	  often	  a	  sense	  of	  wariness.	  Certainly	  as	  a	  researcher,	  I	  was	  an	  imposition,	  requiring	  their	  time	  for	  interviews	  as	  well	  as	  time	  to	  schedule	  interviews	  with	  teachers	  and	  classroom	  observations.	  At	  the	  school,	  I	  felt	  restricted	  in	  my	  contact	  with	  teachers	  and	  my	  movement	  throughout	  the	  school.	  In	  contrast	  to	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  where	  I	  was	  allowed	  to	  approach	  the	  teachers	  for	  interviews	  and	  classroom	  observations,	  the	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  administration	  managed	  the	  logistics.	  Additionally,	  during	  structured	  group	  interviews	  with	  grade-­‐four	  and	  -­‐six	  students,	  the	  administration,	  after	  approving	  a	  revised	  list	  of	  interview	  questions,	  required	  a	  teacher	  to	  be	  present	  during	  interviews.	  These	  may	  have	  been	  standard	  protocol	  procedures	  for	  researchers;	  however,	  I	  often	  felt	  an	  underlying	  sense	  of	  caution	  towards	  me	  as	  well.	  	  The	  presence	  of	  a	  researcher	  at	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  was	  common.	  I	  was	  once	  shown	  the	  guestbook	  cataloguing	  previous	  researchers	  and	  their	  projects.	  Numerous	  Indonesian	  university	  students	  (nationwide,	  a	  senior	  thesis	  often	  based	  on	  original	  research	  is	  an	  undergraduate	  graduation	  requirement)	  and	  a	  few	  other	  foreigners	  (for	  example,	  a	  master’s	  student	  from	  Japan	  looking	  at	  child	  health)	  had	  come	  before	  me.	  However,	  these	  research	  projects	  were	  most	  commonly	  conducting	  one-­‐time	  parent	  surveys,	  faculty	  interviews,	  or	  a	  few	  weeks	  of	  observations.	  I,	  in	  contrast,	  given	  my	  anthropological	  research	  methods	  for	  an	  extensive	  doctoral	  study,	  was	  the	  first	  researcher	  to	  stay	  over	  a	  five-­‐month	  period.	  I	  had	  hoped	  that	  over	  time	  my	  relationships	  with	  the	  administration	  would	  become	  less	  formal.	  Once	  in	  a	  while	  there	  would	  be	  a	  casual	  conversation,	  but	  most	  interactions	  were	  administrative	  in	  nature.	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In	  fairness,	  aside	  from	  being	  an	  imposition	  on	  the	  time	  of	  the	  administration,	  the	  ambiguity	  towards	  me	  that	  I	  sensed	  from	  them	  could	  have	  been	  in	  part	  due	  to	  their	  lack	  of	  information	  regarding	  my	  research.	  Not	  until	  the	  last	  month	  of	  my	  time	  at	  the	  school	  did	  it	  come	  to	  my	  attention	  that	  the	  vice-­‐headmasters	  had	  never	  seen	  the	  research	  project	  description	  and	  plan	  I	  had	  submitted	  to	  the	  headmaster	  when	  I	  first	  came	  to	  the	  school.	  The	  headmaster	  was	  regularly	  busy	  with	  duties	  outside	  of	  the	  school.	  Consequently,	  the	  vice-­‐headmasters,	  who	  were	  not	  present	  in	  my	  first	  meeting	  with	  the	  headmaster,	  were	  asked	  to	  work	  with	  me	  and	  accommodate	  my	  requests	  without,	  it	  seems,	  a	  full	  explanation	  of	  my	  research	  or	  timeframe.	  After	  presenting	  the	  vice-­‐headmasters	  with	  my	  proposal,	  we	  created	  a	  plan	  for	  my	  remaining	  time	  for	  the	  completion	  of	  my	  data	  collection.	  Once	  the	  plan	  was	  approved	  and	  in	  place,	  the	  strain	  with	  the	  administration	  lessened.	  When	  I	  started	  concentrated	  interviews	  with	  teachers	  in	  the	  last	  month	  of	  my	  time,	  I	  was	  not	  required	  to	  submit	  my	  interview	  questions	  for	  approval,	  as	  was	  common	  procedure.	  However,	  as	  much	  as	  I	  wished	  I	  could	  have	  interpreted	  the	  general	  sense	  of	  wariness	  from	  the	  administration	  and	  some	  teachers	  as	  shyness	  or	  curiosity,	  I	  hesitantly	  conveyed	  to	  Ery	  that	  my	  initial	  feelings	  had	  not	  fully	  dissipated	  during	  my	  time	  there.	  Additionally,	  those	  feelings	  were	  not	  isolated	  to	  just	  me,	  a	  foreigner.	  I	  relayed	  the	  experience	  of	  my	  research	  assistant,	  a	  Muslim	  woman	  from	  East	  Java	  working	  on	  her	  master’s	  degree,	  whom	  Ery	  had	  met	  previously.	  During	  her	  first	  visit	  to	  the	  school,	  she	  had	  also	  felt	  a	  bit	  alien	  and	  perceived	  school	  personnel	  to	  not	  been	  as	  polite	  (a	  huge	  Javanese	  offense)	  as	  she	  had	  expected.	  I	  also	  mentioned	  to	  Ery	  that	  she	  had	  thought	  this	  treatment	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was	  possibly	  due	  to	  her	  wearing	  of	  a	  smaller	  headscarf.82	  In	  response,	  he	  forthrightly	  asserted	  that:	  When	  we	  enter	  into	  a	  community	  or	  society	  that	  should	  be	  equal	  to	  ours	  but	  it	  turns	  out	  to	  hold	  to	  a	  higher	  ethical	  standard	  (standar	  etika	  yang	  lebih	  tinggi),	  we	  feel	  guilty	  (bersalah)	  there.	  Automatically,	  we	  feel	  like	  we	  are	  being	  watched,	  whereas	  as	  the	  people	  in	  the	  community	  are	  not	  watching	  us,	  even	  though	  we	  feel	  like	  they	  are.	  (Interview	  with	  Ery	  Masruri,	  May	  5,	  2010)	  	  Ery	  argued	  that	  an	  individual’s	  sense	  of	  acceptance	  is	  negatively	  affected	  when	  one	  encounters	  a	  community	  with	  “higher	  ethical	  standards”	  or	  that	  is	  morally	  superior	  to	  her	  own.	  This	  reasoning	  assumes	  that	  an	  individual	  entering	  the	  community	  would	  automatically	  recognize	  the	  community’s	  value	  system,	  or	  piety,	  as	  “better,”	  not	  simply	  different.	  In	  other	  words,	  Ery	  viewed	  the	  standards	  at	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  to	  be	  normative,	  rather	  than	  relative.	  There	  was	  no	  consideration	  that	  the	  individual	  may	  feel	  completely	  comfortable	  with	  her	  standards,	  yet	  simultaneously	  uncomfortable	  with	  simply	  encountering	  something	  unfamiliar	  or	  different.	  Holding	  people	  to	  a	  higher	  standard	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  appearing	  exclusive	  to	  others.	  The	  above	  incident	  highlights	  the	  complex	  relationship	  between	  maintaining	  “higher	  ethical	  standards”	  and	  providing	  a	  welcoming	  atmosphere	  to	  people	  who	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  adhere	  to	  or	  share	  those	  standards.	  	  Ery	  outlined	  how	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  is	  not	  exclusive:	  	  If	  there	  are	  people	  who	  feel	  the	  school	  is	  exclusive,	  it’s	  because	  they	  don’t	  know	  it	  [the	  school]	  yet.	  From	  the	  aspect	  of	  politics	  or	  political	  background,	  we	  have	  nearly	  all	  the	  leading	  parties	  here…	  So	  from	  the	  aspect	  of	  political	  parties,	  we	  are	  not	  exclusive.	  From	  the	  aspect	  of	  individual	  character,	  we	  are	  also	  not	  exclusive	  because	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  there	  are	  those	  [parents]	  that	  probably	  only	  perform	  20%	  of	  Islamic	  laws	  (hokum	  Islam).	  There	  are	  others	  that	  do	  10%,	  50%,	  70%;	  everybody	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  Her	  experience	  was	  so	  uncomfortable	  that	  she	  did	  not	  want	  to	  return	  to	  the	  school.	  	  So	  when	  I	  requested	  that	  she	  pick	  up	  some	  data	  a	  few	  months	  after	  her	  initial	  visit,	  she	  brought	  along	  a	  friend—another	  young,	  similarly	  veiled	  Muslim	  woman	  with	  an	  NU	  background.	  This	  second	  woman	  relayed	  to	  me	  that	  although	  she	  had	  been	  skeptical	  of	  the	  reality	  of	  her	  friend’s	  discomfort	  and	  perceived	  treatment	  by	  the	  school	  staff,	  she	  too	  had	  felt	  judged	  and	  uncomfortable	  during	  her	  brief	  stop	  at	  the	  school.	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comes	  here.	  There	  are	  those	  who	  wear	  the	  hijab;	  there	  are	  those	  that	  don’t.	  (Interview	  with	  Ery	  Masruri,	  May	  5,	  2010)	  	  Regarding	  school	  membership,	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  does	  welcome	  Muslims	  from	  all	  political	  and	  religious	  affiliations	  and	  levels	  of	  devotion.	  This	  argument	  echoes	  Ery’s	  previous	  line	  of	  reasoning	  that	  the	  school	  is	  not	  fundamental	  in	  that	  it	  does	  not	  forbid	  interactions	  with	  non-­‐Muslims.	  	  There	  is	  an	  unacknowledged	  difference,	  however,	  between	  accepting	  enrollment	  of	  individuals	  who	  hold	  to	  different	  religious	  and	  political	  backgrounds	  (and	  granting	  permission	  to	  a	  non-­‐Muslim	  to	  conduct	  research)	  and	  teaching	  a	  higher	  standard	  that	  does	  not	  equally	  value	  those	  various	  forms	  of	  practices	  and	  beliefs.	  Although	  parents	  may	  “only	  perform	  20%	  of	  Islamic	  law,”	  students	  are	  taught	  and	  expected	  to	  perform	  100%.	  Although	  Ery	  assured	  me	  I	  could	  observe	  women	  at	  school	  picking	  up	  students	  or	  attending	  events	  who	  did	  not	  veil,	  during	  my	  five	  months	  of	  regular	  visits	  to	  the	  school,	  I	  never	  once	  observed	  an	  unveiled	  woman.	  I	  myself	  was	  requested	  to	  veil	  and	  dress	  appropriately	  after	  my	  first	  visit.83	  There	  is	  a	  sign	  at	  the	  entrance	  of	  the	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  school	  courtyard	  which	  reminds	  visitors	  to	  “Please	  dress	  appropriately	  (Harp	  sesuaikan	  pakaian	  Anda).”	  It	  is	  implied	  that	  dressing	  appropriately	  for	  women	  is	  veiling	  and	  fully	  covering	  their	  arms	  and	  legs.	  Below	  this	  sign	  is	  another	  reminding	  guests	  that	  the	  area	  is	  a	  “non-­‐smoking	  area	  (kawasan	  bebas	  rokok).”	  	  JSIT	  leadership	  teaches	  students	  not	  to	  smoke	  and	  forbids	  faculty	  from	  smoking,	  and	  expects	  the	  same	  of	  its	  guests.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  On	  my	  first	  visit,	  I	  was	  not	  asked	  to	  veil.	  But	  once	  I	  was	  approved	  to	  conduct	  my	  research	  at	  the	  school,	  I	  was	  requested	  to	  veil	  and	  dress	  appropriately	  as	  I	  was	  going	  to	  be	  seen	  on	  the	  campus	  regularly	  and	  visiting	  classrooms.	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  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  some	  parents,	  it	  can	  easily	  be	  argued	  that	  there	  is	  institutional	  pressure	  on	  students	  and	  parents	  to	  conform	  to	  these	  “higher	  standards.”	  One	  mother,	  a	  Muhammadiyah	  female	  activist	  who	  had	  enrolled	  her	  son	  in	  the	  school	  upon	  her	  return	  with	  her	  family	  after	  completing	  a	  master’s	  degree	  in	  Australia,	  was	  unaware	  of	  the	  school’s	  approach	  to	  Islam	  at	  the	  time	  of	  enrollment.	  She	  eventually	  became	  concerned	  with	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  school	  on	  her	  son	  due	  to	  comments	  he	  began	  making	  at	  home.	  She	  disapproved	  of,	  among	  other	  things,	  the	  school’s	  “exclusive	  manner”,	  which	  she	  described	  through	  the	  following	  comment.	  	  For	  example	  the	  way	  they…take	  clothing.	  [They	  say,]	  “Islamic	  dress	  can’t	  be	  like	  this.	  The	  most	  Islamic	  way	  to	  dress	  isn’t	  like	  that.”	  I	  mean,	  you	  can’t	  say	  this	  is	  the	  most	  Islamic	  way	  [to	  dress],	  [meaning]	  the	  way	  they	  dress.	  (Interview	  with	  former	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  mother	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  activist,	  February	  9,	  2010).	  	  	  This	  mother	  disagreed	  with	  teachings	  on	  distinguishing	  between	  Islamic	  and	  un-­‐Islamic	  practices.	  An	  interesting	  discussion	  arises	  as	  to	  why,	  if	  parents	  disagree	  with	  some	  of	  the	  school’s	  teaching,	  they	  do	  not	  enroll	  their	  children	  in	  other	  schools.	  This	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  chapter	  7.	  	  	  Another	  mother’s	  experience	  with	  the	  school’s	  influence	  on	  her	  personal	  journey	  with	  veiling	  illustrates	  how	  some	  mothers	  perceived	  the	  school’s	  expectations	  to	  be	  less	  flexible	  than	  Ery	  explained.	  While	  this	  experience	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  much	  less	  common	  among	  mothers,	  it	  does	  demonstrate	  the	  pressure	  one	  can	  feel	  to	  conform	  to	  school	  standards.	  A	  mother	  of	  three	  relayed	  that	  she	  only	  began	  veiling	  because:	  	  It’s	  obligatory	  to	  veil	  if	  you	  want	  to	  meet	  with	  the	  teacher,	  to	  get	  the	  report	  cards	  and	  so	  on.	  Or	  if	  I	  met	  the	  teacher	  on	  the	  street,	  I’d	  be	  uncomfortable	  not	  wearing	  the	  
hijab…	  so	  when	  at	  school	  I	  would	  veil,	  but	  outside	  of	  the	  school	  I	  wouldn’t.	  Then	  I	  thought,	  why	  bother?...	  So	  finally,	  I	  just	  started	  wearing	  it	  all	  of	  the	  time.	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  mother,	  December	  23,	  2009)	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This	  mother	  admitted,	  after	  confirming	  I	  would	  not	  share	  the	  information	  with	  the	  school,	  that	  her	  primary	  interest	  in	  the	  school	  had	  not	  been	  religion,	  but	  rather	  the	  individualized	  attention	  her	  children	  would	  receive	  from	  the	  teachers.	  Her	  oldest	  child’s	  negative	  experience	  with	  teachers	  in	  state	  general	  schools	  motivated	  her	  to	  find	  a	  different	  schooling	  option	  for	  her	  two	  younger	  children.	  Although	  she	  did	  not	  feel	  more	  religious	  after	  veiling	  daily	  for	  two	  years,	  she	  did,	  in	  accordance	  with	  Ery’s	  claim	  of	  personal	  benefits	  to	  veiling	  for	  women,	  feel	  safer	  on	  the	  streets	  because	  men	  did	  not	  bother	  her	  like	  they	  had	  when	  she	  did	  not	  veil.	  At	  first	  her	  husband,	  who	  lives	  in	  another	  city,	  objected	  to	  her	  veiling,	  but	  seeing	  the	  benefits	  had	  since	  accepted	  her	  practice.	  However,	  he	  expressly	  told	  her	  he	  did	  not	  want	  her	  to	  wear	  a	  large	  hijab.	  While	  the	  school	  expects	  women	  to	  veil,	  and	  PKS	  activists	  and	  JSIT	  teachers	  veil	  in	  a	  very	  specific	  style	  (Rinaldo	  2008),	  the	  school	  does	  not	  attempt	  to	  enforce	  this	  specific	  style	  on	  the	  mothers	  and	  female	  visitors.	  Although	  I	  never	  observed	  a	  mother	  unveiled,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  veils	  were	  “small,”	  and	  in	  general,	  mothers	  wore	  pants	  rather	  than	  skirts.	  There	  were	  actually	  very	  few	  mothers	  who	  veiled	  in	  the	  same	  style	  as	  the	  teachers.	  I	  never	  detected	  a	  sense	  of	  discomfort	  among	  the	  mothers	  for	  veiling	  differently	  than	  the	  female	  staff.	  Perhaps,	  as	  Ery	  said	  in	  reference	  to	  my	  research	  assistant’s	  uncomfortable	  experience,	  this	  woman	  had	  come	  to	  know	  the	  school	  and	  did	  not	  feel	  uncomfortable	  or	  consider	  it	  to	  be	  an	  exclusive	  place	  even	  though	  they	  implemented	  what	  Ery	  perceived	  to	  be	  a	  lower	  standard	  of	  veiling.	  Concerns	  of	  exclusivity	  regarding	  JSIT	  schools	  from	  non-­‐JSIT	  communities	  also	  extended	  to	  attitudes	  towards	  other	  religions.	  In	  a	  few	  conversations	  I	  had	  with	  different	  Indonesian	  scholars,	  I	  was	  asked	  about	  anti-­‐Christian	  attitudes.	  They	  wondered,	  since	  they	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perceived	  PKS	  to	  be	  exclusive	  and	  anti-­‐Christian,	  if	  I	  had	  seen	  any	  of	  such	  sentiments	  at	  the	  PKS-­‐linked	  school.	  I	  never	  experienced	  or	  witnessed	  any	  anti-­‐Christian	  activities	  or	  attitudes.	  However,	  on	  a	  smaller	  scale,	  I	  did	  observe	  and	  experience	  two	  forms	  of	  exclusive	  thought	  towards	  Christianity	  and	  other	  religions	  through	  “superiority	  discourse”	  (Niyozov	  &	  Memon	  2011),	  which	  favored	  Muslims	  over	  followers	  of	  other	  religions.	  	  During	  student	  interviews,	  I	  witnessed	  one	  instance	  and	  was	  told	  of	  another	  where	  teachers	  made	  direct	  hierarchical	  distinctions	  between	  Muslims	  and	  Christians	  and	  Islam	  and	  other	  religions.	  In	  a	  structured	  interview	  with	  grade-­‐four	  students,	  I	  had	  asked	  the	  question,	  “In	  your	  opinion,	  can	  a	  non-­‐Muslim	  be	  a	  good	  person?”	  As	  other	  students	  were	  answering,	  the	  chaperoning	  teacher,	  sitting	  one	  student	  away	  from	  me,	  spoke	  into	  the	  ear	  of	  the	  student	  next	  to	  him,	  saying,	  “But	  Muslims	  are	  better.”	  The	  boy	  slightly	  uncomfortably	  replied	  when	  it	  was	  his	  turn	  to	  respond,	  “But	  the	  best	  are	  Muslims	  (Tapi	  yang	  terbaik	  yang	  
Muslim)”	  (Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  grade-­‐four	  boys,	  December	  3,	  2009).	  In	  another	  interview	  with	  grade-­‐six	  girls,	  a	  student	  expressed	  why	  she	  wanted	  to	  attend	  a	  state	  junior	  secondary	  school	  upon	  graduating	  from	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT.	  In	  her	  opinion,	  the	  school	  was	  “way	  too	  Islamic;	  other	  [religions]	  are	  less	  important.	  Other	  religions	  are,	  like,	  looked	  down	  on	  (terlalu	  Islam	  sekali	  jadi	  yang	  lain	  agak	  di	  bawah.	  Agama	  yang	  lain	  itu	  kayak	  direndahkan)”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  grade-­‐six	  girls,	  December	  2,	  2009).	  	  While	  these	  types	  of	  attitudes	  were	  not	  regularly	  expressed	  in	  my	  presence,	  they	  do	  indicate	  a	  presence	  at	  some	  level.	  This	  section	  demonstrates	  how	  encouraging	  observance	  of	  higher	  standards	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  appearing	  exclusive	  or	  promoting	  superiority	  discourses	  towards	  “others”,	  be	  it	  other	  forms	  within	  a	  religion	  or	  other	  religions.	  	  The	  vision	  of	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  and	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JSIT	  leaders	  to	  “give	  birth”	  to	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  school	  that	  promotes	  a	  more	  “strict”	  Islam	  challenges	  the	  status	  quo.	  Consequently,	  resistance	  and	  accusations	  of	  exclusivity	  are	  to	  be	  expected.	  As	  those	  unfamiliar	  with	  the	  schools	  come	  to	  know	  them,	  as	  Ery	  suggests,	  they	  will	  be	  able	  to	  make	  more	  informed	  assessments.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  As	  opposed	  to	  Al	  Azhar’s	  vision	  of	  managing	  a	  peaceful	  society	  through	  respect	  of	  various	  forms	  of	  Islam,	  JSIT	  intends	  to	  create	  a	  new	  type	  of	  believer	  that	  will	  in	  turn	  bring	  about	  a	  more	  pious	  society	  and	  great	  blessings	  to	  the	  country.	  Echoing	  Maududi’s	  argument	  that	  the	  pious	  family	  units	  in	  society	  create	  a	  Muslim	  ummah	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  colonial	  powers,	  the	  JSIT	  intends	  to	  contribute	  to	  PKS’	  plan	  to	  comprehensively	  transform	  corrupt	  and	  secular	  Indonesia	  into	  a	  pious	  Muslim	  nation	  by	  giving	  birth	  to	  a	  new	  educational	  institution	  teaching	  universal	  Islamic	  practices.	  JSIT’s	  conceptualization	  of	  universal	  Islam	  is	  comprised	  of	  three	  components,	  namely	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith-­‐based	  beliefs,	  standardized	  practices,	  and	  exacting	  adherence.	  These	  interrelated	  components	  come	  together	  to	  create	  an	  exacting	  Islam.	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith-­‐based	  beliefs	  allow	  the	  schools	  to	  stay	  free	  of	  local	  religious	  organizations’	  practices.	  This	  also	  enables	  the	  promotion	  of	  the	  original	  form	  of	  Islam	  as	  explained	  in	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith,	  shedding	  layers	  of	  interpretation	  and	  regional	  contextualization.	  Based	  on	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith,	  Islam	  can	  be	  standardized,	  uniform	  in	  core	  practice,	  regardless	  of	  time,	  place,	  or	  organization.	  These	  standardized	  devotional	  practices	  are	  taught	  and	  expected	  to	  be	  performed	  in	  a	  very	  particular	  manner.	  The	  ways	  in	  which	  one	  binds	  oneself	  to	  God	  cannot	  be	  negotiated.	  The	  promotion	  of	  exacting	  adherence	  comes	  from	  the	  leadership’s	  conviction	  that	  a	  specific	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approach	  to	  Islam	  leads	  to	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  personal	  development	  of	  believers	  and	  of	  society.	  	  While	  the	  schools	  welcome	  all	  types	  of	  individuals	  from	  various	  political	  and	  religious	  backgrounds,	  they	  simultaneously	  expect	  personnel,	  students,	  and	  ideally	  community	  members	  to	  live	  the	  “higher	  standards”	  they	  promote.	  These	  higher	  standards	  (specific	  ways	  to	  dress,	  regulated	  ways	  of	  interaction	  with	  the	  opposite	  sex,	  or	  memorizing	  significant	  portions	  of	  the	  Qur’an,	  for	  example)	  are	  ways	  to	  bind	  individuals	  to	  God.	  JSIT,	  as	  demonstrated	  through	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT,	  hopes	  Muslims	  will	  strive	  to	  become	  a	  particular	  brand	  of	  believers	  who	  demonstrate	  devotion	  through	  disciplined	  observance	  of	  Islam.	   While	  both	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT	  make	  similar	  claims	  to	  promote	  universal	  Islam,	  they	  promote	  different	  kinds	  of	  universal	  Islam	  for	  different	  purposes	  and	  with	  different	  aims.	  Both	  claim	  to	  be	  organization-­‐free	  and	  focus	  solely	  on	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith	  as	  sources	  of	  doctrine.	  At	  Al	  Azhar,	  that	  serves	  to	  create	  a	  common	  base	  and	  sponsors	  an	  attitude	  that	  honors	  multiple	  traditions,	  showing	  no	  preference	  of	  one	  group’s	  forms	  of	  ritual	  and	  practice	  over	  another.	  The	  school	  group	  teaches	  a	  foundation	  in	  general	  Islamic	  values	  and	  basic	  duties	  and	  practices	  that	  can	  be	  adapted	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  contexts	  and	  accommodate	  multi-­‐tradition	  practices.	  For	  JSIT,	  being	  universal	  and	  organization-­‐free	  means	  they	  intend	  to	  be	  free	  of	  specific	  local	  cultural	  practices,	  and	  expect	  consistency	  in	  their	  standardized	  mono-­‐traditional	  practices	  and	  standards	  regardless	  time	  or	  space.	  Ironically,	  by	  being	  so	  specific	  in	  how	  Islam	  is	  to	  be	  practiced,	  JSIT	  schools	  are	  institutionalizing	  a	  form	  of	  practice.	  This	  form	  of	  practice	  is	  in	  line	  with	  PKS	  ideology	  and	  therefore,	  the	  JSIT	  schools	  are	  part	  of	  the	  ongoing	  process	  of	  institutionalizing	  PKS’s	  Islamic	  practices.	  	  
	  	  
139	  







Students’	  Trajectories	  in	  Religious	  Subjectivities	  
	  
	   I	  first	  learned	  of	  Michael	  Jackson’s	  death	  as	  I	  perused	  The	  Jakarta	  Post	  while	  waiting	  to	  be	  ushered	  in	  for	  an	  interview.	  I	  do	  not	  know	  how	  his	  death	  affected	  elementary	  school	  children	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  but	  those	  at	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  and	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  seemed	  to	  have	  Michael	  Jackson	  on	  the	  brain.	  Many	  of	  the	  students	  were	  far	  more	  familiar	  with	  his	  music	  than	  I	  was—and	  I	  was	  in	  grade	  five	  when	  Thriller	  was	  released.	  One	  morning	  at	  Al	  Azhar	  31,	  when	  fielding	  questions	  in	  a	  grade-­‐three	  class,	  I	  was	  asked	  about	  Michael	  Jackson	  and	  somehow	  ended	  up	  demonstrating	  the	  moonwalk.	  At	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim,	  a	  large	  group	  of	  grade-­‐three	  boys	  spontaneously	  pulled	  me	  into	  singing	  “Heal	  the	  World”	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  crowded	  courtyard	  during	  recess.	  A	  grade-­‐six	  girl	  was	  easily	  encouraged	  by	  her	  friends	  to	  sing	  her	  repertoire	  of	  Michael	  Jackson	  songs	  as	  we	  rode	  in	  a	  rented	  bus	  through	  rural	  dirt	  roads	  to	  a	  village	  where	  the	  students	  would	  witness	  the	  donation	  and	  slaughter	  of	  two	  cows	  and	  three	  sheep,	  provided	  by	  parents	  from	  the	  school,	  to	  poor	  villagers	  as	  part	  of	  Eid	  al-­‐Adha.84	  One	  day	  after	  the	  daily	  school-­‐wide	  sholat,	  as	  teachers	  and	  students	  were	  putting	  away	  their	  prayer	  shawls	  and	  heading	  to	  back	  to	  classrooms	  to	  eat	  lunch,	  two	  younger	  girls	  shyly	  approached	  me	  and	  asked,	  “Miss,	  what	  does	  ‘Just	  beat	  it’	  mean?”	  I	  remain	  perplexed	  at	  the	  familiarity	  these	  students	  had	  with	  the	  “King	  of	  Pop.”	  However,	  the	  seamless	  movement	  between	  participating	  in	  religious	  and	  mundane	  activities	  demonstrates	  how	  religion	  is	  as	  common	  in	  their	  lives	  as	  pop	  culture,	  and	  neither	  are	  mutually	  exclusive.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Eid	  al-­‐Adha	  is	  a	  holiday	  that	  celebrates	  the	  obedience	  of	  Abraham	  for	  his	  willingness	  to	  sacrifice	  his	  son	  Ishmael,	  before	  an	  angel	  intervened	  and	  provided	  a	  sheep	  for	  the	  sacrifice.	  It	  is	  customary	  for	  those	  who	  have	  the	  resources	  to	  donate	  animals	  to	  poor	  communities	  who	  ceremonially	  slaughter	  the	  animals	  and	  then	  distribute	  the	  meat	  among	  the	  community.	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Students	  from	  both	  schools	  were	  fully	  immersed	  in	  the	  mainstream	  urban	  Indonesian	  pop	  culture	  and	  lifestyle.	  They	  played	  video	  games	  after	  school,	  went	  to	  the	  mall	  with	  their	  families	  and	  to	  the	  movies	  if	  they	  could	  afford	  it.	  Many	  had	  cell	  phones—a	  few	  had	  BlackBerries—and	  Facebook	  accounts.	  Several	  students’	  Facebook	  profile	  pictures	  were	  of	  American	  pop	  stars,	  Disney	  cartoon	  princesses,	  or	  Japanese	  anime	  characters.	  Some	  students	  were	  verging	  on	  the	  childhood	  obesity	  that	  comes	  with	  the	  more	  sedentary	  lives	  and	  diets	  of	  urban	  consumerism.	  While	  versed	  in	  pop	  culture,	  the	  schooling	  experiences	  of	  the	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  school	  students	  varied	  greatly	  from	  their	  state-­‐schooled	  peers,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  Islamic	  school	  students,	  due	  to	  the	  unique	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology	  of	  the	  schools	  (see	  chapter	  6).	  While	  I	  did	  not	  observe	  or	  detect	  differences	  between	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  students’	  engagement	  with	  pop	  culture,	  there	  were	  some	  noticeable	  differences	  in	  their	  religious	  subjectivities.	  These	  findings	  supports	  Mahmood’s	  (2004)	  argument	  that	  within	  a	  particular	  movement,	  variation	  in	  personal	  piety	  develop	  out	  of	  “specific	  discursive	  formation”	  (120).	  This	  chapter	  explores	  the	  relationships	  between	  forms	  of	  schooling	  and	  forms	  of	  religious	  subjectivity.	  McLeod	  (2000),	  employing	  Bourdieu’s	  notions	  of	  “habitus”	  and	  “field,”	  argues	  that	  schools	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  “paradigmatic	  social	  fields…in	  which	  practices,	  discourses	  and	  ethos	  of	  particular	  kinds	  of	  schooling	  shape	  the	  dispositions	  and	  ways	  of	  being	  of	  young	  people”	  (503).	  Bourdieu	  viewed	  learned	  dispositions,	  which	  he	  calls	  habitus,	  to	  be	  “a	  system	  of	  lasting	  and	  transposable	  dispositions	  which,	  integrating	  past	  experiences,	  functions	  at	  every	  moment	  as	  a	  matrix	  of	  perceptions,	  appreciations	  and	  actions	  and	  makes	  possible	  the	  achievement	  of	  infinitely	  diversified	  tasks”	  (quoted	  in	  Bourdieu	  &	  Wacquant	  1992:18).	  Habitus	  is	  not	  simply	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  rules,	  but	  a	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dynamic	  sense	  of	  how	  to	  play	  the	  game	  (Erickson	  2011:30).	  Consequently,	  dispositions	  learned	  in	  school	  are	  applied	  to	  an	  array	  of	  settings	  outside	  of	  the	  institution.	  In	  application	  to	  this	  chapter,	  the	  varied	  forms	  of	  schooling	  seen	  at	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  (a	  more	  flexible	  Islam,	  focusing	  on	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  religion	  balanced	  with	  some	  basic	  principles	  so	  as	  to	  accommodate	  multi-­‐tradition	  practices	  of	  Islam)	  and	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  (an	  exacting	  Islam	  that	  values	  mono-­‐tradition	  practices,	  focusing	  on	  specific	  and	  more	  “correct”	  forms	  of	  practice	  that	  are	  not	  negotiable	  regardless	  of	  time	  or	  space)	  begin	  to	  shape	  varied	  forms	  of	  student	  subjectivities	  and	  set	  them	  in	  disparate	  trajectories	  for	  their	  full	  development.	  However,	  the	  process	  of	  developing	  subjectivity	  is	  not	  only	  acceptance	  of,	  but	  also	  reaction	  to,	  a	  school’s	  “practices,	  discourses	  and	  ethos”	  (McLeod	  2000:503).	  Acknowledging	  that	  subjectivity	  and	  habitus	  are	  formed	  and	  solidified	  over	  time	  (McLeod	  2000),	  this	  chapter	  does	  not	  offer	  an	  in-­‐depth	  discussion	  of	  the	  students’	  habitus,	  but	  rather	  a	  synchronic	  gaze	  into	  the	  religious	  inclinations	  these	  schools	  are	  shaping	  within	  their	  students.	  To	  explore	  students’	  religious	  subjectivities,	  I	  look	  at	  the	  prominence	  of	  religion	  in	  considerations	  of	  future	  education	  and	  career	  aspirations,	  as	  well	  as	  students’	  conceptualizations	  of	  a	  “good	  Muslim”	  and	  their	  moral	  subjectivity.	  I	  argue	  that	  these	  religious	  subjectivities	  of	  the	  students	  correlate	  with	  their	  schools’	  unique	  approaches	  to	  Islam.	  	  	  
Methods	  The	  data	  used	  to	  explore	  how	  the	  schools	  shape	  student	  subjectivities	  comes	  from	  structured	  small-­‐group	  interviews	  with	  students.	  Interviews	  were	  conducted	  at	  each	  school	  by	  gender	  and	  grade.	  Thirty-­‐three	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  students	  (18	  male	  and	  15	  female	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grade-­‐four	  students)	  and	  46	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  students	  (20	  male—8	  grade-­‐four	  and	  12	  grade-­‐six	  boys—and	  26	  female—13	  grade-­‐four	  and	  13	  grade-­‐six	  girls)	  participated.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  this	  research,	  grade	  four	  was	  the	  most	  senior	  grade	  at	  Al	  Azhar	  31;	  therefore,	  there	  were	  no	  grade-­‐six	  students	  to	  be	  interviewed.	  Within	  the	  analysis,	  age-­‐related	  differences	  in	  responses	  that	  emerged	  are	  discussed	  when	  appropriate.	  Some	  students	  did	  not	  respond	  to	  every	  question;	  therefore,	  in	  the	  following	  sections	  the	  total	  numbers	  of	  respondents	  to	  each	  of	  the	  questions	  are	  not	  equivalent.	  I	  interviewed	  Al-­‐Azhar	  students,	  pulled	  out	  of	  their	  computer	  class	  in	  groups	  of	  three	  to	  five,	  in	  an	  open,	  quiet,	  sunlit	  workspace	  outside	  of	  the	  computer	  lab.	  No	  school	  personnel	  were	  present	  during	  the	  interviews.	  The	  students	  may	  have	  conformed	  to	  a	  dominant	  personality	  in	  the	  group,	  but	  given	  the	  multiple	  group	  interviews	  (five	  for	  girls	  and	  six	  for	  boys),	  there	  was	  opportunity	  for	  different	  opinions	  to	  surface	  across	  groups.	  The	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  during	  recess	  in	  the	  small,	  poorly-­‐lit	  school	  counselor’s	  office,	  the	  office	  wall	  providing	  little	  barrier	  to	  the	  loud	  sounds	  of	  children	  taking	  advantage	  of	  their	  time	  to	  move	  around	  and	  socialize.	  For	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  interviews,	  a	  teacher	  or	  administrator	  was	  present,	  per	  the	  request	  of	  the	  school	  administration.	  These	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  in	  groups	  of	  six	  to	  eight	  students.	  I	  recognize	  that	  students	  may	  have	  felt	  pressure	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  opinions	  of	  their	  peers,	  or	  felt	  shy	  about	  expressing	  their	  own	  opinions	  due	  to	  the	  size	  of	  the	  group.	  Additionally,	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  teacher	  could	  have	  influenced	  the	  response	  of	  the	  students.	  However,	  if	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  it	  contributes	  to	  the	  observation	  that	  the	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  promotes	  heavy	  emphasis	  on	  conformity.	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   This	  chapter	  begins	  with	  a	  review	  of	  student	  responses	  to	  the	  following	  four	  questions:	  	  
• Where	  do	  you	  want	  to	  attend	  junior	  high	  school?	  	  
• What	  do	  you	  want	  to	  be	  when	  you	  grow	  up?	  
• What	  is	  a	  good	  Muslim	  like?	  
• Do	  you	  agree	  (setuju)	  with	  a	  woman	  (prempuan)	  leaving	  the	  house	  unveiled?	  	  A	  review	  of	  student	  responses	  to	  these	  questions	  provides	  material	  for	  discussing	  the	  correlation	  between	  the	  type	  of	  Islam	  taught	  at	  each	  school	  and	  the	  religious	  inclinations	  of	  their	  respective	  students.	  Students’	  responses	  to	  questions	  regarding	  future	  education	  and	  professions	  indicate	  that	  while	  some	  students	  from	  both	  schools	  desire	  a	  continued	  religious	  education,	  none	  of	  them	  aspire	  to	  religion-­‐oriented	  careers	  for	  themselves.	  Greater	  difference	  between	  schools	  was	  demonstrated	  by	  students’	  conceptualizations	  of	  piety,	  or	  what	  being	  a	  good	  Muslim	  looks	  like,	  and	  student	  tolerance	  and	  acceptance	  of	  a	  deviant	  religious	  behavior,	  as	  exemplified	  through	  a	  woman	  not	  veiling	  when	  in	  public.	  	  
 Secondary	  school	  preference	  	  	  To	  understand	  the	  prominence	  of	  religion	  in	  future	  schooling	  selection,	  I	  asked	  students	  where	  they	  planned	  to	  attend	  junior	  high	  school.	  	  In	  Jogja,	  the	  options	  for	  Islamic	  schools	  included	  Muhammadiyah	  secondary	  schools,	  vocational	  track	  madrasas,	  various	  pesantren,	  and	  Abu	  Bakar	  Integrated	  Islamic	  Junior	  and	  Senior	  Secondary	  School	  (known	  hereafter	  as	  Abu	  Bakar	  SIT).	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  founders	  established	  Abu	  Bakar	  SIT	  Junior	  High	  School	  in	  2001	  for	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  students	  matriculating	  to	  the	  junior	  secondary	  school	  level.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  research,	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  administration	  was	  talking	  of	  establishing	  a	  junior	  secondary	  school	  in	  2012	  for	  the	  first	  class	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  students	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matriculating	  to	  the	  junior	  high	  school	  level.85	  The	  provision	  of	  solid	  academics	  in	  an	  Islamic	  school,	  as	  offered	  at	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  and	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT,	  is	  less	  common	  at	  the	  secondary	  level.	  The	  dual	  attraction	  for	  parents	  (see	  chapter	  7)	  to	  these	  two	  primary	  schools	  was	  that	  they	  provided	  students	  with	  a	  strong	  foundation	  in	  the	  rituals	  and	  values	  of	  Islam	  as	  well	  as	  a	  solid	  academic	  background	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  their	  schooling	  trajectory,	  ending	  in,	  ideally,	  acceptance	  to	  top	  public	  or	  private	  universities.	  Islamic	  secondary	  schools,	  in	  general,	  do	  not	  rival	  state	  secondary	  schools	  in	  the	  way	  they	  do	  at	  the	  primary	  level.	  Therefore,	  parents	  and	  students	  are	  brought	  to	  a	  crossroads	  and	  must	  decide	  between	  high	  academic	  quality	  and	  continued	  religious	  schooling.	  The	  following	  discussion	  focuses	  first	  on	  grade-­‐six	  students	  at	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT,	  as	  their	  attendance	  in	  junior	  high	  was	  imminent,	  and	  then	  focuses	  on	  the	  grade-­‐four	  student	  responses	  from	  both	  schools.	  (See	  Figures	  2,	  3,	  and	  4	  for	  school	  preference	  by	  grade	  and	  school.)	  Somewhat	  unexpectedly,	  only	  about	  a	  third	  of	  grade-­‐six	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  students	  (nine	  out	  of	  26,	  six	  of	  whom	  were	  boys)	  wanted	  to	  continue	  their	  education	  at	  an	  Islamic	  school.	  Six	  of	  those	  nine	  students	  wanted	  to	  continue	  on	  to	  Abu	  Bakar	  SIT.	  The	  others	  wanted	  to	  go	  to	  a	  pesantren,	  or	  an	  Islamic	  boarding	  school,	  mostly	  to	  join	  an	  older	  sibling	  already	  in	  attendance	  there.	  There	  was	  a	  large	  gender	  difference	  in	  where	  students	  wanted	  to	  go:	  50%	  of	  boys	  wanted	  to	  attend	  a	  religious	  school	  while	  only	  21%	  of	  girls	  wanted	  the	  same.	  The	  boys	  were	  interested	  in	  an	  Islamic	  junior	  secondary	  school	  so	  as	  to	  “deepen	  their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  In	  2012,	  Al	  Azhar	  26,	  a	  junior	  secondary	  school,	  opened	  in	  Jogjakarta.	  	  
Figure 2. Luqman SIT 6th-Graders’ 













religion”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  grade-­‐six	  boys,	  December	  4,	  2009).	  One	  of	  two	  girls	  who	  wanted	  to	  attend	  Abu	  Bakar	  commented,	  “I	  want	  to	  go	  to	  [Abu	  Bakar].	  If	  my	  score	  is	  good	  enough,	  I	  could	  go	  to	  a	  state	  school.	  [But]	  at	  Abu	  Bakar	  I	  could	  	  continue	  to	  improve	  my	  Arabic	  and	  religion	  could	  become	  clearer…later	  if	  I	  meet	  Arab	  foreigners,	  I’d	  be	  able	  to	  speak	  Arabic	  with	  them”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  grade-­‐six	  girls,	  December	  2,	  2009).	  	  Nearly	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  the	  grade-­‐six	  students	  interviewed	  indicated	  that	  they	  hoped	  to	  transfer	  to	  a	  state	  general	  secondary	  school.	  These	  students	  were	  ready	  to	  forgo	  their	  Islamic	  schooling	  experience	  for	  continued	  academic	  development	  and	  new	  social	  experiences.	  More	  girls	  (79%)	  than	  boys	  (42%)	  were	  interested	  in	  state	  schools	  (11	  girls	  and	  five	  boys).	  One	  student	  remained	  undecided.	  Reasons	  for	  choosing	  a	  state	  school	  clustered	  by	  gender.	  Boys	  focused	  on	  academic	  excellence	  while	  girls	  placed	  more	  of	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  social	  experience.	  Many	  of	  the	  boys	  mentioned	  specific	  schools	  by	  name,	  stating	  they	  were	  “better”	  and	  “the	  best	  (favorit)	  in	  the	  city.”	  As	  one	  group	  of	  girls	  struggled	  to	  find	  the	  right	  way	  to	  express	  their	  motivations,	  a	  student	  finally	  explained	  their	  general	  sentiment,	  “Education	  at	  the	  state	  schools	  is	  more	  social	  (lebih	  mengarah	  ke	  sosial).	  At	  [Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT]	  it’s	  way	  too	  Islamic,	  so	  others	  are	  less	  important.	  Other	  religions	  are,	  like,	  looked	  down	  on	  (terlalu	  
Islam	  sekali	  jadi	  yang	  lain	  agak	  di	  bawah,	  agama	  yang	  lain	  itu	  kayak	  direndahkan).	  So	  we	  want	  to	  go	  to	  a	  state	  junior	  secondary	  school	  because	  we	  want	  to	  see	  what	  it’s	  like	  socially	  (ingin	  melihat	  sosialnya	  bagaimana)”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  grade-­‐six	  girls,	  December	  2,	  2009).	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This	  group	  of	  girls	  was	  looking	  for	  a	  less	  Islam-­‐centric	  approach	  to	  schooling	  as	  well	  as	  the	  social	  life	  they	  consider	  state	  schooling	  afforded.	  While	  it	  is	  unclear	  exactly	  what	  they	  meant	  by	  “more	  social,”	  co-­‐ed	  classrooms	  and	  less	  restricted	  association	  with	  the	  opposite	  sex	  are	  a	  likely	  a	  part	  of	  it.	  However,	  continuing	  on	  to	  Abu	  Bakar	  may	  be	  a	  reality	  for	  some	  despite	  their	  preference.	  As	  one	  girl	  put	  it,	  “The	  thing	  is	  that	  I’ve	  become	  bored	  at	  SIT.	  But	  it	  depends	  on	  my	  score.	  If	  my	  score	  is	  low,	  well,	  I’ll	  be	  at	  another	  SIT”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  grade-­‐six	  girls,	  December	  2,	  2009).	  While	  not	  her	  first	  choice,	  Abu	  Bakar	  was	  her	  backup	  plan.	  	  Grade-­‐six	  students	  showed	  a	  less	  varied	  interest	  in	  junior	  secondary	  school	  selection	  and	  less	  loyalty	  to	  their	  current	  schooling	  institutions	  than	  grade-­‐four	  students	  at	  both	  schools.	  Over	  a	  third	  of	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  grade-­‐four	  students	  expressed	  interest	  in	  continuing	  to	  Abu	  Bakar	  SIT	  or	  a	  pesantren	  while	  slightly	  more	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  students	  were	  interested	  in	  attending	  an	  Islamic	  school,	  preferably	  an	  Al	  Azhar	  junior	  secondary	  school	  if	  one	  were	  to	  be	  built.	  Fewer	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  students	  (15%)	  were	  interested	  in	  attending	  state	  schools	  than	  their	  grade-­‐four	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  peers	  (30%).	  Nearly	  double	  the	  percentage	  of	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  grade-­‐six	  students	  (59%)	  wanted	  to	  shift	  to	  a	  state	  school	  compared	  to	  the	  school’s	  grade-­‐four	  students	  (30%).	  	  
Figure 3. Luqman SIT 4th-Graders’ 





Figure 4. Al Azhar 31 4th-Graders’ 



















This	  large	  difference	  could	  indicate	  that	  older	  students	  may	  be	  more	  focused	  on	  academic	  excellence	  than	  younger	  students,	  and	  therefore	  focus	  on	  state	  schools.	  It	  could	  also	  be	  that	  the	  grade-­‐six	  students	  are	  more	  drawn	  to	  social	  settings	  or	  a	  learning	  environment	  different	  than	  those	  found	  at	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  or	  Abu	  Bakar	  SIT.	  Over	  a	  third	  of	  the	  grade-­‐four	  students	  from	  both	  schools	  were	  undecided.	  The	  academic	  reputation	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  junior	  secondary	  schools	  in	  Jakarta	  as	  some	  of	  the	  capital’s	  top	  schools	  may	  give	  confidence	  to	  Al	  Azhar	  students	  and	  parents	  in	  regards	  to	  attending	  the	  proposed	  Al	  Azhar	  junior	  high	  in	  Jogja.	  In	  contrast,	  Abu	  Bakar	  SIT	  does	  not	  compete	  with	  the	  state	  schools	  in	  Jogja	  for	  top	  ranking;	  this	  may	  explain	  Luqman	  la	  Hakim	  SIT	  students’	  greater	  interest	  in	  transferring	  to	  the	  state	  school	  system.	  As	  explained	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters,	  the	  Islamic	  training	  of	  these	  students	  is	  the	  value-­‐added	  aspect	  of	  these	  schools	  for	  most	  parents,	  not	  necessarily	  the	  primary	  attraction	  of	  the	  school.	  Most	  parents	  (see	  chapter	  7)	  expected	  a	  religious	  education	  at	  the	  primary	  level	  to	  form	  a	  solid	  moral	  foundation	  that	  would	  serve	  their	  children	  through	  their	  lives.	  Satisfied	  with	  their	  children’s	  religious	  education	  at	  the	  primary	  level,	  parents	  aspired	  to	  have	  their	  children	  attend	  top	  academic	  schools,	  even	  if	  it	  meant	  moving	  to	  a	  non-­‐religious	  school.	  As	  long-­‐term	  academic	  training	  is	  necessary	  for	  productive	  participation	  in	  the	  work	  force,	  academic	  training	  is	  not	  to	  be	  sacrificed	  for	  Islamic	  training.	  Most	  parents	  opt	  for	  top	  state	  schools	  when	  comparable	  Islamic	  schools	  are	  not	  available,	  such	  as	  the	  case	  in	  Jogja.	  However,	  for	  those	  students	  who	  do	  not	  qualify	  for	  the	  top	  state	  schools,	  the	  private	  Islamic	  system	  may	  be	  the	  backup	  plan.	  	  While	  one	  might	  expect	  secondary	  school	  choice	  to	  be	  primarily	  a	  parent’s	  decision,	  students	  seemed	  to	  be	  quite	  involved.	  Several	  of	  the	  Al	  Azhar	  girls	  were	  unsure	  and	  said	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they	  would	  defer	  to	  their	  parents.	  In	  general,	  however,	  the	  students	  voiced	  their	  opinions,	  with	  only	  a	  few	  from	  each	  school	  stating	  that	  their	  parents	  had	  already	  told	  them	  where	  they	  would	  be	  going.	  Indeed,	  during	  parent	  interviews,	  parents	  from	  both	  schools	  often	  commented	  on	  how	  the	  decision	  on	  where	  their	  children	  would	  attend	  junior	  secondary	  school	  would	  be	  up	  to	  the	  students.	  
Professional	  goals	  To	  understand	  the	  prominence	  of	  religion	  in	  students’	  career	  aspirations,	  I	  asked,	  “What	  do	  you	  want	  to	  be	  when	  you	  grow	  up?”	  The	  student	  responses	  demonstrated	  middle-­‐class	  preferences	  for	  careers	  that	  had	  no	  apparent	  connection	  to	  religion.	  Of	  the	  76	  students	  who	  responded	  (37	  boys	  and	  39	  girls),	  the	  most	  popular	  careers	  were	  medical	  professionals86	  (n=20),	  businesspersons	  and	  entrepreneurs	  (n=11),	  and	  professors	  (n=11).	  Over	  80%	  of	  those	  wanting	  to	  be	  in	  the	  medical	  profession	  were	  female,	  and	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  those	  females	  were	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  students.	  Only	  two	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  girls	  chose	  a	  traditional	  female	  occupation	  of	  midwife,	  while	  the	  rest	  wanted	  to	  be	  doctors	  of	  various	  sorts,	  dentists,	  and	  for	  one,	  to	  be	  “a	  pediatrician	  or	  a	  veterinarian.	  If	  a	  vet,	  I	  just	  want	  to	  help	  God’s	  creations”	  (Al	  Azhar	  31	  grade-­‐four	  girls,	  February	  19,	  2010,	  group	  1).	  There	  were	  more	  than	  four	  times	  the	  students	  at	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  who	  wanted	  to	  go	  into	  business	  than	  at	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  (six	  boys	  and	  three	  girls	  from	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  compared	  to	  two	  boys	  from	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT).	  A	  nearly	  equal	  interest	  was	  shown	  at	  both	  schools	  in	  becoming	  professors.	  However,	  at	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT,	  twice	  as	  many	  boys	  (five	  boys	  and	  two	  girls)	  were	  interested,	  and	  at	  Al	  Azhar	  31,	  four	  girls	  and	  no	  boys	  were	  interested	  in	  becoming	  professors.	  Outside	  of	  these	  three	  professions,	  writer,	  architect,	  pilot,	  and	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  Mostly	  doctors,	  dentists,	  veterinarians,	  and	  a	  couple	  of	  midwives.	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armed	  forces	  were	  also	  popular.	  Two	  boys	  at	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  mentioned	  the	  unexpected	  combination	  of	  professions	  of	  fashion	  designer	  and	  restaurant	  (rumah	  makan)	  owner.	  It	  would	  seem	  that	  they	  had	  talked	  about	  this	  previously,	  since	  the	  boys	  were	  in	  separate	  groups.	  	  Female	  student	  aspirations	  were	  generally	  not	  the	  “traditional”	  female	  careers.	  The	  majority	  of	  girls,	  35	  from	  both	  schools,	  hoped	  to	  be	  doctors,	  writers,	  professors,	  and,	  in	  a	  few	  cases,	  athletes	  and	  astronauts.	  One	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  student	  wanted	  to	  be	  a	  “doctor,	  scientist,	  a	  political	  expert,	  and	  minister”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  grade-­‐four	  girls,	  March	  11,	  2010)	  citing	  by	  name	  Sri	  Mulyani,	  the	  female	  finance	  minister,	  as	  an	  example.	  At	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT,	  only	  one	  girl	  wanted	  to	  be	  a	  primary	  school	  teacher	  and	  another	  wished	  to	  be	  a	  secretary.	  At	  Al	  Azhar	  31,	  as	  mentioned	  earlier,	  two	  girls	  wanted	  to	  be	  midwives.	  Three	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  students	  (two	  boys	  and	  a	  girl)	  also	  aspired	  to	  be	  rich,	  one	  of	  whom	  added	  “famous”	  to	  his	  aspirations	  as	  a	  rich	  racecar	  driver.	  One	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  grade-­‐six	  girl	  hoped	  to	  be	  famous	  for	  designing	  buildings	  in	  other	  countries.	  	  While	  students	  did	  not	  mention	  aspirations	  for	  religious-­‐minded	  professions,	  such	  as	  religious	  leaders	  or	  scholars,	  a	  few	  students	  connected	  the	  idea	  of	  their	  future	  to	  where	  they	  wanted	  to	  be	  in	  the	  next	  stage	  of	  life:	  heaven.	  An	  Azhar	  31	  girl	  said,	  “I	  want	  to	  be	  a	  professor.	  I	  want	  to	  be	  a	  good	  person,	  rich,	  and	  go	  to	  heaven.	  The	  important	  thing	  is	  to	  go	  to	  heaven.	  And	  to	  be	  liked	  by	  a	  lot	  of	  people”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  grade-­‐four	  girls,	  February	  19,	  2010).	  Following	  this	  comment,	  the	  next	  girl	  responded,	  possibly	  attempting	  to	  show	  more	  piety,	  “For	  me,	  the	  important	  thing	  more	  than	  anything	  else	  is	  to	  go	  to	  heaven”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  41	  grade-­‐four	  girls,	  February	  19,	  2010).	  The	  first	  girl’s	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response	  highlights	  the	  common	  idea	  within	  these	  families	  that	  being	  pious	  and	  being	  rich	  are	  not	  incompatible,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  7.	  At	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim,	  among	  one	  group	  of	  grade-­‐six	  boys,	  the	  theme	  of	  honorable	  religious	  duty	  surfaced.	  Two	  boys	  nearly	  simultaneously	  responded	  to	  my	  question,	  “What	  do	  you	  want	  to	  be	  when	  you	  grow	  up?”	  with,	  “A	  martyr	  (mati	  syahid).”	  Instantly	  a	  couple	  of	  other	  boys	  laughed,	  either	  at	  the	  coincidence	  of	  their	  friends’	  responses	  or	  the	  actual	  response.	  However,	  the	  other	  four	  boys	  in	  the	  group	  immediately	  replied	  that	  they	  too	  wanted	  to	  be	  martyrs	  as	  well,	  one	  adding,	  “So	  I	  can	  enter	  heaven.”	  Unfamiliar	  with	  the	  Indonesian	  phrase	  “mati	  syahid,”	  I	  asked	  for	  an	  explanation.	  The	  first	  boy	  explained,	  “A	  martyr	  is	  someone	  who	  dies	  a	  martyr’s	  death	  in	  battle,”	  while	  another	  continued,	  “Dies	  rescuing	  people,”	  and	  another,	  “Defending	  the	  faith”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  grade-­‐six	  boys,	  November	  30,	  2009).	  Still	  confused	  with	  the	  explanations,	  I	  asked	  again	  what	  they	  wanted	  to	  be	  when	  they	  were	  older,	  to	  which	  they	  then	  responded	  with	  career-­‐oriented	  responses:	  doctor,	  architect,	  air	  traffic	  controller,	  scientist,	  and	  archeologist.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  first	  two	  boys	  set	  the	  standard	  high	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  noble	  achievement,	  so	  the	  others	  followed	  suit.	  	  As	  exemplified	  by	  one	  humorous	  response,	  students	  and	  administration	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  global	  controversies	  over	  Islam.	  In	  immediate	  response	  to	  my	  question	  of	  what	  they	  wanted	  to	  be	  when	  they	  grew	  up,	  a	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  grade-­‐four	  boy	  lightheartedly	  called	  out,	  “Terrorist!”	  eliciting	  laughter	  from	  his	  friends.	  He	  than	  continued,	  “Not	  really.	  But	  military,	  and	  then	  president”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  grade-­‐four	  boys,	  December	  3,	  2009).	  Indonesians	  are	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  popular	  idea	  promoted	  by	  much	  of	  Western	  media	  that	  Islamic	  schools	  generate	  terrorists.	  Adults	  who	  are	  generally	  less	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inclined	  to	  joke	  about	  terrorism,	  at	  least	  with	  an	  American	  researcher,	  one	  JSIT	  leader	  from	  headquarters	  during	  our	  first	  meeting	  made	  the	  point	  of	  clearing	  up	  any	  possible	  misconceptions	  I	  may	  have	  had	  regarding	  their	  involvement	  with	  terrorism,	  emphasizing	  the	  students	  from	  their	  schools	  were	  trained	  to	  be	  obedient	  (taat)	  to	  their	  religion	  as	  well	  as	  skilled	  in	  technology	  (technokrat).	  He	  stressed	  that	  the	  students	  from	  their	  schools	  were	  “not	  extreme	  (ekstirm)	  [Muslims]	  like	  is	  alleged	  by	  the	  United	  States	  as,	  what’s	  that	  called,	  a	  terrorist.”	  He	  explained	  that	  Islam	  at	  their	  school	  was	  “modern”	  and	  “fully	  compatible	  with	  development	  (perkembangan),…it’s	  democratic,	  and	  respectful	  of	  others”	  (Interview	  with	  JSIT	  headquarters	  officer,	  March	  18,	  2009).	  	  	  
Conceptualization	  of	  a	  good	  Muslim	  To	  understand	  students’	  conceptualization	  of	  what	  piety	  might	  look	  like	  in	  action,	  I	  asked,	  “What	  is	  a	  good	  Muslim	  like?”	  Students’	  responses	  fell	  into	  four	  main	  interconnected	  elements:	  1)	  participation	  in	  ibadah,	  or	  rituals	  (such	  as	  sholat,	  fasting,	  and	  reading	  the	  Qur’an)	  and	  acts	  of	  worship	  (such	  as	  veiling);	  2)	  obedience	  to	  God	  (taat	  kepada	  Allah)	  or	  following	  God’s	  commandments;	  3)	  moral	  and	  virtuous	  behavior	  such	  as	  being	  honest,	  treating	  others	  kindly,	  and	  respecting	  parents;	  and	  4)	  believing	  (percaya)	  in	  God.	  Ibadah	  was	  “made	  incumbent	  upon	  Muslims	  by	  God”	  (Mahmood	  2004:123),	  and	  these	  acts	  of	  worship	  and	  ritual	  are	  considered	  the	  basics	  of	  piety.	  Obedience	  is	  how	  one	  keeps	  oneself	  clean	  and	  worthy	  of	  God’s	  blessing.	  Morals	  refer	  to	  facets	  of	  one’s	  character.	  Belief	  refers	  to	  one’s	  personal	  convictions	  about	  God’s	  existence.	  One	  could	  argue	  that	  performing	  rituals	  is	  an	  act	  of	  obedience,	  but	  student	  responses	  made	  distinctions	  and	  categorized	  ibadah	  and	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obedience	  differently.	  Therefore,	  the	  above	  elements	  follow	  the	  lead	  of	  the	  students’	  responses.	  	  	   These	  four	  elements	  fall	  into	  two	  larger	  components	  of	  piety:	  outward	  performances	  or	  acts	  (ibadah);	  and	  inner	  character	  (obedience,	  moral	  behavior	  and	  belief	  in	  God)	  that	  drives	  actions.	  Mahmood	  (2004)	  argues	  that	  among	  women	  in	  the	  piety	  movement	  in	  Egypt,	  ritual	  performances	  are	  “disciplinary	  practices	  through	  which	  pious	  dispositions	  are	  formed,”	  when	  approached	  with	  proper	  understanding	  of	  their	  power	  to	  assist	  in	  the	  realization	  of	  piety	  (128).	  However,	  these	  women	  in	  Mahmood’s	  study	  considered	  inner	  character	  or	  “their	  daily	  conduct	  in	  accord	  with	  principles	  of	  Islamic	  piety	  and	  virtuous	  behavior”	  to	  be	  of	  even	  greater	  importance	  in	  their	  journey	  to	  developing	  piety	  (4).	  In	  analyzing	  student	  responses,	  I	  found	  three	  main	  differences	  between	  schools.	  First,	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  children	  showed	  a	  more	  focused	  conceptualization	  of	  being	  a	  good	  Muslim,	  and	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  students	  showed	  a	  more	  diversified	  one.	  See	  Figures	  5,	  6,	  and	  7.	  Second,	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  students’	  answers	  predominantly	  focused	  on	  inner	  character,	  while	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  student	  responses	  focused	  more	  on	  outward	  performances.	  Third,	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  students	  focused	  more	  heavily	  on	  enumerated	  practices	  than	  on	  general	  concepts,	  while	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  students	  balanced	  the	  two	  more	  evenly.	  
Figure 5. Distribution of Student Responses 
Regarding of Categories of Conceptualizations of a 
Good Muslim, by School 
 
 















































Figure 6. Al Azhar 31 Student Response 
Distribution of Categories of 
Conceptualizations of a Good Muslim 
Figure 7. Luqman al Hakim SIT Student 
Response Distribution of Categories of 
Conceptualizations of a Good Muslim 
  
*Ibadah: rituals and acts of worship *Ibadah: rituals and acts of worship 
Note: Belief in God category was not 
represented in Luqman al Hakim SIT data. 
 Al	  Azhar	  31	  students’	  answers	  referenced	  nearly	  equally	  the	  three	  themes	  of	  ibadah,	  obedience,	  and	  morals,	  with	  some	  mention	  of	  belief	  and	  faith.	  Their	  responses	  included	  both	  specific	  actions	  and	  general	  or	  abstract	  concepts	  to	  describe	  a	  good	  Muslim.	  One	  boy	  said,	  “Sholat	  often	  and	  carry	  out	  the	  commandments	  well”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  grade-­‐four	  boys,	  March	  11,	  2010),	  and	  another,	  “Do	  what’s	  required	  of	  you,	  honest,	  moral”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  grade-­‐four	  boys,	  March	  12,	  2010).	  A	  girl	  said,	  “Be	  diligent	  in	  doing	  rituals	  (rajin	  beribadah)	  and	  be	  a	  good	  person	  (baik	  hati)”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  grade-­‐four	  girls,	  February	  18,	  2010).	  A	  few	  students	  also	  mentioned,	  “believe	  in	  God	  (percaya	  kepada	  Allah)”	  or	  “faith	  in	  God	  (beriman	  kepada	  Allah).”	  Ibadah,	  obedience,	  and	  moral	  behavior	  are	  equally	  present	  in	  students’	  understanding	  of	  a	  good	  Muslim,	  with	  belief	  in	  God	  playing	  a	  minor	  role.	  Consequently,	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  students’	  composite	  conceptualization	  is	  one-­‐quarter	  outward	  performance,	  two-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	  quarters	  inner	  character,	  and	  one	  slice	  miscellaneous	  items.	  See	  Figure	  8.	  Nearly	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  responses	  from	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  students	  focused	  on	  









































reads	  the	  Qur’an,”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  grade-­‐four	  boys,	  December	  4,	  2009)	  and	  “Be	  diligent	  in	  reading	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  cover	  the	  aurat”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  grade-­‐six	  boys,	  November	  30,	  2009).	  References	  to	  obedience	  and	  morals	  were	  each	  nearly	  a	  fifth	  of	  the	  responses.	  While	  concepts	  of	  belief	  or	  faith	  in	  God	  did	  not	  surface,	  a	  couple	  of	  students	  mentioned	  larger	  abstract	  concepts	  such	  as	  piety	  or	  takwal	  (having	  an	  submissive	  attitude	  to	  God’s	  way).	  Overall,	  for	  these	  students,	  ibadah’s	  rituals	  and	  acts	  of	  worship	  are	  complemented	  by	  obedience	  and	  moral	  behavior.	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT’s	  composite	  conceptualization	  is	  three-­‐fifths	  outward	  performance,	  two-­‐fifths	  inner	  character,	  and	  a	  fraction	  miscellaneous.	  See	  Figure	  9.	  	  
Figure 8. Al Azhar 31 Student Response 
Distribution as Outward Performance and 
Inner Character  
Figure 9. Luqman al Hakim SIT Student 
Response Distribution as Outward 
Performance and Inner Character 






























Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  students’	  focus	  on	  specific	  rituals	  and	  activities	  allows	  students	  greater	  certainty	  in	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  their	  actions	  and	  those	  of	  others.	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  students’	  inclusion	  of	  abstract	  concepts	  as	  components	  of	  piety	  can	  lead	  to	  ambiguity	  in	  assessing	  moral	  behavior.	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  it	  seems	  this	  ambiguity	  creates	  a	  need	  for	  moral	  flexibility.	  	  	  
Moral	  subjectivity	  Students’	  moral	  subjectivity	  was	  explored	  through	  assessment	  of	  a	  familiar	  scenario	  in	  which	  a	  person’s	  actions	  deviate	  from	  an	  explicit	  religious	  standard	  taught	  at	  schools.	  Woman’s	  dress,	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  wearing	  of	  a	  headscarf,	  has	  become	  one	  of	  the	  most	  visible	  components	  of	  public	  piety	  in	  Indonesia	  (Jones	  2010).	  While	  the	  practice	  of	  veiling	  has	  grown	  since	  the	  1980s,	  there	  are	  still	  significant	  portions	  of	  the	  female	  Muslim	  population	  that	  do	  not	  cover	  their	  hair	  in	  public.	  Although	  students	  at	  both	  schools	  are	  taught	  that	  Muslim	  woman	  are	  required	  by	  God	  to	  veil,	  students	  observe	  women	  on	  a	  daily	  basis	  in	  the	  larger	  community,	  and	  often	  their	  own	  families,	  who	  do	  not.	  The	  request	  to	  judge	  another’s	  actions	  as	  appropriate	  or	  not	  generated	  a	  variety	  of	  reactions	  and,	  therefore,	  more	  analysis	  of	  responses	  than	  in	  other	  sections.	  I	  first	  report	  the	  students’	  responses,	  examine	  the	  types	  of	  arguments	  student	  employ	  to	  explain	  their	  position,	  and	  then	  look	  at	  the	  techniques	  to	  manage	  the	  tension	  generated	  by	  the	  request	  to	  assess	  another’s	  actions,	  or	  level	  of	  piety.	  Students	  were	  asked,	  “Would	  you	  approve	  if	  you	  saw	  a	  female	  Muslim	  (Muslim	  
prempuan)	  going	  out	  in	  public	  without	  veiling?”	  Responses	  clustered	  around	  students’	  gender	  as	  well	  as	  school.	  Nearly	  three-­‐quarters	  of	  boys	  (70%)	  from	  both	  schools	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disapproved,	  while	  just	  fewer	  than	  half	  (48%)	  of	  girls	  disapproved.	  By	  schools,	  less	  than	  half	  (40%)	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  students	  disapproved,	  while	  the	  great	  majority	  (80%)	  of	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  students	  disapproved.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  an	  even	  lower	  percentage	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  students	  would	  have	  objected	  had	  a	  more	  equal	  number	  of	  boys	  and	  girls	  been	  interviewed—20	  male	  and	  13	  female	  students	  at	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  responded,	  while	  14	  male	  and	  16	  female	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  students	  responded.	  (See	  Figures	  10	  and	  11.)	  	  
Figure 10.  Percentage of Students who 
Disagreed With a Woman Leaving Her 
House Unveiled, by Gender and School 
Figure 11. Percentage of Students who 
Disagreed With a Woman Leaving Her 
House Unveiled, by Gender Within School 
  	  The	  various	  arguments	  students	  employed	  to	  defend	  their	  assessment	  of	  the	  situation	  provides	  a	  glimpse	  into	  students’	  developing	  moral	  subjectivities	  and	  levels	  of	  tolerance	  for	  deviant	  behavior.	  By	  “tolerance,”	  I	  mean	  the	  demonstration	  of	  allowance	  for	  the	  behavior,	  but	  not	  necessarily	  acceptance.	  In	  essence,	  the	  question	  asks	  the	  students	  to	  pass	  judgment	  on	  the	  woman	  based	  on	  their	  personal	  standards.	  Answers	  ranged	  from	  full	  disapproval	  to	  personal	  tolerance,	  to	  a	  few	  sentiments	  of	  pluralism.	  Disapproval,	  or	  intolerance,	  was	  demonstrated	  through	  responses	  such	  as,	  “I	  disagree	  because	  a	  woman’s	  



























































“It’s	  not	  a	  problem.”	  A	  few	  students	  demonstrated	  pluralistic	  tendencies	  by	  claiming	  no	  one	  had	  a	  right	  to	  tell	  another	  what	  to	  do	  and	  asserted	  there	  must	  be	  equal	  respect	  for	  whatever	  the	  person	  did,	  basing	  their	  argument	  on	  the	  more	  philosophical	  consideration	  of	  “the	  most	  important	  thing	  is	  her	  heart”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  grade-­‐four	  girls,	  December	  2,	  2009).	  	  Arguments	  the	  students	  employed	  to	  explain	  their	  judgment	  illustrated	  varying	  techniques	  for	  managing	  the	  tensions	  (Simon	  2007:xii,	  270)	  between	  a	  moral	  standard	  the	  schools	  taught	  and	  deviant	  behaviors	  observed	  in	  society.	  Some	  students,	  to	  justify	  and	  support	  their	  disagreement,	  conceded	  to	  a	  standard	  found	  in	  the	  Qur’an,	  given	  by	  God,	  or	  taught	  by	  a	  teacher	  that	  they	  considered	  to	  be	  universally	  applicable	  all	  Muslims.	  Students	  who	  showed	  some	  level	  of	  tolerance	  managed	  the	  tension	  with	  varying	  types	  of	  moral	  flexibility.	  Some	  showed	  tolerance	  for	  the	  activity	  but	  clarified	  their	  personal	  beliefs	  that	  woman	  should	  veil.	  Others	  found	  it	  difficult	  to	  judge	  the	  person	  and	  used	  social	  norms	  or	  situation-­‐specific	  contexts	  to	  excuse	  the	  woman’s	  deviant	  behavior.	  A	  couple	  of	  students	  disregarded	  the	  idea	  that	  judgment	  even	  belonged	  to	  the	  scenario.	  They	  felt	  they	  had	  no	  right	  to	  pass	  judgment	  on	  how	  another	  lived	  her	  life.	  The	  responses	  demonstrate	  multiple	  combinations	  of	  (in)tolerance	  and	  acceptance,	  clustering	  around	  schools	  as	  well	  as	  gender.	  Due	  to	  variations	  among	  those	  who	  did	  not	  fully	  disagree	  with	  the	  behavior,	  the	  following	  analysis	  is	  grouped	  by	  type	  of	  response	  rather	  than	  by	  school.	  Employing	  rule-­‐abiding	  tendencies	  (Johnson	  2010:52),	  many	  students,	  predominantly	  boys,	  from	  both	  schools	  unequivocally	  disapproved	  of	  a	  woman	  leaving	  the	  house	  unveiled.	  Those	  who	  fully	  objected	  justified	  their	  assessment	  by	  citing	  external	  standards	  and	  sources	  of	  law	  in	  Islam,	  namely	  God	  or	  the	  Qur’an.	  All	  of	  the	  boys	  and	  nearly	  
	  	  
159	  
two-­‐thirds	  of	  girls	  at	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  fully	  disapproved,	  while	  nearly	  half	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  31’s	  boys	  and	  only	  one	  girl	  also	  offered	  unqualified	  objections	  of	  a	  woman	  leaving	  the	  house	  without	  veiling.	  Reasons	  for	  their	  disapproval	  included	  “It’s	  required,”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  grade-­‐six	  boys,	  December	  4,	  2009),	  “It’s	  a	  commandment	  of	  God	  contained	  in	  the	  Qur’an,”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  grade-­‐four	  boys,	  March	  12,	  2010),	  “It’s	  impolite,”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  grade-­‐six	  boys,	  December	  4,	  2009),	  “The	  hair	  is	  the	  aurat	  of	  women,”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  grade-­‐four	  boys,	  December	  1,	  2009),	  or	  “Like	  my	  teacher	  said,	  Muslims	  have	  to	  cover	  the	  private	  parts	  of	  their	  bodies”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  grade-­‐four	  boys,	  March	  18,	  2010).	  These	  rule-­‐oriented	  reasons	  elevated	  the	  standard	  above	  personal	  considerations	  or	  contextual	  factors	  that	  could	  influence	  an	  individual’s	  actions.	  	  Possible	  consequences	  of	  not	  veiling	  were	  also	  employed	  to	  justify	  the	  practice	  of	  veiling.	  A	  grade-­‐six	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  boy	  described	  the	  protection	  a	  woman	  receives	  from	  veiling	  when	  he	  explained	  that	  women	  had	  to	  veil	  “in	  order	  to	  not	  invite	  trouble	  (celaka).	  So	  that	  you	  don’t	  invite	  temptation87	  (nafsu)”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  grade-­‐six	  boys,	  December	  4,	  2009).	  This	  comment	  also	  implicitly	  touches	  on	  the	  benefits	  for	  men,	  who	  are	  tempted	  by	  and	  cause	  “trouble”	  for	  an	  unveiled	  woman.	  A	  grade-­‐four	  girl	  from	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  focused	  on	  the	  potential	  negative	  experiences	  of	  the	  woman	  who	  does	  not	  veil	  when	  she	  commented,	  “You	  should	  be	  ashamed	  (malu)	  if	  your	  
aurat	  is	  visible.	  It’s	  shameful	  (malu)	  to	  leave	  the	  house	  and	  not	  veil,	  especially	  if	  you	  go	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  It	  is	  common	  Islamic	  belief	  that	  the	  form	  of	  the	  female	  body	  after	  it	  has	  passed	  through	  puberty	  is	  a	  temptation	  to	  men	  and	  therefore	  it	  is	  incumbent	  upon	  the	  woman	  dress	  in	  clothing	  that	  fully	  covers	  their	  bodies,	  leaving	  only	  the	  hands	  and	  feet	  and	  face	  exposed.	  The	  hair	  is	  often	  considered	  to	  be	  provocative	  as	  well,	  thus	  woman	  also	  cover	  their	  hair	  by	  veiling.	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school”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  grade-­‐four	  girls,	  December	  3,	  2009).	  These	  students	  supported	  veiling	  by	  not	  only	  referring	  to	  the	  law,	  but	  also	  citing	  the	  unwanted	  consequences	  for	  woman—and	  indirectly	  for	  men—when	  woman	  do	  not	  veil.	  Avoidance	  of	  such	  consequences	  is	  expected	  to	  motivate	  one	  to	  follow	  the	  practice	  to	  veil.	  	  Tolerance	  was	  shown	  in	  several	  different	  ways,	  revealing	  some	  instances	  of	  intense	  moral	  gymnastics	  described	  below	  in	  detail.	  Some	  disapproval	  was	  qualified,	  while	  others	  who	  felt	  it	  “wasn’t	  a	  problem,”	  followed	  up	  with	  the	  counsel	  that	  the	  woman	  should	  veil.	  Still	  others	  invented	  scenarios	  that	  would	  excuse	  the	  deviant	  behavior	  and	  exempt	  the	  woman	  in	  question	  from	  disapproval.	  Others	  conceded	  to	  social	  practice	  rather	  than	  a	  normative	  standard	  to	  assess	  the	  situation.	  Many	  students	  spoke	  of	  the	  dissonance	  between	  personal	  belief	  and	  others’	  actions,	  but	  they	  would	  not	  outright	  condemn	  the	  woman	  of	  wrongdoing.	  Aside	  from	  the	  single	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  female	  student	  who	  completely	  disapproved,	  the	  small	  handful	  (fewer	  than	  a	  fifth)	  of	  other	  disapproving	  girls	  qualified	  their	  disapproval.	  For	  example,	  one	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  girl	  explained,	  “I	  disagree,	  but	  other	  people	  think	  differently.	  So,	  just	  let	  it	  be;	  but	  I	  hope	  they’ll	  realize	  [that	  they	  should	  veil]”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  grade-­‐four	  girls,	  March	  11,	  2010).	  One	  of	  the	  few	  female	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  students	  assented	  to	  not	  veiling	  when	  she	  said,	  “Not	  all	  Muslim	  [women]	  wear	  hijabs,	  so	  naturally	  there	  will	  be	  those	  who	  don’t	  wear	  hijabs	  in	  public.	  The	  thing	  is	  there	  are	  those	  who	  wear	  headscarves	  and	  those	  that	  don’t.”	  Her	  classmate	  followed	  up	  with,	  “But	  they	  should	  wear	  a	  hijab”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  grade-­‐four	  girls,	  December	  3,	  2009),	  after	  which	  the	  first	  girl	  immediately	  added	  that	  yes,	  woman	  should	  veil.	  By	  concluding	  with	  the	  personal	  belief	  that	  one	  should	  veil,	  they	  asserted	  their	  own	  beliefs	  and	  felt	  there	  was	  a	  higher	  standard	  that	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should	  be	  respected.	  One	  said,	  “We	  can	  never	  force	  others	  to	  veil.	  We	  can	  only	  suggest”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  grade-­‐six	  girls,	  December	  3,	  2009),	  tacitly	  suggesting	  that	  it	  would	  be	  better	  to	  veil,	  but	  each	  woman	  had	  a	  right	  to	  choose.	  It	  is	  unclear,	  however,	  if	  this	  student	  felt	  critical	  or	  not	  of	  the	  women	  who	  would	  choose	  not	  to	  veil.	  	  In	  a	  more	  diplomatic	  response,	  a	  few	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  students	  chose	  to	  agree	  and	  disagree	  with	  the	  scenario.	  One	  boy	  said,	  “I’m	  fifty-­‐fifty.	  It’s	  okay,	  but	  one	  should	  wear	  the	  
hijab”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  grade-­‐four	  boys,	  February	  11,	  2010).	  These	  students	  acknowledged	  a	  dissonance	  with	  what	  they	  felt	  to	  be	  right,	  but	  did	  not	  feel	  it	  necessary	  to	  create	  conflict	  by	  objecting	  outright	  to	  it.	  Making	  it	  an	  issue	  of	  fashion	  rather	  than	  morals,	  one	  student	  argued,	  “You’re	  prettier	  if	  you	  wear	  a	  headscarf	  and	  so	  you	  cover	  your	  aurat”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  grade-­‐six	  girls,	  December	  2,	  2009),	  leaving	  her	  justification,	  or	  softening	  her	  criticism,	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  benefits	  of	  veiling.	  	  In	  what	  seems	  an	  effort	  to	  exempt	  the	  woman	  from	  judgment,	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  students	  often	  provided	  various	  hypothetical	  situations	  as	  justification	  for	  the	  woman’s	  behavior.	  These	  included	  situational	  reasons	  such	  as	  “maybe	  she’s	  not	  used	  to	  it.	  Or	  it’s	  hot	  so	  she	  doesn’t	  wear	  it”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  grade-­‐four	  boys,	  March	  12,	  2010)	  or	  “if	  it’s	  hot	  or	  her	  hijab	  is	  being	  washed,	  it’s	  okay”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  grade-­‐four	  girls,	  March	  12,	  2010),	  or,	  it’s	  okay	  “as	  long	  as	  she	  is	  fully	  covered	  [modestly	  dressed]	  otherwise”	  (Interviews	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  grade-­‐four	  girls,	  March	  11,	  2010).	  Other	  students	  suggested	  a	  cognitive	  rather	  than	  material	  explanation:	  “Maybe	  she	  doesn’t	  know	  she	  has	  to	  wear	  the	  
hijab”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  grade-­‐four	  boys,	  February	  18,	  2010)	  or	  even	  more	  simply,	  “Maybe	  the	  woman	  has	  a	  reason	  for	  not	  wearing	  the	  hijab”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  grade-­‐four	  girls,	  February	  18,	  2010).	  Here,	  situational	  factors	  such	  as	  being	  in	  the	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process	  of	  “getting	  used	  to	  it,”	  the	  weather,	  other	  clothing	  considerations,	  or	  one’s	  personal	  reasoning	  or	  lack	  thereof,	  exempt	  the	  woman	  from	  disapproval.	  It’s	  easy	  to	  imagine	  a	  mother	  providing	  these	  sorts	  of	  explanations	  to	  an	  inquiring	  child	  as	  to	  why	  women,	  possibly	  including	  she	  herself,	  do	  not	  veil.	  A	  common	  justification	  for	  excusing	  the	  deviant	  behavior	  was	  age.	  Several	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  students	  excused	  the	  lack	  of	  veiling	  if	  the	  female	  in	  question	  was	  “still	  a	  kid”	  or	  “not	  grown	  up.”	  The	  word	  prempuan	  used	  to	  mean	  “woman”	  in	  the	  question	  does	  not	  directly	  carry	  connotations	  of	  an	  adult	  female,	  but	  is	  generally	  used	  in	  reference	  to	  adults	  rather	  than	  children.	  The	  use	  of	  the	  word	  left	  unintentional	  ambiguity,	  and	  some	  students	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  ambiguity	  to	  excuse	  the	  female	  in	  question	  for	  her	  deviant	  practices.	  Either	  the	  suggestion	  of	  age	  arose	  among	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  students	  because	  they	  were	  searching	  to	  find	  a	  justification	  for	  the	  deviant	  behavior,	  or	  it	  did	  not	  surface	  among	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  students	  because	  they	  felt	  that	  veiling,	  regardless	  of	  age,	  was	  necessary	  in	  public.	  It	  is	  more	  common	  for	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  than	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  parents	  to	  require	  their	  daughters	  to	  continue	  to	  veil	  upon	  returning	  home	  and	  removing	  their	  school	  uniforms	  (which	  include	  the	  hijab).	  According	  to	  a	  parent	  survey	  (discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  7),	  13%	  and	  47%	  of	  parent	  respondents	  from	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  and	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  respectively	  said	  they	  required	  their	  daughters	  to	  veil	  once	  they	  had	  returned	  from	  school.	  It	  is	  possible	  the	  difference	  between	  schools	  was	  influenced	  by	  parent	  attitudes.	  	  	  A	  girl	  from	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  felt	  the	  social	  etiquette	  was	  the	  overriding	  factor	  for	  determining	  veiling	  choice:	  “If	  you	  want	  to	  meet	  a	  friend,	  and	  you	  don’t	  veil,	  well,	  it’s	  not	  a	  problem.	  But	  if	  you	  want	  to	  meet	  your	  boss	  or	  are	  going	  to	  an	  event,	  yeah,	  you	  have	  to	  veil”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  grade-­‐four	  girls,	  March	  12,	  2010).	  This	  reasoning	  could	  be	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related	  to	  protocols	  for	  gendered	  interactions	  as	  much	  as	  fashion	  considerations.	  If	  a	  woman	  meets	  with	  a	  female	  friend	  in	  a	  private	  setting,	  the	  woman	  would	  not	  need	  to	  veil.	  A	  boss	  could	  be	  male	  and	  an	  event	  would	  likely	  be	  mixed	  company,	  thus	  making	  it	  appropriate	  to	  cover	  her	  aurat.	  Either	  way,	  stepping	  out	  into	  public	  unveiled	  isn’t	  necessarily	  the	  problem,	  but	  more	  the	  woman’s	  destination	  and	  possibly	  the	  mix	  of	  company.	  	  For	  others,	  the	  touchstone	  for	  appropriateness	  was	  common	  social	  practice.	  One	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  boy	  said,	  “I	  approve	  of	  it,	  but	  there	  are	  those	  that	  disagree,	  too…because	  Muslims	  should	  wear	  veils	  when	  out	  in	  public	  but	  many	  do	  not,	  so	  just	  let	  it	  be.	  It’s	  fine”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  grade-­‐four	  boys,	  March	  11,	  2010).	  This	  boy	  conceded	  to	  social	  practice	  rather	  than	  the	  standard	  set	  at	  school.	  Another	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  girl	  said,	  “I	  agree	  and	  disagree.	  I	  agree	  because	  certainly	  a	  portion	  of	  Muslim	  people,	  most	  of	  them	  (kebanyakan),	  don’t	  veil.	  I	  disagree	  because	  usually	  (biasanya)	  woman	  veil”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  grade-­‐four	  girls,	  March	  12,	  2010).	  Her	  statement	  is	  full	  of	  contradictions.	  If	  the	  majority	  of	  woman	  don’t	  veil,	  then	  it	  cannot	  be	  that	  woman	  usually	  do	  veil.	  These	  contradictory	  statements	  highlight	  the	  cognitive	  dissonance	  many	  students	  encountered	  as	  they	  worked	  through	  the	  scenario.	  The	  students	  “know”	  from	  observation	  within	  their	  community	  that	  many	  Muslim	  women	  do	  not	  veil.	  They	  also	  “know”	  from	  their	  lessons	  at	  school	  that	  Muslim	  women	  should	  veil.	  This	  student	  took	  into	  consideration	  what	  others	  were	  doing	  and	  attributed	  to	  it	  some	  kind	  of	  value	  that	  led	  her	  to	  “agree.”	  She	  took	  the	  observations	  that	  women	  usually	  veil,	  particularly	  in	  her	  school	  environment	  and	  larger	  social	  environment,	  and	  therefore	  disagreed	  with	  the	  action	  of	  the	  woman	  in	  the	  proposed	  scenario.	  	  Another	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  girl,	  while	  personally	  objecting	  to	  a	  woman	  not	  wearing	  the	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hijab,	  felt	  it	  was	  a	  personal	  decision	  rather	  than	  one	  that	  should	  be	  forced	  upon	  individuals	  when	  she	  said,	  “Actually	  I	  don’t	  agree,	  but	  people	  have	  no	  right	  to	  prohibit	  it.	  So	  it’s	  just	  up	  to	  the	  person	  if	  she	  wants	  to	  veil	  or	  not”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  grade-­‐four	  girls,	  March	  12,	  2010).	  Here,	  it	  becomes	  a	  human	  right	  to	  make	  the	  choice	  rather	  than	  a	  religious	  injunction	  that	  one	  must	  follow.	  This	  student	  demonstrates	  the	  greatest	  flexibility	  between	  personal	  commitment	  to	  the	  religious	  practice	  and	  another	  person’s	  right	  to	  make	  her	  own	  choices.	  She,	  and	  her	  personal	  values,	  are	  not	  a	  part	  of	  another	  woman’s	  process	  to	  choose	  if	  she	  will	  veil	  or	  not.	  It	  is	  a	  private	  or	  individual	  issue,	  not	  an	  issue	  of	  universal	  commandment	  or	  universal	  rights.	  She	  demonstrates	  tolerance	  for	  others’	  individual	  standards.	  The	  greatest	  moral	  flexibility,	  looking	  much	  like	  attitudes	  of	  pluralism,	  came	  from	  a	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  grade-­‐six	  girl	  when	  she	  stated,	  “The	  important	  thing	  is	  the	  heart”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  grade-­‐six	  girls,	  December	  2,	  2009).	  This	  comment	  echoes	  a	  common	  saying	  in	  Indonesia,	  “One	  should	  cover	  her	  heart	  first	  before	  her	  head.”	  This	  dictum	  represents	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  person’s	  character	  is	  more	  reflective	  of	  one’s	  relationship	  to	  God	  than	  the	  wearing	  of	  the	  hijab.	  In	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning,	  veiling	  is	  not	  a	  requirement	  to	  be	  a	  pious	  Muslim	  woman.	  The	  student’s	  answer	  also	  promotes	  the	  idea	  that	  one	  ought	  not	  judge	  another’s	  piety	  based	  on	  veiling	  practices,	  as	  one	  would	  not	  know	  a	  woman’s	  heart,	  the	  true	  indicator	  of	  one’s	  piety,	  simply	  by	  the	  covering	  of	  her	  hair.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  student	  completely	  disregarded	  the	  school’s	  instruction	  and	  challenged	  the	  idea	  that	  women	  are	  required	  to	  veil.	  She	  herself	  may	  choose	  to	  veil,	  but	  she	  does	  not	  see	  that	  as	  a	  necessary	  choice	  for	  all	  women.	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The	  explanations	  for	  their	  assessments	  of	  the	  hypothetical	  situation	  illuminate	  students’	  techniques	  to	  “manage	  the	  tensions”	  (Simon	  2007)	  created	  in	  a	  situation	  that	  challenges	  a	  moral	  standard	  promoted	  by	  their	  schools.	  Although	  the	  schools	  promote	  different	  attitudes	  regarding	  the	  type	  of	  veil	  that	  is	  acceptable	  or	  most	  appropriate,	  the	  school	  standard	  is	  that	  woman	  should	  veil.	  However,	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  as	  a	  school	  shows	  greater	  tolerance	  from	  women	  who	  do	  not	  veil,	  as	  demonstrated	  in	  not	  requiring	  women	  to	  veil	  while	  on	  campus.	  Those	  who	  fully	  objected	  cited	  the	  Qur’an	  or	  official	  sources,	  making	  the	  act	  an	  infraction	  against	  a	  fixed	  standard	  outside	  of	  anyone’s	  negotiation.	  Other	  students	  showed	  varying	  forms	  of	  tolerance	  by	  simultaneously	  understanding	  the	  normative	  standard	  and	  generally	  showing	  commitment	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  veiling	  by	  saying	  women	  “should	  veil,”	  while	  allowing	  others	  to	  disregard	  the	  practice.	  Others	  allowed	  the	  deviant	  behavior	  due	  to	  social	  practice,	  thus	  allowing	  societal	  norms	  to	  compromise	  an	  institutional	  regulation.	  Some	  took	  a	  more	  philosophical	  approach	  and	  focused	  on	  the	  virtue	  rather	  than	  a	  specific	  “expressive	  repertoire”	  (Mahmood	  2004:23)	  of	  it.	  	  In	  their	  management	  of	  tensions,	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  students	  demonstrated	  various	  forms	  of	  tolerance	  and	  more	  readily	  withheld	  judgment.	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  students	  seemed	  to	  be	  most	  comfortable	  with	  excusing	  the	  deviant	  behavior	  under	  considerations	  such	  as	  age,	  conditional	  factors	  (i.e.	  weather,	  etc.),	  social	  etiquette,	  or	  personal	  preference,	  rather	  than	  directly	  accusing	  the	  woman	  of	  wrongdoing.	  The	  use	  of	  contextualization	  in	  the	  process	  of	  discerning	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  a	  woman’s	  possibly	  deviant	  behavior	  is	  facilitated	  by	  more	  abstract	  and	  principle-­‐based	  ideas	  of	  piety	  promoted	  at	  Al	  Azhar	  31.	  Additionally,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  diversified	  conceptualization	  of	  piety,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  facilitates	  greater	  tolerance	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  acceptance	  of	  deviant	  behavior.	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The	  majority	  of	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  students	  fully	  objected	  and	  referenced	  the	  laws	  of	  God	  to	  validate	  the	  objections.	  The	  school’s	  more	  delineated	  approach	  to	  standards	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  specifics	  and	  particular	  observable	  acts	  seems	  to	  offer	  a	  clear	  way	  to	  monitor	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  one’s	  own	  actions	  as	  well	  as	  any	  other	  person’s.	  As	  such,	  the	  students	  could	  talk	  with	  greater	  confidence	  about	  the	  inappropriateness	  of	  a	  woman	  leaving	  the	  house	  unveiled.	  	  Responses	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  boys	  more	  immediately	  disapproved	  of	  a	  woman	  not	  veiling	  because	  they	  believed	  it	  was	  a	  religious	  obligation	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  heavily	  gendered	  response	  could	  be	  due	  largely	  to	  one	  of	  the	  most	  common	  explanations	  for	  why	  women	  should	  veil—so	  as	  not	  to	  arouse	  sexual	  desire	  in	  men—which	  is	  a	  directly	  relevant	  benefit,	  leading	  boys	  to	  support	  it.	  Additionally,	  the	  practice	  does	  not	  require	  any	  kind	  of	  action	  on	  the	  part	  of	  men,	  but	  is	  expected	  to	  greatly	  benefit	  his	  efforts	  to	  be	  pious.	  Girls,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  tended	  to	  have	  a	  more	  nuanced	  response	  to	  the	  situation.	  While	  several	  girls	  disagreed	  for	  the	  same	  reasons	  as	  the	  boys,	  many	  other	  girls	  found	  reasons	  to	  excuse	  the	  woman	  from	  the	  offense	  of	  not	  veiling	  or	  at	  least	  recognized	  that	  there	  were	  many	  reasons	  why	  one	  would	  not.	  Perhaps	  unlike	  boys,	  girls	  who	  actually	  have	  to	  choose	  to	  veil	  have	  empathy	  even	  at	  a	  young	  age	  towards	  those	  who	  make	  choices	  not	  to.	  Additionally,	  since	  it	  is	  their	  gender	  that	  wears	  them,	  it	  is	  also	  likely	  that	  girls	  have	  had	  more	  discussions	  regarding	  the	  practice	  that	  have	  produced	  a	  more	  developed,	  varied	  and	  nuanced	  thinking	  around	  the	  practice.	  	  While	  home	  life	  may	  influence	  attitudes	  about	  veiling,	  almost	  two-­‐thirds	  (59%)	  of	  Al-­‐Azhar	  mothers	  and	  just	  over	  three-­‐fourths	  (77%)	  of	  the	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  mothers	  reported	  on	  a	  self-­‐administered	  parent	  survey	  (see	  chapter	  7)	  that	  they	  veil	  on	  a	  daily	  
	  	  
167	  
basis.	  This	  would	  indicate	  that	  at	  each	  school	  similar	  proportions	  of	  children	  objecting	  to	  a	  woman	  not	  veiling	  correlate	  with	  the	  proportion	  of	  mothers	  who	  veil	  daily,	  and	  presumably	  would	  consistently	  veil	  when	  going	  out	  in	  public.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  student	  attitudes	  correlate	  with	  the	  practice	  of	  their	  mothers.	  However,	  as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  7,	  mothers	  are	  often	  influenced	  by	  their	  children’s	  encouragement	  to	  veil.	  Several	  mothers	  mentioned	  the	  influence	  of	  their	  children	  and	  school	  environment	  as	  factors	  in	  their	  decisions	  to	  begin	  veiling.	  Consequently,	  some	  mothers’	  current	  veiling	  practices	  were	  preceded	  by	  students’	  opinions	  in	  regards	  to	  veiling.	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  unclear	  how	  much	  mothers’	  practices	  influenced	  student	  attitudes	  or	  vice	  versa.	  	  
Conclusion	  This	  chapter	  demonstrates	  how	  forms	  of	  schooling	  correlate	  with	  the	  development	  of	  students’	  religious	  inclinations.	  The	  prominence	  of	  religion	  in	  future	  education	  and	  professional	  aspirations	  are	  similar	  among	  students	  at	  both	  schools,	  while	  differences	  between	  students’	  conceptualizations	  of	  a	  good	  Muslim	  and	  moral	  flexibility	  are	  influenced	  by	  the	  schools’	  unique	  approaches	  to	  Islam.	  Concepts	  of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  be	  a	  good	  Muslim	  mirror	  levels	  of	  tolerance	  for	  deviant	  veiling	  practices.	  	  The	  schools’	  emphasis	  on	  quality	  academic	  schooling	  delivered	  within	  the	  Islamic	  framework	  of	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  create	  adverse	  feelings	  towards	  state	  general	  schools	  for	  continued	  secondary	  schooling.	  There	  was	  mixed	  interest	  among	  students	  at	  both	  schools	  in	  continued	  schooling	  at	  an	  Islamic	  institution.	  More	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  students	  were	  interested	  in	  continuing	  at	  Al	  Azhar	  if	  an	  Al	  Azhar	  junior	  high	  were	  to	  be	  opened,	  while	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  students	  were	  more	  interested	  in	  state	  schools.	  It	  is	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possible	  that	  the	  stricter	  environment	  of	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  generated	  student	  interest	  in	  a	  less	  rigid	  and	  more	  mainstream	  environment	  of	  state	  schools.	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  interest	  in	  quality	  academic	  schooling	  was	  more	  important	  than	  religious	  schooling	  and,	  therefore,	  Abu	  Bakar	  SIT,	  the	  secondary	  school	  for	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  students	  which	  was	  not	  on	  par	  with	  top	  state	  schools,	  was	  not	  a	  first	  choice.	  Along	  this	  same	  vein	  of	  reasoning,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  many	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  students	  mentioned	  interest	  in	  continuing	  at	  Al	  Azhar	  junior	  secondary	  school	  not	  necessarily	  only	  because	  they	  valued	  the	  school’s	  Islamic	  atmosphere	  and	  teachings,	  but	  also	  assumed	  Al	  Azhar’s	  high	  quality	  academics	  would	  be	  found	  at	  their	  proposed	  junior	  secondary	  school	  in	  Jogja.	  	  Regardless	  of	  differences	  in	  junior	  secondary	  school	  preference,	  students	  from	  both	  schools	  showed	  similar	  professional	  aspirations	  that	  aligned	  with	  common	  middle-­‐class	  occupations.	  References	  to	  overtly	  religious	  occupations	  were	  absent.	  Students	  seem	  to	  consider	  religion	  to	  be	  more	  a	  way	  of	  living	  one’s	  life	  than	  a	  professional	  field.	  Even	  those	  boys	  and	  girls	  who	  wanted	  to	  deepen	  their	  religious	  understanding	  by	  continuing	  their	  education	  at	  an	  Islamic	  junior	  secondary	  school	  expressed	  similar	  career	  objectives,	  with	  no	  difference	  in	  professional	  aspirations	  than	  their	  peers	  wanting	  to	  attend	  a	  state	  junior	  secondary	  school.	  The	  students	  who	  mentioned	  aspirations	  of	  “getting	  to	  heaven”	  or	  being	  martyrs	  did	  not	  view	  their	  careers	  as	  a	  vehicle	  for	  earning	  that	  reward.	  Religion	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  play	  an	  influential	  role	  in	  decisions	  regarding	  professional	  aspirations.	  This	  aligns	  with	  both	  schools’	  goals	  of	  training	  intelligent	  and	  pious	  Muslims	  rather	  than	  Islamic	  scholars.	  	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  students	  had	  a	  more	  diversified	  conception	  of	  a	  good	  Muslim,	  combining	  the	  outward	  performance	  of	  ritual	  acts	  of	  worships	  with	  inner	  character.	  Much	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of	  what	  was	  mentioned,	  aside	  from	  specific	  rituals	  to	  be	  performed,	  was	  more	  conceptual	  than	  activity-­‐specific.	  In	  contrast,	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  students	  demonstrated	  a	  more	  focused	  conceptualizations	  of	  a	  good	  Muslim,	  with	  a	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  ritual	  performance	  and	  task-­‐specific	  understandings	  of	  the	  more	  abstract	  ideas	  of	  piety	  such	  as	  morality.	  Specific	  actions	  appear	  to	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  their	  conceptualizations	  of	  a	  good	  Muslim	  among	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  students.	  Students’	  moral	  subjectivities	  demonstrated	  two	  main	  attitudes,	  namely	  disapproval	  and	  tolerance,	  with	  a	  few	  students	  demonstrating	  pluralist	  perspectives	  by	  showing	  acceptance.	  They	  employed	  various	  techniques	  to	  manage	  the	  tensions	  they	  encountered	  in	  the	  scenario	  of	  a	  woman	  not	  veiling	  when	  in	  public.	  Two-­‐fifths	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  students	  and	  more	  than	  three-­‐quarters	  of	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  students	  were	  intolerant	  of	  deviant	  veiling	  practices.	  To	  justify	  their	  assessment,	  they	  conceded	  to	  a	  normative	  standard	  that	  stood	  outside	  of	  contextualizing	  a	  situation	  within	  particular	  material	  or	  emotional	  conditions	  or	  personal	  interpretations.	  Over	  half	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  students	  were	  tolerant	  of	  the	  woman’s	  action	  to	  not	  veil,	  but	  showed	  variance	  in	  personal	  acceptance	  of	  the	  behavior.	  The	  students’	  techniques	  for	  dealing	  with	  the	  tensions	  included	  allowing	  the	  practice	  but	  not	  approving	  by	  insisting	  that	  the	  woman	  “should”	  veil.	  This	  also	  indicated	  that	  the	  students	  believed	  the	  standard	  applied	  to	  all	  Muslim	  women.	  A	  few	  others	  did	  not	  object	  but	  held	  a	  personal	  standard	  to	  veil,	  thus	  making	  the	  practice	  individual	  choice	  rather	  than	  universal	  edict.	  Others,	  in	  avoidance	  of	  passing	  judgment,	  excused	  the	  deviant	  behavior	  by	  creating	  conditional	  and	  contextual	  situations	  that	  would	  justify	  the	  woman’s	  actions.	  Still	  others	  validated	  the	  practice	  to	  not	  veil	  based	  on	  societal	  norms	  rather	  than	  a	  universal	  standard.	  Two	  students	  who	  called	  for	  the	  focus	  on	  individuals’	  basic	  social	  rights	  rather	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than	  deity-­‐imposed	  requirement	  demonstrated	  the	  greatest	  moral	  flexibility.	  	  	   	  Students’	  conceptualizations	  of	  a	  good	  Muslim,	  moral	  subjectivity,	  and	  techniques	  for	  managing	  tensions	  around	  behavior	  that	  is	  socially	  deemed	  deviant	  correlate	  to	  the	  types	  of	  Islam	  promoted	  at	  their	  respective	  schools.	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  does	  not	  promote	  organization-­‐specific	  ways	  to	  conduct	  one’s	  religious	  life.	  Unlike	  the	  organization-­‐specific	  practices	  that	  can	  be	  generalized	  into	  NU,	  Muhammadiyah,	  and	  PKS,	  Al	  Azhar	  disassociates	  itself	  from	  these	  and	  promotes	  a	  more	  basic	  multi-­‐traditional	  approach	  to	  Islam	  that	  honors	  various	  forms	  of	  practice.	  Al	  Azhar	  is	  more	  accepting	  of	  multiple	  practices	  and	  therefore	  not	  so	  prescriptive	  in	  form.	  This	  was	  reflected	  in	  students’	  understanding	  of	  a	  good	  Muslim	  as	  not	  solely	  focused	  on	  standard	  expectations	  such	  as	  rituals,	  but	  also	  allowed	  for	  various	  interpretations	  that	  fostered	  tolerance	  for	  various	  forms	  of	  Islamic	  practices.	  However,	  this	  greater	  tolerance	  is	  accompanied	  by	  greater	  moral	  ambivalence.	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  students’	  conceptualization	  of	  a	  good	  Muslim	  offers	  greater	  flexibility	  in	  interpreting	  the	  deviant	  behavior	  of	  a	  woman	  not	  veiling.	  While	  some	  students	  viewed	  veiling	  to	  be	  of	  such	  importance	  that	  a	  woman	  should	  wear	  the	  hijab,	  associating	  it	  with	  following	  what	  is	  commanded,	  some	  students	  focused	  on	  other	  concepts,	  such	  as	  being	  a	  good	  person	  or	  believing	  in	  God.	  Also,	  valuing	  various	  interpretations	  of	  a	  single	  practice	  likely	  facilitated	  the	  moral	  gymnastics	  necessary	  to	  be	  tolerant	  of	  others’	  choices	  that	  were	  not	  congruent	  with	  standards	  promoted	  at	  school.	  This	  flexible	  approach	  to	  Islam	  could	  easily	  translate	  into	  more	  flexible	  interpretations	  of	  moral	  conduct	  and	  respect	  of	  those	  who	  carry	  out	  their	  religion	  differently	  than	  they	  themselves	  do.	  This	  more	  flexible	  approach	  that	  honors	  multiple	  traditions	  is	  seen	  in	  Al	  Azhar	  31’s	  school	  practices	  of	  veiling.	  While	  all	  teachers	  were	  devout	  Muslims	  with	  required	  levels	  of	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knowledge	  of	  the	  Qur’an,	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  faculty	  was	  fairly	  heterogeneous	  in	  outward	  appearance	  and	  practices	  of	  Islam.	  They	  personalized	  their	  religion	  in	  different	  ways.	  While	  at	  first	  glance	  a	  non-­‐Muslim	  may	  assume	  that	  there	  was	  no	  variance	  among	  faculty	  since	  all	  teachers	  conducted	  themselves	  within	  the	  general	  principles	  and	  values	  of	  Islam.	  However,	  as	  previously	  explained,	  variations	  within	  practices	  have	  cultural	  meaning	  that	  often,	  especially	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT,	  translate	  into	  perceived	  levels	  of	  piety	  and	  preference	  for	  one	  Islamic	  organization’s	  tradition	  over	  another.	  The	  female	  teachers	  veiled	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  fashions.	  Some	  wore	  fancier	  headscarves	  with	  lace	  and	  beading	  on	  sheer	  material,	  tied	  snugly	  around	  the	  neck	  or	  tucked	  into	  the	  collar	  of	  their	  uniforms.	  Others	  wore	  large,	  plainer	  and	  simple	  headscarves,	  frequently	  offering	  some	  contour	  of	  the	  neck	  and	  often	  falling	  over	  the	  chest	  and	  down	  to	  the	  navel.	  The	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  part-­‐time	  teachers	  who	  worked	  one-­‐on-­‐one	  with	  students	  for	  Qur’anic	  reading	  were	  generally	  dressed	  in	  simple,	  loose	  clothing	  that	  looked	  much	  like	  those	  of	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  teachers.	  	  Additionally,	  an	  implicit	  acceptance	  of	  those	  who	  do	  not	  veil	  was	  demonstrated	  with	  the	  attendance	  of	  a	  few	  bare-­‐headed	  mothers	  at	  school	  events.	  More	  prominently	  and	  perhaps	  more	  officially	  sanctified,	  however,	  was	  the	  public	  display	  of	  students’	  family	  photos	  outside	  of	  the	  grade-­‐two	  classrooms	  along	  a	  main	  corridor.	  While	  most	  mothers	  and	  daughters	  in	  the	  photos	  were	  veiled,	  some	  were	  not.	  However,	  the	  equally	  prominent	  display	  of	  photos,	  regardless	  of	  veiling	  practice,	  indicated	  a	  tolerance	  for,	  if	  not	  an	  acceptance	  of,	  both	  practices.	  It	  also	  spoke	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  hijab	  students	  wore	  at	  school	  
	  	  
172	  
was	  part	  of	  a	  uniform,	  rather	  than	  a	  part	  of	  their	  religious	  practices	  while	  in	  public	  spaces.88	  	  In	  contrast,	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT’s	  exacting	  approach	  to	  Islam	  coincided	  with	  a	  homogeneous	  demonstration	  of	  Islamic	  practices	  among	  the	  faculty	  and	  thus	  a	  more	  uniform	  example	  of	  piety	  throughout	  the	  school.	  Teachers	  more	  uniformly	  veiled	  in	  oversized	  tunics	  falling	  far	  below	  the	  buttocks,	  long	  loose	  skirts,	  and	  veils	  of	  thick	  and	  largely	  unadorned	  material	  hanging	  loosely	  over	  the	  shoulders	  and	  midway	  down	  the	  arms.	  As	  a	  regular	  female	  visitor,	  although	  not	  Muslim,	  I	  was	  asked	  to	  veil	  as	  well.	  However,	  my	  style	  of	  veiling,	  like	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  mothers	  who	  came	  on	  campus,	  did	  not	  mirror	  that	  of	  the	  teachers,	  and	  an	  issue	  was	  never	  made	  of	  it.	  While	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  did	  not	  challenge	  the	  variations	  in	  styles	  of	  veiling	  among	  the	  visitors	  on	  campus,	  the	  official	  representatives	  of	  the	  institution	  were	  fairly	  homogeneous	  in	  style.	  	  Additionally,	  the	  majority	  of	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  students’	  conceptualizations	  of	  a	  good	  Muslim	  aligned	  with	  an	  approach	  to	  Islam	  that	  leaves	  little	  if	  any	  room	  for	  situational	  considerations	  for	  deviant	  moral	  conduct.	  This	  was	  demonstrated	  in	  chapter	  4	  regarding	  the	  firing	  of	  a	  teacher	  for	  smoking	  while	  off	  duty.	  Initially,	  he	  was	  put	  on	  probation	  for	  smoking	  in	  front	  of	  students	  while	  on	  a	  hike.	  While	  he	  had	  not	  before	  smoked	  on	  campus,	  smoking	  regardless	  of	  location	  was	  prohibited,	  as	  the	  school	  taught	  that	  smoking,	  a	  very	  popular	  activity	  in	  Indonesia	  to	  which	  many	  people	  are	  addicted,	  was	  haram	  (a	  forbidden	  activity).	  The	  teacher	  was	  unable	  to	  quit	  smoking,	  and	  even	  though	  he	  did	  not	  smoke	  at	  school,	  smoking	  in	  his	  private	  life	  was	  still	  seen	  as	  inconsistent	  practice	  of	  the	  school’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  The	  attitude	  that	  the	  hijab	  is	  only	  part	  of	  a	  uniform	  was	  more	  readily	  obvious	  to	  me	  when	  I	  observed	  high	  school	  students	  at	  the	  Al	  Azhar	  High	  School	  in	  Jakarta	  removing	  their	  veils	  as	  they	  exited	  the	  school	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day.	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standards,	  he	  was	  fired.	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  promotes	  what	  is	  considered	  an	  authentic	  concept	  of	  self,	  which	  views	  an	  individual	  as	  a	  person	  who	  does	  not	  change	  regardless	  of	  the	  context	  in	  which	  one	  might	  find	  oneself.	  	  Consistency	  is	  of	  the	  upmost	  importance	  at	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT.	  Consequently,	  one	  must	  understand	  the	  standards	  so	  as	  to	  know	  how	  to	  behave	  appropriately.	  Under	  this	  approach,	  an	  individual	  can	  more	  confidently	  monitor	  moral	  behavior	  regardless	  of	  time	  or	  place,	  and	  avoid	  ambiguity	  and	  dissonance	  regarding	  standards	  and	  practices	  inherent	  in	  a	  more	  flexible	  approach.	  This	  emphasis	  on	  consistency,	  manifested	  in	  part	  through	  an	  emphasis	  on	  exacting	  ways	  for	  performing	  one’s	  religion,	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  students’	  quantifiable,	  list-­‐oriented,	  and	  rule-­‐abiding	  conceptualizations	  of	  a	  “good	  Muslim”	  and	  their	  disposition	  towards	  obedience	  and	  intolerance	  towards	  the	  situation	  of	  a	  woman	  not	  veiling	  in	  public.	  The	  high	  correlation	  between	  students’	  conceptualizations	  of	  a	  good	  Muslim	  and	  levels	  of	  tolerance	  and	  acceptance	  of	  deviant	  behavior	  and	  the	  schools	  flexible	  and	  exacting	  approaches	  to	  Islam	  suggest	  the	  schools	  are	  effectively	  shaping	  students’	  religious	  subjectivities.	  While	  subjectivities	  develop	  over	  time	  (McLeod	  2000)	  and	  the	  students’	  present	  dispositions	  are	  not	  indelible,	  the	  schools	  are	  setting	  the	  students	  on	  particular	  trajectories	  in	  subjectivity	  development	  that	  look	  quite	  different	  from	  each	  other.	  As	  an	  important	  final	  point	  is	  that	  students’	  development	  of	  religious	  subjectivity	  is	  not	  only	  acceptance	  of,	  but	  also	  reaction	  to,	  a	  school’s	  “practices,	  discourses	  and	  ethos”	  (McLeod	  2000:503).	  While	  many	  of	  the	  students	  interviewed	  seemed	  to	  have	  incorporated	  their	  school’s	  approach	  to	  Islam	  into	  their	  own,	  some	  had	  not.	  One	  group	  of	  grade-­‐six	  girls	  at	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  most	  vividly	  exemplifies	  this.	  Aside	  from	  one	  of	  the	  eight	  girls	  in	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Chapter	  6	  	  
	  
Intelligence,	  Piety,	  and	  Citizenship	  	  	  	  
The	  Prophet	  Muhammad	  once	  said	  that	  people	  who	  only	  have	  general	  knowledge	  (ilmu)	  are	  
very	  dangerous	  if	  they	  do	  not	  have	  morals	  (akhlak),	  and	  people	  who	  only	  have	  morals	  will	  not	  
be	  able	  to	  change	  the	  world	  if	  they	  have	  no	  general	  knowledge	  (ilmu).	  So	  both	  are	  highly	  
correlated	  and	  both	  should	  go	  hand-­‐in-­‐hand.	  People	  who	  are	  knowledgeable	  (berilmu)	  but	  
are	  immoral	  (tidak	  berakhlak)	  or	  have	  bad	  character	  (tidak	  berkepribadian	  baik),	  they’ll	  
produce	  a	  more	  devastated	  (lebih	  hancur)	  Indonesia.	  Interview	  with	  an	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  teacher,	  March	  18,	  2010	  A	  large	  vertical	  banner	  in	  Al	  Azhar	  31’s	  spacious	  main	  office	  displayed	  a	  lifelike	  drawing	  of	  the	  impressive,	  yet-­‐to-­‐be-­‐completed	  four-­‐story	  school	  building	  with	  the	  English	  words	  “Integrated	  Islamic	  School,”	  followed	  in	  Indonesian	  by	  “Educating	  a	  generation	  of	  intelligent,	  creative,	  skilled	  and	  pious	  Muslims.”	  These	  characteristics	  the	  school	  intends	  to	  develop	  in	  their	  students	  are	  not	  subjects	  to	  be	  taught,	  but	  qualities	  to	  be	  cultivated	  through	  guiding	  ideology,	  pedagogy,	  practices	  and	  school	  ethos.	  In	  interviews,	  teachers	  and	  founders	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  and	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  repeatedly	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  coupling	  of	  piety	  and	  intelligence,	  or	  educating	  “hearts	  and	  minds,”	  to	  students’	  comprehensive	  development.	  In	  the	  United	  States	  there	  are	  multiple	  educational	  programs	  that	  promote	  this	  idea	  that	  non-­‐cognitive	  characteristics	  are	  equally	  important	  to	  students’	  success	  in	  society	  as	  cognitive	  skills.	  Moral	  education,	  character	  education,	  leadership	  education,	  and	  multicultural	  education	  programs,	  for	  example,	  have	  been	  touted	  as	  crucial	  to	  full	  development	  of	  students	  and	  the	  nation	  (Tough	  2012).	  To	  promote	  piety,	  these	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schools	  have	  integrated	  religion	  into	  all	  aspects	  of	  their	  curricula	  and	  school	  cultures.	  	  
	  	  
176	  
While	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  three	  chapters,	  have	  different	  visions	  of	  what	  piety	  looks	  like	  and	  how	  a	  good	  Muslim	  behaves,	  the	  two	  school	  groups	  are	  in	  full	  agreement	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  piety	  and	  both	  use	  what	  I	  term	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology89	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  engender	  piety	  within	  their	  students.	  Certainly	  leadership	  at	  any	  Islamic	  school	  would	  want	  their	  students	  to	  be	  intelligent	  and	  pious.	  However,	  unlike	  most	  Islamic	  schools,	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT	  are	  framing	  the	  education	  of	  their	  students’	  hearts	  and	  minds	  within	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology.	  Most	  other	  Islamic	  schools	  keep	  religion	  and	  other	  curriculum	  materials	  separated	  by	  class	  periods.	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT	  schools,	  as	  will	  be	  explained	  in	  detail,	  abolish	  the	  secular−religious	  dichotomy	  perpetuated	  in	  most	  other	  Islamic	  schools	  by	  integrating	  religious	  concepts	  and	  teachings	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  into	  class	  discussions	  on	  any	  relevant	  subject	  and	  established	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  knowledge	  between	  the	  mundane	  and	  divine.	  Additionally,	  they	  focus	  on	  Islamic	  duties	  and	  morals,	  rather	  than	  subjects	  such	  as	  Islamic	  history	  or	  classical	  religious	  commentaries	  (kitab	  kuning).	  This	  approach	  is	  expected	  to	  transform	  students	  into	  pious	  observant	  Muslims	  rather	  than	  to	  inform	  students	  about	  Islam.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  For	  Al	  Azhar,	  this	  integration	  (memadukan)	  of	  religious	  and	  general	  knowledge	  as	  an	  approach	  to	  teaching	  came	  about	  “gradually”	  since	  the	  first	  Al	  Azhar	  school	  was	  founded	  in	  1964	  (Busyairi	  2002:110).	  In	  contrast,	  integrated	  Islam	  was	  the	  signature	  ideology	  of	  JSIT	  schools	  from	  their	  inception	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  Tarbiyah	  movement	  activists	  conceived	  JSIT	  institutions	  of	  education	  to	  disseminate	  a	  new	  religious	  sensibility	  intended	  to	  set	  aright	  the	  perceived	  misdirection	  of	  the	  secular-­‐minded	  population.	  Al	  Azhar	  is	  less	  vocal	  on	  reshaping	  the	  misguided	  Islamic	  practices	  of	  the	  country,	  but	  both	  schools	  hope	  to	  influence	  the	  population	  to	  be	  more	  pious.	  The	  use	  of	  the	  term	  “integrated	  Islam”	  is	  potentially	  confusing	  and	  my	  use	  of	  it	  requires	  justification.	  It	  is	  taken	  from	  the	  name	  of	  the	  Network	  of	  Integrated	  Islamic	  Schools	  (JSIT)	  and	  the	  phrase	  “integrated	  Islam”	  (Islam	  terpadu,	  or	  IT)	  has	  become	  an	  informal	  trademark	  for	  JSIT	  schools.	  However,	  Al	  Azhar,	  along	  with	  other	  Islamic	  school	  groups	  not	  mentioned	  in	  this	  research,	  prefers	  to	  be	  free	  of	  politics	  and	  to	  be	  recognized	  for	  their	  organization’s	  uniqueness	  and	  therefore	  does	  not	  like	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  JSIT	  and	  its	  linkage	  to	  PKS.	  Yet,	  as	  mentioned	  above,	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  in	  Jogja	  has	  used	  the	  phrase	  in	  English	  to	  describe	  the	  school’s	  ideology	  on	  a	  banner.	  The	  phrase	  is	  likely	  used	  in	  English	  not	  only	  to	  distance	  Al	  Azhar	  from	  the	  JSIT	  schools’	  fundamentally	  different	  implementation	  of	  Islam	  but	  also	  as	  a	  way	  to	  advertise	  the	  integrated	  approach	  to	  knowledge	  that	  both	  schools	  share.	  “Integrated	  Islam”	  succinctly	  describes	  the	  distinguishing	  characteristic	  of	  this	  new	  wave	  of	  modern	  Islamic	  schools—an	  integration	  of	  religious	  and	  secular	  knowledge	  in	  the	  classroom.	  Therefore,	  I	  use	  the	  term	  to	  describe	  the	  guiding	  ideology	  of	  these	  two	  types	  of	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schools.	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The	  development	  of	  this	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology	  is	  motivated	  by	  the	  perception	  that	  Indonesian	  students	  need	  an	  Islamic	  context	  in	  which	  to	  be	  properly	  educated.	  One	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  founder,	  who	  received	  a	  PhD	  abroad	  in	  engineering,	  explained,	  	  I	  know	  the	  Western	  concept	  [of	  education]	  is	  based	  on	  agnostic	  concepts	  or	  maybe	  disbelief	  [sic.]	  concepts,	  secularism,	  and	  materialism.	  I	  know	  Darwinism.	  Of	  course…in	  practical	  matters	  there	  are	  a	  lot	  of	  Western	  concepts	  that	  we	  agree	  on...But	  you	  know,	  we	  are	  in	  an	  Islamic	  country,	  so	  we	  teach	  them	  [our	  students]	  to	  understand	  about	  God,	  about	  the	  understanding	  that	  this	  world	  was	  created	  by	  God,	  about	  how	  we	  are	  to	  behave	  properly	  to	  all	  humankind,	  about	  humanity.	  We	  try	  to	  take	  the	  good	  things	  from	  Western	  education,	  and	  then	  we	  add	  to	  it	  Islamic	  philosophy.	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  founder,	  October	  10,	  2009).	  	  This	  founder	  suggested	  that	  an	  Islamic	  country’s	  education	  (not	  merely	  an	  Islamic	  school’s	  education)	  should	  look	  different	  from	  a	  secular	  Western	  country’s	  education.	  It	  is	  a	  common	  concern	  among	  a	  large	  range	  of	  religious	  educators	  in	  Indonesia	  that	  Western	  modernity	  and	  globalization	  have	  deteriorated	  Indonesia’s	  traditional	  values,	  which	  these	  educators	  believe	  to	  be	  Qur’an-­‐based	  (Lukens-­‐Bull	  2000:32).	  These	  perceptions	  echo	  the	  above	  informant’s	  views	  that	  Indonesian-­‐ness	  is	  often	  thought	  of	  in	  terms	  of	  religion.	  Additionally,	  imbedded	  in	  his	  criticisms	  of	  Western	  schools	  is	  the	  assumption	  that	  one	  cannot	  learn	  “to	  behave	  properly”	  through	  “agonistic	  concepts,”	  “secularism,	  and	  materialism,”	  but	  only	  through	  learning	  “about	  God.”	  	  To	  extended-­‐day	  school	  educators,	  moral	  character	  is	  crucial	  to	  being	  a	  good	  citizen	  and	  religion	  is	  the	  best	  vehicle	  for	  character	  education.	  This	  idea	  extends	  to	  their	  view	  of	  what	  is	  right	  for	  the	  public	  at	  large,	  as	  will	  be	  addressed	  later	  on	  in	  this	  chapter.	  Certainly	  it	  behooves	  any	  government	  to	  advocate	  for	  a	  moral	  population	  as	  criminal,	  anti-­‐social	  activity	  is	  a	  drain	  on	  national	  resources.	  However,	  these	  educators	  consider	  moral	  character	  to	  be	  synonymous	  with	  piety.	  In	  interviews,	  educators	  emphasized	  the	  dire	  social	  consequences	  of	  educated	  individuals	  who	  were	  not	  also	  pious.	  An	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  teacher	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reasoned,	  “We	  have	  to	  integrate	  faith	  and	  piety	  (taqwa)	  with	  science	  (ilmu	  pengetahuan)	  and	  technology	  because	  if	  someone	  was	  just	  smart,	  but	  didn’t	  believe	  in	  God,	  it	  means	  he	  will	  not	  love	  his	  fellowmen.	  Then	  later,	  his	  knowledge	  will	  actually	  mess	  up	  (mengacaukan)	  the	  world”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  teacher,	  February	  9,	  2010).	  	  Along	  these	  same	  lines,	  a	  Ery	  described	  the	  products	  of	  a	  secular	  education	  system	  as	  “individuals	  who	  are	  individualistic,	  exploitative,	  and	  lean	  towards,	  well,	  are	  highly	  motivated	  to	  control	  the	  universe	  for	  the	  interests	  of	  themselves	  and	  their	  small	  communities”	  (Interview	  with	  Ery	  Masruri,	  April	  8,	  2009).	  He	  went	  on	  to	  say	  that	  such	  individualistic	  tendencies	  have	  no	  sense	  of	  accountability	  and,	  he	  intimated,	  only	  result	  in	  corrupt	  leadership,	  rather	  than	  a	  kholifah,	  or	  a	  benevolent	  steward	  of	  God’s	  world	  who	  governs	  for	  the	  prosperity	  of	  the	  entire	  human	  race.	  Ultimately,	  these	  educators	  believed	  that	  only	  moral	  character-­‐cum-­‐piety,	  which	  comes	  through	  religious	  education,	  can	  thoughtfully	  guide	  the	  application	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  and	  technology	  so	  that	  it	  can	  be	  beneficial	  to	  society.	  In	  other	  words,	  piety	  protects	  against	  nefarious	  uses	  of	  knowledge.	  I	  argue	  that	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT	  view	  piety	  as	  a	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  not	  only	  personal	  development,	  but	  also	  citizenship.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  demonstrate	  how	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  school	  personnel	  conceptualize	  character	  development	  through	  solely	  religious	  terms	  and	  employ	  an	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology	  to	  promote	  piety	  among	  students.	  As	  the	  educators	  see	  universal	  benefits	  of	  a	  pious	  citizenry,	  they	  have	  hopes	  of	  an	  “integrated	  religion	  ideology”	  to	  be	  implemented	  in	  the	  general	  state	  schools.	  The	  religious	  aspects	  of	  Indonesia’s	  government	  policies	  facilitate	  and	  provide	  justification	  for	  extended-­‐day	  school	  leadership’s	  arguments	  for	  visions	  of	  a	  nationally	  implemented	  piety	  project.	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In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  first	  discuss	  extended-­‐day	  school	  educators’	  views	  of	  religion’s	  role	  in	  character	  development,	  how	  they	  conceptualize	  moral	  character	  to	  be	  synonymous	  with	  piety,	  and	  how	  they	  view	  piety	  as	  a	  crucial	  form	  of	  citizenship.	  I	  then	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  implementation	  of	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology	  is	  intended	  to	  engender	  piety	  in	  their	  students.	  I	  lay	  out	  the	  three	  components	  of	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology:	  1)	  desegregation	  of	  secular	  and	  religious	  knowledge	  by	  presenting	  all	  class	  content	  in	  an	  Islamic	  framework;	  2)	  a	  Qur’an-­‐based	  epistemology;	  and	  3)	  a	  strong	  consciousness	  of	  God.	  These	  components	  of	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology	  combine	  to	  create	  an	  intellectual	  respect	  for	  and	  emotional	  indebtedness	  to	  God,	  which	  in	  turn	  is	  meant	  to	  engender	  pious	  and	  devout	  sensibilities	  within	  students.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology	  promotes	  piety	  as	  it	  approaches	  academic	  studies	  by	  highlighting	  God’s	  own	  intelligence	  and	  benevolence.	  I	  conclude	  the	  chapter	  by	  discussing	  the	  school	  leaderships’	  vision	  of	  introducing	  an	  “integrated	  religion	  ideology”	  into	  the	  national	  education	  system	  in	  order	  to	  develop	  a	  more	  pious	  and	  upright	  Indonesian	  citizenry.	  I	  highlight	  the	  JSIT-­‐cum-­‐PKS	  activists’	  proposed	  education	  platform	  as	  the	  material	  for	  discussion	  of	  a	  hoped-­‐for	  nationwide	  piety	  project.	  	  	  
Moral	  Character	  as	  Piety	  Through	  the	  eyes	  of	  these	  Islamic	  educators,	  moral	  character	  is	  synonymous	  with	  piety,	  and	  it	  can	  only	  be	  taught	  through	  religion.	  If	  one	  is	  not	  pious,	  one	  cannot	  be	  moral.	  An	  Al	  Azhar	  official	  at	  Jakarta	  headquarters	  explained,	  	  Moral	  education	  is	  the	  way	  of	  building	  character	  of	  the	  young	  people…[Character	  building	  means]	  to	  build	  a	  moral	  life.	  A	  moral	  life	  should	  be	  based	  on	  the	  teachings	  of	  religion.	  Because	  the	  basic	  philosophy	  of	  our	  nation	  is	  Pancasila,	  with	  the	  first	  pillar	  of	  the	  philosophy	  related	  to	  the	  teaching	  of	  religion.	  There	  are	  more	  than	  six	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religions	  that	  are	  practiced	  by	  the	  population	  of	  Indonesia.	  We	  agree	  that	  moral	  education	  should	  be	  built	  on	  the	  teaching	  of	  religion.	  This	  is	  how	  we	  understand	  it	  [moral	  education]	  in	  Indonesia.	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  headquarters	  official,	  August	  13,	  2012).	  	  	  Relating	  that	  the	  state	  general	  schools	  only	  studied	  morals	  “a	  little	  bit”,	  but	  Islamic	  schools	  taught	  morals	  and	  general	  knowledge,	  an	  Al	  Azhar	  teacher	  explained	  that	  “the	  pre-­‐eminence	  of	  Islamic	  schools”	  results	  from	  a	  strong	  moral	  education.	  He	  went	  on	  to	  say,	  “I’m	  certain	  that	  any	  Christian	  school	  is	  like	  that	  too.	  They	  don’t	  only	  want	  them	  [students]	  to	  be	  superb	  intellectually	  but	  and	  also	  superb	  in	  character	  (kepribadian)”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  teacher,	  March	  18,	  2010).	  This	  Al	  Azhar	  teacher	  felt	  only	  religious	  schools	  promote	  morals	  and	  a	  “superb”	  personality.	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT	  leadership	  are	  clear	  that	  they	  advocate	  for	  a	  religiously	  filtered	  morality.	  Like	  most	  religious—and	  not	  just	  Islamic—organizations	  and	  groups,	  they	  feel	  that	  religion	  has	  the	  monopoly	  on	  ethics	  and	  morals	  (Niyozov	  &	  Memon	  2011:19).	  While	  both	  intelligence	  and	  piety	  are	  meant	  to	  be	  the	  two	  equal	  crowning	  characteristics	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT	  students,	  when	  extended-­‐day	  schools	  are	  compared	  to	  the	  top	  state	  schools,	  student	  piety	  is	  the	  value-­‐added	  commodity	  that	  makes	  these	  schools	  stand	  out.	  Intelligence	  is	  a	  cognitive	  skill	  achieved	  through	  quality	  instruction,	  and	  at	  these	  schools	  it	  is	  filtered	  through	  an	  Islamic	  framework	  so	  students	  avoid	  misinformation	  from	  a	  secular	  perspective.	  Piety	  is	  more	  a	  matter	  of	  affinities	  of	  the	  heart.	  There	  are	  two	  components	  to	  piety.	  First,	  it	  is	  the	  proper	  performance	  of	  religious	  duties	  and	  acts	  of	  worship.	  Second,	  and	  more	  fundamentally	  important,	  it	  is	  Islamic	  character,	  or	  daily	  conduct	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  principles	  of	  devotion	  and	  virtuous	  behavior	  (Mahmood	  
	  	  
181	  
2004).90	  Religious	  duties	  and	  acts	  of	  worship	  are	  taught	  and	  practiced	  at	  school	  through	  both	  the	  curriculum	  and	  daily	  routine	  to	  ensure	  proper	  performance.	  Islamic	  morals	  such	  as	  honesty,	  respect	  for	  elders,	  care	  for	  the	  environment,	  modesty,	  and	  service	  to	  others	  are	  the	  product	  of	  devotion	  to	  God.	  Teachers	  and	  administration	  I	  spoke	  with	  always	  assumed	  that	  Islamic	  instruction	  engendered	  moral	  children.	  They	  asserted	  that	  religion	  was	  the	  vehicle	  through	  which	  morals	  are	  taught	  and	  given	  meaning.	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT	  employ	  an	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology	  to	  teach	  Islamic	  values	  and	  motivate	  students	  to	  be	  pious.	  	  Integrated	  Islam	  ideology	  promotes	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  coupling	  of	  intelligence	  and	  piety	  is	  crucial	  to	  personal	  development	  and	  the	  development	  of	  one’s	  community	  and	  country.	  There	  are	  social	  benefits	  to	  be	  reaped	  from	  a	  holistic,	  religion-­‐filtered	  understanding	  of	  the	  world.	  Correct	  principles	  lead	  to	  moral	  individuals	  and	  good	  governance,	  which	  then	  translates	  into	  individual	  and	  civic	  peace	  in	  this	  world	  and	  happiness	  in	  the	  world	  to	  come.	  Extended-­‐day	  school	  education	  is	  more	  than	  human	  capital	  development	  for	  national	  economic	  prosperity.	  These	  schools	  are	  to	  “make	  Indonesian	  society	  in	  possession	  of	  good	  ethics	  (berakhlakul	  karimah),	  so	  that	  the	  next	  generation	  of	  Indonesians	  becomes	  a	  great	  people	  and	  upholds	  things	  of	  Islam	  (keIslaman)”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  teacher,	  March	  18,	  2010).	  Strong	  personal	  character,	  or	  good	  morals,	  is	  expected	  to	  manage	  negative	  impulses	  and	  wield	  knowledge	  for	  societal	  benefit.	  In	  the	  increasingly	  religious	  public	  sphere	  of	  Indonesia,	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  religion-­‐based	  morality	  or	  piety	  is	  the	  strongest	  form	  of	  morality	  is	  gaining	  traction.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  See	  Politics	  of	  Piety	  by	  Saba	  Mahmood	  (2004)	  for	  similar	  discussion	  on	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Piety	  Movement	  in	  Egypt	  in	  the	  informal	  educational	  setting	  of	  mosque	  study	  groups	  for	  women.	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The	  idea	  that	  individual	  piety	  benefits	  the	  nation	  is	  a	  growing	  phenomenon	  and	  is	  being	  applied	  to	  various	  sectors	  of	  Indonesian	  society.	  For	  example,	  an	  Al	  Azhar	  teacher	  was	  certain	  that	  a	  moral	  governing	  body	  would	  be	  conscientious	  of	  the	  environment.	  He	  theorized	  that	  if	  Indonesia	  was	  to	  advance	  as	  a	  nation	  under	  the	  guidance	  of	  pious	  Muslims,	  the	  development	  would	  not	  be	  accompanied	  by	  environmental	  disasters	  and	  environmental	  pollution	  as	  have	  occurred	  in	  the	  secular	  United	  States	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  teacher,	  March	  18,	  2010).	  In	  formalized	  practice,	  public	  and	  private	  businesses	  are	  implementing	  three-­‐day	  Emotional	  and	  Spiritual	  Quotient	  training	  programs	  to	  increase	  company	  productivity	  levels.	  Rudnyckyj’s	  (2010)	  fascinating	  ethnography,	  based	  in	  the	  national	  company	  Krakatau	  Steel,	  demonstrates	  how	  economic	  development	  is	  being	  recast	  in	  Indonesia	  as	  an	  ethical,	  rather	  then	  technical,	  problem.	  Paralleling	  Weber’s	  concept	  of	  the	  Protestant	  Work	  Ethic,	  the	  steel	  company	  has	  turned	  to	  a	  program	  of	  Islamic	  “spiritual	  reform”	  that	  merges	  Islamic	  ethics	  with	  Western	  management	  knowledge	  to	  increase	  productivity.	  Through	  spiritual	  development,	  employees	  become	  better	  Muslims,	  workers	  and	  citizens	  who	  in	  turn	  positively	  impact	  the	  economic	  development	  of	  the	  company,	  society,	  and	  nation.	  The	  Spiritual	  Quotient	  trainings	  are	  meant	  to	  be	  universally	  applicable	  to	  all	  employees,	  Muslims	  of	  any	  kind	  as	  well	  as	  non-­‐Muslim.	  However,	  Rudnyckyj	  reported	  that	  many	  non-­‐Muslim	  participants	  did	  feel	  uncomfortable	  with	  the	  heavily	  Islamic	  approach	  to	  spiritual	  development.	  	  	   The	  perceived	  social	  benefits	  of	  piety	  are	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  PKS’s	  political	  goal	  of	  creating	  a	  more	  religious	  country.	  Unlike	  Al	  Azhar,	  PKS	  is	  actively	  and	  explicitly	  participating	  in	  efforts	  to	  develop	  a	  religious	  sensibility	  to	  replace	  the	  secular	  mindsets,	  abstract	  approaches	  to	  religion,	  or	  adulterated	  Islamic	  practices	  of	  previous	  decades	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through	  political	  and	  cultural	  means.	  JSIT	  schools	  are	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  the	  cultural	  Islamization	  efforts	  of	  the	  party.	  In	  effect,	  the	  SITs	  are	  a	  laboratory	  for	  developing	  educational	  practices	  that	  the	  party	  would,	  in	  a	  modified	  form,	  expand	  to	  the	  national	  level	  if	  given	  the	  opportunity.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Al	  Azhar	  has	  similar	  hopes	  of	  a	  more	  religious	  citizenry,	  but	  does	  not	  hold	  the	  same	  vision	  of	  what	  that	  piety	  would	  look	  like.	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  a	  later	  section,	  leadership	  from	  both	  organizations	  have	  similar	  visions	  of	  reforming	  the	  national	  education	  system	  to	  generate	  pious	  citizens,	  regardless	  of	  religion.	  As	  visions	  of	  this	  national	  reform	  are	  based	  on	  the	  extended-­‐day	  schools’	  unique	  approach	  to	  instilling	  piety,	  this	  ideology	  will	  first	  be	  explained	  as	  implemented	  in	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT	  schools,	  before	  moving	  to	  ideas	  of	  its	  national	  application.	  	  	  
The	  Ideology	  of	  Integrated	  Islam	  Since	  their	  conception,	  Islamic	  schools	  have	  been	  adapting	  to	  their	  social	  and	  political	  milieu.	  However,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  shifts	  came	  at	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  (Niyozov	  &	  Memon	  2011),	  or	  the	  modern	  (Kadi	  2006,	  Berkey	  2007),	  era.	  The	  Muslim	  response	  to	  Western	  modernity	  and	  Western	  science	  has	  been	  diverse,	  ranging	  from	  rejection,	  to	  adaptation,	  to	  adoption.	  Some,	  such	  as	  Ataturk	  in	  Turkey,	  marginalized	  Islamic	  schooling	  and	  embraced	  the	  Western	  sciences	  and	  Western	  schooling,	  seeing	  them	  as	  the	  key	  to	  Europe’s	  superiority	  in	  technology	  and	  warfare,	  and	  therefore	  the	  key	  to	  Turkey’s	  modernization.	  Others,	  such	  as	  Maududi	  in	  the	  subcontinent,	  called	  upon	  Muslims	  to	  distance	  themselves	  from	  Western	  modernity	  and	  Western	  sciences,	  because	  in	  Maududi’s	  view,	  Western	  immorality	  and	  secularism,	  among	  other	  things,	  were	  corrupting	  Islam’s	  message	  of	  obedience	  to	  God’s	  servants	  (Niyozov	  &	  Memon	  2011:13-­‐14).	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In	  post-­‐colonial	  Indonesia,	  successive	  policy	  shifts	  progressively	  incorporated	  non-­‐boarding	  Islamic	  schools	  (mainly	  madrasas	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  schools)	  into	  the	  state	  education	  system91	  through	  standardized	  curriculum	  requirements	  regarding	  the	  inclusion	  of	  general	  sciences.	  Although	  Islamic	  schooling	  has	  been	  largely	  the	  work	  of	  private	  institutions	  rather	  than	  the	  government,	  with	  an	  estimated	  96%92	  of	  madrasa	  and	  Islamic	  schools	  being	  private,	  madrasas	  and	  Islamic	  schools	  account	  for	  the	  education	  of	  13%	  of	  all	  primary-­‐	  and	  secondary-­‐level	  students	  in	  Indonesia	  (Azra	  et	  al.	  2006:179,	  180).	  Currently,	  these	  schools	  are	  required	  to	  provide	  a	  curriculum	  comprised	  of	  about	  70%	  general	  and	  30%	  religious	  subjects.	  This	  policy	  was	  intended	  to	  guarantee	  the	  successful	  continuation	  of	  religious	  school	  students’	  education	  at	  public	  institutions	  at	  the	  postsecondary	  level.	  Pesantren,	  Islamic	  boarding	  schools	  that	  traditionally	  only	  provide	  Islamic	  training,	  have	  not	  been	  and	  are	  not	  beholden	  to	  government	  certification,	  and	  are	  thus	  free	  from	  state	  curricula	  requirements.	  However,	  to	  address	  the	  challenges	  of	  a	  changing,	  modernizing	  society,	  pesantren	  leaders	  have	  and	  continue	  to	  adjust	  their	  curriculum	  by	  adding	  general-­‐studies	  content	  (see	  Lukens-­‐Bull	  2000;	  Lukens-­‐Bull	  2005;	  Pohl	  2006).	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT	  schools	  see	  the	  learning	  of	  the	  sciences	  not	  only	  as	  a	  way	  to	  survive	  in	  the	  modern	  era,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  commandment	  of	  God	  and	  an	  act	  of	  worship.	  A	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  Qur’an	  teacher	  explained,	  “Islam	  encourages	  Muslims	  to	  seek	  knowledge	  (ilmu)	  about	  everything…	  The	  studying	  of	  any	  knowledge	  (ilmu)	  constitutes	  worship”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  Qur’an	  teacher,	  November	  30,	  2009).	  This	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  Upon	  independence	  in	  1945,	  the	  colonial	  Dutch	  education	  system	  was	  nationalized,	  becoming	  the	  basic	  pattern	  for	  the	  national	  education	  system.	  	  	  92	  This	  data	  is	  from	  1989.	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perspective	  that	  the	  Qur’an	  insists	  that	  the	  sciences	  and	  other	  general	  subject	  matter	  be	  studied	  not	  only	  validates	  the	  study	  of	  scientific	  subjects,	  but	  also	  justifies	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  entire	  national	  curriculum	  in	  an	  Islamic	  school’s	  program	  of	  study.	  	  Although	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT	  educators	  do	  not	  oppose	  Western	  sciences,93	  they	  do	  oppose	  Western	  society’s	  ostensibly	  secular94	  approach	  to	  that	  knowledge.	  During	  the	  Enlightenment,	  religion	  and	  its	  revealed	  knowledge	  was	  considered	  limiting	  to	  scientific	  knowledge	  and	  reason-­‐based	  understanding.	  The	  desacralization	  of	  knowledge	  and	  public	  life	  ensued,	  creating	  “secular”	  and	  “religious”	  types	  of	  knowledge.	  Consequently,	  state	  schooling	  systems	  in	  the	  West	  generally	  reflect	  a	  more	  secular	  approach	  to	  and	  understanding	  of	  the	  sciences	  and	  information	  in	  general.	  Various	  contemporary	  religious	  movements,	  however—most	  famously	  among	  Christians,	  the	  Creationists	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  among	  Muslims,	  the	  Gülen	  Movement	  in	  Turkey—have	  challenged	  this	  desacralized	  approach	  to	  knowledge	  and	  are	  working	  to	  reintegrate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  Teachers’	  tertiary	  training	  is	  from	  all	  different	  fields,	  rather	  than	  religion	  departments,	  and	  they	  are	  eager	  to	  provide	  an	  education	  for	  children	  that	  is	  both	  academically	  sound	  and	  religiously	  rigorous.	  Mirroring	  the	  “common	  man”	  persona	  of	  the	  current	  revival	  of	  Islam	  through	  out	  the	  world,	  where	  lay	  individuals	  fill	  leadership	  roles	  in	  social	  institutions	  with	  religious	  missions,	  these	  two	  school	  groups	  are	  no	  different.	  	  94	  The	  concept	  of	  “secular”	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  two	  primary	  distinctions:	  the	  separation	  of	  religion	  from	  issues	  of	  the	  state,	  and	  the	  differentiation	  of	  various	  sectors	  of	  society	  such	  as	  economic,	  legal,	  educational,	  familial,	  and	  religious	  (Berger	  1973,	  Casanova	  1994;	  Durkheim	  1965;	  Martin	  1978).	  	  
	  




religion	  and	  the	  sciences.	  While	  making	  similar	  efforts,	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT	  schools	  have	  no	  connection	  to	  the	  Gülen	  Movement.	  While	  most	  other	  Islamic	  schools	  in	  Indonesia	  incorporate	  both	  religion	  and	  general	  classes	  into	  their	  school	  curricula,	  religious	  and	  scientific	  knowledge	  are	  discussed	  in	  separate	  classes.	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT	  schools	  consider	  the	  categorization	  of	  religious	  and	  secular	  knowledge,	  or	  religion	  and	  the	  sciences,	  to	  be	  a	  misguided	  dichotomy.	  This	  inaccurate	  dichotomy	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  curriculum	  of	  both	  general	  schools	  and	  other	  Islamic	  schools.	  As	  one	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  founder	  put	  it,	  	  In	  our	  idealism	  as	  Muslims,	  Islam	  is	  a	  holistic	  or	  comprehensive	  set	  of	  world	  affairs	  and	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  hereafter.	  Cognitive,	  emotional,	  and	  psychomotor	  aspects	  must	  coalesce...Other	  Islamic	  schools	  indeed	  already	  had	  religious	  studies	  and	  general	  studies	  but	  they	  are	  not	  yet	  integrated.	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  founder,	  March	  22,	  2010)	  	  Like	  many	  of	  the	  Islamization	  projects	  currently	  going	  on	  throughout	  the	  world,	  these	  schools	  view	  Islam	  as	  comprehensive	  and	  relevant	  to	  all	  public	  (political,	  economic,	  social,	  etc.)	  and	  private	  aspects	  of	  life	  (Roy	  2004).	  In	  this	  paradigm,	  an	  integration	  of	  the	  religious	  and	  general	  knowledge	  is	  viewed	  as	  a	  more	  accurate	  portrayal	  of	  the	  comprehensiveness	  of	  Islam,95	  and	  thus	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  and	  accurate	  worldview.	  Since	  Islam	  is	  from	  God	  and	  God	  created	  all	  things,	  Islam	  contains	  all	  knowledge	  necessary	  for	  being	  successful	  in	  this	  life	  and	  the	  next.	  Therefore,	  a	  division	  of	  secular	  and	  religious	  is	  artificial.	  	  Integrated	  Islam	  ideology	  combines	  some	  aspects	  of	  Western	  schooling	  (i.e.	  academic	  focus,	  the	  use	  of	  technology,	  and	  critical	  thinking	  pedagogy)	  with	  Islamic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  If	  Islam	  is	  comprehensive,	  isn’t	  the	  term	  “integrated	  Islam”	  misleading?	  JSIT	  founders	  initially	  felt	  a	  conflict	  when	  deciding	  what	  to	  call	  their	  new	  schools.	  As	  one	  explained,	  they	  hesitated	  at	  first	  to	  use	  the	  term	  “integrated”	  since	  Islam,	  by	  its	  nature,	  is	  complete	  or	  integrated	  into	  all	  aspects	  of	  life.	  Ultimately,	  however,	  they	  chose	  to	  use	  the	  term	  to	  signify	  to	  the	  larger	  community	  that	  they	  approached	  Islamic	  schooling	  differently	  than	  other	  Islamic	  schools,	  namely	  keeping	  “secular”	  and	  “religious”	  subjects	  segregated.	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concepts	  and	  narratives,	  therefore	  providing	  a	  “morally	  meaningful	  context”	  to	  the	  material	  (Milligan	  2006:419).	  These	  schools’	  integration	  of	  Islam	  and	  Western	  sciences	  has	  similarities	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  Islamization	  of	  knowledge.	  In	  1977	  in	  Mecca,	  at	  the	  First	  World	  Congress	  on	  Muslim	  Education,	  al-­‐Attas	  from	  Malaysia	  made	  first	  mention	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  Islamization	  of	  knowledge,	  or	  ridding	  Western	  knowledge	  of	  its	  secular	  values	  by	  reframing	  it	  in	  its	  right	  and	  proper	  place	  within	  an	  Islamic	  vision	  of	  truth	  and	  reality	  (Wan	  Daud	  1998:309,	  Halstead	  2004:523).	  However,	  debates	  among	  scholars	  have	  arisen	  regarding	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  accepting	  Western	  classifications	  of	  knowledge	  versus	  giving	  more	  attention	  to	  “sources	  of	  knowledge	  established	  in	  Islam	  or	  to	  the	  methodology	  followed	  by	  eminent	  Muslim	  thinkers”	  (Halstead	  2004:522).	  The	  extended-­‐day	  educators	  do	  not	  consider	  themselves	  to	  be	  engaged	  in	  these	  debates,	  though	  they	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  influenced	  by	  these	  concepts	  and	  approaches	  to	  knowledge.	  	  In	  order	  to	  approach	  the	  study	  of	  the	  sciences	  and	  general	  knowledge	  appropriate	  for	  an	  Islamic	  society,	  the	  schools	  employ	  an	  Islamic	  framework	  that	  is	  guided	  by	  what	  I	  have	  termed	  an	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology.	  This	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology	  is	  marked	  by	  three	  key	  features:	  1)	  desegregation	  of	  secular	  and	  religious	  knowledge	  by	  presenting	  all	  class	  content	  in	  an	  Islamic	  framework;	  2)	  a	  Qur’an-­‐based	  epistemology;	  and	  3)	  development	  of	  a	  strong	  consciousness	  of	  God.	  These	  three	  interrelated	  features	  are	  intended	  to	  engender	  piety	  among	  students	  by	  instilling	  intellectual	  respect	  for	  God	  and	  indebtedness	  to	  God’s	  benevolence.	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Desegregation	  of	  secular	  and	  religious	  knowledge	  in	  the	  classroom	  Integrated	  Islam	  ideology	  seeks	  to	  reinsert	  God	  into	  the	  history,	  explanation,	  and	  understanding	  of	  the	  workings	  of	  this	  world	  (Niyozov	  &	  Memon	  2011).	  This	  is	  done	  through	  the	  use	  of	  religious	  text,	  namely	  the	  Qur’an,	  alongside	  textbooks	  as	  sources	  of	  information	  in	  the	  sciences	  and	  all	  other	  classes.	  As	  an	  Al-­‐Azhar	  31	  religion	  teacher	  understood	  it,	  the	  combination	  of	  religion	  and	  sciences	  “is	  pure	  knowledge,	  it	  [knowledge]	  becomes	  perfect	  (kaffah).	  We	  shouldn’t	  distinguish	  Islamic	  knowledge	  and	  general	  knowledge.	  Knowledge	  is	  one”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  religion	  teacher,	  February	  16,	  2010).	  He	  argues	  that	  one	  without	  the	  other	  is	  incomplete.	  Their	  combination	  works	  together	  for	  a	  complete,	  perfect	  understanding	  of	  this	  world,	  and	  the	  next.	  In	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology,	  there	  are	  no	  categorical	  divisions	  of	  “secular”	  and	  “religious”	  knowledge.	  All	  knowledge	  is	  from	  God.	  A	  JSIT	  founder	  explained:	  What	  is	  learned	  at	  school	  must	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  single	  unit,	  which	  in	  Islam	  is	  called	  
tumid	  [unity	  and	  interconnectedness	  of	  truth].	  What	  are	  the	  implications?	  When	  we	  learn	  about	  flowers,	  about	  the	  stones,	  rain,	  sky,	  earth,	  and	  so	  on	  it	  should	  not	  just	  be	  looked	  at	  as	  only	  science…We	  believe	  that	  science	  on	  the	  earth	  comes	  from	  the	  one	  that	  is	  God,	  the	  owner	  of	  knowledge.	  (Interview	  with	  Fahmi	  Alaydrus,	  May	  1,	  2010)	  	  He	  continued	  with	  an	  example,	  claiming	  that	  it	  would	  be	  inaccurate	  to	  describe	  the	  law	  of	  gravity	  as	  a	  so-­‐called	  law	  of	  nature.	  Secular	  people	  call	  it	  a	  law	  of	  nature.	  Nature	  has	  willed	  it	  that	  way.	  Newton	  thought	  that	  there	  was	  gravity	  because	  the	  earth	  had	  gravitational	  pull.	  But	  we	  consider	  the	  earth	  to	  have	  gravity	  because	  God	  created	  it.	  So	  we	  integrate.	  (Interview	  with	  Fahmi	  Alaydrus,	  May	  1,	  2010)	  	  From	  his	  perspective,	  referring	  to	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  world	  as	  the	  “laws	  of	  nature”	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  sidestep	  recognition	  of	  God’s	  hand	  in	  creating	  the	  world.	  	  In	  his	  mind,	  to	  discuss	  the	  “laws	  of	  nature”	  without	  attributing	  their	  existence	  to	  God’s	  power	  is	  to	  deprive	  the	  principle	  of	  an	  Islamic	  narrative	  and	  “morally	  meaningful	  context”	  (Milligan	  2006:419).	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   Additionally,	  Islamic	  principles	  are	  discussed	  and	  integrated	  into	  lessons	  so	  as	  to	  “deepen	  the	  students’	  understanding	  of	  Islam”	  (Al	  Azhar	  headquarters	  official,	  August	  11,	  2012).	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  mathematics	  class	  on	  division,	  students	  use	  the	  context	  of	  the	  act	  of	  alms	  giving,	  one	  of	  the	  five	  pillars	  of	  Islam,	  for	  calculating	  an	  amount	  to	  be	  given.	  This	  situation	  provides	  direct	  application	  of	  the	  skill	  as	  well	  as	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  practice	  of	  alms	  giving.	   	  	  
Qur’an-­‐based	  epistemology	  In	  this	  ideology,	  the	  Qur’an	  is	  the	  ultimate	  source	  of	  knowledge.	  As	  a	  grade-­‐four	  teacher	  at	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  succinctly	  explained,	  “All	  I	  know	  is	  that	  all	  knowledge	  is	  from	  God	  and	  Islam	  is	  from	  God,	  so	  all	  the	  knowledge	  that’s	  out	  there	  has	  an	  explanation	  here	  [in	  the	  Qur’an],	  even	  though	  it’s	  not	  very	  detailed”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  teacher,	  February	  9,	  2010).	  In	  other	  words,	  God	  is	  the	  source	  of	  all	  knowledge	  and	  he	  has	  revealed	  it	  in	  the	  Qur’an.	  As	  such,	  “When	  learning	  science	  it’s	  not	  secular.	  We	  associate	  it	  with	  revelations	  [from	  the	  Qur’an]”	  (Interview	  with	  Fahmi	  Alaydrus,	  May	  1,	  2010).	  In	  other	  words,	  while	  the	  schools	  implement	  the	  ostensibly	  secular	  national	  curriculum	  in	  its	  entirety,	  it	  is	  taught	  within	  a	  religious	  framework	  that	  provides	  the	  students	  with	  a	  morally	  meaningful	  context	  for	  the	  information.	  While	  there	  is	  no	  secular−religious	  dichotomy	  in	  the	  classroom,	  there	  is	  a	  distinct	  hierarchy	  to	  knowledge.	  These	  schools	  both	  readily	  acknowledge	  the	  importance	  of	  religious	  and	  general	  knowledge	  for	  productive	  participation	  in	  society.	  Yet,	  if	  there	  are	  conflicts	  between	  an	  Islamic	  perspective	  and	  a	  non-­‐Islamic	  one	  on	  a	  social,	  political	  or	  scientific	  topic,	  the	  revealed	  knowledge	  eclipses	  any	  other.	  While	  all	  knowledge	  is	  one,	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man’s	  knowledge	  is	  subject	  to	  God	  and	  His	  prophets’	  teachings.	  Science	  comes	  from	  God;	  therefore	  God’s	  word	  in	  holy	  texts	  take	  precedence	  over	  scientists’	  explanations	  if	  the	  two	  sources	  do	  not	  correlate.	  The	  integration	  occurs	  at	  the	  level	  of	  discussing	  all	  perspectives	  together,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  perspectives	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  equal.	  The	  word	  of	  God,	  and	  therefore	  the	  concepts,	  perspectives,	  and	  ideals	  found	  within	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Hadith,	  are	  the	  correct	  truths	  and	  cannot	  be	  altered	  or	  negotiated.	  The	  perspective	  is	  that	  scholars	  do	  not	  invent	  knowledge,	  but	  rather	  scientists	  discover	  God’s	  knowledge	  (Niyozov	  &	  Memon	  2011:17).	  	  Classroom	  instruction	  on	  evolution	  offers	  the	  most	  vivid	  example	  of	  how	  this	  hierarchy	  is	  implemented	  through	  Islamic	  narratives	  of	  scientific	  principles.	  As	  the	  theory	  of	  evolution	  is	  part	  of	  the	  national	  high	  school	  curriculum,	  which	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT	  schools	  teach	  in	  full,	  the	  science	  teacher	  would	  teach	  the	  theory	  of	  evolution	  and	  then	  cite	  the	  Qur’anic	  account	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  Adam	  and	  Eve	  and	  present	  it	  as	  the	  accurate	  account	  of	  man’s	  coming	  into	  existence.	  The	  proof	  for	  discounting	  scientific	  theories	  is	  found	  in	  the	  Qur’an,	  the	  spoken	  word	  of	  God.	  Teachers	  do	  not	  withhold	  the	  generally	  accepted	  theories	  of	  science	  from	  the	  students,	  but	  provide	  what	  they	  consider	  a	  complete	  education	  by	  correcting	  theories	  when	  needed	  with	  the	  teachings	  of	  the	  Qur’an.	  Rather	  than	  saving	  the	  theological	  discussion	  about	  the	  origins	  of	  man	  for	  religion	  class	  led	  by	  a	  religion	  teacher,	  as	  would	  happen	  in	  general	  and	  other	  religious	  schools,	  the	  science	  teacher	  subordinates	  man’s	  “incorrect”	  theories	  to	  the	  revealed	  truths	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  in	  science	  class.	  Thus,	  all	  teachers	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  both	  religion	  and	  subject-­‐specific	  teachers.	  Such	  a	  practice	  is	  expected	  to	  prevent	  contradictions	  in	  the	  various	  learning	  environments	  students	  experience	  in	  a	  given	  day.	  In	  “a	  very	  extreme	  example”	  provided	  by	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Ery,	  one	  of	  the	  founders	  of	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT,	  students	  in	  “elementary	  school	  to	  college”	  are	  taught	  that	  our	  ancestors	  are	  apes…	  In	  the	  afternoon	  when	  children	  return	  to	  the	  mosques,	  to	  their	  homes,	  it	  is	  believed	  that	  in	  the	  book	  of	  Islam	  that	  the	  first	  human	  was	  Adam,	  the	  second	  Eve,	  and	  so	  forth.	  So	  in	  the	  morning	  our	  ancestors	  are	  apes;	  our	  ancestor	  in	  the	  afternoon	  is	  Adam,	  a	  glorious	  human	  being.	  That’s	  something	  that’s	  contradictory.	  That’s…an	  example	  of	  a	  problem	  in	  the	  world	  of	  education	  in	  Indonesia—its	  [curricular	  content]	  doesn’t	  start	  from	  the	  basic	  religious	  communities	  themselves…	  We	  are	  passionate	  about	  correcting	  this.	  (Interview	  with	  Ery	  Masruri,	  October	  21,	  2009)	  	  Thus,	  by	  addressing	  both	  the	  worldly	  and	  religious	  understandings	  of	  the	  same	  issues	  and	  establishing	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  knowledge,	  subordinating	  man’s	  scientific	  theories	  to	  explanations	  from	  the	  Qur’an,	  students	  avoid	  confusion	  from	  contradictory	  information.	  They	  categorize	  the	  information	  into	  God’s	  revealed	  knowledge,	  which	  is	  right,	  and	  scientists’	  knowledge,	  which	  is	  faulty.	  	  	   On	  a	  practical	  level,	  students	  need	  to	  know	  the	  national	  curriculum	  in	  order	  to	  excel	  on	  the	  national	  exams	  and	  eventually	  gain	  access	  to	  top	  universities.	  Student	  performance	  on	  these	  exams	  greatly	  impacts	  students’	  future	  educational	  prospects	  (and	  the	  reputation	  of	  the	  institutions	  as	  quality	  schools).	  Consequently,	  teachers	  and	  parents	  alike	  expect	  students	  to	  know	  and	  understand	  the	  national	  curriculum	  well.	  As	  a	  science	  teacher	  from	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  pragmatically	  commented,	  “The	  exam	  is	  more	  academically	  oriented	  which	  is	  the	  overall	  goal	  of	  education.	  The	  overall	  aim	  is	  inevitably	  to	  pursue	  good	  academics”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  science	  teacher,	  November	  14,	  2009).	  The	  schools	  understand	  that	  a	  solid	  foundation	  in	  not	  only	  religion,	  but	  also	  sciences,	  technology,	  and	  employable	  skills,	  is	  necessary	  to	  function	  in	  society	  as	  a	  productive	  citizen.	  Students	  are	  not	  being	  trained	  to	  become	  religious	  leaders	  so	  much	  as	  God-­‐fearing	  citizens,	  religious	  politicians,	  pious	  businesspersons,	  Muslim	  academics	  and	  devout	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activists.	  In	  their	  eyes,	  for	  Indonesia	  to	  become	  a	  stronger	  country,	  it	  must	  have	  not	  only	  an	  intelligent	  but	  also	  a	  faithful	  population.	  Integrated	  schools	  are	  determined	  to	  do	  their	  part	  in	  educating	  students	  to	  become	  smart	  and	  pious	  Muslims.	  	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  while	  it	  is	  crucial	  that	  students	  are	  instructed	  in	  Qur’anic	  content	  relevant	  to	  the	  sciences	  and	  other	  general	  subjects,	  students	  are	  not	  tested	  on	  this	  information.	  Obviously	  national	  exams	  would	  only	  cover	  national	  curricula,	  but	  school	  exams	  did	  not	  cover	  the	  supplementary	  Qur’anic	  material	  either.	  Such	  an	  examination	  seemed	  like	  an	  odd	  idea	  to	  the	  teachers.	  One	  teacher	  suggested	  it	  would	  be	  too	  much	  for	  students	  to	  learn	  the	  general	  textbook	  information	  and	  memorize	  Qur’anic	  references	  to	  the	  correlating	  material.	  It	  seems	  neither	  teacher	  nor	  student	  viewed	  general	  subject	  exams	  as	  the	  place	  to	  display	  their	  Qur’anic	  knowledge.	  Given	  the	  emphasis	  on	  of	  integrating	  Islamic	  understanding	  into	  all	  subject	  matters,	  it	  was	  surprising	  to	  me	  as	  an	  educator	  that	  the	  schools	  and	  teachers	  did	  not	  consider	  this	  information	  relevant	  for	  assessment.	  Perhaps	  this	  indicates	  a	  pressure	  the	  schools	  feel	  to	  keep	  the	  exams	  in	  their	  schools	  as	  equivalent	  as	  possible	  with	  the	  general	  schools.	  Or,	  it	  may	  indicate	  a	  culturally	  different	  approach	  to	  and	  understanding	  of	  the	  use	  of	  exams	  in	  schools.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  most	  subject	  content	  is	  not	  contrary	  to	  the	  Qur’an	  as	  much	  as	  it	  is	  simply	  missing	  the	  moral	  context	  or	  appropriate	  attribution	  of	  its	  existence	  to	  God’s	  grace,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  	  
Consciousness	  of	  God	  A	  consciousness	  of	  God’s	  intellectual	  prowess	  and	  benevolent	  character	  round	  out	  this	  ideology.	  The	  “core”	  to	  integrated	  Islam,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  a	  JSIT	  secretary	  at	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headquarters	  in	  Jakarta,	  is	  for	  students	  to	  “feel	  the	  greatness	  of	  God	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  God”	  (Interview	  with	  JSIT	  secretary,	  December	  9,	  2009).	  His	  use	  of	  the	  word	  “feel”	  connotes	  not	  an	  intellectual	  understanding	  that	  can	  be	  stored	  in	  the	  mind,	  but	  a	  consciousness	  centered	  in	  the	  heart.	  A	  student’s	  sense	  of	  God	  is	  expected	  to	  emerge	  from	  subtle	  messages	  in	  the	  more	  epistemological	  lessons.	  Phrases	  such	  as	  “We	  believe	  that	  science	  on	  the	  earth	  comes	  from	  the	  one	  that	  is	  God,	  the	  owner	  of	  knowledge”	  implies	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  benefactor−beneficiary	  relationship	  between	  God	  and	  humans,	  thus	  promoting	  a	  sense	  of	  intellectual	  indebtedness	  to	  God	  for	  knowledge.	  	  Not	  only	  are	  humans	  intellectually	  indebted	  to	  God	  for	  all	  knowledge	  in	  this	  ideology,	  but	  their	  lives	  are	  also	  blessed	  by	  God’s	  mercy	  and	  generosity.	  In	  another	  example	  from	  the	  science	  classroom,	  students	  are	  taught	  God’s	  benevolence	  to	  humans.	  As	  an	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  teacher	  explained	  to	  me,	  she	  teaches	  her	  fourth-­‐grade	  students	  the	  scientific	  concepts	  of	  the	  water	  cycle,	  such	  as	  evaporation,	  condensation,	  and	  precipitation.	  She	  then	  reads	  from	  the	  Qur’an	  to	  teach	  that	  rain	  is	  a	  gift	  from	  God	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  teacher,	  February	  9,	  2010).	  This	  additional	  revealed	  knowledge	  from	  the	  Qur’an	  does	  not	  change	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  scientific	  process;	  rather,	  it	  highlights	  the	  compassion	  of	  God	  for	  gifting	  the	  world	  with	  rain.	  By	  emphasizing	  that	  rain	  or	  other	  aspects	  of	  life	  are	  gifts	  from	  God,	  the	  teachers	  engender	  a	  sense	  of	  God’s	  compassion	  for	  humanity.	  Additionally,	  the	  systematic	  insertion	  of	  Islamic	  values	  and	  codes	  of	  conduct	  in	  the	  schools’	  daily	  routine	  interweaves	  God	  into	  the	  mundane	  tasks	  of	  the	  day	  (Hasan	  2009).	  For	  example,	  the	  school	  day,	  and	  often	  lessons,	  are	  begun	  with	  prayer;	  students	  are	  instructed	  to	  write	  “Basmallah”—a	  shorthand	  phrase	  to	  mean	  “In	  the	  name	  of	  God,	  Most	  Gracious,	  Most	  Merciful”	  generally	  uttered	  at	  the	  initiation	  of	  any	  activity—on	  their	  school	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work.	  The	  culminating	  effect	  of	  these	  activities	  attempts	  to	  imbue	  an	  awareness	  of	  God’s	  presence	  in	  all	  aspects	  of	  life.	  	  The	  epistemological	  components	  of	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology	  are	  coupled	  with	  an	  affective	  one	  to	  accomplish	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT’s	  goals	  of	  shaping	  intelligent	  and	  pious	  students.	  The	  first	  two	  components—desegregation	  of	  secular	  and	  religious	  knowledge	  and	  a	  Qur’an-­‐based	  epistemology—engender	  a	  particular	  intellectual	  perspective	  that	  honors	  God’s	  revealed	  knowledge	  over	  scientists’	  reason-­‐based	  understandings.	  The	  third	  component—consciousness	  of	  God—creates	  a	  more	  affective	  relationship	  to	  God.	  Thus,	  embedding	  the	  divine	  in	  all	  aspects	  of	  learning,	  attributing	  God	  to	  be	  “the	  owner”	  and	  therefore	  the	  source	  of	  knowledge,	  and	  ascribing	  the	  presence	  of	  scientific	  phenomena	  as	  gifts	  from	  God,	  teaches	  students	  both	  an	  intellectual	  respect	  for	  and	  sense	  of	  indebtedness	  to	  God.	  This	  is	  intended	  to	  create	  a	  bond	  with	  or	  allegiance	  to	  God	  with	  both	  the	  mind	  and	  heart.	  Such	  an	  allegiance	  is	  expected	  to	  inspire	  and	  drive	  the	  performance	  of	  Islamic	  values	  and	  expressions	  of	  piety.	  	  	  
Visions	  of	  a	  National	  Piety	  Project	  In	  October	  2012,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  National	  Education	  announced	  a	  proposed	  overhaul	  of	  the	  national	  curriculum	  to	  be	  implemented	  in	  July	  2013;96	  although	  the	  reform	  is	  in	  part	  an	  effort	  to	  de-­‐clutter	  the	  curriculum,	  it	  proposes	  to	  increase	  religion	  classes	  as	  part	  of	  a	  focus	  on	  character	  development	  (Schonhardt	  2013).	  There	  has	  been	  strong	  opposition,	  not	  all	  of	  which	  is	  directed	  toward	  the	  increased	  religion	  courses.	  Regardless,	  the	  proposed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  The	  rush	  to	  implement	  the	  reform	  is	  likely	  related	  to	  fear	  of	  a	  shift	  in	  political	  support	  after	  upcoming	  legislative	  elections.	  (Personal	  communication	  with	  Sara	  Schonhardt,	  New	  York	  Times	  freelance	  journalist,	  January	  28,	  2013).	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changes	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  conceptualization	  of	  religion	  and	  moral	  character	  development	  as	  intrinsically	  connected	  extends	  beyond	  Islamic	  school	  educators.	  	  If	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT	  leadership	  were	  able	  to	  propose	  their	  own	  national	  curriculum	  reforms,	  they	  would	  go	  beyond	  increased	  religion	  classes	  as	  the	  ministry	  has	  proposed,	  and	  seek	  for	  an	  overall	  infusion	  of	  religion	  into	  all	  subjects	  through	  an	  “integrated	  religion”	  approach.	  Leadership	  from	  both	  organizations	  have	  similar	  visions	  of	  a	  robust	  national	  piety	  project	  that	  would	  prompt	  piety	  and	  moral	  behavior	  in	  all	  students,	  regardless	  of	  religious	  affiliation.	  The	  proposed	  method	  for	  accomplishing	  this	  would	  be	  much	  like	  integrated	  Islam,	  but	  generalized	  to	  a	  basic	  belief	  in	  “God.”	  Although	  their	  visions	  are	  similar,	  PKS	  has	  a	  more	  formalized	  reform	  plan.	  As	  a	  member	  of	  the	  winning	  political	  coalition	  for	  the	  2009	  presidential	  elections,	  PKS,	  the	  Islamic	  party	  associated	  with	  JSIT,	  requested	  the	  cabinet	  position	  of	  Minister	  of	  Education.	  The	  request	  was	  denied.97	  Undaunted,	  however,	  the	  party	  remains	  active	  in	  developing	  a	  national	  education	  platform.	  In	  addition	  to	  standard	  policy	  issues	  such	  as	  the	  expansion	  of	  schooling	  quality,	  modernization	  of	  the	  curriculum	  with	  real-­‐life	  relevance,	  and	  improved	  facilities,	  the	  PKS	  education	  platform	  includes	  objectives	  to	  rectify	  the	  secular	  orientation	  of	  the	  national	  curriculum.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  During	  the	  2004	  and	  2009	  presidential	  elections,	  PKS	  was	  part	  of	  the	  nationalist	  coalition	  lead	  by	  the	  Democratic	  Party’s	  founder,	  Susilo	  Bambang	  Yudhoyono,	  who	  won	  both	  elections.	  After	  the	  president’s	  2009	  re-­‐election,	  PKS	  members	  obtained	  four	  cabinet	  seats	  in	  the	  new	  government.	  They	  currently	  serve	  as	  Ministers	  of	  Communication	  and	  Information	  Technology	  (Minister	  Tifatul	  Sembiring),	  Agriculture	  (Minister	  Suswono),	  Social	  Affairs	  (Minister	  Salim	  Segaf	  Al	  Jufri)	  and	  Research	  and	  Technology	  (Minister	  Suharna	  Surapranata).	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The	  following	  description	  of	  a	  national	  piety	  project	  is	  predominantly	  based	  on	  interviews	  with	  the	  secretary	  of	  JSIT,	  and	  also	  with	  Fahmi	  Alaydrus,98	  one	  of	  JSIT’s	  founders	  and	  current	  PKS	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Education	  Department.	  Given	  that	  JSIT	  is	  an	  unofficial	  but	  undeniable	  extension	  of	  PKS	  as	  they	  work	  together	  to	  develop	  educational	  policy	  for	  the	  network	  and	  the	  political	  party,	  much	  of	  the	  following	  discussion	  representing	  JSIT	  is	  discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  PKS’	  national	  educational	  platform.	  	  Information	  from	  two	  short	  interviews	  with	  Murni	  Djamal99	  also	  inform	  the	  following	  discussion.	  	  I	  spoke	  with	  Murni	  Jamal,	  the	  Dean	  of	  Faculty	  of	  Literature	  at	  Al	  Azhar	  University,	  in	  part	  to	  discuss	  his	  thoughts	  regarding	  the	  PKS	  vision	  of	  a	  reformed	  national	  education	  system.	  However,	  as	  this	  vision	  is	  not	  widely	  distributed	  (given	  PKS	  are	  not	  in	  a	  political	  position	  to	  propose	  it),	  Murni	  was	  not	  familiar	  with	  it	  when	  we	  talked.	  He	  was	  familiar	  with	  JSIT	  schooling.	  After	  my	  brief	  explanation,	  he	  was	  in	  general	  agreement	  with	  its	  goals	  and	  expressed	  similar	  opinions	  and	  vision.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  Al	  Azhar,	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  A	  founder	  and	  former	  Chairman	  of	  JSIT	  and	  current	  Chairman	  of	  Nurul	  Fikri	  Foundation,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  established	  and	  influential	  foundations	  providing	  and	  promoting	  integrated	  Islamic	  schooling	  in	  Indonesia.	  He	  is	  also	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Education	  Department	  for	  PKS.	  	  	  99	  When	  I	  asked	  my	  Al	  Azhar	  headquarter	  contacts	  to	  speak	  with	  someone	  who	  was	  familiar	  with	  the	  development	  of	  the	  organization’s	  integrated	  approach,	  I	  was	  put	  in	  contact	  with	  Murni	  Djamal.	  As	  such,	  I	  view	  his	  perspectives	  to	  be	  representative	  of	  the	  organization’s	  leadership.	  	  
	  




far	  as	  I	  am	  aware,	  does	  not	  have	  a	  mapped	  out	  vision	  for	  reforming	  the	  national	  education	  system,	  it	  is	  to	  be	  expected	  that	  the	  organization’s	  invested	  educators	  would	  have	  ideas	  they	  believe	  would	  strengthen	  the	  national	  system.	  However,	  the	  JSIT-­‐cum-­‐PKS	  vision	  is	  much	  more	  formalized	  than	  any	  Al	  Azhar-­‐based	  ideas.	  Therefore,	  the	  discussion	  below	  is	  predominantly	  based	  on	  PKS’	  vision,	  with	  some	  additional	  input	  from	  Al	  Azhar	  when	  appropriate.	  Starting	  from	  the	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology	  that	  a	  complete	  education	  promotes	  intelligence	  and	  piety	  and	  that	  religion	  is	  the	  best	  vehicle	  for	  moral	  development	  and	  piety,	  PKS	  would	  seek	  to	  set	  the	  state	  education	  curriculum	  within	  a	  religious	  framework.	  Emphasizing	  the	  myopic	  nature	  of	  a	  secular	  perspective	  that	  reduces	  this	  life	  to	  a	  material	  level	  (Niyozov	  &	  Memon	  2011),	  Fahmi,	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  PKS	  education	  department,	  explained,	  	  We	  do	  not	  want	  there	  to	  be	  a	  secular	  curriculum.	  We	  consider	  that	  what	  is	  on	  the	  face	  of	  this	  earth	  was	  created	  by	  God,	  including	  ourselves…so	  we	  do	  not	  separate	  [secular	  and	  religious	  knowledge].	  We	  live	  in	  this	  world,	  a	  stage	  before	  our	  life	  after	  we	  die.	  It’s	  our	  first	  stage	  (Interview	  with	  Fahmi	  Alaydrus,	  May	  1,	  2010).	  	  From	  their	  perspective,	  all	  true	  knowledge	  is	  from	  God	  and	  true	  knowledge	  transcends	  time	  and	  space.	  Consequently,	  the	  concept	  that	  God	  created	  the	  world	  and	  “ourselves”	  (a	  subtle	  reminder	  that	  God,	  and	  not	  the	  process	  of	  evolution,	  created	  man)	  transcends	  the	  context	  of	  the	  students’	  and	  teachers’	  specific	  religious	  beliefs.	  Additionally,	  the	  party	  believes	  that	  a	  national	  education	  system	  ought	  to	  equip	  students	  for	  both	  this	  life	  and	  the	  next.	  A	  secular	  curriculum	  is	  then	  an	  incomplete	  curriculum,	  as	  it	  only	  deals	  with	  the	  present	  material	  world.	  As	  the	  JSIT	  secretary	  explained,	  “There	  is	  no	  difference	  between	  Islam	  and	  Christianity	  in	  divinity	  and	  matters	  of	  creation.”	  Therefore	  students	  would	  continue	  to	  have	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religion	  classes	  specific	  to	  their	  religious	  traditions,	  but	  the	  generic	  or	  “non-­‐denominational”	  concept	  of	  God	  would	  be	  integrated	  into	  general	  subjects.	  He	  continued,	  “The	  important	  thing	  is	  that	  students	  are	  able	  to	  feel	  the	  greatness	  of	  God	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  God.	  That’s	  the	  essence	  of	  integrated	  Islam”	  and	  therefore	  would	  be	  the	  emphasis	  of	  an	  integrated	  religion	  approach	  (Interview	  with	  JSIT	  secretary,	  December	  9,	  2009).	  In	  the	  classroom,	  Fahmi	  explained,	  when	  in	  a	  public	  school,	  if	  [the	  teacher]	  is	  not	  Muslim	  but	  Christian,	  he	  can	  explain	  to	  the	  students	  the	  greatness	  of	  God	  (Tuhan)	  because	  Christians	  and	  Muslims	  believe	  in	  God.	  Each	  believes	  in	  God.	  So	  a	  Christian	  is	  able	  to	  explain	  the	  greatness	  of	  God	  to	  the	  students	  though	  he	  doesn’t	  know	  the	  Qur’an	  but	  knows	  the	  Gospel.	  (Interview	  with	  Fahmi	  Alaydrus,	  Interview	  May	  1,	  2010)	  	  The	  particulars	  of	  God	  could	  be	  discussed	  in	  segregated	  religion	  classes,	  but	  in	  general	  subject	  classes	  where	  teachers	  and	  students	  of	  various	  religions	  participate	  together,	  teachers	  would	  instill	  a	  consciousness	  of	  God’s	  greatness	  without	  mention	  of	  a	  specific	  God.	  As	  for	  matters	  of	  creation	  that	  would	  surface	  in	  science	  classes,	  Fahmi	  also	  explained,	  “The	  Gospel	  talks	  about	  God	  and	  that	  God	  created	  the	  universe.	  It’s	  the	  same	  with	  Islam…All	  religions	  teach	  it,	  including	  Judaism”	  (Interview	  with	  Fahmi	  Alaydrus,	  Interview	  May	  1,	  2010).	  According	  to	  the	  Qur’an,	  Christians	  and	  Jews	  are	  considered	  ahl-­‐al-­‐
kitab,	  or	  “people	  of	  the	  book”—those	  who	  recognize	  the	  God	  of	  Abraham	  as	  the	  one	  and	  only	  God	  and	  adhere	  to	  religions	  based	  on	  revealed	  scripture.	  	  While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  Muslims	  and	  Christians	  share	  a	  common	  creation	  story	  and	  have,	  relatively	  speaking,	  fairly	  similar	  beliefs	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  God,	  not	  all	  Indonesians	  are	  from	  these	  religions.	  In	  addition	  to	  Islam	  and	  Christianity	  (divided	  into	  Catholicism	  and	  Protestantism	  in	  Indonesia),	  which	  an	  estimated	  95%	  (CIA	  2012)	  of	  the	  population	  identifies	  as	  their	  religious	  tradition,	  Hinduism,	  Buddhism,	  and	  Confucianism	  are	  also	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constitutionally	  recognized	  religions.100	  As	  a	  lead-­‐in	  question	  to	  understanding	  how	  different	  religious	  traditions	  would	  be	  honored	  within	  this	  integrated	  religion	  ideology,	  I	  asked	  how	  Buddhist	  and	  Hindu	  understandings	  of	  man’s	  creation	  compared	  with	  Christian	  and	  Muslim	  beliefs.	  Both	  the	  PKS	  and	  JSIT	  officials	  openly	  admitted	  to	  knowing	  little	  about	  the	  religions.	  However,	  both	  men	  assumed	  that	  by	  the	  mere	  fact	  that	  Hinduism	  and	  Buddhism	  were	  religions,	  they	  would	  hold	  concepts	  of	  God	  compatible	  with	  Islam	  and	  Christianity.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Fahmi:	  I	  don’t	  understand	  Buddhism,	  but	  I	  do	  understand	  that	  Buddhism	  cares	  a	  lot	  about	  the	   environment,	   the	   earth,	   and	   the	   sky.	   Hinduism	   too.	   I	   see	   there	   is	   a	   kind	   of	  intersection	   between	   these	   many	   religions.	   They	   teach	   things	   that	   are	   definitely	  commonly	  accepted.	  (Interview	  with	  Fahmi	  Alaydrus,	  Interview	  May	  1,	  2010)	  	  In	  other	  words,	  he	  believed	  that	  these	  religions	  promoted	  values	  that	  were	  universally	  accepted	  and	  assumed	  that	  these	  values	  were	  equivalent	  to	  those	  promoted	  within	  Islam	  and	  Christianity.	  	  In	  addition,	  these	  JSIT	  and	  PKS	  activists	  assumed	  that	  Hindu	  and	  Buddhist	  concepts	  of	  God101	  and	  the	  Earth’s	  creation	  intersected	  in	  a	  meaningful	  and	  compatible	  way	  with	  Islam	  and	  Christianity.	  I	  suggested	  that	  the	  Muslim	  or	  Christian	  concepts	  of	  God	  were	  different	  than	  Hindu	  concepts	  and	  thus	  possibly	  incompatible.	  Fahmi	  replied,	  “They	  [Hindus]	  have	  gods	  (dewa).	  Similarly,	  they	  are	  super-­‐natural	  as	  well,	  but	  their	  forms	  are	  not	  Allah	  or	  Jesus,	  but	  there	  is	  Brahma,	  Shiva,	  Vishnu.	  They	  call	  them	  gods.	  It’s	  the	  same”	  (Interview	  with	  Fahmi	  Alaydrus,	  Interview	  May	  1,	  2010).	  Similarly,	  the	  JSIT	  secretariat	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  Other	  religious	  groups	  exist	  in	  Indonesia,	  such	  as	  Baha’i	  and	  Judaism,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  officially	  recognized.	  	  101	  Technically	  speaking,	  Buddhas	  are	  not	  considered	  Gods.	  However,	  Pyysiäinen	  (2003)	  argues	  that	  Buddhas	  fulfill	  the	  criteria	  of	  “counter-­‐intuitive	  agents,”	  thus	  allowing	  for	  Buddhism	  to	  fit	  into	  a	  global	  concept	  of	  religion.	  	  See	  “Buddhism,	  Religion,	  and	  the	  Concept	  of	  ‘God’”	  by	  Ilkka	  Pyysiäinen,	  Numen,	  Vol.	  50,	  No.	  2	  (2003)	  pp.	  147−171	  for	  full	  discussion.	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said,	  “I’m	  not	  Hindu,	  but	  I	  don’t	  think	  there’s	  a	  difference	  between	  Islam	  and	  [Hinduism].	  Perhaps	  the	  rituals	  are	  different	  but	  the	  beliefs	  are	  the	  same.	  They	  believe	  in	  dewa	  [Hindu	  word	  for	  God]	  but	  we	  say	  ‘Allah.’	  I	  don’t	  think	  it’s	  different”	  (Interview	  with	  JSIT	  secretary,	  December	  9,	  2009).	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  see	  the	  fact	  that	  believing	  in	  a	  god,102	  regardless	  of	  theological	  tenets,	  creates	  sufficient	  commonalities	  for	  a	  guiding	  integrated	  religion	  ideology	  for	  the	  national	  education	  system.	  	  	   Although	  one	  must	  register	  oneself	  on	  official	  government	  documents	  (birth	  certificates,	  school	  registration	  forms,	  state-­‐issued	  identification,	  marriage	  certificates,	  etc.)	  as	  belonging	  of	  one	  of	  the	  six	  constitutionally	  recognized	  religious	  traditions,	  it	  is	  well	  known	  that	  there	  are	  additional	  religious	  traditions	  as	  well	  as	  non-­‐believers	  in	  Indonesia.	  To	  my	  question	  of	  how	  an	  integrated	  religion	  ideology	  would	  affect	  non-­‐believers	  in	  the	  education	  system,	  Fahmi,	  speaking	  from	  sustained	  determination	  and	  vision,	  stated,	  That	  is	  the	  task	  of	  education.	  To	  those	  who	  do	  not	  believe,	  yes	  we	  have	  to	  educate	  them	  because	  they	  have	  arguments	  as	  to	  why	  they…position	  themselves	  as	  atheists.	  Well,	  actually	  this	  is	  the	  main	  work	  of	  the	  prophets,	  educators,	  ulama,	  and	  people	  who	  have	  knowledge	  to	  explain	  to	  them—in	  ways	  that	  are	  wise	  and	  good	  and	  step-­‐by-­‐step…We	  must	  always	  be	  optimistic	  and	  think	  that	  every	  person	  has	  the	  opportunity	  to	  change	  his	  mind.	  So	  we	  just	  inform	  them:	  “This	  is	  religion.	  This	  is	  the	  system.	  Synch	  your	  brain	  and	  your	  heart.”	  At	  first	  they	  may	  reject	  it,	  but	  like	  a	  hard	  stone	  if	  we	  use	  drops	  of	  water,	  it	  will	  slowly	  erode.	  So	  you	  have	  to	  be	  patient.	  That	  is	  the	  task	  of	  Jesus,	  Muhammad,	  Noah,	  Abraham,	  everyone	  like	  them.	  So,	  it’s	  not	  a	  problem.	  It’s	  our	  job	  to	  communicate	  and	  educate.	  (Interview	  with	  Fahmi	  Alaydrus,	  Interview	  May	  1,	  2010)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  As	  Indonesia	  is	  comprised	  of	  myriad	  ethnic	  groups	  and	  religious	  backgrounds,	  this	  founding	  principle	  states	  “Belief	  in	  one	  God,”	  but	  the	  name	  of	  that	  God	  is	  withheld	  so	  as	  to	  accommodate	  Muslims,	  Christians,	  Catholics,	  and	  other	  monotheistic	  religions.	  This	  was	  an	  effort	  to	  claim	  to	  be	  a	  religious,	  monotheistic	  country,	  which	  in	  turn	  would	  not	  officially	  recognize	  the	  animistic	  religions,	  which	  had	  pre-­‐Islamic	  presence	  throughout	  the	  archipelago,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  minority	  religions,	  and	  in	  more	  contemporary	  debates,	  atheists.	  Initially	  there	  were	  five	  officially	  recognized	  religions:	  Islam,	  Catholicism,	  Christianity,	  Buddhism,	  and	  Hinduism.	  Hinduism	  and	  Buddhism	  were	  creatively	  reinterpreted	  as	  monotheistic	  religions	  in	  order	  to	  be	  officially	  recognized	  (Ricklefs	  1981:213).	  A	  sixth	  religion,	  Confucianism,	  has	  since	  been	  formally	  recognized.	  The	  other	  fours	  pillars	  of	  Pancasila	  are	  more	  nationalistic	  rather	  than	  religious,	  namely:	  Just	  and	  civilized	  humanity;	  Unity	  of	  Indonesia;	  Democracy	  guided	  by	  the	  inner	  wisdom	  in	  the	  unanimity	  arising	  out	  of	  deliberations	  among	  representatives;	  and,	  Social	  justice	  for	  all	  Indonesians.	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  In	  Fahmi’s	  mind,	  the	  proposed	  education	  system’s	  legal	  obligations	  to	  educate	  parallel	  that	  of	  the	  callings	  of	  prophets,	  Jesus,	  Muhammad	  and	  current	  religious	  leaders,	  or	  ulama,	  to	  teach	  and	  instruct	  the	  population	  to	  become	  believers.	  In	  essence,	  the	  party’s	  integrated	  religion	  ideology	  would	  act	  as	  a	  form	  of	  dakwah	  for	  religion—rather	  than	  Islam	  specifically—to	  both	  Muslim	  and	  non-­‐Muslim	  students	  in	  both	  public	  and	  private	  general	  and	  religious	  schools.	  	  	   Acknowledging	  that	  not	  all	  unbelievers	  are	  likely	  to	  convert	  to	  a	  religious	  life,	  Fahmi	  concluded,	  “Whether	  they	  will	  want	  to	  join	  or	  not	  is	  none	  of	  our	  business.”	  However,	  he	  went	  onto	  explain	  that	  	  What	  is	  often	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  they	  don’t	  get	  full	  and	  complete	  information,	  or	  they	  are	  often	  misinformed	  and	  biased	  about	  things.	  What’s	  the	  result?	  Ultimately,	  their	  process	  of	  thinking	  is	  wrong.	  Why?	  Because	  the	  data	  and	  information	  was	  inaccurate.”	  (Interview	  with	  Fahmi	  Alaydrus,	  May	  1,	  2010)	  	  Fahmi	  seems	  convinced	  that	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  education,	  “full	  and	  complete	  information,”	  rather	  than	  a	  secular	  perspective,	  would	  turn	  an	  individual	  to	  God.	  Therefore,	  the	  national	  education	  system	  is	  an	  obvious	  forum	  for	  disseminating	  correct	  information	  and	  generating	  an	  awareness	  of	  God	  in	  all	  aspects	  of	  life,	  facilitating	  the	  conversion	  of	  both	  students’	  minds	  and	  hearts	  to	  God.	  His	  belief	  that	  “inaccurate	  information”	  is	  the	  only	  viable	  explanation	  for	  why	  individuals	  would	  not	  believe	  in	  God	  highlights	  a	  widespread	  bias	  among	  PKS	  and	  other	  religious	  educators,	  towards	  those	  that	  are	  religious.	  	  The	  integrated	  religion	  approach	  is	  meant	  to	  convert	  individuals	  to	  a	  deeper,	  more	  pious	  practice	  of	  their	  own	  religious	  heritages,	  putting	  a	  premium	  on	  piety.	  As	  the	  JSIT	  secretariat	  reasoned,	  “Being	  religious	  is	  better	  than	  being	  irreligious	  or	  agnostic...We	  think	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that	  religious	  people	  are	  better	  than	  non-­‐religious	  people.	  People	  who	  believe	  in	  God	  are	  better	  than	  people	  who	  don’t	  believe	  in	  God.”	  He	  went	  on	  to	  clarify,	  	  We	  encourage	  everyone	  to	  adhere	  to	  a	  religion.	  A	  Muslim	  should	  be	  a	  good	  Muslim	  and	  a	  Christian	  a	  good	  Christian.	  This	  is	  our	  vision	  of	  diversity	  and	  plurality.	  They	  are	  religious	  within	  their	  religion	  and	  we	  are	  religious	  within	  our	  religion;	  they	  don’t	  interfere	  with	  each	  other.	  All	  goes	  well	  and	  everyone	  is	  happy.	  A	  Christian	  is	  welcome	  to	  worship	  as	  a	  Christian	  ought,	  and	  Islamic	  people	  also	  worship	  as	  well	  as	  possible	  (Interview	  with	  JSIT	  secretary,	  December	  9,	  2009)	  	  This	  vision	  of	  peaceful	  diversity	  and	  plurality	  within	  the	  community	  is	  dependent	  on	  being	  actively	  religious;	  not	  just	  a	  nominal	  Muslim	  or	  Christian,	  but	  a	  “good	  Muslim”	  and	  a	  “good	  Christian”	  “worshiping	  as	  best	  they	  can.”	  This	  broadens	  the	  party’s	  inclusion	  of	  those	  who	  can	  contribute	  to	  the	  country’s	  development	  and	  who	  would	  be	  considered	  good	  citizens	  to	  any	  religious	  person.	  However,	  it	  seems	  a	  bit	  optimistic	  to	  believe	  that	  “good	  Muslims”	  and	  “good	  Christians”	  living	  within	  their	  religions	  as	  best	  they	  can	  will	  not	  “interfere	  with	  each	  other.”	  Current	  trends,	  including	  an	  uptake	  in	  religious	  intolerance	  and	  violence	  between	  religious	  groups	  in	  Indonesia,	  suggest	  that	  increased	  religiosity	  does	  not	  immediately	  translate	  to	  religious	  respect	  or	  tolerance	  for	  others’	  religious	  practices.	  	  This	  perspective	  that	  religious	  traditions’	  values	  will	  not	  differ	  in	  fundamental	  ways	  assumes	  compatible	  social,	  moral,	  and	  political	  ideals	  between	  religious	  groups.	  While	  morals	  such	  as	  honesty,	  respect,	  and	  social	  responsibility	  may	  be	  universal,	  beliefs	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  God	  and	  God’s	  role	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  world	  and	  daily	  happenings	  are	  more	  tradition-­‐specific.	  Reactions	  to	  the	  pornography	  bill,	  heavily	  legislated	  by	  PKS	  members,	  passed	  into	  law	  in	  2008	  demonstrated	  differences	  between	  religious	  traditions	  on	  issues	  as	  simple	  as	  modesty.	  Under	  its	  vague	  language,	  naked	  or	  partially	  clothed	  statues	  of	  Hindu	  gods	  could	  easily	  be	  considered	  arousing	  and	  therefore	  pornographic	  and	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  law.	  The	  governor	  of	  Bali,	  a	  predominantly	  Hindu	  island,	  disagreed	  with	  the	  law	  and	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stated	  that	  Bali	  officials	  would	  not	  enforce	  it	  (Setiawati	  2008).	  Unless	  one’s	  sense	  of	  piety	  extends	  to	  respect	  for	  diverse	  conceptualizations	  of	  piety,	  there	  is	  great	  potential	  for	  clashes	  between	  religious	  groups.	  	  Justification	  for	  this	  vision	  of	  a	  national	  piety	  project	  is	  based	  in	  Ministry	  of	  Education	  policy	  and	  the	  founding	  principles	  of	  Indonesia.	  Fahmi	  argued,	  “Indonesia’s	  national	  education	  objective	  rests	  on	  two	  pillars	  (substansi),	  namely	  intelligence	  (cerdas)	  and	  piety	  (taqwa).	  These	  two	  things	  become	  a	  necessity	  for	  building	  character”	  (Interview	  with	  Fahmi	  Alaydrus,	  May	  1,	  2010).	  Murni	  from	  Al	  Azhar	  drew	  upon	  a	  more	  fundamental	  piece	  of	  national	  policy,	  claiming	  the	  integration	  of	  religion	  into	  everyday	  life,	  and	  therefore	  all	  subjects,	  is	  part	  of	  Indonesia’s	  founding	  principles,	  namely	  the	  first	  tenet	  of	  Pancasila,	  “Belief	  in	  one	  God.”	  He	  stated,	  “The	  main	  goal	  of	  our	  school	  system	  nationally	  is	  to	  make	  our	  young	  generation	  base	  their	  lives,	  their	  knowledge	  on	  the	  teachings	  of	  religion…This	  is	  what	  we	  call	  the	  first	  pillar	  of	  Pancasila…[The	  national	  school	  system	  is]	  to	  make	  people	  pious,	  to	  make	  people	  religious	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  to	  make	  important	  people	  within	  national	  life,	  based	  on	  the	  moral	  teachings	  of	  religion…So	  knowledge	  and	  religion	  should	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  to	  make	  one	  complete	  personality	  of	  young	  Indonesian	  people”	  (Interview	  with	  Murni	  Djamal,	  August	  11,	  2012).	  Murni	  references	  government	  policy	  and	  refers	  to	  students	  as	  Indonesians,	  implying	  that	  developing	  one’s	  religion,	  intellect,	  and	  morality	  is	  as	  much	  a	  civic	  duty	  as	  it	  is	  a	  personal	  pursuit.	  The	  National	  Education	  Act	  of	  2003,103	  chapter	  2,	  article	  3,	  states,	  “The	  function	  of	  national	  education	  is	  to	  develop	  skills	  and	  form	  the	  character	  and	  civilization	  of	  a	  dignified	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  Since	  independence	  in	  1945,	  the	  Indonesian	  Government	  has	  released	  two	  education	  policies	  regarding	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  education	  system:	  National	  Education	  Act	  Number	  2	  in	  1998	  and	  National	  Education	  Act	  Number	  20	  in	  2003.	  A	  comparison	  of	  the	  1998	  and	  2003	  acts	  reveals	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  references	  to	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nation,	  to	  educate	  the	  nation	  by	  developing	  the	  potential	  of	  students	  to	  be	  faithful	  and	  pious	  toward	  God	  Almighty	  (Tuhan	  Yang	  Maha	  Esa),	  upstanding	  (berakhlak	  mulia),	  healthy,	  knowledgeable,	  skilled,	  creative,	  and	  independent	  individuals	  and	  democratic	  and	  accountable	  citizens”	  (MoNE	  2003).	  From	  its	  conception,	  Indonesia	  has	  constitutionally	  been	  a	  religious	  country,	  without	  a	  named	  religion.	  As	  just	  stated,	  the	  first	  pillar	  of	  Pancasila	  (the	  Five	  Principles	  of	  the	  nation)	  is	  “Belief	  in	  One	  God.”	  Religion,	  and	  more	  specifically	  Islam,	  has	  always	  been	  a	  very	  public	  matter	  in	  Indonesia	  (Gade	  2004,	  Hefner	  2000).	  As	  religion	  must	  be	  declared	  on	  one’s	  Indonesian	  identity	  card,	  publicly	  acknowledged	  religion	  is	  linked	  to	  citizenship	  (Bowen	  2003).	  Religious	  instruction104	  has	  been	  compulsory	  in	  general	  schools	  since	  the	  late	  1960s,	  with	  a	  tightening	  of	  regulations	  in	  1989	  (Azra	  et	  al.	  2007:187).	  While	  Fahmi’s	  claim	  that	  current	  national	  education	  objectives	  rest	  solely	  on	  the	  pillars	  of	  intelligence	  and	  piety	  is	  debatable,	  an	  “integrated	  religion”	  reform	  would	  work	  to	  move	  religion	  to	  the	  forefront.	  	  The	  current	  national	  compulsory	  curriculum	  for	  general	  schools	  only	  requires	  a	  minimum	  of	  religious	  instruction,	  generally	  meeting	  once	  a	  week—the	  same	  frequency	  as	  compulsory	  arts	  and	  culture	  and	  physical	  education	  classes.	  While	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  belief	  in	  God	  is	  one	  of	  the	  country’s	  founding	  principles,	  and	  piety	  among	  students	  is	  a	  stated	  goal	  of	  the	  education	  policy,	  the	  attention	  religion	  has	  been	  given	  in	  the	  national	  curriculum	  makes	  one	  question	  the	  government’s	  historical	  level	  of	  commitment	  to	  this	  ideal	  relative	  to	  other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  God	  and	  piety	  in	  the	  2003	  document.	  This	  shift	  is	  yet	  another	  indication	  that	  religion	  is	  becoming	  more	  prominent	  in	  Indonesian	  politics	  and	  policies.	  	  104	  Religion	  classes	  are	  segregated	  by	  religion;	  students	  learn	  only	  about	  the	  religion	  to	  which	  they	  belong	  and	  teachers	  teach	  only	  classes	  on	  the	  religion	  to	  which	  they	  belong.	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objectives.	  Proposed	  changes	  announced	  in	  October	  2012	  signal	  efforts	  underway	  to	  give	  greater	  priority	  to	  religious	  education.	  	  	  In	  the	  future,	  PKS	  may	  have	  the	  political	  position	  and	  wider	  political	  support	  to	  implement	  further	  reform,	  or	  Al	  Azhar	  may	  be	  able	  to	  influence	  ministry	  policy	  through	  consultations.	  However,	  implementation	  would	  be	  fraught	  with	  complications	  such	  as	  teacher	  training,	  ascertaining	  teacher	  commitment	  to	  the	  approach,	  and	  possible	  opposition	  from	  minority	  religions	  and	  the	  non-­‐religious	  public.105	  Other	  Indonesians	  will	  be	  uncomfortable	  with	  such	  an	  explicit	  infusion	  of	  a	  particular	  religious	  perspective	  into	  the	  public	  education	  system.	  However,	  religion	  is	  becoming	  more	  dominant	  in	  Indonesia’s	  public	  sphere,	  and	  this	  kind	  of	  policy	  may	  get	  more	  traction	  at	  a	  later	  date.	  In	  the	  interim,	  the	  proposed	  curriculum	  reform,	  if	  implemented,	  will	  increase	  students’	  instruction	  on	  religion.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  Extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  school	  educators	  consider	  moral	  character	  to	  be	  synonymous	  with	  piety.	  Pervasive	  in	  the	  thinking	  of	  these	  educators	  is	  the	  belief	  that	  piety	  is	  not	  only	  an	  essential	  personal	  characteristic	  of	  a	  good	  Muslim	  (or	  believer	  of	  any	  religion),	  but	  also	  a	  crucial	  component	  of	  Indonesian	  citizenship.	  The	  study	  of	  both	  religion	  and	  general	  subjects	  is	  an	  act	  of	  worship;	  further,	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  these	  educators,	  it	  is	  a	  commandment	  and	  moral	  obligation.	  While	  an	  intelligent	  population	  is	  necessary	  for	  national	  progress,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105	  PKS’	  vision	  of	  national	  education,	  as	  explained	  to	  me,	  would	  not	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  credits	  for	  religious	  instruction,	  but	  would	  infuse	  religious	  instruction	  into	  other	  subjects.	  Although	  explanations	  to	  me	  were	  not	  exhaustive	  and	  implementation	  strategies	  were	  not	  discussed,	  it	  seems	  implementation	  would	  require	  curriculum	  development	  and	  an	  expansive	  overhaul	  of	  teacher	  training,	  with	  teacher	  buy-­‐in	  being	  a	  key	  component.	  Teachers	  from	  across	  the	  archipelago	  come	  from	  a	  vast	  array	  of	  backgrounds	  and	  may	  have	  different	  views	  on	  the	  place	  of	  religion	  in	  typical	  non-­‐religion	  classes.	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particularly	  in	  modern	  times,	  piety	  is	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  knowledge	  is	  applied	  in	  beneficial	  ways	  that	  prevent	  selfishness	  and	  corruption	  and	  contribute	  to	  a	  healthy	  nation.	  As	  the	  previous	  chapters	  have	  demonstrated,	  although	  leadership	  and	  educators	  within	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT	  visualize	  the	  particulars	  of	  piety	  and	  what	  a	  good	  Muslim	  looks	  like	  differently,	  they	  both	  agree	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  pairing	  piety	  with	  intelligence	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  full	  development	  of	  their	  students	  and	  the	  nation.	  	  In	  a	  break	  from	  the	  common	  Islamic	  schools,	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT	  schools	  employ	  an	  innovative	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology,	  as	  I	  term	  it,	  in	  order	  to	  shape	  students	  who	  are	  both	  intelligent	  and	  pious.	  The	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology	  is	  comprised	  of	  three	  interrelated	  components:	  1)	  desegregation	  of	  secular	  and	  religious	  knowledge	  by	  presenting	  all	  class	  content	  in	  an	  Islamic	  framework;	  2)	  a	  Qur’an-­‐based	  epistemology;	  and,	  3)	  a	  strong	  consciousness	  of	  God.	  The	  ostensibly	  secular	  national	  curriculum	  is	  taught	  within	  an	  Islamic	  framework,	  integrating	  revealed	  knowledge	  into	  classroom	  discussions	  on	  all	  subjects.	  The	  innovation	  of	  the	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology	  is	  that	  it	  creates	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  knowledge,	  prioritizing	  divine	  knowledge	  over	  that	  of	  the	  mundane.	  	  This	  integration	  has	  both	  intellectual	  and	  affective	  functions.	  While	  all	  true	  knowledge	  is	  good,	  students	  must	  understand	  that	  God	  is	  the	  source.	  A	  hierarchy	  of	  knowledge	  is	  established	  in	  which	  humans’	  reason-­‐based	  knowledge	  is	  subordinate	  to	  God’s	  revealed	  knowledge,	  as	  found	  in	  the	  Qur’an,	  when	  there	  is	  conflict	  between	  the	  two.	  Refuting	  the	  theory	  of	  evolution	  with	  the	  Qur’an	  teaches	  students	  that	  God	  is	  more	  intelligent	  than	  humans.	  	  However,	  not	  all	  references	  to	  the	  Qur’an	  in	  class	  are	  meant	  to	  disprove	  the	  theories	  of	  humans.	  They	  often	  provide	  a	  morally	  meaningful	  context	  for	  scientific	  phenomena.	  For	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example,	  students	  learn	  about	  precipitation,	  but	  ultimately	  learn	  to	  view	  rain	  as	  a	  gift	  from	  God	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  mere	  scientific	  process.	  Teaching	  such	  Qur’anic	  verses	  contributes	  to	  a	  consciousness	  of	  and	  indebtedness	  to	  God	  for	  his	  benevolence.	  These	  functions	  are	  intended	  to	  generate	  an	  intellectual	  respect	  for	  and	  affective	  indebtedness	  to	  God	  that	  will	  motivate	  pious	  and	  devout	  sensibilities	  among	  students.	  	  The	  current	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology	  component	  of	  these	  schools’	  piety	  projects	  serves	  as	  a	  blueprint	  for	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  school	  leaders’	  envisioned	  national	  piety	  projects.	  While	  ideas	  espoused	  by	  Al	  Azhar	  leadership	  are	  not	  formalized	  in	  any	  real	  sense,	  JSIT-­‐cum-­‐PKS’	  vision	  for	  development	  of	  a	  PKS	  education	  platform	  is.	  Both	  groups	  justify	  a	  national	  piety	  project	  through	  national	  policy	  and	  founding	  principles	  of	  the	  country	  that	  call	  for	  “belief	  in	  one	  God”	  and	  for	  students	  to	  be	  “faithful	  and	  pious	  toward	  God	  Almighty.”	  They	  believe	  the	  universality	  of	  values	  and	  concepts	  in	  religions	  allows	  for	  any	  religion	  to	  be	  the	  vehicle	  for	  teaching	  piety	  and	  thus	  comprehensive	  character	  development.	  The	  mechanism	  for	  teaching	  would	  be	  a	  modification	  of	  integrated	  Islam	  ideology	  to	  a	  more	  general	  integrated	  religion	  ideology.	  	  However,	  this	  ideology	  assumes	  that	  the	  similarity	  of	  values	  between	  Indonesia’s	  various	  religions	  to	  be	  greater	  than	  theological	  differences.	  While	  integrated	  religion	  would	  intend	  to	  be	  inclusive	  of	  all	  religions	  through	  the	  inclusion	  of	  universal	  values	  and	  stripped-­‐down	  concepts	  of	  God,	  in	  all	  likelihood	  it	  would	  promote	  a	  specific	  understanding	  of	  God	  that	  would	  not	  and	  could	  not	  be	  universal.	  The	  determination	  to	  integrate	  religion	  into	  the	  national	  education	  system	  appears	  to	  overshadow	  the	  theological	  tenets	  of	  the	  minority	  religions	  of	  the	  country	  and	  to	  ignore	  how	  those	  tenets	  may	  or	  may	  not	  fit	  with	  the	  dominant	  religion’s	  learning	  objectives	  and	  worldview.	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Middle	  Class	  Morality:	  Parents	  and	  School	  Selection	  	  	  
I	  saw	  that	  the	  method	  of	  instruction	  at	  state	  schools	  was	  too	  harsh	  for	  my	  daughter	  so	  I	  
preferred	  to	  send	  her	  to	  Al	  Azhar.	  Additionally,	  she	  can	  study	  religion	  here	  (Al	  Azhar	  31)	  and	  
in	  the	  afternoon	  she	  can	  participate	  in	  other	  extra	  activities,	  like	  swimming	  and	  other	  things.	  	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  mother,	  housewife,	  April	  26,	  2010	  	   The	  2008	  instant	  blockbuster	  film	  Laskar	  Pelangi	  (The	  Rainbow	  Troops),	  based	  on	  the	  bestselling	  autobiography	  of	  the	  same	  title,	  details	  the	  challenges	  of	  a	  dilapidated	  private	  Muhammadiyah	  school	  in	  the	  1970s	  on	  the	  small	  mining	  island	  of	  Belitong,	  Indonesia.	  Shunned	  by	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  community	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  National	  Education	  for	  its	  poor	  facilities,	  lack	  of	  supplies,	  and	  low	  quality	  academic	  education,	  this	  school	  survives	  on	  the	  goodwill	  and	  determination	  of	  its	  unpaid	  teachers	  and	  the	  commitment	  of	  its	  10	  students,	  one	  of	  whom	  bikes	  80	  kilometers	  round	  trip	  each	  day	  from	  his	  remote	  fishing	  village	  to	  attend.	  Even	  though	  the	  school’s	  fees	  were	  significantly	  less	  expensive	  than	  the	  local	  state	  school,	  the	  financial	  sacrifice	  of	  the	  parents	  to	  enroll	  their	  children	  came	  with	  the	  expectation	  that	  even	  a	  poor	  education	  would	  improve	  their	  children’s	  future	  prospects.	  The	  film	  highlights	  the	  role	  Islamic	  schools	  have	  historically	  played	  in	  providing	  educational	  opportunities	  to	  poor	  families	  who	  could	  not	  afford	  public	  schools,	  which	  charged	  fees	  until	  2009,	  when	  all	  public	  schools	  were	  declared	  free.	  	  This	  common	  scenario,	  seen	  across	  the	  globe,	  of	  impoverished	  parents	  sacrificing	  a	  great	  deal	  in	  order	  to	  enroll	  their	  children	  in	  school	  with	  hopes	  for	  improving	  their	  future	  life	  situations,	  gets	  a	  middle-­‐class	  makeover.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  film’s	  marginalized	  Muhammadiyah	  school	  of	  the	  1970s,	  the	  new	  and	  innovative	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schools	  are	  the	  first	  choice	  schools	  of	  many	  urban	  middle-­‐class	  families	  in	  the	  post-­‐Suharto	  era.	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Unlike	  the	  parents	  in	  Belitong,	  who	  would	  have	  opted	  for	  the	  state	  school	  had	  it	  been	  affordable,	  the	  middle-­‐class	  parents	  of	  this	  study	  opted	  for	  a	  more	  expensive	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  school.	  These	  parents	  have	  redefined	  an	  education	  for	  a	  brighter	  future	  to	  include	  not	  only	  strong	  academics,	  but	  also	  a	  robust	  religious	  curriculum,	  and	  they	  are	  willing	  to	  pay	  expensive	  tuition	  fees	  for	  it.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  schools’	  focus	  on	  the	  collective	  transformative	  effects	  of	  Islamic	  schooling	  on	  society,	  parents	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  benefits	  for	  themselves	  and	  their	  children.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  aspirations,	  dilemmas,	  and	  anxieties	  of	  the	  newly	  religious	  middle	  classes,	  particularly	  in	  relation	  to	  tensions	  between	  morality,	  consumption,	  and	  corruption,	  create	  ready	  consumers	  for	  the	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  school	  market.	  Busy	  schedules	  and	  commitment	  to	  their	  children’s	  intellectual	  and	  moral	  development	  draw	  parents	  to	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  and	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT.	  In	  contrast	  to	  piety	  projects	  at	  the	  institutional	  level,	  where	  the	  schools	  focus	  on	  the	  collective	  transformative	  effects	  of	  Islamic	  schooling	  on	  society,	  parents	  engage	  in	  their	  own	  piety	  projects	  on	  the	  individual	  level,	  looking	  to	  Islamic	  schooling	  to	  individually	  influence	  their	  children’s	  religiosity.	  	  To	  explore	  this	  phenomenon,	  I	  first	  lay	  out	  the	  concepts	  of	  class	  and	  discuss	  middle	  class-­‐specific	  privileges	  and	  anxieties	  in	  Indonesia.	  Secondly,	  to	  locate	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  and	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  parents	  in	  the	  middle	  class	  and	  as	  practicing	  Muslims,	  I	  create	  a	  profile	  of	  the	  parents	  using	  data	  such	  as	  education	  levels,	  religious	  practices,	  and	  income.	  I	  then	  discuss	  parents’	  ideological	  and	  practical	  motivations	  for	  enrolling	  their	  children	  in	  an	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  school;	  parent	  motivations	  were	  quite	  similar	  between	  the	  two	  schools.	  Finally	  I	  explore	  the	  welcomed	  and	  unwelcomed	  attitudes	  and	  understandings	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students	  bring	  from	  school	  into	  the	  home,	  how	  parents	  accommodate	  or	  contest	  these	  teachings,	  and	  the	  potential	  complications	  of	  these	  unwelcomed	  teachings.	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  students	  have	  developed	  Islamic	  character	  that	  aligns	  with	  the	  parents’	  visions	  of	  a	  good	  Muslim.	  	  
Middle	  Class	  Anxiety	  with	  Wealth	  and	  Morality	  Weber	  framed	  class	  formation	  within	  social	  processes	  such	  as	  piety	  and	  anxiety	  (Jones	  2012:149).	  While	  the	  middle	  classes	  were	  of	  little	  interest	  to	  Marx,	  Weber	  focused	  nearly	  completely	  on	  them	  (Bottomore	  1983:75;	  Liechty	  2002).	  According	  to	  Weber,	  the	  emergence	  of	  middle	  classes	  was	  largely	  based	  not	  upon	  the	  “means	  of	  production”	  (such	  as	  factories	  or	  plantations),	  but	  upon	  access	  to	  other	  forms	  of	  “property.”	  Due	  to	  growth	  in	  new	  occupations	  in	  bureaucratic,	  service,	  and	  professional	  labor	  sectors	  and	  a	  new	  consumer	  economy,	  social	  identity	  was	  constructed	  around	  the	  property	  individuals	  owned	  rather	  than	  the	  kind	  of	  work	  they	  did	  (Halle	  1984	  as	  cited	  by	  Liechty	  2002:14-­‐15).	  Weber	  argues	  that	  the	  middle	  class’	  position	  is	  constructed	  around	  its	  ability	  to	  consume,	  or	  its	  place	  in	  the	  capitalist	  economy.	  In	  contrast	  to	  workers	  who	  earn	  “wages,”	  and	  capitalists	  who	  earn	  “dividends,”	  members	  of	  the	  middle	  class	  earn	  “salaries,”	  a	  term	  that	  implies	  a	  certain	  moral	  distance	  from	  laboring	  and	  wealth.	  For	  Weber,	  the	  middle	  class	  “stakes	  its	  identity	  on	  its	  accomplishments	  and	  refinement,	  moral	  discourses	  that	  it	  pursues	  largely	  through	  its	  privileged	  access	  to	  goods	  and	  services	  (from	  education	  to	  fashion)	  in	  the	  ‘free’	  market”	  (Liechty	  2002:17).	  In	  other	  words,	  Weber	  views	  middle-­‐class	  morality	  as	  a	  way	  to	  naturalize	  and	  defend	  middle-­‐class	  privilege.	  Anthropology’s	  nascent	  investigations	  of	  class	  have	  largely	  focused	  on	  the	  working	  classes,	  with	  some	  studies	  on	  social	  elites	  (Liechty	  2002).	  Early	  anthropological	  studies	  in	  
	  	  
212	  
Indonesia	  focused	  more	  on	  symbolic	  analysis	  and	  Javanese	  ideologies	  of	  status,	  which	  cut	  across	  social	  classes	  but	  never	  focused	  on	  class	  (Jones	  2012).	  In	  his	  well-­‐known	  analysis	  of	  Islam	  and	  various	  forms	  of	  worship	  in	  Java,	  Clifford	  Geertz’s	  (1960)	  observations	  of	  religious	  practices	  broke	  down	  along	  class	  lines,	  more	  or	  less.	  According	  to	  Geertz’s	  employment	  of	  ideal	  types,	  Indonesia’s	  socio-­‐religious	  groupings	  of	  the	  abangan,	  santri,	  and	  prijaji	  were,	  respectively,	  comprised	  of	  peasants	  with	  an	  animist	  emphasis,	  traders	  with	  Islamic	  leanings,	  and	  bureaucratic	  aristocracy	  with	  Hindu-­‐Buddhist	  affinities.	  This	  seminal	  work	  has	  since	  been	  refuted	  for	  its	  conflation	  of	  religious	  complexes	  with	  class	  differences	  and	  for	  the	  simplification	  of	  Indonesian	  society	  into	  ideal	  types	  (see	  for	  example	  Hefner	  1990;	  Koentjaraningrat	  1975;	  van	  Niel	  1992).	  The	  diversity	  of	  Indonesian	  society	  and	  the	  significant	  growth	  of	  a	  middle	  class	  since	  the	  1980s,	  which	  Hefner	  calls	  the	  “new	  Muslim	  middle	  class”	  (Hefner	  2000),	  demands	  nuanced	  attention	  from	  researchers	  who	  recognize	  the	  diversity	  within	  this	  category.	  Heryanto	  (2003)	  calls	  for	  the	  recognition	  of	  middle	  classes,	  rather	  than	  the	  singular	  middle	  class,	  particularly	  when	  examining	  Indonesia.	  He	  argues	  that	  middle	  classes	  consist	  of	  different	  and	  often	  contradictory	  elements	  such	  as	  progressive	  and	  conservative,	  opportunistic	  and	  apathetic.	  Each	  segment	  may	  respond	  in	  distinct	  ways	  to	  political	  and	  social	  events	  based	  on	  factors	  such	  as	  ethnic	  or	  religious	  differences.	  Henk	  Schulte	  Nordholt	  (2004)	  argues	  that	  while	  the	  middle	  classes—from	  the	  lower	  to	  the	  upper	  middle	  class—“form	  the	  backbone	  of	  Indonesian	  culture,”	  they	  have	  been	  under-­‐studied	  by	  both	  Indonesian	  and	  foreign	  scholars,	  making	  them	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  “people	  without	  a	  history”	  (16).	  Their	  histories,	  he	  claims,	  are	  essential	  to	  “decolonizing	  Indonesian	  historiography,”	  as	  the	  middle	  classes	  suddenly	  appeared	  in	  the	  late-­‐1980s	  literature	  when	  groups	  no	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longer	  fit	  into	  older	  colonial	  categories	  such	  as	  aristocracy,	  officials,	  peasants,	  laborers.	  Jones	  (2012)	  argues	  that	  in	  post-­‐Suharto	  Indonesia,	  it	  is	  more	  fruitful	  to	  ask	  questions	  about	  middle-­‐class	  subjectivities	  regarding	  middle-­‐class	  consumption	  patterns	  than	  to	  investigate	  the	  middle	  class	  as	  a	  singular	  group.	  This	  dissertation	  supports	  the	  idea	  of	  inconsistent	  perspectives	  and	  preferences	  within	  the	  middle	  classes	  through	  its	  demonstration	  of	  the	  discordant	  approaches	  to	  Islam	  that	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT	  put	  forth	  to	  their	  students.	  Political	  and	  cultural	  historical	  factors	  have	  limited	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  class	  within	  the	  Indonesian	  psyche.	  In	  the	  early	  1960s,	  Indonesia’s	  communist	  party	  was	  the	  largest	  communist	  party	  outside	  of	  the	  socialist	  bloc.	  Due	  to	  the	  anti-­‐communist	  sentiments	  around	  which	  Suharto	  framed	  his	  regime,	  Marxists	  ideas	  of	  class	  were	  banned	  from	  political	  discourse.	  After	  multiple	  anti-­‐communist	  mass	  killings	  in	  Indonesia	  in	  the	  late	  1960s,	  the	  term	  “class”	  came	  to	  have	  strong	  leftist	  overtones	  (Jones	  2012).	  Additionally,	  Indonesian	  nationalism	  during	  revolutionary	  days	  promoted	  concepts	  of	  “a	  nation	  composed	  of	  kin,”	  supplanting	  other	  forms	  of	  collective	  consciousness,	  especially	  among	  the	  middle	  class.	  As	  the	  middle	  class	  was	  founded	  upon	  state	  employment,	  the	  middle	  class	  formed	  a	  strong	  loyalty	  towards	  leadership	  who	  knew	  what	  was	  best	  for	  the	  “family.”	  (Siegel	  2002:222).	  Unlike	  in	  Europe,	  where	  class	  conflict	  has	  shaped	  class	  identity,	  in	  Indonesia	  “attitudes	  towards	  wealth	  are	  a	  central	  point	  of	  differentiation”	  among	  the	  classes	  (Siegel	  1998:83).	  	  Due	  to	  ambivalence	  regarding	  the	  relationship	  between	  wealth	  and	  their	  identity	  (Jones	  2012:149),	  middle-­‐class	  Indonesians	  have	  been	  slow	  to	  identity	  themselves	  as	  middle-­‐class.	  Heryanto	  (2003)	  purports	  that	  the	  middle	  classes	  of	  Indonesia	  define	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themselves	  not	  as	  members	  of	  a	  class,	  but	  rather	  as	  “educated”	  or	  “developed,”	  eschewing	  the	  pursuit	  of	  “wealth	  and	  power”	  for	  “truth,	  justice,	  ethics	  or	  beauty.”	  Thus	  there	  is	  a	  constant	  need	  to	  “deny	  their	  privileged	  status,	  self-­‐interest,	  or	  desire	  for	  recognition”	  (Heryanto	  2003:29).	  However,	  as	  economist	  Howard	  Dick	  (1985:75)	  argues,	  in	  addition	  to	  income	  and	  expenditure	  levels,	  social	  behaviors	  regarding	  the	  privatization	  of	  consumption	  are	  the	  most	  striking	  features	  of	  Indonesia’s	  middle	  class.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  communal	  attitudes	  toward	  open	  access	  to	  property	  and	  assets	  among	  rural	  communities,	  urban	  middle-­‐class	  families	  have	  a	  greater	  sense	  of	  individual	  ownership	  of	  property	  and	  their	  private	  lives.	  Consequently,	  religious	  middle-­‐class	  parents	  whose	  identification	  is	  connected	  to	  personal	  morality	  and	  refinement	  can	  assuage	  their	  angst	  concerning	  individualized	  habits	  of	  consumption	  through	  providing	  expensive	  schooling	  for	  their	  children	  if	  it	  provides	  religious	  training	  as	  well.	  	  The	  new	  prominence	  of	  Islam	  in	  the	  Indonesian	  public	  sphere	  since	  the	  late	  1980s	  has	  assumed	  a	  “moral	  tone	  for	  the	  middle	  class	  position	  between	  the	  working	  classes	  and	  the	  wealthy”	  (Jones	  2012:159).	  Many	  scholars	  argue	  that	  the	  rise	  of	  Islamic	  piety	  in	  Indonesia	  has	  been	  a	  fundamentally	  middle-­‐class	  phenomenon	  (Brenner	  1996,	  Hefner	  2000,	  Smith-­‐Hefner	  2007,	  as	  cited	  by	  Jones	  2012:159).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  middle	  classes—more	  than	  other	  classes	  in	  Indonesia—are	  embracing	  a	  more	  Islamic	  lifestyle.	  Religion	  has	  become	  a	  platform	  from	  which	  to	  critique	  Indonesia’s	  political	  and	  economic	  conditions,	  seen	  to	  result	  from	  a	  national	  moral	  crisis.	  	  Consequently,	  Islam	  is	  posited	  as	  the	  solution	  to	  the	  county’s	  economic	  and	  social	  ills.	  	  Class	  has	  recently	  become	  a	  lens	  through	  which	  to	  understand	  contemporary	  political	  and	  religious	  aspects	  of	  Indonesian	  life.	  Heryanto	  (2003)	  discusses	  middle-­‐class	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influences	  on	  authoritarian	  rule	  and	  the	  process	  of	  democratization	  in	  Indonesia.	  Rinaldo	  (2007)	  discusses	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  middle	  class,	  Islam,	  political	  activism,	  and	  women.	  She	  argues	  that	  Islam	  is	  used	  among	  middle-­‐class	  women	  to	  justify	  their	  participation	  in	  the	  public	  sphere,	  and	  in	  politics	  more	  specifically.	  Jones	  (2012)	  discusses	  middle-­‐class	  women,	  femininity,	  consumption,	  and	  morality.	  There	  has	  yet	  been	  little,	  if	  any,	  discussion	  of	  how	  the	  middle	  classes	  influence	  Islamic	  schooling	  in	  urban	  Indonesia;	  this	  chapter	  initiates	  the	  discussion.	  	  The	  anxieties	  around	  this	  relatively	  new	  phenomenon	  of	  middle	  class-­‐ness	  in	  Indonesia	  stem	  from,	  among	  other	  things,	  the	  perceived	  incompatibility	  between	  wealth	  and	  morality,	  and	  in	  particular	  consumption	  and	  corruption	  (Jones	  2012).	  Indonesia	  is	  well	  known	  for	  its	  high	  levels	  of	  corruption.106	  This	  corruption	  is	  seen	  both	  internally	  and	  internationally	  as	  a	  key	  impediment	  to	  the	  county’s	  economic	  development.	  	  Jones	  argues	  that	  the	  rise	  in	  public	  forms	  of	  Islamic	  piety	  is	  a	  partial	  solution	  to	  public	  anxieties	  about	  corruption.	  I	  argue,	  more	  specifically,	  that	  the	  rise	  in	  Islamic	  schooling	  among	  the	  middle	  classes	  is	  due	  to	  parental	  expectations	  that	  it	  will	  safeguard	  children	  against	  moral	  corruption.	  	  Significant	  research	  has	  been	  conducted	  regarding	  the	  intersection	  of	  class	  and	  schooling,	  but	  little	  has	  looked	  at	  class	  and	  private	  religious	  schooling.	  Researchers	  have	  analyzed,	  and	  criticized,	  the	  use	  of	  state	  schooling	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  class	  structures	  in	  Western	  (see	  Apple	  1979,	  1986,	  1991,	  2006;	  Bourdieu	  1984;	  Foley	  et	  al.	  2010;	  Gramsci	  1971;	  Willis	  1981)	  and	  non-­‐Western	  countries	  (see	  Freire	  1970;	  Levinson	  2001;	  Luykx	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  Indonesia	  is	  constantly	  at	  the	  top	  of	  lists	  of	  corrupt	  countries	  in	  the	  world.	  Jones	  (2012)	  provides	  a	  thorough	  analysis	  of	  the	  forms	  of	  monetary	  corruption	  that	  can	  take	  place,	  particularly	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  feminized	  work	  in	  the	  home.	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1999).	  Others	  have	  looked	  at	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  such	  as	  middle-­‐class	  parents,	  and	  the	  strategies	  they	  employ	  to	  ensure	  social	  and	  economic	  advantages	  for	  their	  children	  through	  schooling	  (see	  Ball	  2003,	  Brantlinger	  2003;	  Demerath	  2009;	  Park	  &	  Abelmann	  2004;	  Water	  2005;	  Weenink	  2008).	  This	  chapter	  largely	  focuses	  on	  the	  school	  choice	  motivations	  of	  religious	  middle-­‐class	  parents	  to	  obtain	  a	  hybrid	  rigorous	  academic	  and	  religious	  education	  for	  their	  children	  through	  private	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schools.	  	  According	  to	  school	  choice	  literature,	  parent	  motivations	  are	  generally	  based	  on	  three	  considerations:	  academic;	  social/school	  environment;	  and	  religious/moral	  (Badawi	  2005).	  Research	  indicates	  that	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  parents	  generally	  base	  public	  or	  private	  and	  sectarian	  or	  non-­‐sectarian	  school	  selection	  decisions	  first	  and	  foremost	  on	  academic	  considerations	  (Dee	  1981,	  Gratiot	  1980,	  Greene	  et	  al.	  1998,	  Vanourek	  et	  al.	  1998).	  Parents	  may	  choose	  religious	  schooling	  for	  their	  children	  not	  necessarily	  for	  religious	  instruction,	  but	  for	  a	  perceived	  higher	  quality	  of	  services,	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  discipline,	  attendance,	  and	  homework	  (Coleman	  et	  al.	  1982)	  and	  increased	  academic	  achievement	  (Evans	  &	  Schwab	  1995).	  Indeed,	  prior	  to	  the	  recent	  development	  of	  quality	  Islamic	  schools	  in	  Indonesia,	  many	  elite	  Muslim	  families	  sent	  their	  children	  to	  Catholic	  schools,	  as	  they	  provided	  better	  academic	  quality	  programs	  than	  Islamic	  or	  state	  schools.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say,	  however,	  that	  all	  American	  parents	  who	  enroll	  children	  in	  religious	  schools	  are	  not	  interested	  in	  religious	  education	  of	  their	  children.	  Gratiot	  (1980)	  distinguished	  two	  types	  of	  parents	  interested	  in	  religious	  schooling:	  parents	  who	  were	  dissatisfied	  with	  public	  schooling	  options,	  and	  religiously-­‐oriented	  parents	  who	  placed	  high	  premium	  on	  religious	  education.	  However,	  as	  Khan	  (2012:12)	  points	  out	  from	  his	  study	  in	  Pakistan,	  for	  religiously-­‐minded	  parents	  to	  consider	  religious	  schooling,	  two	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fundamental	  preconditions	  must	  be	  present:	  first,	  the	  religious	  school	  must	  offer	  a	  quality	  education;	  and	  secondly,	  the	  type	  of	  education	  and	  credentials	  offered	  must	  be	  similar	  to	  those	  of	  the	  public	  schools.	  As	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT	  provide	  these	  two	  preconditions,	  it	  becomes	  the	  parents’	  classed	  aspirations,	  anxieties,	  and	  dilemmas	  that	  draw	  them	  to	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schools.	  	  	  I	  argue	  that	  Indonesia’s	  newly	  religious	  middle-­‐class	  parents	  ameliorate	  their	  anxieties	  about	  privilege,	  consumption,	  and	  corrupted	  morality	  in	  part	  through	  enrolling	  their	  children	  in	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schools.	  As	  stated	  in	  sections	  to	  follow,	  these	  parents	  want	  their	  children	  to	  become	  better	  than	  themselves	  in	  terms	  of	  education,	  economic	  and	  social	  achievement,	  and	  piety.	  The	  high	  quality	  of	  these	  schools	  allows	  students	  to	  pursue	  university	  education	  and	  assists	  them	  in	  becoming	  respectable	  professionals	  and	  citizens	  of	  the	  middle	  class.	  Religious	  training	  is	  expected	  to	  instill	  a	  sense	  of	  modesty	  to	  monitor	  and	  downplay	  privileges	  afforded	  by	  their	  wealth.	  Additionally,	  parents	  expect	  children’s	  susceptibility	  to	  moral	  corruption	  as	  young	  individuals	  growing	  up	  in	  a	  rapidly	  changing	  society	  to	  be	  countered	  by	  an	  Islamic	  education	  that	  teaches	  children	  specific	  guidelines	  for	  identifying	  and	  avoiding	  immorality.	  Finally,	  in	  a	  more	  direct	  form	  of	  protection,	  the	  longer	  school	  day	  keeps	  children	  off	  the	  street	  and	  out	  of	  other	  spaces	  that	  could	  introduce	  them	  to	  corrupting	  influences.	  	  	  
The	  Profile	  of	  Middle-­‐class	  Parents	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  and	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  Parents	  enrolling	  their	  children	  in	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  and	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  are	  better	  educated	  than	  the	  general	  population,	  regularly	  participate	  in	  daily	  sholat	  (prayer),	  and	  have	  a	  reported	  income	  above	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  city’s	  inhabitants.	  To	  gather	  this	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information,	  I	  conducted	  a	  survey	  of	  parents	  through	  self-­‐administered	  questionnaires	  distributed	  to	  all	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  and	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  parents.	  A	  total	  of	  937	  parent	  surveys	  were	  collected,	  reaching	  an	  83%	  to	  88%	  response	  rate.	  The	  questionnaires	  were	  distributed	  to	  parents	  via	  students	  through	  the	  classroom	  teachers.	  They	  were	  then	  returned	  to	  the	  teachers	  through	  the	  students	  and	  collected	  at	  the	  main	  office.	  Questionnaires	  were	  returned	  in	  envelopes	  provided	  with	  the	  questionnaire	  to	  create	  as	  high	  a	  level	  of	  anonymity	  as	  possible.	  The	  data	  was	  analyzed	  using	  Microsoft	  Excel	  and	  Stata	  software.	  (See	  Table	  4	  below	  for	  reference	  to	  the	  number	  of	  questionnaires	  received	  from	  each	  school.)	  	  
 
Table 4. Student and Parent Totals and Number of 
Questionnaires Collected 










  Male 
  Female 









Al Azhar 31 
  Male 
  Female 









Note: A questionnaire was distributed to each student at each 
school. A search for duplicate surveys due to parents returning a 
completed survey for each sibling at the school was conducted, 
and duplicates were deleted from the total surveys received and 
used in analysis. 
*While the number of male and female students is not available, 
there was general gender parity.  
 Overall,	  the	  parents	  are	  highly	  educated,	  especially	  in	  comparison	  to	  their	  contemporaries	  throughout	  the	  rest	  of	  Indonesia.	  Over	  98%	  of	  all	  parents	  from	  both	  schools	  completed	  secondary	  education,	  and	  82%	  or	  more	  completed	  a	  postsecondary	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degree.	  National	  gross	  enrollment	  rates	  for	  secondary	  and	  tertiary	  schooling	  in	  1986,	  the	  year	  the	  average	  father	  would	  have	  graduated	  from	  senior	  high	  school,	  were	  43%	  and	  8%,	  respectively	  (World	  Bank	  2012).	  Even	  in	  2010,	  only	  67%	  of	  the	  senior	  secondary	  school-­‐	  and	  23%	  of	  the	  tertiary-­‐aged	  populations	  were	  enrolled	  (World	  Bank	  2012).	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  comparison	  to	  their	  age	  group	  and	  the	  current	  school-­‐aged	  population	  across	  the	  nation,	  these	  mothers	  and	  fathers	  are	  educationally	  privileged	  and	  highly	  educated.	  Most	  of	  these	  parents,	  raised	  during	  the	  heyday	  of	  Suharto’s	  secular	  New	  Order	  policies,	  had	  attended	  state	  schools	  and	  had	  become	  interested	  in	  Islam	  only	  as	  adults.	  In	  the	  primary	  grades,	  more	  than	  92%	  of	  Al	  Azhar’s	  parents	  and	  84%	  of	  those	  at	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  had	  attended	  state	  general	  schools.	  Therefore,	  the	  majority	  of	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  school	  parents	  are	  providing	  their	  children	  a	  primary	  education	  significantly	  different	  than	  their	  own.	  It	  is	  no	  surprise	  that	  over	  three-­‐fourths	  of	  these	  extended-­‐day	  parents	  considered	  their	  children	  to	  be	  more	  religious	  than	  they	  considered	  themselves	  to	  have	  been	  during	  their	  own	  childhoods.	  	  	  While	  income	  can	  be	  hard	  to	  determine,	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  parents	  reported	  having	  the	  greatest	  levels	  of	  income	  per	  family.	  More	  than	  two	  thirds	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  respondents	  reported	  monthly	  incomes	  of	  over	  US$436,	  while	  just	  over	  a	  third	  of	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  parents	  reported	  the	  same	  monthly	  income.	  However,	  this	  income	  is	  still	  well	  above	  the	  average	  monthly	  income	  in	  Jogja	  in	  2009	  of	  US$119	  (PBS	  Statistics	  Indonesia	  2011:31).	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  families	  also	  scored	  lower	  on	  other	  wealth	  measurements,	  such	  as	  employing	  domestic	  help,	  owning	  a	  home,	  and	  owning	  a	  motorized	  vehicle.	  Even	  though	  JSIT	  schools	  promote	  more	  restrictive	  and	  regulated	  gendered	  attitudes,	  more	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  mothers	  work	  outside	  of	  the	  home	  than	  those	  from	  Al	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Azhar	  31.	  On	  the	  survey,	  29%	  of	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  mothers	  were	  reported	  as	  “housewife”	  as	  their	  occupation.	  Of	  the	  mothers	  at	  Al	  Azhar	  31,	  45%	  were	  reported	  as	  housewives.	  In	  other	  words,	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  reported	  a	  higher	  number	  of	  dual	  income	  households	  (71%	  in	  contrast	  to	  55%).	  Given	  that	  the	  mothers’	  education	  levels	  are	  fairly	  similar	  between	  the	  two	  schools,	  it	  can	  be	  safely	  assumed	  that	  there	  would	  be	  equal	  opportunities	  for	  employment	  for	  both	  sets	  of	  mothers.	  It	  is	  therefore	  possible	  that	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  mothers	  work	  more	  out	  of	  necessity,	  while	  the	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  mothers	  have	  more	  choice	  in	  whether	  to	  work	  or	  not.	  This	  suggests	  that	  for	  many	  parents,	  a	  large	  draw	  to	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  may	  be	  in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  need	  for	  after-­‐school	  care	  for	  students.	  This	  will	  be	  supported	  below	  in	  interview	  data.	  	  Although	  the	  general	  upbringing	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  extended-­‐day	  school	  parents	  was	  not	  overtly	  religious,	  parents	  reported	  to	  now	  regularly	  participate	  in	  daily	  sholat	  (prayer).	  Performing	  five	  daily	  prayers	  is	  one	  of	  the	  five	  pillars	  of	  Islam	  and	  is	  considered	  a	  way	  to	  remember	  Allah.	  The	  great	  majority	  of	  parents,	  91%	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  and	  98%	  of	  those	  at	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT,	  reported	  performing	  the	  required	  five	  sholat	  or	  more	  each	  day.	  Going	  beyond	  the	  required	  amount,	  40%	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  and	  32%	  of	  Luqman	  parents	  performed	  additional	  sholat	  each	  day.	  	  Being	  raised	  without	  formal	  religious	  activity	  translated	  into	  most	  parents	  holding	  no	  strong	  cultural	  or	  doctrinal	  allegiances	  to	  NU,	  Muhammadiyah,	  or	  other	  specific	  religious	  traditions	  or	  those	  organizations’	  Islamic	  schools.	  The	  parents’	  religious	  interests	  tended	  to	  be	  in	  Islam	  itself,	  rather	  than	  religious	  organizations.	  A	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  mother	  explained,	  I	  just	  want	  my	  child	  to	  follow	  the	  religion	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  teachings	  of	  the	  Prophet.	  I	  don’t	  require	  him	  to	  be	  Muhammadiyah	  or	  NU.	  The	  PKS	  is	  a	  political	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organization,	  and	  the	  NU	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  are	  community	  (masyarakat)	  organizations…The	  important	  thing	  is	  that	  my	  child	  practices	  religion	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  guidance	  of	  the	  disciples	  [rosulloh].	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  mother,	  April	  30,	  2010)	  	  Most	  parents,	  like	  this	  one,	  see	  the	  essence	  of	  Islam	  as	  standing	  outside	  of	  organizations,	  religious	  or	  political.	  This	  lack	  of	  allegiance	  allows	  for	  the	  organization-­‐free,	  or	  universal,	  Islamic	  schools	  to	  thrive.	  	  As	  one	  Muhammadiyah	  activist	  perceived	  it,	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  school	  parents	  are	  interested	  in	  Islam	  in	  the	  personal,	  individual	  sense	  rather	  than	  the	  collective	  sense	  that	  comes	  with	  organizations.	  Parents	  are	  not	  interested	  in	  their	  children	  becoming	  Islamic	  activists	  or	  being	  involved	  in	  Islamic	  political	  parties.	  Consequently,	  the	  parents	  are	  not	  particularly	  selective	  of	  the	  organizations	  behind	  the	  schools	  (Interview	  with	  Muhammadiyah	  Activist,	  December	  16,	  2009).	  Fealy	  (2008:16)	  argues	  that	  the	  rise	  of	  Islamic	  consumption	  in	  Indonesia	  has	  led	  to	  strengthened	  individualized	  forms	  of	  Islam	  that	  shift	  away	  from	  the	  prominence	  of	  established	  organizations	  or	  figures.	  The	  few	  parents	  I	  spoke	  with	  who	  identified	  connection	  to	  an	  organization	  as	  important	  were	  willing	  to	  send	  their	  children	  to	  a	  high	  quality	  religious	  school	  outside	  of	  their	  affiliation,	  assuming	  they	  would	  teach	  the	  specifics	  to	  their	  children	  at	  home.	  This	  will	  be	  discussed	  later	  on	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	  
Reasons	  or	  School	  Selection	  	  	   Parents’	  reasons	  for	  enrolling	  their	  children	  in	  both	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schools	  fall	  in	  line	  with	  middle-­‐class	  parents’	  aspirations,	  anxieties,	  and	  dilemmas.	  Parents	  want	  their	  children	  to	  gain	  intellectual	  capabilities	  and	  a	  moral	  compass	  necessary	  for	  successfully	  navigating	  their	  futures.	  As	  one	  of	  the	  original	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  founders	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who	  has	  since	  moved	  to	  Jakarta	  to	  work	  at	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Youth	  and	  Sports	  observed,	  “I	  think…integrated	  Islamic	  schools	  have	  become	  a	  trend	  because	  there’s	  parental	  anxiety	  about	  the	  future	  of	  their	  children.	  The	  future	  is	  not	  only	  intellectual,	  but	  it’s	  also	  moral”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  founder,	  April	  22,	  2010).	  In	  other	  words,	  he	  believes	  that	  today’s	  Muslim	  parents	  are	  concerned	  with	  their	  children’s	  moral	  and	  intellectual	  development.	  On	  a	  more	  practical	  level,	  parents	  seek	  help	  in	  taking	  care	  of	  their	  children	  as	  their	  busy	  schedules	  reduce	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  they	  have,	  particularly	  in	  the	  afternoons,	  to	  personally	  attend	  to	  their	  children.	  Although	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  and	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  differ	  in	  expectations	  for	  individual	  implementation	  of	  Islam,	  one	  being	  more	  flexible	  and	  the	  other	  more	  exacting,	  and	  though	  parents	  personal	  religious	  practices	  vary	  somewhat,	  parents	  from	  both	  schools	  held	  similar	  ideological	  and	  practical	  motivations	  for	  enrolling	  their	  children.	  The	  few	  disparities	  suggest	  a	  financial,	  rather	  than	  an	  ideological,	  difference.	  For	  many	  parents,	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  was	  economically	  unfeasible.	  The	  following	  section	  presents	  parents’	  explanations	  of	  their	  motivations	  for	  enrolling	  their	  children	  in	  these	  two	  schools.	  	  	  
Academic	  quality	  First	  and	  foremost,	  the	  academic	  quality	  of	  the	  schools	  was	  non-­‐negotiable.	  At	  first	  glance,	  only	  a	  few	  parents	  cited	  overall	  quality	  or	  the	  schools’	  positive	  reputations	  in	  the	  community	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  their	  children’s	  enrollment.	  The	  overall	  quality	  of	  the	  national	  education	  system	  is	  poor.	  Consequently,	  middle-­‐class	  parents	  frequently	  seek	  out	  the	  “favorite”	  general	  schools,	  private	  schools,	  or	  international	  schools	  in	  the	  country.	  In	  some	  cases,	  elite	  parents	  send	  their	  children	  to	  schools	  in	  Singapore	  or	  even	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Western	  Europe.	  For	  religious	  education,	  parents	  who	  send	  their	  children	  to	  general	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schools	  often	  hire	  private	  religion	  tutors	  or	  send	  their	  children	  to	  lessons	  at	  the	  neighborhood	  mosque.	  By	  marrying	  quality	  academics	  and	  robust	  religious	  education,	  the	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  school	  provides	  a	  new	  schooling	  option	  for	  religious-­‐minded	  middle-­‐class	  parents.	  These	  highly	  educated	  parents	  are	  not	  interested	  in	  religious	  education	  alone,	  but	  also	  in	  academic	  training	  that	  allows	  their	  children	  to	  attend	  respectable	  high	  schools	  and	  then	  universities.	  Starting	  from	  a	  pool	  of	  the	  city’s	  high-­‐performing	  schools,107	  parents	  then	  differentiated	  characteristics	  that	  eventually	  lead	  them	  to	  the	  schools	  of	  their	  choice.108	  Hasan	  (2009)	  argues	  that	  enrolling	  children	  in	  reputable	  schools	  bolsters	  and	  confirms	  parents’	  social	  status,	  even	  more	  so	  if	  the	  school	  is	  a	  quality	  Islamic	  school.	  	  	  
A	  solid	  moral	  foundation	  Just	  as	  with	  most	  parents	  around	  the	  world,	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  school	  parents	  expressed	  desires	  for	  their	  children	  to	  have	  a	  better	  life	  than	  their	  own,	  to	  be	  better	  than	  they	  are.	  “Better,”	  in	  this	  case,	  largely	  entailed	  being	  more	  educated	  in	  both	  academics	  and	  religion.	  A	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  father,	  a	  graduate	  student	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  at	  the	  prestigious	  Gajah	  Made	  University,	  explained:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  Generally,	  student	  rankings	  on	  national	  and	  regional	  exams	  published	  in	  the	  local	  newspapers	  are	  the	  basic	  indicators	  of	  the	  schools’	  academic	  quality.	  	  108	  Options	  included	  the	  top	  state	  general	  schools,	  top	  Muhammadiyah	  schools,	  top	  SIT	  schools,	  Al	  Azhar	  31,	  and	  a	  few	  other	  private	  religious	  and	  non-­‐religious	  schools,	  such	  as	  BIAS	  and	  Budi	  Mulia	  Dua.	  BIAS	  is	  a	  small	  network	  of	  the	  Development	  of	  Pious	  Children	  (Bina	  Anak	  Sholeh-­‐BIAS)	  schools	  belonging	  to	  the	  Institution	  of	  Integrated	  Islamic	  Schools	  (Lembaga	  Pendidikan	  Islam	  Terpadu).	  This	  organization	  is	  separate	  from	  the	  JSIT.	  Budi	  Mulia	  Dua	  is	  a	  private	  school	  run	  founded	  by	  Amien	  Rais,	  a	  prominent	  Indonesian	  politician	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  figure.	  While	  it	  is	  run	  by	  a	  prominent	  Muhammadiyah	  figure	  and	  all	  female	  teachers	  veil,	  the	  school	  does	  not	  advertise	  itself	  as	  an	  Islamic	  school.	  See	  chapter	  2	  for	  more	  details.	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[In	  the	  current]	  culture	  of	  Indonesia,	  mainly	  Muslims,	  one	  of	  the	  wishes	  is	  that	  children	  be	  better	  than	  their	  parents	  in	  terms	  of	  education,	  prosperity	  (kesejahteran),	  and	  religious	  education	  in	  particular…Islam	  has	  become	  so	  important	  in	  life	  that	  we	  want	  it	  applied	  well	  to	  our	  children.	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  father,	  April	  9,	  2010)	  	  Additionally,	  an	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  father,	  a	  professor	  at	  the	  State	  Islamic	  University	  campus	  in	  Jogja,	  stated:	  I	  believe	  that	  religion	  can	  direct	  my	  kids	  to	  a	  better	  life.	  I	  believe	  that	  religion	  is	  the	  foundation	  of	  life.	  I	  want	  my	  children	  to	  have	  a	  strong	  foundation	  regarding	  religion	  that	  will	  lead	  in	  the	  way	  that	  is	  good	  and	  right.	  Perhaps	  the	  way	  that	  is	  good	  and	  right	  doesn’t	  have	  to	  be	  through	  religion,	  but	  it	  is	  one	  way…and	  I	  want	  my	  kids	  to	  stick	  to	  that	  one.	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  father,	  Jogjakarta,	  February	  1,	  2010).	  	  These	  parents	  see	  religion	  as	  not	  just	  the	  foundation	  for	  life,	  but	  the	  key	  to	  a	  better	  life.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  the	  non-­‐exclusive	  attitude	  of	  the	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  father	  regarding	  the	  idea	  that	  non-­‐religious	  value	  systems	  could	  also	  lead	  to	  a	  good	  life.	  Although	  he	  feels	  this	  way,	  he	  has	  chosen	  Islam	  as	  his	  guiding	  value	  system	  and	  wants	  his	  children	  to	  do	  the	  same.	  	  Parents	  expect	  a	  substantial	  religious	  education	  at	  an	  early	  age	  to	  promote	  understanding	  of	  Islam	  and,	  possibly	  more	  importantly,	  of	  religious	  devotion.	  They	  believe	  that	  if	  their	  children	  become	  good	  Muslims,	  they	  will	  have	  better	  lives.	  Parents	  do	  not	  aspire	  to	  have	  their	  children	  become	  religious	  leaders	  or	  scholars,	  but	  rather	  pious	  businesspersons,	  religious	  academics,	  and	  upstanding	  professionals	  in	  all	  fields.	  They	  look	  to	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schooling	  to	  provide	  a	  religious	  foundation	  that	  is	  expected	  to	  set	  the	  children	  on	  the	  right	  path	  for	  a	  moral,	  upright	  life.	  The	  previously	  quoted	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  father	  above	  reasoned:	  	  If	  we	  inculcate	  Islamic	  education	  from	  an	  early	  age,	  they’ll	  be	  strong	  from	  childhood…Our	  hope	  is	  just	  that	  our	  child	  lives	  according	  to	  religion	  and	  doesn’t	  become	  a	  troublemaker.	  If	  he	  becomes	  a	  politician	  or	  statesman,	  that’s	  fine…What’s	  important…is	  to	  not	  get	  involved	  in	  promiscuity,	  drug	  abuse,	  and	  so	  forth.	  For	  Muslims,	  promiscuity	  and	  drugs	  are	  very	  defacing	  (mencoreng).	  Whatever	  they	  want	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to	  be,	  or	  aspire	  to,	  as	  long	  as	  the	  desire	  comes	  from	  a	  good	  source,	  it	  doesn’t	  matter.	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  father,	  April	  9,	  2010)	  	  	  This	  parent	  wants	  his	  child	  to	  be	  a	  respectable	  Muslim,	  first	  and	  foremost.	  The	  profession	  of	  his	  child	  is	  less	  of	  a	  concern	  than	  his	  religious	  identity	  and	  moral	  character.	  	  Much	  like	  school	  leadership,	  parents	  view	  being	  religious	  as	  intrinsically	  connected	  to	  having	  a	  strong	  moral	  code.	  Parents	  expect	  this	  moral	  code	  to	  guide	  their	  children	  and	  protect	  them	  from	  the	  perceived	  growing	  current	  of	  increasing	  immorality	  and	  shifts	  in	  societal	  values.	  Parents	  are	  concerned	  with	  the	  loosening	  of	  traditional	  social	  values	  as	  Indonesia	  enters	  the	  21st	  century.	  Religion	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  shield	  against	  inappropriate	  behavior	  and	  poor	  choices.	  Parents	  frequently	  mentioned	  disrespect	  for	  adults	  (a	  significant	  offense	  in	  Javanese	  culture),	  drug	  use,	  pornography,	  and	  “free	  sex”	  as	  signs	  of	  decaying	  morals	  among	  today’s	  youth.	  A	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  mother	  expressed	  her	  reasons	  for	  wanting	  her	  children	  to	  be	  more	  religious	  than	  she	  was	  as	  in	  the	  following	  statement.	  I	  think	  the	  current	  social	  problems	  of	  children	  and	  youth	  are	  very	  widespread.	  In	  that	  sense	  there	  are	  many	  cases,	  like	  youth	  who	  become	  pregnant	  out	  of	  wedlock,	  drugs,	  and	  so	  on.	  That’s	  usually	  from	  religious	  factors	  being	  less	  embedded	  [in	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  youth]…My	  husband	  and	  I	  do	  not	  quite	  understand	  religion	  and	  only	  know	  that	  Islam	  should	  be	  like	  this	  and	  this.	  But	  as	  for	  the	  Hadith	  and	  the	  relevant	  Qur’anic	  verses,	  we	  do	  not	  know	  them	  exactly…So	  if	  we	  cultivate	  it	  from	  childhood,	  and	  hope	  he	  [our	  son]	  understands,	  he	  can	  think	  if	  you	  want	  to	  do	  something	  like	  this	  because	  according	  to	  religion…We	  were	  told	  in	  earlier	  times,	  “You	  cannot,	  it’s	  a	  sin.”	  Then	  we	  would	  not	  ask	  again.	  But	  the	  children	  now	  say,	  “Sin?	  According	  to	  what?	  Where	  is	  the	  sin?”	  and	  so	  on.	  So	  there	  is	  a	  barrage	  of	  questions…that	  we	  must	  explain.	  In	  my	  day,	  if	  we	  were	  told,	  “Don’t	  do	  it,	  it’s	  a	  sin,”	  we	  wouldn’t	  dare	  to	  do	  it.	  But	  children	  today...	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  mother,	  December	  21,	  2009)	  	  This	  parent	  sees	  the	  youth	  of	  today	  as	  less	  obedient,	  more	  challenging	  of	  authority,	  and	  more	  widely	  involved	  in	  negative	  social	  activities	  than	  the	  youth	  in	  her	  adolescence.	  Rather	  than	  wishing	  to	  return	  to	  the	  era	  of	  her	  own	  childhood,	  where	  children	  may	  not	  have	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understood	  religion	  but	  didn’t	  “dare”	  to	  go	  against	  its	  teachings,	  she	  looks	  to	  religious	  schooling	  as	  the	  best	  way	  to	  keep	  her	  child	  from	  being	  brazen	  and	  participating	  in	  risky	  social	  behaviors.	  She	  and	  her	  husband	  feel	  insufficiently	  familiar	  with	  Islam’s	  doctrinal	  sources	  to	  find	  answers	  to	  children’s	  questions	  that	  challenge	  an	  adult’s	  admonitions	  to	  not	  act	  in	  a	  certain	  way.	  Consequently,	  she	  hopes	  an	  Islamic	  school	  will	  provide	  her	  child	  with	  the	  needed	  religious	  knowledge	  and	  instruction	  to	  intellectually	  or	  doctrinally	  support	  the	  admonitions	  against	  sinful	  behavior.	  The	  mother	  assumes	  knowing	  the	  holy	  texts	  will	  be	  sufficient	  for	  students	  to	  make	  good	  choices	  and	  be	  obedient.	  Integrated	  schools	  are	  most	  popular	  for	  preschool	  and	  primary-­‐level	  students.	  There	  are	  more	  preschools	  and	  primary	  schools	  than	  junior	  and	  senior	  high	  extended-­‐day	  schools.109	  In	  part,	  this	  is	  because	  the	  educational	  movement	  is	  still	  young,	  and	  students	  have	  not	  “grown”	  the	  system	  into	  a	  robust	  secondary	  sector	  yet.	  However,	  many	  parents	  also	  feel	  it	  is	  most	  important	  for	  their	  children	  to	  gain	  a	  solid	  religious	  foundation	  at	  a	  young	  age.	  Parents	  had	  little	  objection	  to	  their	  students	  attending	  general	  secondary	  schools.110	  Many	  parents	  see	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  children’s	  lives	  as	  the	  most	  crucial	  for	  the	  development	  of	  religious	  character	  and	  the	  setting	  of	  a	  moral	  compass.	  They	  assume	  that	  if	  their	  children	  learn	  at	  a	  young	  age	  to	  be	  religious,	  they	  would	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  In	  2010,	  Al	  Azhar	  had	  35	  preschools	  and	  kindergartens,	  35	  primary	  schools,	  24	  junior	  high	  schools	  and	  six	  senior	  high	  schools,	  and	  one	  university.	  In	  that	  same	  year,	  JSIT	  membership	  included	  571	  preschools	  and	  kindergartens,	  424	  primary	  schools,	  109	  junior	  high	  schools,	  and	  21	  senior	  high	  schools.	  	  	  110	  Possibly	  a	  remnant	  of	  other	  Islamic	  schooling	  systems,	  secondary	  Islamic	  schools	  are	  often	  of	  even	  poorer	  quality	  than	  the	  primary-­‐level	  schools.	  There	  are	  also	  fewer	  of	  them.	  Frequently,	  children	  who	  matriculate	  to	  secondary	  school	  from	  a	  primary	  Islamic	  school	  go	  to	  general	  schools.	  The	  majority	  of	  students	  interviewed	  at	  two	  different	  schools	  were	  eager	  to	  attend	  general	  schools	  rather	  than	  continue	  their	  secondary	  education	  at	  an	  Islamic	  school.	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become	  upstanding	  adult	  Muslims.	  A	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  parent,	  a	  mother	  who	  works	  as	  a	  teacher	  at	  a	  different	  SIT,	  explained:	  	  	  	  The	  primary	  school	  is	  important	  for	  them	  [students]	  for	  when	  they	  grow,	  when	  they	  get	  old…What	  they	  experience	  in	  their	  primary	  schooling	  will	  stick	  in	  their	  minds	  and	  become	  habit	  and	  attitude…Some	  parents	  send	  their	  children	  to	  the	  best	  public	  schools	  but	  they	  [miss	  out	  on]	  good	  habits,	  religious	  practices.	  That’s	  not	  enough	  for	  us.	  We	  need	  it	  all	  [religious	  and	  academic	  understanding].	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  mother,	  December	  22,	  2009)	  	  In	  her	  opinion,	  public	  schools	  provide	  an	  incomplete	  education.	  Similarly,	  another	  mother	  enrolled	  her	  children	  at	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT,	  attracted	  to	  SITs	  after	  seeing	  her	  neighbor’s	  preschool	  child	  reciting	  Qur’anic	  verses	  and	  “teach[ing]	  us,	  ‘Oh,	  you	  must	  not	  dress	  like	  this.’”	  She	  continued,	  We	  want	  our	  children	  to	  be	  religious,	  even	  though	  we’re	  all	  from	  the	  state	  general	  schools	  where	  the	  cultivation	  (penanaman)	  of	  religion	  is	  less.	  We	  want	  our	  children	  from	  childhood	  to	  understand	  the	  true	  principles	  of	  Islam.	  We	  expect	  it	  will	  in	  be	  a	  little	  easier	  in	  the	  future	  as	  adolescents	  if	  they	  have	  been	  implanted	  (tertanam)	  [with	  religion]	  from	  the	  beginning.	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  mother,	  December	  21,	  2009)	  	  While	  the	  majority	  of	  extended	  day	  Islamic	  school	  parents	  themselves	  did	  not	  have	  the	  kind	  of	  religious	  education	  they	  are	  providing	  for	  their	  children,	  in	  retrospect,	  they	  seem	  to	  feel	  they	  had	  something	  missing	  in	  their	  own	  lives	  as	  they	  were	  growing	  up.	  Or,	  due	  to	  new	  social	  trends,	  they	  feel	  a	  stronger	  moral	  and	  religious	  guide	  is	  much	  more	  necessary	  now	  than	  it	  was	  in	  their	  own	  youth.	  	  Parents	  reasoned	  that,	  not	  only	  would	  a	  moral	  compass	  help	  students	  navigate	  the	  ills	  of	  society	  when	  they	  are	  older,	  but	  it	  would	  also	  benefit	  the	  wider	  society.	  Again,	  the	  same	  mother	  who	  teaches	  at	  another	  SIT	  explained:	  I	  think	  if	  they	  are	  good	  in	  religion	  they	  will	  be	  good	  to	  people	  around	  them.	  They	  will	  have	  a	  good	  connection…People	  who	  rule	  this	  country	  and	  who	  are	  corrupt	  are	  not	  good	  in	  religion,	  any	  religion.	  If	  a	  person	  isn’t	  good	  in	  their	  religion	  (tidak	  bagus	  
agamanya),	  their	  actions	  aren’t	  good	  (nggak	  bagus).	  I	  want	  my	  children	  to	  be	  a	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benefit	  to	  people.	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  mother,	  December	  22,	  2009)	  	  This	  mother	  considers	  being	  religious	  or	  being	  “good	  in	  religion”	  to	  be	  a	  protection	  against	  personal	  corruption.	  Additionally,	  this	  mother,	  just	  like	  school	  leadership,	  believes	  that	  when	  one	  is	  free	  of	  personal	  corruption,	  one	  can	  be	  a	  benefit	  to	  society	  at	  large.	  	  	  
Teaching	  methods	  and	  teachers	  Parents	  valued	  these	  schools	  for	  their	  teaching	  methods	  and	  most	  frequently	  mentioned	  the	  teachers.	  Rather	  than	  discussing	  the	  depth	  of	  understanding	  the	  teachers	  have	  of	  their	  subject	  matter,	  the	  parents’	  comments	  focused	  on	  the	  teachers’	  treatment	  of	  students,	  particularly	  in	  contrast	  with	  state	  general	  schoolteachers.	  One	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  mother,	  a	  stay-­‐at-­‐home	  mother	  whose	  husband	  worked	  on	  another	  island,	  said	  she	  enrolled	  her	  younger	  children	  at	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  after	  her	  oldest	  son	  had	  negative	  experiences	  in	  the	  public	  schools.	  Most	  of	  the	  teachers	  in	  the	  public	  schools	  just	  educate	  children,	  but	  not	  in	  a	  polite	  way.	  Sometimes	  they	  call	  the	  students	  stupid…In	  my	  opinion,	  children	  don’t	  deserve	  to	  be	  punished;	  so	  don’t	  be	  harsh	  with	  them,	  not	  too	  much.	  In	  public	  schools	  a	  student	  must	  get	  a	  10	  or	  nine	  if	  the	  teacher’s	  going	  to	  be	  good	  to	  him.	  I	  think	  teachers	  should	  think,	  “These	  kids	  aren’t	  clever,	  so	  I	  have	  to	  teach	  them	  to	  be	  clever.”	  But	  they	  don’t	  do	  that.	  The	  just	  teach.	  And	  if	  the	  kids	  don’t	  get	  good	  scores,	  the	  teachers	  get	  mad.	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  mother,	  December	  23,	  2009)	  	  	  This	  mother	  went	  on	  to	  echo	  sentiments	  from	  parents	  at	  both	  schools	  that	  teachers	  patiently	  and	  lovingly	  teach	  and	  re-­‐teach	  concepts,	  using	  multiple	  teaching	  methods	  when	  necessary.	  The	  parents	  believe	  the	  teachers	  at	  these	  schools	  are	  attentive	  to	  their	  children	  and	  work	  hard	  to	  help	  them	  understand	  the	  material.	  	  The	  teachers	  themselves	  often	  commented	  to	  me	  about	  cultivating	  warm	  and	  caring	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relationships	  with	  the	  students.	  A	  male	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  teacher	  claimed	  that	  the	  students	  felt	  such	  a	  close	  bond	  with	  the	  teachers	  at	  the	  school,	  they	  would	  confide	  in	  them	  rather	  than	  their	  own	  parents.	  One	  Saturday	  afternoon,	  I	  ran	  into	  an	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  grade-­‐four	  teacher	  near	  one	  of	  two	  upscale	  movie	  theaters	  in	  town.	  He	  was	  treating	  a	  student,	  whom	  he	  told	  me	  later	  was	  having	  difficulties	  at	  home,	  to	  an	  afternoon	  at	  the	  movies.	  I	  consistently	  observed	  the	  teachers	  showing	  patience	  and	  affection	  to	  the	  students	  through	  their	  communication	  in	  and	  out	  of	  the	  classroom.	  As	  a	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  mother	  described	  it,	  “They	  provide	  education	  to	  their	  students	  with	  love,	  genuinely.	  They	  love	  them	  like	  their	  own	  children”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  mother,	  April	  30,	  2010).	  While	  male−female	  interactions	  are	  highly	  regulated	  at	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT,	  male	  and	  female	  teachers	  warmly	  interacted	  with	  students	  of	  both	  genders	  equally.	  	  	   This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  students	  were	  not	  disciplined.	  During	  classroom	  observations	  at	  Al	  Azhar	  31,	  students	  were	  typically	  well-­‐behaved.	  One	  day	  at	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  as	  I	  walked	  into	  the	  a	  grade-­‐four	  classroom	  to	  conduct	  an	  observation,	  the	  teacher	  promptly	  approached	  me	  at	  the	  back	  of	  the	  room	  and	  quietly	  asked	  me	  to	  leave	  the	  classroom	  so	  she	  could	  talk	  with	  the	  students	  privately.	  Apparently	  there	  had	  been	  some	  inappropriate	  behavior,	  but	  I	  was	  not	  given	  any	  details.	  Standing	  outside	  of	  the	  room,	  I	  did	  not	  hear	  the	  teacher’s	  voice	  rise.	  After	  a	  few	  minutes	  of	  waiting,	  I	  was	  invited	  back	  in	  and	  sensed	  a	  feeling	  of	  remorse	  among	  the	  students,	  who	  were	  also	  ready	  to	  get	  back	  to	  their	  classwork.	  	  While	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  is	  strict	  on	  observance	  of	  standards,	  I	  regularly	  observed	  less	  disciplined	  classroom	  behavior	  by	  students.	  During	  class,	  students	  often	  talked	  with	  each	  other	  during	  lessons,	  leaving	  my	  voice	  recording	  of	  class	  lectures	  indiscernible.	  Outside	  noise	  from	  other	  classes	  also	  drifted	  into	  the	  classroom,	  adding	  to	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the	  commotion.	  One	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  subject	  teacher	  who	  moved	  to	  different	  classrooms	  during	  the	  day	  pointed	  out	  that	  a	  short	  prayer	  before	  beginning	  her	  lesson	  was	  not	  only	  an	  act	  of	  devotion,	  but	  also	  served	  as	  a	  strategic	  way	  to	  quiet	  down	  students	  so	  she	  could	  begin	  her	  lesson.	  The	  difference	  in	  student	  behaviors	  between	  schools	  could	  be	  in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  larger	  class	  sizes	  at	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT.	  	  
Extended-­‐day	  schools	  as	  “one-­‐stop	  shopping”	  Inevitable	  social	  changes	  have	  accompanied	  Indonesia’s	  economic	  development	  and	  concomitant	  creation	  of	  a	  Muslim	  middle	  class.	  Among	  other	  things,	  urbanization	  has	  changed	  family	  dynamics.	  Extended	  families	  are	  not	  living	  together	  and	  women	  are	  taking	  on	  more	  professional	  work,	  leaving	  the	  house	  to	  take	  office	  jobs.	  Consequently,	  these	  schools	  are	  playing	  new	  roles	  that	  educational	  institutions	  had	  not	  before	  done.	  As	  a	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  religion	  teacher	  saw	  it:	  Most	  young	  families	  do	  not	  live	  together	  with	  parents	  like	  in	  earlier	  times.	  Today’s	  young	  families	  usually	  have	  their	  own	  home	  and	  a	  little	  son.	  Both	  [parents]	  work	  and	  are	  relatively	  busy	  until	  2:00	  or	  3:00	  p.m.	  So	  when	  we	  introduced	  the	  full-­‐day	  school,	  parents	  could…work	  and	  children	  could	  be	  safe	  at	  school.	  That’s	  different	  than	  in	  times	  past	  in	  the	  village	  (di	  kampung)	  when	  only	  the	  husband	  worked	  while	  the	  wife	  was	  at	  home	  so	  that	  children	  would	  have	  some	  home	  care.	  If	  the	  mother	  wasn’t	  around,	  there	  was	  usually	  the	  grandmother,	  but	  not	  now.	  The	  child	  at	  home	  doesn’t	  have	  a	  companion	  except	  the	  maid.	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  religion	  teacher,	  November	  10,	  2009)	  	  With	  this	  shift	  in	  the	  family	  dynamics	  of	  both	  parents	  working	  or	  busy	  with	  non-­‐household	  activities,	  and	  not	  living	  with	  extended	  family	  members,	  the	  family	  turns	  to	  the	  school	  as	  partial	  guardian	  of	  their	  children.	  Extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schools	  are	  one	  of	  few,	  if	  not	  the	  only,	  non-­‐boarding	  educational	  institutions	  in	  the	  country	  that	  hold	  regular	  classes	  into	  mid-­‐	  and	  late	  afternoon.	  Public	  schools	  and	  more	  common	  private	  religious	  non-­‐boarding	  
	  	  
231	  
schools	  continue	  to	  release	  students	  by	  noon	  or	  1	  p.m.	  National	  policy	  on	  public	  teacher	  hours	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  extended	  school	  day	  schedules.	  Consequently,	  national	  policies	  are	  de	  facto	  creating	  a	  niche	  market	  for	  private	  schools	  with	  longer	  hours.	  	  	   One	  morning	  at	  the	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  library,	  I	  met	  a	  parent	  hoping	  to	  transfer	  in	  his	  daughter,	  who	  was	  currently	  attending	  a	  Muhammadiyah	  school.	  During	  the	  child’s	  required	  entrance	  exam,	  the	  father	  very	  simply	  laid	  out	  his	  situation.	  Both	  he	  and	  his	  wife	  worked;	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  had	  longer	  school	  hours	  than	  his	  daughter’s	  Muhammadiyah	  school;	  a	  longer	  school	  day	  would	  ease	  the	  burden	  of	  after-­‐school	  care,	  even	  though	  it	  meant	  paying	  higher	  tuition	  fees.	  In	  this	  situation,	  the	  convenience	  of	  a	  longer	  school	  day	  eclipsed	  any	  interest	  in	  or	  allegiance	  to	  a	  specific	  type	  of	  religious	  education.	  A	  father	  from	  one	  of	  Jogja’s	  many	  JSIT	  schools	  explained	  the	  complex	  issues	  and	  multiple	  reasons	  for	  enrolling	  his	  son	  at	  an	  SIT.	  As	  it	  was	  a	  younger,	  less	  well-­‐known	  SIT	  than	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim,	  it	  was	  less	  expensive.	  	  I	  bring	  my	  son	  to	  an	  SIT	  although	  my	  background	  is	  NU.	  My	  wife’s	  background	  is	  not	  NU	  or	  Muhammadiyah	  but	  mixed…For	  my	  family	  and	  me	  we	  have	  practical	  reasons	  for	  sending	  my	  child	  there.	  The	  school	  is	  a	  full-­‐day	  school,	  until	  3	  p.m.	  But	  it’s	  flexible.	  You	  can	  also	  pick	  up	  your	  kids	  until	  4	  p.m.,	  for	  example,	  and	  you	  don’t	  need	  to	  pay	  for	  it…I	  work	  all	  day.	  Maybe	  like	  all	  the	  professionals,	  we	  work	  until	  4	  or	  5	  p.m.	  and	  we	  don’t	  have	  any	  maids	  at	  home…	  And	  the	  ideological	  reason	  is	  because	  there	  my	  son	  can	  learn	  Islamic	  knowledge	  and	  practice	  Islamic	  teachings	  as	  well	  as…learn	  general	  knowledge	  like	  math,	  science,	  etc.	  If	  I	  take	  him	  to	  a	  madrasa	  that’s	  closer	  to	  my	  house	  and	  is	  cheaper	  but	  not	  full-­‐day…the	  quality	  of	  the	  general	  education	  is	  not	  good.	  Although	  the	  cost	  is	  much	  higher,	  because	  we	  have	  to	  pay	  for	  lunch	  and	  some	  other	  things,	  for	  us	  it	  is	  affordable.	  In	  [the	  SIT]	  we	  have	  to	  pay	  about	  Rp	  250,000	  or	  Rp	  220,000	  (US$24	  –	  $21	  a	  month)	  while	  in	  a	  madrasa	  maybe	  we	  would	  have	  to	  pay	  less	  than	  Rp	  100,000	  (USUIN	  a	  month).	  (Interview	  with	  UIN-­‐Jogja	  professor,	  February	  2,	  2010)	  	  This	  father’s	  experience	  highlights	  several	  of	  the	  motivational	  factors	  for	  sending	  children	  to	  an	  integrated	  school:	  the	  neutral	  background	  of	  the	  school	  accommodating,	  or	  at	  least	  not	  challenging,	  either	  of	  the	  parent’s	  religious	  backgrounds;	  instilling	  religious	  knowledge	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and	  teaching	  religious	  rituals;	  the	  convenience	  of	  the	  “full-­‐day”	  schedule;	  and	  the	  quality	  education	  in	  general	  subjects.	  Additionally,	  paying	  the	  extra	  tuition	  was	  likely	  less	  than	  wages	  for	  domestic	  help	  at	  home	  to	  watch	  the	  child	  during	  the	  afternoon.	  	  An	  SIT	  father	  in	  Jakarta	  suggested	  SITs	  are	  akin	  to	  “one-­‐stop	  shopping.”	  As	  he	  viewed	  it,	  an	  extended	  school	  day	  provided	  his	  child	  with	  wholesome	  activities	  throughout	  the	  afternoon.	  It	  eliminated	  his	  need	  to	  arrange	  classes	  and	  transportation,	  as	  is	  done	  by	  many	  middle-­‐class	  parents	  of	  state	  general	  school	  students.111	  Additionally,	  an	  afternoon	  at	  school	  was	  also	  more	  desirable	  than	  his	  child	  simply	  passing	  the	  time	  in	  front	  of	  the	  television	  or	  hanging	  out	  with	  domestic	  help	  at	  home.	  Similarly,	  the	  focus	  on	  religion	  at	  school	  removes	  the	  need	  for	  religion	  classes	  at	  the	  mosque	  or	  private	  lessons	  at	  home.	  (Personal	  conversation,	  December	  2008)	  	  	  Extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  school	  leadership	  fully	  understands	  the	  time	  demands	  of	  a	  middle	  class	  lifestyle.	  Extended-­‐day	  school	  administrators	  capitalize	  on	  the	  conveniences	  the	  length	  of	  their	  school	  days	  offer	  their	  clientele.	  When	  asking	  founders	  of	  both	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT	  schools	  why	  parents	  were	  interested	  in	  their	  schools,	  or	  why	  their	  schools	  had	  become	  popular,	  inevitably,	  the	  extended	  school	  day	  schedule	  was	  given	  as	  a	  top	  reason.	  An	  item	  on	  Al	  Azhar’s	  mission	  statement	  explicitly	  states:	  “Helping	  children's	  education	  beyond	  the	  ‘traditional	  school	  hours’	  to	  carry	  out	  education	  from	  morning	  until	  evening.	  The	  objective	  of	  this	  activity	  is	  for	  the	  children	  of	  parents	  who	  are	  busy	  and	  [find	  it]	  difficult	  to	  take	  the	  time	  to	  educate	  their	  children	  outside	  of	  traditional	  school	  hours”	  (YPI	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  Sulaiman	  Mappiasse,	  a	  PhD	  student	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Sociology,	  University	  of	  Hawaii	  at	  Manoa,	  is	  conducting	  research	  on	  class	  and	  education	  in	  Indonesia,	  part	  of	  which	  focuses	  on	  the	  after-­‐school	  activities	  in	  which	  middle	  class	  families	  from	  state	  schools	  are	  enrolling	  their	  children.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  our	  communication,	  he	  had	  not	  yet	  published	  on	  this	  topic.	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Al	  Azhar	  2012).	  General	  schools	  release	  students	  at	  noon	  or	  1	  p.m.	  Al	  Azhar	  31’s	  schedule	  extends	  an	  extra	  hour	  or	  two	  into	  the	  afternoon,	  with	  children	  being	  released	  from	  school	  at	  2:00	  p.m.	  and	  after-­‐school	  classes	  and	  clubs	  keep	  the	  students	  until	  3	  p.m.	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  advertises	  itself	  on	  flyers	  as	  a	  “full	  day”	  school,	  releasing	  students	  at	  3	  p.m.,	  plus	  possible	  after-­‐school	  classes	  and	  clubs	  keep	  the	  children	  at	  school	  until	  4	  or	  5	  p.m.	  in	  the	  afternoon.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  larger	  number	  of	  dual-­‐income	  families	  at	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  directly	  correlates	  with	  the	  longer	  school	  day,	  as	  neither	  parent	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  at	  home	  from	  work	  until	  late	  afternoon.	  Given	  that	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  households	  have	  a	  dual	  income	  but	  are	  still	  overall	  less	  wealthy	  than	  those	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  31,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  some	  parents	  are	  not	  specifically	  attracted	  to	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  over	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  as	  much	  as	  they	  are	  limited	  by	  cost	  to	  the	  school	  with	  lower	  tuition	  fees.	  	  In	  conclusion,	  what	  do	  parents	  expect	  religious	  education	  to	  do	  for	  their	  children?	  Most	  parents	  do	  not	  talk	  from	  personal	  experience	  about	  growing	  up	  religious.	  Rather,	  as	  adults	  they	  have	  come	  to	  consider	  religion	  something	  valuable,	  and	  hope	  for	  various	  reasons	  to	  provide	  a	  religious	  foundation	  for	  their	  children	  early	  on.	  Parent	  comments	  demonstrated	  a	  repeated	  certainty	  that	  religious	  training	  in	  the	  early	  years	  would	  sustain	  a	  religious	  life	  in	  adolescence	  and	  into	  adulthood.	  Parents	  are	  hopeful	  that	  if	  their	  children	  are	  taught	  about	  Islam,	  adopt	  Islamic	  values,	  and	  become	  accustomed	  to	  performing	  Islamic	  rituals	  such	  as	  daily	  prayer,	  Qur’anic	  recitation,	  and	  fasting,	  they	  will	  not	  stray	  from	  them	  as	  they	  grow	  older.	  Additionally,	  such	  knowledge	  and	  habits	  will	  prevent	  them	  from	  participating	  in	  immoral	  behaviors,	  such	  as	  drugs	  and	  “free	  sex,”	  seen	  to	  be	  more	  commonplace	  in	  society.	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What	  do	  parents	  expect	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schools	  to	  do	  for	  them?	  These	  schools	  teach	  their	  children	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  Islam	  that	  most	  parents	  do	  not	  have	  themselves.	  In	  turn,	  the	  students’	  piety	  influences	  their	  own	  parents’	  religious	  lives.	  Additionally	  important,	  these	  schools	  keep	  the	  children	  in	  school	  longer	  than	  other	  non-­‐boarding	  schools,	  religious	  or	  non-­‐religious,	  thus	  simplifying	  parents’	  lives	  by	  creating	  a	  complete—religious	  and	  academic—educational	  experience.	  	  Although	  these	  schools	  are	  relatively	  costly,	  particularly	  in	  light	  of	  the	  recent	  2010	  policy	  making	  all	  government	  schools	  free,	  parents	  are	  willing	  to	  pay.	  Even	  parents	  with	  lower	  incomes,	  as	  one	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  mother	  explained,	  see	  the	  cost	  as	  an	  investment	  in	  having	  well-­‐educated	  children.	  	  [My]	  husband	  is	  also	  aware	  that	  in	  terms	  of	  religion	  we	  are	  lacking.	  We	  want	  our	  children	  to	  also	  get	  a	  better	  religious	  education	  than	  we	  did,	  even	  though	  maybe	  the	  fees	  for	  kindergarten	  (TKIT)	  and	  primary	  (SDIT)	  integrated	  Islamic	  schools	  are	  expensive.	  Many	  say	  so,	  but	  we	  don’t	  think	  about	  it.	  We	  want	  our	  children	  to	  be	  better	  than	  we	  are…Sometimes	  others	  will	  say	  it’s	  not	  worth	  what	  our	  children	  will	  get	  [from	  the	  school].	  And	  if	  you’re	  from	  an	  economic	  class	  that’s	  just	  scraping	  by,	  you	  have	  to	  think	  about	  it	  because	  it’s	  not	  an	  easy	  decision	  to	  make…We	  think	  that	  investing	  in	  children	  is	  most	  valuable	  for	  later	  in	  life.	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  mother,	  December	  21,	  2009)	  	  The	  tuition	  compensates	  for	  what	  the	  parents	  are	  not	  able	  to	  provide	  their	  children	  through	  their	  own	  personal	  understanding	  of	  religion.	  It	  also	  buys	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  brighter	  future	  for	  their	  children.	  In	  other	  words,	  an	  acceptable	  or	  moral	  use	  of	  their	  money	  is	  investing	  in	  their	  children’s	  intellectual	  and	  moral	  development.	  Such	  an	  investment	  is	  expected	  to	  have	  fruitful	  future	  returns.	  	  On	  a	  sensible,	  money-­‐conscious	  line	  of	  argument,	  a	  few	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  parents	  calculated	  that	  the	  high	  tuition	  included	  the	  price	  of	  lunch,	  noting	  that	  state-­‐schooled	  children	  usually	  ate	  at	  home.	  Additionally,	  even	  though	  the	  extended	  school	  hours	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increased	  tuition,	  parents	  would	  otherwise	  have	  spent	  large	  amounts	  of	  money	  on	  after	  school	  lessons,	  shopping	  trips	  with	  the	  children	  during	  the	  afternoon,	  or	  pocket	  money	  given	  to	  the	  children	  for	  afternoon	  activities.	  In	  their	  minds,	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  school	  was	  not	  an	  extravagant,	  as	  one	  might	  initially	  assume,	  but	  a	  thoughtful	  use	  of	  money.	  	  
Parental	  Learning,	  Re-­‐teaching,	  and	  Risks	  The	  democratization	  of	  religious	  knowledge	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  disrupt	  generational	  and	  familial	  hierarchies,	  as	  the	  younger	  generation	  becomes	  systematically	  educated	  in	  religious	  knowledge	  to	  which	  their	  parents	  and	  elders	  did	  not	  have	  access	  (Abu-­‐Lughod	  1993,	  Adely	  2012,	  Adely	  &	  Starrett	  2011;	  Eickelman	  1992).	  Enrolling	  children	  in	  Islamic	  schools	  invites	  religious	  influence	  into	  the	  home.	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  predict	  exactly	  how	  that	  influence	  will	  affect	  child−parent	  interactions.	  Some	  of	  the	  new	  ideas	  are	  welcomed,	  and	  parents	  become	  secondary	  students.	  Some	  ideas	  cause	  concern,	  and	  parents	  re-­‐teach	  their	  children	  on	  the	  specific	  issues.	  This	  second	  scenario	  presents	  a	  precarious	  situation,	  as	  there	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  students	  will	  agree	  with	  their	  parents	  (who	  generally	  in	  the	  beginning	  stages	  of	  their	  personal	  religious	  development)	  rather	  than	  side	  with	  their	  teachers	  (who	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  positions	  can	  be	  considered	  authorities	  on	  religion).	  This	  section	  demonstrates	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  students’	  religious	  educations	  create	  learning	  experiences	  in	  the	  home—with	  students	  teaching	  parents,	  or	  parents	  instructing	  students—and	  pose	  the	  risk	  of	  parents	  and	  students	  not	  seeing	  eye-­‐to-­‐eye.	  	  Parents	  often	  comment	  with	  amusement	  that	  their	  children	  know	  more	  about	  religion	  than	  they	  do	  as	  adults.	  They	  enjoy	  the	  fact	  that	  their	  children	  have	  memorized	  verses	  of	  Qur’an	  or	  know	  specific	  prayers,	  such	  as	  for	  entering	  the	  bathroom,	  which	  they	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have	  never	  learned	  themselves.	  School	  founders	  repeatedly	  commented	  on	  an	  increase	  in	  parents’	  religious	  practices	  due	  to	  their	  children’s	  attendance	  at	  the	  school.	  This	  secondary	  influence	  on	  the	  larger	  community	  works	  to	  fulfill	  a	  larger	  goal	  of	  JSIT	  schools,	  the	  Islamization	  of	  society.	  	  Parents	  frequently	  take	  example	  from	  their	  children’s	  piety,	  becoming	  more	  religious-­‐minded	  and	  observant	  themselves.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  an	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  housewife,	  “May	  my	  child	  be	  better	  [than	  me]	  and	  hopefully	  that	  [goodness	  and	  religiosity]	  can	  be	  transmitted	  to	  her	  parents”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  mother,	  April	  29,	  2010).	  This	  mother	  related	  to	  me	  that,	  while	  it	  was	  a	  three-­‐year	  process,	  she	  began	  veiling	  regularly	  after	  her	  daughter’s	  enrollment	  at	  Al	  Azhar	  31.	  She	  started	  veiling,	  although	  inconsistently,	  at	  the	  encouragement	  of	  her	  preschool	  daughter,	  who,	  while	  in	  the	  car	  on	  the	  way	  to	  school,	  would	  say,	  “Mama,	  you’re	  prettier	  if	  you	  veil.	  Tomorrow	  when	  you	  take	  me	  to	  school,	  why	  don’t	  you	  just	  wear	  a	  hijab?”	  The	  mother	  “finally	  gave	  in,”	  reasoning,	  “Okay,	  anything	  for	  my	  kids.	  I	  don’t	  mind.	  Moreover,	  in	  this	  case,	  my	  child	  showed	  (menunjukan)	  me	  something	  good.	  We	  actually	  also	  knew	  that	  it	  was	  good”	  (Interview	  with	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  mother,	  April	  29,	  2010).	  Initially,	  she	  only	  veiled	  when	  dropping	  off	  or	  picking	  up	  her	  daughter	  at	  school.	  Eventually,	  however,	  she	  felt	  conflicted	  about	  veiling	  only	  when	  at	  school,	  or	  at	  voluntary	  woman’s	  religious	  study	  group	  (pengajian),	  where	  veiling	  was	  required.	  If	  she	  bumped	  into	  a	  friend	  from	  the	  study	  group	  without	  the	  veil,	  she	  would	  feel	  embarrassed.	  Her	  life	  as	  a	  performer	  complicated	  her	  decision	  to	  veil	  full-­‐time.	  She	  played	  guitar	  and	  sang	  backup	  vocals	  in	  a	  local	  rock	  band.	  She	  feared	  a	  veil	  would	  look	  out	  of	  place	  onstage,	  and	  she	  was	  uncomfortable	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  removing	  it	  for	  performances.	  In	  this	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process,	  she	  talked	  with	  friends	  who	  veiled	  and	  others	  who	  did	  not.	  Finally,	  a	  few	  months	  before	  our	  interview,	  with	  her	  child	  then	  in	  grade	  three,	  she	  began	  veiling	  the	  entire	  day.	  	  Although	  the	  mother	  was	  veiling,	  she	  admitted	  that	  she	  did	  not	  understand	  the	  arguments	  (dalil)	  for	  requiring	  woman	  to	  veil,	  but	  she	  observed	  it	  anyway.	  She	  reasoned,	  “It’s	  better,	  so	  why	  not?	  What’s	  so	  hard	  in	  veiling	  anyway?”	  While	  still	  new	  to	  the	  practice	  and	  unsure	  exactly	  how	  she	  felt	  about	  it,	  she	  planned	  to	  continue	  veiling	  and	  “find	  out”	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  practice.	  As	  for	  the	  stage,	  she	  decided	  she	  could	  look	  hip	  during	  performances	  by	  wearing	  a	  hooded	  sweatshirt,	  pulling	  the	  hood	  up	  over	  her	  hijab	  (kerudung).	  Certainly	  her	  daughter’s	  enrollment	  at	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  was	  not	  the	  singular	  and	  decisive	  factor	  in	  this	  mother’s	  decision	  to	  veil	  regularly;	  yet	  it	  was	  the	  impetus.	  Although	  she	  “knew	  it	  was	  a	  good	  thing,”	  she	  did	  not	  experiment	  with	  the	  actual	  practice	  until	  her	  daughter	  encouraged	  her	  to.	  	  	   While	  some	  parents	  welcomed	  the	  influence	  of	  their	  children,	  some	  parents	  objected	  to	  the	  religious	  practices	  or	  perspectives	  their	  children	  brought	  home	  from	  school.	  Few	  parents	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  withdraw	  their	  students	  from	  the	  schools,112	  but	  several	  made	  efforts	  to	  correct	  their	  children’s	  understanding	  to	  bring	  them	  in	  line	  with	  practices	  at	  home.	  A	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  mother	  became	  concerned	  with	  her	  son’s	  education	  as	  several	  school	  practices	  and	  teachers’	  comments	  as	  relayed	  by	  her	  son	  were	  inconsistent	  with	  her	  beliefs.	  For	  example,	  she	  disagreed	  with	  the	  segregation	  of	  students	  at	  grade	  four	  and	  the	  heavy	  emphasis	  on	  memorizing	  the	  Qur’an,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  comment	  from	  a	  teacher	  about	  the	  heavenly	  rewards	  of	  suicide	  in	  the	  name	  of	  Islam.	  [Jaman	  nabi	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112	  Due	  to	  obvious	  challenges	  of	  tracking	  down	  disaffected	  parents,	  as	  they	  are	  no	  longer	  connected	  to	  the	  schools	  and	  schools	  find	  it	  in	  their	  best	  interest	  not	  to	  provide	  contact	  information	  for	  such	  parents,	  little	  data	  was	  gathered	  on	  this	  subset	  of	  parents.	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Muhammad	  dulu,	  katanya	  begitu,	  ada	  orang	  yang	  bunuh	  diri	  untuk	  membela	  agama	  itu	  bisa	  
masuk	  surga]113	  Not	  wanting	  to	  take	  a	  financial	  hit	  by	  withdrawing	  her	  child	  from	  the	  school,	  losing	  the	  costly	  one-­‐time	  building	  and	  enrollment	  fee	  only	  to	  pay	  out	  similar	  fees	  at	  a	  new	  school,	  or	  to	  disrupt	  her	  son’s	  social	  life	  as	  he	  settled	  into	  Indonesia	  after	  the	  family’s	  return	  from	  living	  abroad,	  she	  kept	  the	  child	  enrolled	  with	  his	  friends	  and	  decided	  to	  “neutralize	  him	  at	  home”	  regarding	  issues	  such	  as	  “gender	  roles,”	  their	  “ideology,”	  and	  “exclusivity”	  (Interview	  with	  former	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  mother	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  activist,	  February	  9,	  2010).	  Additionally,	  she	  felt	  she	  could	  wait	  out	  their	  time	  until	  they	  moved	  to	  Australia	  for	  her	  PhD	  program.	  	   Another	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  mother	  who	  worked	  as	  a	  lecturer	  at	  a	  midwifery	  academy	  recounted	  her	  fifth-­‐grade	  son’s	  disagreement	  with	  her	  perspective	  that	  dating	  was	  acceptable.	  The	  son,	  citing	  his	  teacher,	  said	  that	  dating	  is	  not	  allowed	  (tidak	  boleh).	  While	  she	  agreed	  that	  “the	  religion	  says	  you	  can’t	  do	  it,”	  she	  explained	  to	  her	  son	  that	  if	  dating	  was	  done	  within	  particular	  guidelines,	  it	  was	  acceptable.	  As	  she	  reasoned	  with	  her	  son,	   Mom	  and	  Dad	  know	  that	  according	  to	  the	  religion,	  it’s	  like	  that,	  but	  we	  don’t	  always	  have	  to	  go	  there.	  As	  long	  as	  we	  are	  on	  the	  right	  path	  and	  don’t	  disobey	  (menyalahi)	  the	  religion	  excessively	  (berlebihan).	  We	  have	  to	  be	  neutral	  towards	  our	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  This	  mother	  was	  the	  only	  parent	  to	  mention	  this	  topic	  to	  me.	  The	  mother	  pointed	  out	  that	  she	  did	  not	  find	  any	  material	  on	  this	  topic	  in	  her	  son’s	  textbooks,	  but	  she	  could	  not	  be	  certain	  what	  was	  discussed	  in	  class.	  While	  one	  can	  imagine	  several	  scenarios	  where	  the	  discussion	  of	  suicide	  in	  the	  name	  of	  God	  could	  surface,	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  know	  what	  the	  context	  of	  the	  discussion	  was	  or	  the	  full	  meaning	  of	  the	  comment.	  It	  is	  clear,	  however,	  that	  the	  student	  was	  curious	  enough	  about	  the	  discussion	  to	  make	  a	  comment	  to	  his	  mother.	  During	  my	  time	  at	  the	  school,	  I	  did	  not	  observe	  or	  have	  a	  sense	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  promotion	  of	  violence	  at	  the	  school.	  However,	  a	  similar	  idea	  did	  arise	  during	  a	  group	  interview	  with	  sixth-­‐grade	  boys	  at	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  question,	  “What	  do	  you	  want	  to	  be	  when	  you	  grow	  up?”	  the	  first	  boy	  said,	  “a	  martyr	  (mati	  
syahid)”	  and	  then	  all	  the	  other	  boys	  responded	  the	  same,	  one	  adding,	  “So	  I	  can	  enter	  heaven”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  grade-­‐six	  boys,	  November	  30,	  2009).	  In	  another	  instance,	  a	  grade-­‐four	  boy,	  in	  response	  to	  the	  same	  question,	  joked,	  “Terrorist!”	  eliciting	  laughter	  from	  his	  friends,	  he	  then	  continued,	  “Not	  really,	  but	  military,	  and	  to	  be	  the	  president”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  grade-­‐four	  boys,	  December	  3,	  2009).	  These	  interviews	  are	  detailed	  and	  analyzed	  in	  chapter	  5.	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surroundings.	  We	  also	  have	  to	  adjust	  to	  the	  local	  culture	  here	  (melihat	  budaya	  yang	  
ada).	  That’s	  what	  we’ve	  taught	  our	  son.	  We	  really	  aren’t	  fanatic	  (fanatik).	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  mother,	  December	  21,	  2009)	  	  This	  same	  student	  also	  objected,	  multiple	  times,	  to	  his	  mother’s	  removal	  of	  the	  headscarf	  and	  the	  wearing	  of	  “open”	  (terbuka)	  clothing	  —clothing	  that	  does	  not	  completely	  cover	  everything	  but	  the	  face	  and	  hands—while	  at	  home	  in	  the	  company	  of	  her	  family.114	  On	  another	  occasion,	  he	  informed	  his	  mother	  that	  women	  were	  not	  allowed	  (tidak	  boleh)	  to	  wear	  trousers,	  which	  his	  mother	  frequently	  donned.	  Unwilling	  to	  accept	  these	  admonitions,	  she	  explained	  that	  veiling	  was	  not	  necessary	  in	  the	  privacy	  of	  her	  own	  home.	  She	  also	  pointed	  out	  the	  impracticality	  of	  women	  wearing	  skirts	  when	  riding	  scooters	  or	  motorbikes,	  the	  main	  form	  of	  transportation	  for	  most	  Indonesians.	  Again,	  she	  told	  her	  son,	  “If	  we	  do	  what	  the	  religion	  teaches	  us	  and	  we	  keep	  in	  line	  with	  our	  local	  customs,	  then	  we	  aren’t	  sinning”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  mother,	  December	  21,	  2009).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  long	  skirts	  as	  opposed	  to	  pants	  is	  not	  part	  of	  “what	  religion	  teaches”	  but	  rather	  a	  cultural	  way	  of	  doing	  things.	  In	  this	  mother’s	  opinion,	  women	  wearing	  pants	  are	  part	  of	  the	  Indonesian	  Muslim	  tradition.	  Her	  concern	  about	  maintaining	  a	  social	  order,	  or	  being	  “neutral	  towards	  our	  surroundings”	  rather	  than	  a	  “fanatic,”	  is	  a	  classed	  attitude.	  As	  the	  maintenance	  of	  middle-­‐class	  position	  is	  dependent	  upon	  social	  order,	  she	  sees	  following	  a	  common	  moral	  order	  as	  key	  to	  maintaining	  social	  order.	  This	  mother’s	  contextualization	  of	  standards	  for	  dating	  and	  dress	  within	  the	  “local	  culture”	  so	  as	  to	  be	  “neutral	  towards	  her	  surroundings,”	  as	  well	  as	  the	  idea	  that	  one	  need	  not	  be	  “fanatic”	  or	  exacting	  in	  one’s	  approach	  to	  Islam,	  counters	  the	  approach	  of	  the	  school	  in	  which	  she	  enrolled	  her	  son.	  She	  valued	  a	  less	  strict	  adherence	  than	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  The	  most	  common	  veiling	  practices	  require	  veiling	  while	  in	  public,	  but	  not	  while	  with	  husband	  and	  children,	  or	  with	  blood	  relatives	  that	  could	  not	  be	  potential	  suitors	  if	  the	  women	  were	  single.	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exacting	  approach	  and	  expectations	  on	  implementation	  of	  higher	  standards.	  As	  such,	  she	  expected	  her	  son	  to	  adopt	  her	  perspective	  and	  disregard	  the	  teacher’s	  instructions.	  However,	  earlier	  in	  the	  interview	  this	  same	  mother	  commented	  with	  gratitude	  about	  how	  her	  child	  monitored	  his	  behavior	  and	  made	  smart	  choices,	  such	  as	  determining	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  television	  shows	  according	  to	  what	  he	  learned	  at	  school.	  She	  said,	  “It	  turns	  out	  it’s	  easier	  if	  the	  child	  is	  told	  by	  his	  teachers	  than	  his	  own	  parents.	  That’s	  what	  has	  happened	  with	  my	  son.	  They’re	  more	  receptive	  to	  the	  words	  that	  the	  teachers	  say	  than	  their	  parents”	  (Interview	  with	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  mother,	  December	  21,	  2009).	  She	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  aware	  of,	  or	  at	  least	  concerned	  with,	  the	  potential	  for	  her	  son	  choosing	  to	  follow	  the	  teacher’s	  instructions	  rather	  than	  her	  own	  when	  their	  perspectives	  do	  not	  match.	  	  Parents	  seem	  to	  be	  pleased	  with	  students	  being	  more	  religiously	  minded,	  participating	  in	  devotional	  acts	  such	  as	  prayer	  and	  fasting,	  but	  the	  observance	  of	  “higher”	  standards	  of	  JSIT	  schools	  sometimes	  caused	  tension.	  The	  disconnect	  between	  the	  principles	  taught	  at	  the	  school	  and	  the	  standards	  upheld	  at	  home	  may	  not	  always	  be	  predictable.	  The	  organization-­‐free	  Islamic	  school	  that	  welcomes	  all	  types	  of	  Muslims	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  readily	  identifiable	  set	  of	  beliefs	  and	  standards	  for	  parents	  to	  anticipate	  before	  enrollment.	  Many	  parents,	  due	  to	  their	  lack	  of	  religious	  upbringing	  themselves,	  are	  likely	  in	  the	  process	  of	  solidifying	  and	  defining	  their	  own	  set	  of	  beliefs	  and	  practices.	  Practices	  that	  challenge	  the	  familiar	  and	  mainstream,	  especially	  if	  those	  practices	  seem	  to	  be	  cultural	  rather	  than	  religious,	  may	  be	  resisted.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  parents	  who	  have	  a	  religious	  background	  may	  not	  have	  thoroughly	  considered	  the	  implications	  of	  one	  school’s	  teachings	  over	  another.	  Yet	  some	  parents	  may	  feel	  their	  family	  constraints	  confine	  their	  schooling	  options,	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and	  practicality	  drives	  the	  selection	  of	  school,	  as	  in	  the	  situation	  of	  the	  father	  transferring	  his	  daughter	  from	  Muhammadiyah	  to	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT.	  Although	  there	  was	  an	  occasional	  mismatch	  of	  beliefs	  or	  practices	  between	  the	  parents	  and	  schools,	  particularly	  with	  JSIT,	  there	  was	  enough	  overlap	  in	  educational	  and	  religious	  agendas	  to	  sustain	  parental	  patronage	  (Chudleigh	  2011).	  What	  happens	  when	  the	  school’s	  perspective	  and	  the	  parents’	  perspectives	  differ?	  Will	  the	  re-­‐teaching	  at	  home	  hold	  sway	  over	  teacher	  instruction?	  These	  questions	  cannot	  be	  answered	  here.	  However,	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  gamble	  many	  parents	  are	  willing	  to	  take.	  A	  discussion	  with	  Fuad,	  an	  Islamic	  history	  professor	  at	  the	  State	  Islamic	  University	  (UIN)	  in	  Jakarta,	  provided	  some	  possible	  insight	  into	  what	  parents	  are	  assuming.	  Fuad’s	  15-­‐year-­‐old	  son	  was	  enrolled	  in	  a	  Salafi	  pesantren	  (boarding	  school),	  which	  could	  be	  considered	  the	  concurrent	  educational	  development	  in	  pesantren	  schooling	  as	  JSIT	  schools	  are	  to	  the	  “older”	  modern	  Islamic	  schools.	  Fuad	  relayed	  the	  story	  of	  a	  trip	  to	  the	  mall	  with	  his	  son	  and	  cousins	  during	  the	  son’s	  visit	  at	  home.	  As	  they	  headed	  out	  of	  the	  mall	  they	  bought	  ice	  cream	  cones,	  then	  continued	  walking	  to	  the	  car.	  His	  son	  did	  not	  eat	  his	  ice	  cream,	  even	  though	  it	  was	  melting	  quickly	  in	  the	  Indonesian	  heat.	  Finally,	  the	  son	  stopped,	  squatted	  down,	  began	  eating	  his	  treat,	  and	  thus	  fell	  behind	  the	  group.	  When	  Fuad	  inquired	  about	  this	  behavior,	  his	  son	  explained	  that	  it	  was	  only	  appropriate	  to	  eat	  when	  sitting;	  the	  Prophet	  Muhammad	  had	  clearly	  explained	  standing	  and	  walking	  were	  not	  appropriate	  activities	  while	  eating.	  While	  Fuad	  was	  familiar	  with	  this	  teaching,	  he	  did	  not	  practice	  it	  himself,	  nor	  did	  he	  feel	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  comply	  with	  when	  in	  the	  mall	  or	  in	  a	  crowd.	  His	  son	  felt	  the	  location	  made	  no	  difference	  and	  insisted	  on	  eating	  only	  when	  sitting.	  Fuad	  respected	  his	  son’s	  stance	  and	  nothing	  more	  was	  said	  about	  it.	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   After	  relaying	  this	  story,	  Fuad	  commented	  on	  how	  it	  did	  not	  bother	  him	  that	  his	  son	  was	  so	  committed	  to	  following	  the	  prophet.	  He	  felt	  his	  son	  would	  grow	  out	  of	  this	  literal	  obedience	  to	  the	  prophet’s	  words	  and	  become	  less	  exact	  in	  his	  commitments.	  For	  Fuad,	  the	  important	  thing	  was	  for	  the	  child	  to	  learn	  “to	  commit	  to	  something.	  And	  then	  when	  the	  commitment	  is	  there,	  you	  can	  change	  the	  way	  you	  express	  your	  commitment”	  (Interview	  with	  UIN-­‐Jakarta	  professor,	  March	  24,	  2009).	  He	  went	  on	  to	  explain	  that	  even	  though	  parents	  may	  enroll	  their	  children	  in	  schools	  that	  do	  not	  align	  completely	  with	  their	  own	  perspectives,	  as	  he	  did,	  they	  are	  most	  interested	  in	  their	  children	  learning	  the	  process	  of	  commitment.	  	  While	  there	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  children	  will	  continue	  in	  the	  way	  they	  were	  taught	  when	  young,	  there	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  they	  will	  not.	  Fuad,	  though,	  seems	  to	  have	  thought	  through	  the	  possibility	  of	  his	  son	  remaining	  more	  literal	  in	  his	  commitments,	  and	  he	  has	  a	  strategy	  to	  prevent	  it.	  I	  believe…that	  my	  kid	  is	  my	  kid,	  not	  somebody	  else’s.	  And	  it	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  I	  have	  every	  right	  to	  shape	  him	  or	  to	  create	  him…But	  I	  have	  more	  room	  to	  negotiate	  with	  him	  because	  he	  is	  my	  son.	  He	  will	  come	  to	  my	  home	  [after	  living	  at	  the	  boarding	  school]	  and	  I	  have	  a	  lot	  of	  books	  and	  I	  will	  motivate	  him	  to	  read	  different	  books,	  to	  go	  to	  different	  Muslim	  groups,	  and	  so	  on.	  (Interview	  with	  UIN-­‐Jakarta	  professor,	  March	  24,	  2009)	  	  Fuad	  felt	  he	  would	  still	  have	  significant	  influence	  over	  his	  child.	  He	  believed	  he	  would	  be	  able	  to	  extend	  his	  child’s	  understanding	  about	  religion	  and	  religious	  observance.	  Although	  Fuad	  had	  not	  enrolled	  his	  son	  in	  an	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  school,	  his	  situation	  and	  hopes	  for	  his	  son’s	  religious	  development	  are	  similar	  to	  parents	  who	  do.	  	  	   A	  father	  from	  a	  small	  JSIT	  school	  in	  southern	  Jogja	  felt	  similarly.	  In	  relaying	  how	  a	  friend	  of	  his	  had	  withdrawn	  his	  son	  from	  a	  JSIT	  school	  in	  the	  city,	  he	  postulated	  that	  it	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could	  have	  been	  due	  to	  the	  Islam	  they	  practice	  being	  “more	  rigid	  and	  exclusive,	  and	  more	  observant.”	  For	  him	  and	  his	  wife,	  however,	  who	  were	  not	  PKS,	  	  It	  is	  good	  [to	  be	  rigid	  and	  observant	  in	  religion]…And	  Islam	  should	  be	  like	  that,	  for	  me.	  But	  for	  political	  thinking	  or	  if	  you	  regard	  other	  people	  as	  bad,	  if	  you	  regard	  non-­‐Muslims	  or	  even	  Islam	  outside	  your	  group	  as	  a	  competitor...[pause]	  My	  son	  is	  just	  a	  kid.	  He	  will	  grow.	  We	  can	  handle	  it.	  We	  can	  discuss	  that	  later	  on	  when	  he	  can	  think	  about	  what	  Islam	  is.	  And	  we	  don’t	  need	  to	  worry	  because	  they	  (JSIT	  schools)	  don’t	  teach	  terrorism	  or	  radicalism.	  It’s	  just	  a	  matter	  of	  observance	  and	  it	  is	  good	  for	  his	  discipline.	  As	  Muslims	  we	  have	  to	  practice	  Islam	  every	  day	  and	  all	  the	  time.	  (Interview	  with	  UIN-­‐Jogja	  professor,	  October	  14,	  2009)	  	  Potential	  doctrinal	  conflicts	  between	  these	  fathers	  and	  their	  sons	  are	  quite	  real,	  but	  these	  men	  are	  confident	  these	  potential	  conflicts	  will	  not	  be	  problematic.	  	  	   A	  hierarchy	  of	  values	  could	  explain	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  risks	  parents	  take	  with	  enrolling	  their	  children	  in	  schools	  that	  teach	  values	  and	  practices	  that	  conflict	  with	  their	  own.	  Parents	  value	  a	  solid	  academic	  education,	  want	  to	  provide	  their	  children	  with	  a	  religious	  foundation	  to	  protect	  them	  from	  moral	  corruption,	  and	  find	  the	  extended	  school	  day	  useful	  in	  accommodating	  their	  urban	  middle-­‐class	  lives.	  Given	  the	  advantages	  these	  schools	  offer,	  parents	  appear	  to	  be	  willing	  to	  overlook	  the	  conflicting	  differences	  in	  specific	  religious	  perspectives	  and	  practices	  promoted	  at	  home	  and	  school.	  	  
Conclusion	  Being	  newly	  middle-­‐class	  in	  contemporary	  Indonesia,	  as	  in	  other	  countries,	  provokes	  both	  privilege	  and	  anxiety	  (Jones	  2012,	  Liechty	  2002).	  Middle-­‐class	  parents	  are	  keenly	  aware	  of	  their	  position	  between	  the	  poor	  and	  the	  wealthy	  segments	  of	  society.	  The	  supposed	  incompatibility	  between	  wealth	  and	  morality	  generates	  middle-­‐class	  parent	  anxieties	  about	  the	  corrupting	  power	  of	  consumption.	  Middle-­‐class	  Indonesians,	  who	  are	  more	  comfortable	  defining	  themselves	  as	  “educated”	  or	  “developed”	  rather	  than	  “middle-­‐
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class”	  (Heryanto	  2003;	  Jones	  2012),	  can	  assuage	  concerns	  over	  paying	  high	  tuition	  fees	  for	  elite	  schools	  by	  knowing	  that	  they	  are	  “investing”	  in	  not	  just	  a	  good	  education,	  but	  in	  high	  quality	  Islamic	  instruction	  for	  their	  children.	  Additionally,	  concerned	  with	  the	  immorality	  of	  the	  day,	  religion	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  corruption	  of	  social	  morals.	  As	  all	  parents	  do,	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  and	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  parents	  aspire	  to	  provide	  their	  children	  with	  “a	  better	  life,”	  which	  includes	  a	  religious	  education.	  These	  religiously-­‐minded	  middle-­‐class	  parents	  have	  redefined	  the	  type	  of	  education	  required	  to	  produce	  a	  “better	  life”	  in	  Indonesia;	  in	  addition	  to	  academic	  training,	  they	  have	  elevated	  rigorous	  religious	  education	  to	  be	  an	  integral	  component.	  In	  order	  for	  their	  children	  to	  maintain	  middle-­‐class	  status,	  students	  must	  be	  well	  educated	  so	  as	  to	  competitively	  enter	  the	  labor	  market	  as	  professional,	  white-­‐collar	  workers.	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  moral	  corruption	  associated	  with	  wealth,	  as	  well	  as	  Western	  values	  that	  are	  filtering	  into	  society,	  parents	  rely	  on	  Islamic	  values	  to	  guide	  students.	  However,	  in	  contrast	  to	  most	  other	  Islamic	  schooling,	  extended-­‐day	  schooling	  does	  not	  focus	  on	  extensive	  doctrines,	  Islamic	  history,	  or	  other	  material	  that	  would	  prepare	  students	  to	  become	  religious	  leader.	  Rather,	  it	  focuses	  on	  basic	  Islamic	  rituals	  and	  Islamic	  character,	  ostensibly	  with	  no	  loyalty	  to	  any	  particular	  religious	  organization.	  This	  type	  of	  religious	  education	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  train	  students	  to	  be	  Islamic	  specialists	  or	  religious	  preachers,	  but	  moral	  businesspeople,	  educators,	  political	  activists,	  or	  any	  other	  respectable	  profession.	  Through	  this	  type	  of	  education,	  parents	  expect	  their	  children	  to	  gain	  a	  moral	  compass	  at	  a	  young	  age	  that	  will	  guide	  them	  through	  the	  challenges	  of	  the	  modern	  day	  and	  unpredictable	  future.	  	  The	  marriage	  of	  high	  quality	  academic	  training	  and	  extensive	  religious	  curriculum,	  combined	  with	  the	  resultant	  extended	  school	  day,	  makes	  for	  a	  convenient	  solution	  to	  busy	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middle-­‐class	  parents	  concerned	  with	  the	  intellectual	  and	  moral	  development	  of	  their	  children	  and	  the	  maintenance	  of	  middle-­‐class	  status.	  The	  middle-­‐	  class	  parents	  use	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schools	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  mitigate	  their	  parental	  anxieties,	  to	  care	  for	  and	  provide	  comprehensive—intellectual	  and	  religious—education	  and	  development	  of	  their	  children.	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT	  schools	  become	  partner	  institutions	  in	  middle-­‐class	  parenting	  responsibilities.	  Most	  obviously,	  the	  schools	  provide	  religious	  understanding	  in	  which	  many	  parents	  feel	  they	  are	  personally	  deficient.	  	  Additionally,	  the	  extended	  school	  day	  provides	  students	  with	  supervised	  activities	  in	  a	  productive	  learning	  environment	  during	  the	  afternoons	  when	  parents	  may	  be	  working	  or	  otherwise	  involved	  in	  activities	  outside	  of	  the	  home.	  It	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  the	  warmth	  and	  kindness	  teachers	  exhibit	  towards	  their	  children	  eases	  any	  sense	  of	  abandonment	  for	  leaving	  their	  children	  in	  school	  longer	  than	  the	  students	  in	  the	  general	  schools.	  And	  finally,	  as	  a	  parent’s	  wisdom	  and	  protection	  have	  limited	  reach,	  parents	  hope	  and	  expect	  religious	  understanding,	  “good	  habits,”	  and	  Islamic	  character	  taught	  at	  the	  schools	  to	  protect	  their	  children	  from	  immorality	  and	  negative	  social	  activities,	  such	  as	  drugs,	  “free	  sex,”	  pornography,	  and	  forms	  of	  moral	  corruption	  throughout	  their	  lives.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  schools	  fortify	  students	  with	  the	  intellectual	  skills	  and	  Islamic	  character	  needed	  to	  navigate	  the	  modern	  world,	  equipping	  them	  to	  participate	  successfully	  in	  the	  global	  economy	  while	  sidestepping	  the	  pitfalls	  of	  Western	  culture.	  	  The	  religious	  influence	  of	  the	  schools	  that	  parents	  invite	  into	  their	  homes	  through	  enrollment	  of	  their	  children	  in	  religious	  private	  schools	  is,	  however,	  received	  with	  mixed	  reviews.	  Although	  many	  parents	  self-­‐identify	  as	  lacking	  in	  religious	  knowledge,	  they	  do	  have	  opinions	  and	  preferences	  in	  appropriate	  religious	  behaviors	  or	  standards.	  While	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enrolling	  their	  children	  in	  an	  Islamic	  school	  instills	  in	  their	  children	  Islamic	  values	  and	  introduces	  them	  to	  “good	  habits”	  such	  as	  prayer	  and	  fasting,	  parents	  run	  the	  risk	  that	  their	  children	  will	  acquire	  religious	  perspectives,	  practices,	  and	  standards	  that	  conflict	  with	  their	  own.	  Some	  differences	  are	  welcomed	  and	  parents	  modify	  their	  behaviors	  and	  standards	  accordingly.	  Several	  parents	  contributed	  their	  own	  religious	  growth	  in	  part	  to	  the	  example	  and	  encouragement	  of	  their	  children.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  predominantly	  in	  homes	  of	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  students,	  some	  parents	  disagree	  with	  new	  attitudes	  and	  understandings	  children	  are	  taught	  at	  school.	  In	  these	  instances,	  parents	  re-­‐teach	  their	  children	  according	  to	  practices	  the	  parents	  follow.	  Most	  disagreements	  appear	  to	  center	  around	  concepts	  of	  male−female	  interactions,	  such	  as	  dating	  and	  female	  dress	  codes.	  Although	  there	  are	  disagreements,	  few	  parents	  fail	  to	  voice	  concern	  over	  the	  dissonance.	  With	  the	  home	  and	  the	  school	  presenting	  different	  religious	  practices,	  the	  students	  then	  must	  decide	  to	  which	  standard	  they	  will	  align	  themselves.	  Certainly	  it	  cannot	  be	  predicted	  whether	  loyalty	  for	  religious	  practices	  will	  align	  with	  the	  Islamic	  teachers	  or	  the	  parents.	  As	  JSIT	  students	  become	  adults	  themselves,	  it	  will	  be	  interesting	  to	  see	  how	  they	  resolve	  the	  dissonance	  in	  religious	  values	  between	  school	  and	  home.	  	  If	  students	  side	  with	  the	  ideology	  of	  their	  teachers—who	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  positions	  are	  established	  as	  trained	  in	  religion—rather	  than	  that	  of	  their	  parents—who	  generally	  feel	  inadequate	  in	  their	  personal	  religious	  development—the	  previous	  generation’s	  approach	  to	  Islam	  could	  be	  overshadowed	  by	  a	  newer	  approach.	  Given	  the	  middle-­‐	  and	  upper-­‐middle	  class	  clientele	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT,	  their	  graduates	  are	  very	  likely	  to	  become	  some	  of	  Indonesia’s	  future	  political	  leaders,	  social	  activists,	  academics	  and	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Conclusion	  	   	  	   At	  the	  intersection	  of	  Islamic	  movements,	  Islamic	  education,	  and	  the	  religious	  middle	  class,	  this	  dissertation	  examines	  two	  piety	  projects	  competing	  for	  control	  over	  popular	  conceptualizations	  of	  piety	  and	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  good	  Muslim	  in	  Indonesia.	  Through	  focused	  research	  at	  two	  primary	  school	  campuses	  of	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  and	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  in	  Jogja,	  this	  dissertation	  provides	  comparative	  examples	  of	  how	  these	  two	  schools	  accommodate,	  assimilate	  and	  reject	  various	  outside	  influences,	  such	  as	  Western	  science	  and	  transnational	  Islam,	  on	  the	  intellectual	  and	  religious	  development	  of	  their	  students.	  With	  parallel	  approaches	  to	  and	  emphasis	  on	  knowledge	  and	  piety,	  the	  schools	  aim	  for	  the	  development	  of	  both	  the	  heart	  and	  mind	  of	  their	  students.	  However,	  the	  schools’	  disparate	  conceptualizations	  of	  piety,	  which	  are	  representative	  of	  the	  larger	  polarizing	  trends	  in	  Islam,	  set	  the	  students	  on	  different	  trajectories	  in	  their	  development	  of	  religious	  and	  moral	  subjectivities.	  As	  such,	  this	  research	  shows	  how	  schooling	  can	  be	  a	  tool	  for	  shaping	  the	  socio-­‐religious,	  and	  political,	  climate	  of	  a	  community	  and	  country.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  Egypt	  (Herrera	  2000,	  2006;	  Starrett	  1998)	  and	  Malaysia	  (Kraince	  2009)	  where	  governments	  have	  attempted	  to	  marginalize	  private	  religious	  schools	  in	  efforts	  to	  manage	  the	  dissemination	  of	  religious	  education,	  Indonesia	  is	  experiencing	  growth	  and	  innovation	  in	  private	  Islamic	  schooling	  within	  the	  supportive	  structures	  of	  the	  government.	  As	  Islamization	  efforts	  in	  the	  current	  world-­‐wide	  revival	  of	  Islam	  shift	  from	  reformation	  of	  political	  structures	  to	  (re)formation	  of	  individuals’	  personal	  piety,	  new	  educational	  spaces	  have	  emerged	  (Adely	  &	  Starrett	  2011).	  New	  forms	  of	  formal	  and	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informal	  study	  groups,	  schools,	  and	  professional	  trainings	  have	  developed	  (Brenner	  1996;	  Deeb	  2006;	  Hefner	  2009;	  Hirschkind	  2009;	  Mahmood	  2005;	  Rudnyckyj	  2009).	  The	  emergence	  and	  rapid	  growth	  of	  Indonesia’s	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  school	  market	  is	  a	  prime	  example.	  	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT	  school	  groups	  have	  developed	  what	  I	  call	  an	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  schooling	  model.	  I	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  six	  main	  facets	  that	  distinguish	  these	  schools	  from	  Indonesia’s	  more	  common	  Islamic	  schooling	  models	  (i.e.	  pesantren,	  madrasas,	  and	  Muhammadiyah	  schools):	  1)	  relatively	  expensive	  tuition	  and	  fees;	  2)	  a	  Qur’an-­‐based	  epistemology	  that	  guides	  the	  integration	  of	  Islamic	  knowledge	  and	  general	  knowledge	  in	  all	  subjects;	  3)	  an	  expanded	  religion	  curriculum	  on	  top	  of	  the	  full	  national	  curriculum;	  4)	  the	  focus	  of	  religious	  curriculum	  on	  Islamic	  values	  and	  ethics	  rather	  than	  the	  more	  traditional	  subjects,	  such	  as	  fiqh	  (jurisprudence)	  or	  organization-­‐specific	  histories;	  5)	  an	  extended	  school	  day,	  releasing	  students	  one	  to	  three	  hours	  later	  than	  state	  general	  schools	  and	  other	  private	  Islamic	  day	  schools;	  and	  6)	  no	  association	  with	  a	  formal	  Islamic	  organizations	  (i.e.	  Muhammadiyah	  or	  NU).	  	  The	  schools’	  integrated	  Islam	  approach	  to	  knowledge	  combines	  some	  aspects	  of	  Western	  schooling	  (i.e.	  academic	  focus,	  the	  use	  of	  technology,	  sciences)	  with	  Islamic	  concepts	  and	  narratives,	  providing	  a	  “morally	  meaningful	  context”	  (Milligan	  2006:419)	  to	  the	  material.	  In	  addition	  to	  introducing	  Islamic	  practices	  within	  government	  school	  structures,	  such	  as	  group	  prayer	  or	  Islamic	  dress	  codes,	  as	  documented	  in	  places	  like	  Morocco	  (Boyle	  2004)	  and	  Egypt	  (Herrera	  2003)	  and	  Indonesia’s	  own	  Muhammadiyah	  schools,	  the	  Al	  Azhar	  and	  JSIT	  schools	  have	  also	  reframed	  national	  curriculum	  within	  an	  Islamic	  framework	  to	  create	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  knowledge	  between	  the	  divine	  and	  mundane.	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The	  key	  features	  (desegregation	  of	  secular	  and	  religious	  knowledge	  by	  presenting	  all	  class	  content	  in	  an	  Islamic	  framework,	  a	  Qur’an-­‐based	  epistemology,	  and	  development	  of	  a	  strong	  consciousness	  of	  God)	  of	  this	  ideology	  are	  intended	  to	  engender	  piety	  among	  students	  by	  instilling	  intellectual	  respect	  for	  God	  and	  indebtedness	  to	  God’s	  benevolence.	  These	  schools	  view	  piety	  as	  a	  crucial	  form	  of	  citizenship.	  Their	  divergent	  conceptualizations	  of	  piety	  are	  reflected	  in	  their	  students’	  religious	  and	  moral	  subjectivities.	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  promotes	  an	  Indonesian	  Islam,	  pluralistic	  and	  inclusive	  of	  multi-­‐tradition	  approaches	  to	  Islam	  that	  is	  flexible	  in	  regards	  to	  acceptable	  forms	  of	  worship.	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  students’	  conceptualizations	  of	  piety	  referenced	  nearly	  equally	  three	  themes,	  namely	  ibadah	  (rituals	  and	  acts	  of	  worship),	  obedience,	  and	  morals,	  and	  also	  included	  some	  mention	  of	  belief	  and	  faith.	  Their	  responses	  included	  both	  specific	  actions	  and	  abstract	  concepts	  to	  describe	  a	  good	  Muslim.	  Categorized	  differently,	  the	  answers	  were	  one-­‐quarter	  outward	  performance,	  two-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	  quarters	  inner	  character,	  and	  one	  slice	  miscellaneous	  items.	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  students’	  inclusion	  of	  abstract	  concepts	  in	  what	  constitutes	  a	  good	  Muslim	  correlated	  with	  greater	  moral	  flexibility,	  but	  also	  ambiguity	  in	  defining	  what	  is	  acceptable	  moral	  behavior.	  Students	  demonstrated	  greater	  tolerance	  towards	  deviant	  Islamic	  behavior,	  specifically	  of	  a	  woman	  not	  veiling	  in	  public.	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  promotes	  a	  transnational	  Islam	  that	  pushes	  for	  the	  removal	  of	  local	  customs	  and	  traditions	  from	  mainstream	  Islam	  and	  advocates	  for	  disciplined,	  exacting	  observance	  of	  standardized	  practices.	  This	  purificationist	  approach	  is	  inspired	  by	  the	  Egyptian	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  and	  linked	  to	  the	  Islamic	  political	  party	  the	  Prosperous	  Justice	  Party	  (Partai	  Keadilan	  Sejatera,	  PKS).	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  students’	  conceptualizations	  of	  piety	  were	  dominated	  by	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  answers	  focused	  on	  ibadah,	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with	  obedience	  and	  moral	  behavior	  each	  nearly	  a	  fifth	  of	  the	  responses.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  answers	  were	  three-­‐fifths	  outward	  performance,	  two-­‐fifths	  inner	  character,	  and	  a	  fraction	  miscellaneous	  items.	  Students	  showed	  greater	  certainly	  in	  defining	  acceptable	  moral	  behavior	  and	  less	  tolerance	  for	  deviant	  Islamic	  behavior,	  specifically	  of	  a	  woman	  not	  veiling	  in	  public.	  The	  inclusion	  of	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  in	  this	  dissertation	  provides	  a	  rare	  investigation	  of	  the	  transnational	  influence	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  on	  Islamic	  schooling	  through	  the	  Tarbiyah	  Movement,	  institutionalized	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  Islamic	  political	  party	  PKS.	  The	  significant	  emphasis	  al-­‐Banna	  put	  on	  education	  is	  usually	  overshadowed	  in	  the	  press	  and	  scholarly	  research	  by	  the	  political	  nature	  of	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  groups.	  The	  importance	  of	  education	  and	  its	  power	  to	  effect	  social,	  and	  ultimately	  political,	  change	  was	  not	  lost	  on	  the	  Tarbiyah	  Movement-­‐cum-­‐PKS	  leadership	  (Hasan	  2009,	  Machmudi	  2006).	  In	  accordance	  with	  Indonesian	  law,	  PKS	  does	  not	  directly	  sponsor	  or	  finance	  JSIT	  and	  its	  member	  schools;	  however,	  PKS	  cadre	  members	  established	  and	  manage	  JSIT	  headquarters	  and	  most	  JSIT	  member	  schools.	  JSIT	  schools	  teach	  principles	  and	  promote	  religious	  subjectivities	  of	  the	  Tarbiyah	  Movement.	  	  As	  the	  political	  party	  addresses	  legal	  structures,	  the	  JSIT	  schools	  focus	  on	  cultural	  and	  social	  aspects	  of	  society.	  In	  some	  ways,	  the	  schools	  are	  better	  able	  to	  promote	  a	  truer	  form	  of	  the	  Tarbiyah	  Movement’s	  vision	  of	  Islam	  than	  PKS,	  as	  the	  schools	  are	  not	  beholden	  to	  the	  ever-­‐shifting	  political	  milieu.	  Since	  the	  schools	  are	  popular	  for	  both	  ideological	  and	  practical	  reasons	  among	  parents,	  some	  differences	  in	  approaches	  to	  Islam	  between	  school	  and	  home	  rarely	  outweigh	  the	  academic	  and	  logistical	  benefits	  the	  schools	  provide	  parents	  (Chudleigh	  2011).	  The	  potential	  political	  influence	  of	  JSIT	  schools	  is	  significant.	  Although	  I	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did	  not	  observe	  direct	  promotion	  of	  the	  party,	  the	  schools	  teach	  affinities	  for	  and	  religious	  subjectivities	  that	  align	  with	  PKS	  values.	  This	  could	  be	  very	  advantageous	  in	  the	  future	  when	  students	  are	  of	  voting	  age.	  The	  students’	  conviction	  in,	  or	  at	  least	  affinity	  for,	  the	  party’s	  Islamic	  culture	  and	  values	  could	  engender	  support	  for	  PKS	  during	  elections.	  	  While	  the	  school	  groups	  are	  engaged	  in	  piety	  projects	  at	  the	  institutional	  level,	  another	  set	  of	  mini	  piety	  projects	  are	  being	  waged	  at	  the	  familial	  level.	  Parents	  enroll	  their	  children	  in	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  and	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  to	  facilitate	  their	  own	  piety	  projects	  aimed	  at	  their	  children.	  Middle	  class	  parents’	  classed	  aspirations	  and	  anxieties	  regarding	  education,	  wealth,	  morality,	  and	  corruption	  create	  demand	  for	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  Islamic	  school:	  one	  that	  provides	  a	  longer	  school	  day,	  strong	  academics,	  and	  a	  robust	  religious	  curriculum	  focused	  on	  Islamic	  morals	  and	  values.	  	  Adding	  to	  the	  paucity	  of	  literature	  on	  middle	  class,	  religion,	  and	  education	  in	  Indonesia,	  this	  research	  initiates	  discussions	  on	  how	  classed	  subjectivities	  influence	  Islamic	  schooling	  in	  urban	  Indonesia.	  The	  relatively	  high	  tuition	  and	  fees	  of	  these	  schools	  make	  them	  unaffordable	  for	  lower	  classes,	  the	  populations	  typically	  served	  by	  Islamic	  schools.	  Many	  scholars	  argue	  that	  the	  rise	  of	  Islamic	  piety	  in	  Indonesia	  has	  been	  a	  fundamentally	  middle-­‐class	  phenomenon	  (Brenner	  1996;	  Hefner	  2000;	  Smith-­‐Hefner	  2007;	  as	  cited	  by	  Jones	  2012:159).	  Jones	  (2012)	  argues	  that	  the	  rise	  in	  public	  forms	  of	  Islamic	  piety	  is	  a	  partial	  solution	  to	  public	  anxieties	  about	  corruption.	  I	  have	  shown,	  more	  specifically,	  that	  the	  rise	  in	  Islamic	  schooling	  among	  the	  middle	  classes	  is	  due	  in	  part	  to	  parental	  expectations	  that	  Islamic	  schooling	  will	  safeguard	  children	  against	  moral	  corruption.	  No	  less	  important,	  however,	  is	  that	  Al	  Azhar	  31	  and	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  meet	  two	  fundamental	  preconditions:	  first,	  the	  schools	  offer	  quality	  education;	  and	  secondly,	  the	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type	  of	  education	  and	  credentials	  offered	  are	  similar	  to	  those	  of	  the	  public	  schools	  (Khan	  2012).	  The	  quality	  of	  the	  schools’	  academic	  programs	  provides	  the	  educational	  foundation	  for	  future	  education	  and	  training	  that	  students	  need	  in	  order	  to	  be	  successful	  professionals,	  and	  thus	  maintain	  middle-­‐class	  status.	  	  Through	  their	  patronage,	  parents	  are	  the	  (at	  times	  unsuspecting)	  accomplices	  in	  the	  institutional	  battle	  between	  the	  competing	  piety	  projects.	  As	  many	  parents	  did	  not	  grow	  up	  religious,	  they	  have	  no	  allegiance	  to	  a	  particular	  group,	  such	  as	  NU	  or	  Muhammadiyah,	  and	  are	  therefore	  open	  to	  schools	  independent	  to	  those	  organizations.	  Additionally,	  many	  parents	  are	  in	  the	  process	  of	  solidifying	  and	  defining	  their	  own	  set	  of	  beliefs	  and	  practices,	  and	  therefore	  less	  concerned	  about	  specific	  practices	  than	  general	  development	  of	  Islamic	  character.	  More	  pragmatically,	  family	  constraints	  often	  limit	  schooling	  options	  and	  drive	  school	  selection.	  Although	  mismatches	  of	  beliefs	  between	  the	  schools	  and	  the	  parents	  surfaced,	  particularly	  with	  JSIT	  families,	  there	  was	  enough	  overlap	  in	  educational	  and	  religious	  agendas	  to	  sustain	  parental	  patronage,	  and	  therefore	  to	  continue	  the	  shaping	  of	  student	  subjectivities	  around	  a	  particular	  approach	  to	  piety.	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  students	  will	  develop	  Islamic	  character	  that	  aligns	  with	  the	  schools’	  and/or	  parents’	  visions	  of	  a	  good	  Muslim.	  As	  McLeod	  (2000)	  argues,	  habitus	  and	  subjectivities	  develop	  over	  time.	  Parents	  who	  were	  keen	  on	  robust	  religious	  training	  of	  their	  children	  during	  the	  early	  years	  to	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  solid	  Islamic	  character	  tended	  to	  be	  less	  interested	  in	  similar	  religious	  training	  at	  the	  secondary	  schooling	  level	  if	  academic	  training	  had	  to	  be	  compromised.	  Many	  students,	  particularly	  from	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT,	  expected	  and	  looked	  forward	  to	  leaving	  the	  extended-­‐day	  Islamic	  school	  to	  enter	  state	  secondary	  schools.	  Although	  Adely	  (2012)	  demonstrates	  that	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in	  Jordan	  religious	  subjectivities	  are	  developed	  in	  non-­‐religious	  state	  schools,	  it	  is	  unpredictable	  what	  shape	  student	  subjectivities	  will	  take	  as	  students	  move	  from	  an	  overtly	  Islamic	  schooling	  experience	  to	  a	  schooling	  environment	  where	  religion	  is	  curricularly	  segregated	  from	  academic	  studies.	  	  While	  there	  is	  obviously	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  the	  Indonesian	  way,	  there	  are	  Indonesian	  ways	  of	  doing	  things;	  or	  rather,	  the	  familiar	  ways	  of	  doing	  politics,	  approaching	  religion,	  and	  living	  amongst	  a	  plurality	  of	  religious	  traditions.	  It	  is	  well	  known	  in	  the	  field	  of	  anthropology	  that	  culture	  is	  not	  stagnant,	  but	  rather	  always	  shifting	  and	  changing.	  Brenner	  (1996)	  demonstrates	  this	  in	  the	  increased	  practice	  of	  veiling	  among	  Indonesian	  women.	  In	  the	  1980s,	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  most	  recent	  revival	  of	  Islam,	  very	  few	  Muslim	  women	  veiled.	  Veiling	  was	  not	  considered	  an	  Indonesian	  custom,	  but	  rather	  an	  Arab	  one.	  Fast	  forward	  20-­‐plus	  years,	  and	  one	  sees	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  Muslim	  women	  veiling	  throughout	  the	  archipelago.	  Within	  veiling	  practices,	  there	  are	  Indonesian	  and	  non-­‐Indonesian	  approaches.	  Interestingly,	  the	  veiling	  habits	  of	  female	  PKS	  activists	  are	  considered	  non-­‐Indonesian.	  One	  of	  my	  NU-­‐educated	  research	  assistants	  exclaimed,	  in	  partial	  objection,	  one	  day	  after	  returning	  from	  the	  Luqman	  al	  Hakim	  SIT	  campus,	  “That	  is	  not	  Indonesian!”	  She	  was	  referencing	  the	  wearing	  of	  long	  pants	  underneath	  long	  skirts	  and	  tight	  sleeves	  down	  to	  the	  wrist	  underneath	  loose	  tunics	  to	  prevent	  accidental	  exposure	  of	  the	  ankles	  and	  calves	  or	  wrists	  and	  forearms.	  Although	  my	  research	  assistant	  may	  not	  have	  felt	  it	  was	  Indonesian,	  the	  headscarf	  she	  was	  wearing,	  although	  small	  and	  colorful,	  would	  not	  have	  been	  considered	  Indonesian	  a	  few	  decades	  earlier.	  The	  current	  piety	  projects	  are	  at	  battle;	  it	  is	  too	  early	  yet	  to	  tell	  which	  if	  either	  will	  retain	  or	  gain	  hegemonic	  control	  over	  how	  Indonesians	  will	  conceptualize	  piety	  and	  what	  a	  good	  Muslim	  will	  look	  like.	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